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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between perceptions and experiences of corruption 
within local government entities (councils) in New South Wales (NSW) from a social 
policy perspective.  The literature on corruption and anti-corruption has evolved 
exponentially in the past three decades, with much focus on how to define, measure and 
regulate this complex phenomenon.  Yet, limited attention has been paid to corruption 
within the administration of local government, where day-to-day services affect the lives 
of all residents within Australia’s most populous state.  The thesis shows how local 
council practices, cultures and structures impact on the visibility and subsequent 
management of corruption in its different guises.  While some forms of corruption are 
outwardly visible, others take place in plain sight, but are very much hidden. 
This research took the form of a mixed methods study undertaken between 2015 and 
2016.  Through synthesisation of data gleaned from an attitudinal survey completed by 
frontline workers across ten different council entities in NSW, and from semi-structured 
interviews held with a small sample of individuals who have experience and expertise in 
governing corruption, the research identified divergences between perceptions and 
experiences of, and regulatory responses to, corruption.  It highlighted the ambivalent 
outcomes of corruption management strategies, both in terms of their comparative 
successes and unintended consequences.  The research identified that the discourse of 
corruption is largely informed and mediated by external influencers, such as the NSW 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and tabloid media, the former 
focusing on the investigation and exposure of high-profile matters, and the latter 
representing such examples in sensationalised ways.  This has created something of a 
disconnect between how corruption is popularly understood (in terms of what it is and 
is not) and how it is then situationally encountered and interpreted in the workplace.  
When first-hand experiences of corrupt practices were explored with participants, it 
was revealed that certain lower threshold practices (termed as ‘mundane corruption’) 
have been frequently observed.  Such practices have become institutionalised as normal, 
in spite of the different modes of regulatory management that are deemed to be 
effective, and a broad view that the level of corruption in local government is low.  Many 
suspicions of corruption have not been raised or pursued.  Of those that have, many have 
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been met with an inadequate or unconvincing response, attributed to the organisational 
architecture and culture, and perceptions that certain corrupt practices must breach a 
given threshold of severity to be reportable and then actioned.   
Overall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to corruption studies by showing 
how popular, if reductionist, frameworks of corruption, shaped by key institutions in 
society, mediate everyday perceptions, understandings and practices of corruption.  
These frameworks can, and do, affect the prevention and management of this complex 
social activity.   
A more holistic approach to understanding organisational corruption is recommended 
across the domains of research, education, regulation and policy, so that optimal 
strategies of prevention and management can be co-designed and co-delivered. 
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In defining my approach and role in relation to the topic explored within this thesis,  
I might be, to borrow Edgar Schein’s terminology, something of a scholar-practitioner 
(Wasserman & Kram, 2009, p. 12).  Tenkasi and Hay (2008, p. 49) define scholar-
practitioners as ‘actors who have one foot each in the worlds of academia and practice 
and are pointedly interested in advancing the causes of both theory and practice’.  
Before I immigrated to Australia, my work within avenues of fraud prevention, 
education and investigation spanned different sectors in the United Kingdom (UK), and 
this influenced my fascination with, and desire to find out more about, why fraud and 
corruption continue to manifest.  The more I have researched these concepts 
academically, and seen, as well better understood, how and why they thrive within 
different sectors and organisations, the more I continue to realise that there is so much 
more to learn about why this is.   
When I arrived in Australia in 2012, my intellectual interest was piqued when I 
commenced full-time employment as an Internal Ombudsman within the then 
Warringah Council, situated in the northern beaches region of Sydney, prior to its 
merging with Pittwater Council and Manly Council in May 2016 to form Northern 
Beaches Council.  Despite my work experience in different UK settings, this was my first 
experience within a local government environment, and it transpired to be an 
inspirational milieu for the study that forms the basis of this thesis.  As a practitioner at 
the coalface of a metropolitan council, I quickly came to grasp how matters of 
misconduct might, or might not, be construed or interpreted as corrupt conduct in situ.  
Different investigative pursuits involving corruption, publicised through media and 
council communication channels, had clearly heightened council workers’ awareness of 
corruption; yet, they did not seem to engage with the concept or practice, from an 
empirical and regulatory perspective.  I was not convinced that the concept of 
corruption, as it was reported on by the media and discussed in select academic 
publications, aligned with the perceptions and experiences of employees who might 
encounter its incidence on the frontline of local government.  These might include 
employees, as well as senior officials, who might have a responsibility to educate on 
anti-corruption strategies and regulate or govern practices of corruption.  From an 
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ethnographic position, the two concepts seemed incongruent; there appeared to be a 
disconnect between practices that might be considered ‘corrupt’ under the relevant 
jurisdictional definition and the exceptional examples of corruption that dominated 
popular news.   
This realisation inspired me to explore distinctions between the perception of 
corruption and its multifarious realities.  I was keen to explore the meanings of 
corruption, both formal and informal, in the context of organisational structure, culture 
and practice.  I was also interested in exploring the interpretations of corruption and its 
associated characteristics, informed by third-party publications – such as academic 
literature, measurement indices and stories about corruption in local government – but 
also by those who encounter or experience its everydayness in the course of their work. 
I am now able to present a thesis which delves into these various aspects.  I have had the 
privilege of presenting many of the findings at various Australian conferences and 
symposiums during the course of this doctoral program, but it has been an equally 
rewarding experience to have had the opportunity to apply them to the different 
workplace endeavours that I have been involved with.  Following my tenure at 
Warringah/Northern Beaches Council, I have worked within, or consulted to, a range of 
councils within New South Wales, as well as a state government department and now 
within the corporate setting.  These experiences have afforded me with opportunities to 
apply much of the knowledge that I have acquired during the course of this doctoral 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Most anti-corruption efforts are bound to fail unless we can find more effective ways of 
unpacking the problem we are seeking to address. (Heywood, 2017, p. 28)   
1.1 Introducing the thesis 
This thesis explores how occupational corruption is perceived, interpreted and managed 
within local government in New South Wales (NSW), Australia.  It finds that corruption 
in local government is infrequently recognised and rarely reported.  On the occasion that 
corruption is identified and subsequently reported, any response is lacking or is 
inadequate.  Local government is studied here as it is the closest level of government to 
the people, with inherent opportunities for corruption to arise through daily operational 
activities.  This thesis highlights and unravels the complexities associated with 
corruption, by exploring council workers’ perceptions, insights and experiences, as well 
as the accounts of those tasked with investigating and managing corruption in local 
government.  It accentuates the contradictions and tensions that are inherently 
entwined within the organisational culture of many councils, highlighting how different 
forces impact on the in/visibility of corruption and strategies designed to manage its 
incidence.   
The topic of corruption is one of great interest and importance.  In recent years, it has 
been discussed more frequently than the economy, unemployment or poverty 
(GlobeScan, 2011), and is considered to be a ‘defining issue of the 21st century’ 
(Fukuyama, 2017).  Despite this degree of interest, corruption is by no means a new 
phenomenon, and this thesis explores how it is subject to misunderstanding, popularly, 
academically, but especially organisationally.  The term has existed since the beginning 
of time (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p. 3), yet only in the last three decades has the study 
of corruption gained pace (Bjørnskov, 2011, p. 135; Kuris, 2015, p. 126; Wedel, 2012, 
p. 453), primarily through the lens of its impact on economic growth (Heywood, 2017, 
p. 23) but also because it has increasingly become newsworthy and an object of public 
interest.  From a causation perspective, it is notable that, during this time, multifarious 
examples of the damaging effects of corruption have been cited by eminent scholars; 
specifically, it is asserted that: corruption in public service undermines ‘the legitimacy 
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and effectiveness of government’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 9) and the meritorious and 
egalitarian principles of economic distribution (Smith, 2010, p. 449); corruption deters 
investment (Graycar & Smith, 2011, p. 3), especially in core services such as education 
and health (Transparency International, 2015, p. 7); corruption causes injustice and 
affects quality of life, as well as adding to business costs and competition (Lee, 2006, 
p. 221).  Even petty bribery, as a form of corrupt conduct, has the ability to erode public 
trust and institutional legitimacy (Dix et al., 2012, p. 36).   
Corruption, as a broad concept, has been referred to as one of the ‘greatest challenges 
societies face’ (Maduna, 1999, cited by Johnson & Sharma, 2004, p. 1).  In 2013, just 
before the commencement of this research project, corruption was estimated to cost 5% 
or US$2.6 trillion of global gross domestic product (GDP) (World Economic Forum, 
2012).  If this sum is correct, the cost of corruption sits just outside each of the top five 
countries’ respective contributions to global GDP (howmuch.net, 2017).  On the basis of 
such accounts, corruption appears to be a ubiquitous phenomenon without jurisdiction.  
And yet, despite being referred to as a single concept, corruption has different cultural 
manifestations and meanings as a consequence of its situatedness; thus, who or what is 
doing the defining or measuring of corruption is as important to examine as the social 
contexts in which the practices materialise.  
Despite the growth of academic research on corruption, there is uncertainty as to 
whether such research has a direct impact on reducing corruption (Heywood, 2017, 
p. 21).  Hence, one might wonder what the implications are of this increase in 
exploration.  The aforementioned statements about its purported enormity and cost to 
society do little to assist practitioners and policymakers in their efforts to map its 
various forms, reduce its incidence or degree of risk, or to unravel its complexities so 
that apposite solutions might be designed and delivered.  Do such claims have an 
empirical foundation or are they hyperbole: amplifications that reveal deep societal 
misunderstandings of this phenomenon and therefore generate excessive agitation?  
Although corruption is deemed to be ‘a complex, dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon 
that can take a variety of forms’ (DFID, 2015, p. 80), it is often cited as a catch-all term 
for a number of individual practices.  Such references rarely unpack the component 
parts of corruption or explore the array of economic, political, historical and socio-
cultural factors that mediate and contribute to its prevalence. 
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The local government sector in NSW provides an apt case study, as it is the milieu most 
frequently complained about by members of the public to the state’s anti-corruption 
agency (ACA), the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (ICAC NSW, 
2016, p. 17).  ICAC was created in 1989 ‘in response to growing community concern 
about the integrity of public administration in NSW’ (ICAC NSW, 2014b) and was the 
first ACA to be established in Australia.  Yet, despite the majority of complaints about 
local government made to ICAC being by members of the public, the 152 councils that 
serviced a population of approximately 7.7 million residents (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017c) made just 120 reports to ICAC in 2015–16 (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20).  It 
would seem that many councils either purposefully or inadvertently omitted to report 
any suspected form of corrupt activity to ICAC, despite a statutory obligation to do so 
(ICAC NSW, n.d.).  Noting that council officials are well placed to identify and respond to 
the risk and reality of corruption, as a consequence of their proximity to and 
engagement in everyday operations, this sum of just 120 reports indicates that much 
suspected corruption is failing to come to external attention and investigation; it is a 
significantly minuscule number given that there are more than 54,000 local government 
employees in NSW (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a).  Given the purported degree 
of corruption in public and professional life, especially as captured in economic 
portrayals and calculations, very little research focus has been paid to the peculiar lack 
of reportage and equally curious dearth of investigatory responses.  This thesis 
therefore examines why corruption is failing to come to light in ways one might expect, 
by exploring and detailing the various factors which explain this lack of reporting and 
consequent visibility.  At the present time, the chronic under-reporting of corruption 
appears to fall under public notice without any degree of scrutiny, and remains 
significantly under-researched.   
In spite of the increased interest in corruption during the preceding three decades, and 
the fact that ICAC has existed in NSW for almost that length of time, the study of 
corruption at the local government level is relatively marginal (Masters & Graycar, 2016, 
p. 46).  Previous research has addressed corruption from a multitude of perspectives 
and has proposed conceptual models germane to particular academic disciplines 
(Jancsics, 2014, p. 358).  However, few studies explicate the rich nuances associated 
with the notion of corruption at the grassroots of Australian local government.  Salient 
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distinctions exist between corruption in poor countries and rich countries such as 
Australia (Graycar & Monaghan, 2015), yet influential measurement indices, such as 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), tend to focus on 
cross-country comparisons (Transparency International, 2013b).  These could be 
construed as objective indices, with limited or conveyed elucidation of geographical, 
cultural and historical contexts.  The CPI, in particular, attracts public interest 
(Davidson, 2013), yet it fails to unravel multifarious factors such as geopolitical situation 
or religiosity (Dreher et al., 2007, p. 448), differing and situated definitions (Kurer, 
2015; Philp, 2009), or cultural divergences and practices (Larmour, 2008).  As an 
example, cultural divergences compound ambiguities between corruption and practices 
associated with gift-giving (Graycar & Jancsics, 2017), a specific facet that is viably 
contextualised within the multicultural context of Australia, and NSW in particular, 
which is home to a third of the nation’s population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2017c).  The correlation between gift-giving, culture and corruption is discussed further 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1). 
It seems logical that the meanings that citizens attach to corruption are significant in 
terms of understanding the complex nature of corruption.  This thesis explores these 
subjective meanings as they circulate and mediate the frontline of local government, 
canvassing the perceptions and interpretations of employees in local government who 
might observe the risks and realities of corruption during the course of their 
employment.  Accordingly, this thesis is not focused on why the interest in corruption 
has transpired and grown in the last three decades, nor on contributing explicitly to any 
debate about how corruption should or should not be defined.  Of course, these issues 
feature heavily in the current scholarly discourse on corruption, as explored in 
Chapter 2, and are influential in terms of how practitioners and policymakers 
conceptualise and approach corruption management within their respective 
jurisdictions.  Instead, this thesis seeks to invert this dominant approach, by coming to a 
grounded understanding of corruption from the inside out: to understand what 
corruption means to those whose occupational role brings them into close proximity 
with anti/corruption discourses and practices, and to those who may encounter or 
experience its manifestations in the weave of their everyday doings, both as participants 
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and witnesses; and to explore the extent of any deviations and tensions that may exist 
within the diverse local government sector of NSW.   
Blumer’s (2007, pp. 68-69) theory of symbolic interactionism is relevant in this regard, 
being a direct examination of group dynamics, meanings and conduct, contending that if 
the scholar ‘wishes to understand the action of people it is necessary for him to see their 
objects as they see them’.  Building on this, Blumer (2007, p. 69) argues that ‘people act 
toward things on the basis of the meaning that these things have for them, not on the 
basis of the meaning that these things have for the outside scholar’.  Blumer’s theory is 
salient to this thesis, which is original in its exploration of the rich nuances associated 
with corruption, as seen through the lens of those who work at the frontline, this being a 
focus which has been sparsely explored to date.  As such, the thesis seeks to contribute 
to public and policy understandings of local government corruption by grounding this 
concept, phenomenon and practice within everyday meanings and workplace cultures. 
On this basis, it is worth outlining the broad landscape of local government within NSW, 
Australia’s most populous state.  This context significantly shaped the approach taken in 
the study and the research methods that were employed, particularly when determining 
how best to elicit views from public officials in local government. 
1.1.1 Local government in NSW 
Australia comprises three tiers of government: federal government, state or territory 
government, and local government.  State and territory governments define the powers 
of local government, or local councils as they may also be referred to, and their 
geographical boundaries (Australian Government, 2014).  At the commencement of this 
research project, the local government sector in NSW comprised 152 councils, some of 
which were amalgamated in 2016, resulting in a reduced number of council entities 
(N=128) (NSW Government, 2017b).  While amalgamation is a novel development in the 
state of NSW, the Australian states of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania have 
previously experienced similar modalities of local government reform with the main 
rationale being economies of scale (Baker, 2003, pp. 119-120; May, 2003, pp. 89-96).  
Key to these changes was the erasure of boundaries between former local government 
areas (LGAs), which are defined by the NSW state government (Australian Government, 
2014), but also the merging of staff, constituents, elected officials, and cultural and 
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occupational models of practice.  It could be argued that this process amplified the 
timeliness of this study.  During any period of organisational change or restructuring, 
where there is a period of administrative disruption and messiness, corruption has the 
potential to metastasise through the emergence of weaknesses in the existing 
governance of controls which might have previously limited or governed opportunities 
for corruption (ICAC NSW, 2017c, pp. 7-8).   
It is pertinent to note that, in addition to the sector’s fragmented, heterogeneous 
composition, local governments are quite unique in the way they operate (Dollery et al., 
2003, pp. 3-4).  Each council is comprised of a pool of democratically elected members, 
but the day-to-day operations and administrative functions fall to each council’s general 
manager (GM), or chief executive officer (CEO), to perform.  As such, there were 152 
GMs in NSW local government at the commencement of this study, with each council 
governed by an elected body.   
Many well-regarded countries today have been the focus of political corruption at one 
stage or another (Johnston, 2012, pp. 60-61).  Yet, while there have been examples of 
corrupt conduct committed by elected representatives in NSW (e.g., ICAC NSW, 2014d), 
the democratic election process provides opposition leaders with the opportunity to 
expose corrupt incumbents (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 142).  Consequently, public 
‘visibility’ of corruption in the Australian local government context is often spotlighted 
on the elected officials, rendering public opinion with a perception that the local 
government is a ‘hotbed of corruption’ (Solomons, 2018).  Sensationalistic notions such 
as this do little to assist practitioners, policymakers and scholars develop their 
understanding about this broadly referred to, but situationally diverse and popularly 
misunderstood, phenomenon, that is categorised as corruption.  
Council members are democratically elected to civic office; while their actions are 
somewhat visible and accountable, the day-to-day administration predominantly takes 
place out of public view.  This thesis explores the occupational and administrative 
workings that ensue behind the veneer of the elected domain and the high-profile 
political matters that stimulate public interest.  It focuses on the administrative and 
operational aspects of local government, which are far less observable to the collective 
population.  It is here that less exceptional practices of corruption, which are less 
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newsworthy and of lower priority for regulatory attention, are potentially interwoven 
within the administrative tapestry of a sector that is for the most part self-governing.   
In this regard, each council inter alia: collects rates and manages its own finances; makes 
procurement and personnel decisions, including the hiring of subcontractors; collects 
fines; and applies discretionary judgement to applications.  Within dispersed 
operational environments such as these, corrupt practices may feasibly be less 
discernible, manifesting as low-level transgressions and conceived by the majority to be 
unexceptional or ‘mundane’.  Such practices would be vastly dissimilar to the more 
sensationalised and exceptional examples that inform public opinion, but equally might 
be concealed within the routineness and ordinariness of public administration.  The 
premise behind this argument is formulated on the basis that, if a mere 120 reports are 
made to ICAC by 152 councils in NSW, one might surmise that many councils are: not 
experiencing any form of corrupt conduct; dealing with the risk and reality of its 
occurrence in a different way; omitting to notify ICAC out of concern for organisational 
reputation or ensuing investigatory disruptions, or because the activity is not adjudged 
to merit investigation; or the conduct is not designated as corrupt, but is instead 
enmeshed within the everyday machinery of council operations.   
In terms of how corruption is conceptualised and explored within this thesis, it is 
pertinent to note key definitions of corruption that exist in the literature when seeking 
to formulate a baseline on what corruption is, and how it may be researched, 
understood and governed.   
1.1.2 The nature and concept of corruption 
In terms of dominant definitions of corruption, Transparency International’s simplistic 
interpretation, ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Transparency 
International, 2018; Treisman, 2000, p. 399), is notably influential.  While there are well 
documented problems associated with this definitional phrasing, which are discussed 
further in Chapter 2, this framing and meaning of corruption has arguably influenced the 
everyday discourse on corruption, especially in the last three decades of increasing 
international interest (Sampson, 2010, p. 262).  In terms of how corrupt conduct is 
designated more locally within NSW local government, the legislative framework has 
important leverage, bearing down on how corruption is defined, understood and 
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regulated.  ICAC’s legislative decree is cogent in this regard.  The Independent 
Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) (ICAC Act) offers a definition of corrupt 
conduct and places a number of accountabilities on local government, as well as on other 
public authorities in the state of NSW.  
Underpinning the theoretical base of this thesis, it is pertinent to note that the 
application of any definition is an inherently subjective and contingent social process 
(Rose, 2018, p. 229).  This is relevant in the study on corruption, as a variance in 
understanding exists between those who see corruption as a structural principal–agent 
problem and those who see it as an offshoot of political and economic systems and 
processes (Heywood, 2017, pp. 22-25); in other words, a societal problem.  The more 
traditional idea of corruption as a societal problem differs broadly from the notion of 
corruption as a principal–agent problem, and is thought to be rare in contemporary 
references to corruption (Holmes, 2015, p. 1).  From a societal perspective, corruption is 
assumed to be an ‘infection of the body politic’ (Hindess, 2012, p. 5), a symptom of social 
dysfunction rather than an individual pathology.  Conversely, the doctrine of the 
principal–agent model assumes that corruption is committed by the agent and that 
corruption control rests with the principal (Groenendijk, 1997, p. 207).  This model 
tends to focus on corrupt practices and individuals: a degree of quid pro quo, being a 
favour or advantage granted in return for something, on the part of the agent.  The 
principal–agent model assumes that a ‘benevolent and ethical principal’ has a vested 
interest in tackling corruption, but a fundamental critique of this model notes it is ‘quite 
rare that systemically corrupt societies produce such leaders’ (Rothstein, 2017a, p. 14).  
As argued by Andvig and colleagues (2000, p. 117), ‘the political and administrative 
leaders may themselves be corrupt’.  In this case, if the principal is corrupt or complicit, 
the model is limited in its ability to control corruption (Persson et al., 2012, p. 452) and 
anti-corruption measures would be futile in a council that is already inherently corrupt 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2015, p. 88).  
The consideration for this thesis, and one that compounded difficulties for conducting 
research of this nature, is that those within the system of administration may not 
comprehend that their actions, or those of their colleagues’, are or would be considered 
by an outsider to be corrupt (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, p. 143).  This point is crucial to 
the research: while corrupt behaviour might be thought of as individualistic, its 
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institutional context means that it is often not perceived as such by those who work 
within the system (MacLennan, 2005, p. 165).  Contemporary references might tend to 
focus on specific practices that fall within the regulatory purview of the ICAC Act, in 
which punishment is individually ascribed.  However, it is not clear whether such 
practices are disentangled from the organisational and cultural context of local 
government.  Compounding this, if everyday practices are not deemed to be in the same 
league as the types of ‘corruption’ that dominate public opinion, this potentially informs 
the organisational discourse and allows them to be normalised or routinely disregarded.   
This scholarly debate intrinsically informs the position of this thesis and the rationale 
behind the methodological approach utilised: the empirical examination of corruption in 
local government by those who might encounter its mundane forms and those who have 
a role in managing it.  Neither model is favoured within this thesis, but it seems 
pertinent to accede that any notion of corruption that is restricted to being a societal 
problem appears amorphous and difficult to disentangle.  In this regard, Groenendijk’s 
(1997, p. 207) view is a noteworthy one, that ‘although corruption is generally analysed 
as a social phenomenon … it is from the decision of individuals that corruption stems’.  
Corruption may be the outcome of structured activity that has been institutionalised 
over time, but corrupt practices may manifest from sporadic or routine actions and 
behaviours, committed by individuals who do or do not see wrongfulness in their 
actions.  This thesis, therefore, seeks to review corruption as a broad concept, but also to 
unpack its component parts so that its complexities can be examined systematically and 
responded to in nuanced ways.  Given this, approaching the research project with a 
single, unifying question did not seem to be the best means to achieve the research 
objectives, and was considered to be potentially limited.  This served as a basis for why a 
more explorative and inductive approach was undertaken. Moreover, because of the 
multi-method and iterative character of the primary research, I embraced a holistic and   
situational and participant-driven framework for binding the main thesis around.  
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis explores and attempts to explain how occupational corruption is perceived, 
interpreted and managed within the appointed and administrative purview of NSW local 
government.  In this regard, it addresses four sub-questions:  
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1. How do local government employees understand the nature and prevalence 
of corruption in local government?  
2. What perceptions and experiences do employees have of corruption and 
what explanations do they provide for its existence and management within 
local government? 
3. How does the organisational arrangement and culture of councils either 
facilitate or hinder the incidence of corruption? 
4. How do councils recognise and respond to the risk and reality of 
corruption? 
1.3 The study 
Recognising the inherently negative connotations of the term ‘corruption’ (Mulgan, 
2012, p. 25), a key challenge of this research project was how best to operationalise the 
study of corruption, as a nuanced, subjective experience, and to elicit candid views from 
appointed officials in a way that would be credible and enhance validity.  To expand on 
observations by Rothstein and Torsello (2014, p. 264), key challenges were envisaged in 
exploring a contentious and contested topic that is not only subjective in nature, but 
arguably sensitive in the organisational realm.  This is amplified when one is seeking to 
explore first-hand encounters with corruption, as well as perceptions and perspectives 
on the effectiveness or otherwise of organisational responses.  
Accordingly, the research employed a mixed methods approach to data capture and 
analysis, to elicit insights from workers and practitioners that might not be sufficiently 
probed and explained by the use of one research method alone.  Through integration of 
results based on two divergent approaches – one attitudinal in scope, the other more 
about intersubjective and biographical experience – the research explored the views of 
those who might see, experience and potentially report on corruption (Phase 1), and 
those who might have a guardianship role in preventing or managing corruption 
(Phase 2).  While the sample base in Phase 1 was utilised to explore the meanings and 
implications of employees’ understanding about corruption, Phase 2 approached the 
topic via an anti-corruption practitioner perspective, owing to the fact that anti-
corruption features within practitioners’ everyday discourse and forms part of their 
‘guardianship’ mandate (Clarke & Eck, 2003).  The insights and experiences of the 
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participants in Phase 2 added considerable value to the knowledge base, by expanding 
on and elucidating contextual issues that facilitate or hinder the reality and risk of 
corruption and the effectiveness of efforts to address it.  
1.3.1 Assumptions underpinning the development of this thesis 
The following assumptions underpin the research undertaken for this thesis.  They 
highlight how the thesis will be developed through the following chapters, as a baseline 
for how corruption may be situated, understood and attended to. 
Baker (2003, p. 119) asserts that ICAC has ‘had a significant impact on organisational 
culture in local government’.  ICAC is potentially not only influential in terms of how 
corruption is understood and addressed by those who work within this sector, but as a 
perceived authority on which practices, behaviours or activities may, or may not, be 
designated as crossing a ‘corruption’ threshold.  The creation of ICAC as the first ACA in 
Australia, and its evolution during the past 30 years, coincided with the upsurge of 
global anti-corruption initiatives during the same period (Kuris, 2015, p. 126; Wedel, 
2012, p. 453) and a corollary increase in citizens’ outrage and concerns about the 
detrimental effects of corruption (Rothstein, 2017a, p. 4).  However, ICAC’s mandate to 
investigate and make public ‘serious and systemic corruption’ (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20) 
assumes that the types of matters predominantly brought to the attention of the public 
are the ones that have reached a level of pervasiveness or seriousness, or both.  Such 
matters are not representative of everyday, mundane corrupt events, nor do they enrich 
public opinion on how cultures and social factors reify particular practices and 
understandings.  ICAC’s visible pursuit of some matters over others, as publicised 
through tabloid media, focuses on the ‘tip of the iceberg’; it thus represents what 
corruption is or might be and, by virtue of this socially constructed normativity, what it 
is not.  The implications of this are discussed within Chapter 4.  
Building on this line of argument, which is explored in more detail in Chapter 2, a 
theoretical assumption underpinning this study is the fact that many activities 
designated as ‘corrupt’ are not always legal infractions (Dormaels, 2015, p. 607; Graycar 
& Villa, 2011, pp. 435-436; Philp, 1997, p. 441; Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 797).  From a 
legislative and regulatory perspective, the ICAC Act stipulates that corruption may be a 
‘criminal offence or warrant disciplinary action or … amount to a substantial breach of 
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an applicable Code of Conduct’ (ICAC NSW, 2014a).  Therefore, ‘corrupt conduct’, as per 
ICAC’s jurisdictional definition, need not be illegal.  Yet, despite this defined regulatory 
decree being introduced at the inception of ICAC in 1989, it remains that instances of 
suspected corruption have not been referred to ICAC in the quantities one might expect. 
Moreover, there is limited effort to understand why this might be so.  Chapter 5 explores 
the range, nature and extent of practices that have been suspected and witnessed by 
front line employees, before developing insights into why such matters have not come to 
light or are otherwise institutionalised within the occupational realm.  This chapter also 
explores how practices less prone to the label of corruption are subsumed within the 
organisational messiness of council operations or considered unexceptional when 
compared to the newsworthy forms of corruption that attract the interest of ICAC.  This 
chapter further identifies different social stigmas and preconceptions about corruption, 
noting their degree of influence in terms of how employees react and respond to 
corruption, including by reporting it, or not. 
Until the point of intervention, instances of suspected corruption have continued for that 
duration, with many activities not reaching the attention of ICAC or not receiving any 
investigative response.  These instances, therefore, remain unattended to. Chapter 6 
describes the different factors that disrupt or enable different practices that may be 
construed as corrupt, with a particular examination of the structural and cultural 
elements that have a bearing on this.  It explores the multifarious tensions that exist 
within councils and the administrative systems that facilitate or hinder efforts to 
understand and manage corruption.  From there, this chapter examines the extent to 
which these factors influence the willingness and inclination to manage corruption on 
the part of those who have a stewardship role, as well as those who might experience 
forms of corruption.   
In Chapter 7, the findings from each of the three preceding chapters are discussed.  This 
discussion reflects on the broader implications of the findings for how corruption is 




1.4 Research importance 
No previous research has explored perceptions and experiences of corruption, in any 
jurisdiction of Australian local government, at the depth and scale probed by this study: 
the degree to which corruption manifests in various mundane forms in local government 
contexts and practices; how it is perceived, understood and responded to; and whether 
current anti-corruption measures are fit for purpose and address some of the situated 
and intra-organisational tensions and complexities that mediate the corruption field.  
Key to this research was establishing, via a mixed method approach, whether the degree 
of corruption within NSW local government is considered to be so widespread or 
systemic that anti-corruption endeavours have become ineffective (Klitgaard, 2000, p. 5; 
Persson et al., 2012, p. 453), and if so, what factors might explain this.   
Efforts to address corruption at the stage of it being widespread and systemic could be 
metaphorically likened to the expression, ‘closing the stable door after the horse has 
bolted’.  By then, scholars, practitioners and policymakers have lost the opportunity to 
understand the rich and multifarious complexities of corruption, which would enable 
them to design appropriate methods of management.  Hence, the choice of 
Paul Heywood’s quote to introduce the thesis: in order to address corruption before it 
becomes widespread or systemic, there is a need to better understand corruption.  
If organisational practices are, or were at one stage, defined or seen as wrong, deviant, 
even corrupt – as per contemporary definitions of corruption – then what factors 
contributed to the degree of acceptance, toleration and normativity, and why were 
regulatory interventions not forthcoming?   
This reasoning underpins the importance and necessity of this research.  The knowledge 
produced will have broad theoretical and practical benefits, and will potentially have 
implications for how corruption is perceived, defined and practised, in addition to how it 
is managed and regulated. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the study context, objectives and purpose of the thesis, and 
drew attention to the nature and complexity of corruption, as a theoretical notion, a 
14 
 
contested discourse and a socially situated practice.  It suggested that the paucity of 
reports made to ICAC by councils within the NSW local government sector is an 
indicator that corruption is a socially constructed phenomenon amenable to multiple 
levels of definition and regulatory manipulation.  Specifically, many forms of corruption, 
as regarded by scholars and regulators working in this field, are failing to come to light 
as a consequence of particular organisational, cultural, political, economic and social 
factors. It proposed a research question that seeks to elicit greater understanding about 
this intangible phenomenon by grounding it in the experiences of those who may 
encounter its multiple manifestations in local government.   
Chapter 2 will now proceed to examine the relevant literature in the field of corruption 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relevant literature associated with the objective of this study, 
which is to understand:  
How occupational corruption is perceived, interpreted and managed in NSW 
local government 
While understanding corruption is a key element to this thesis, in terms of how it is then 
researched and explored in practice, the research needs to explore underpinning 
theories associated with crime prevention before unpacking the literature on 
corruption.  Several ideas and approaches informed the theoretical foci of this study, 
which are developed by a review of the literature that follows in this chapter.  These 
ideas and approaches assist in providing an analytical lens with which to explain the 
complex nature and situated meanings of corruption among those who encounter its 
incidence or potential within the organisational and administrative realm of local 
government.  Considered as core concepts that might inform relational thinking 
(Berman & Smyth, 2015, p. 127), each has the potential to inform any conceptualisation 
of corruption, the relationship between its discernibility and degree of tolerance, and 
social relations of reaction or inaction.   
2.2 Theoretical influences 
Several theoretical concepts are influential in terms of how this thesis explores: the 
nature, level and types of corruption in local government; the symbolic meanings that 
individuals ascribe to corruption; and the different explanations that might explain the 
existence of seemingly deviant or corrupt practices within the workplace culture and 
any corresponding proaction, reaction or inaction.  These concepts are:  
• differential association theory (Sutherland & Cressey, 2004) 
• techniques of neutralisation (Sykes & Matza, 1957) 
• fraud triangle (Cressey, 1973) 
• denial theory (Cohen, 2001) 
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• broken windows theory (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) 
• crime triangle (Clarke & Eck, 2003) 
• routine activity theory (Clarke & Eck, 2003) 
• differential rationalisation theory (Shepherd & Button, 2018) 
These theories, explained further below, are discussed in accordance with 
Bauman’s (1990, pp. 145-146) reference to culture as a ‘human activity’ that comprises 
two elements: the individual and the organisational environment.   
2.2.1 Theories associated with individuals 
Drawing on Sutherland and Cressey’s (2004) differential association theory, which 
explains how individuals interact with others and come to learn that crime and deviance 
are normal social processes, this thesis seeks to make sense of the different 
understandings that exist in relation to corruption and the interrelationship with 
occupational status and network (Dormaels, 2015, p. 596).  The normalcy of deviant or 
corrupt conduct becomes commonplace as individuals rationalise or neutralise their 
behaviour in correspondence with the cultural script of the social organisation or group 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 2004, pp. 67-69).  As a well-documented component of fraud and 
corruption theory (Gorta, 1998, p. 76), these conceptual notions are largely influenced 
by Sykes and Matza’s (1957) work on techniques of neutralisation, which was developed 
as a theory to describe juvenile delinquency, but is relevant in the context of corruption, 
whereby ordinary employees find ways to avoid moral culpability.  Five types of 
neutralisation techniques are identified: the denial of injury; the denial of responsibility; 
the denial of the victim; the condemnation of the condemners; and the appeal to higher 
loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957, pp. 667-669).  
Sykes and Matza (1957, p. 666) state that ‘these justifications are commonly described 
as rationalisations’.  Likewise, the notion of rationalisation features as a component in 
Cressey’s (1973) fraud triangle, which states that three categories are required to 
commit a fraud: (1) opportunity; (2) pressure; and (3) rationalisation.  This third 
category, rationalisation, is not an ex post facto means of justifying the act, but a 
necessary component that is required before or during the act (Cohen, 2001, p. 58; 
Wells, 2004, pp. 11-12); rationalisation is a means of mitigating or justifying any 
illegitimacy, deviancy or wrongfulness, such that it becomes embedded as culturally 
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acceptable within its socially situated context (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, p. 139; Ditton, 
1977, p. 149; Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 54).  These theories are not only noteworthy in the 
operationalisation of the research and in explaining the findings, they also further assist 
in the search to understand whether, to what extent, and why, corruption may be 
habitually perpetrated, accepted or disregarded.  
Assisting this understanding, denial theory focuses on the accounts given based on an 
acceptable language of motives acquired through socialisation techniques (Cohen, 2001, 
pp. 58-59).  Denial theory builds on Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralisation and 
is considered in this thesis in the context of whether denials are by a person or several 
people, or are culturally endemic within either a particular council or across the local 
government sector.  This theory does not necessarily support the ‘bad apple vs. rotten 
barrel theory’ (Torsello & Taylor, 2016), but more whether conscious or sub-conscious 
vocabularies indicate complicity in the denial (Cohen, 2001, p. 64) or a degree of ‘wilful 
blindness’ (Heffernan, 2011); that is to say, whether such factors contribute to the 
practice of ‘unseeing’.  There have been many instances of employees ‘turning a blind 
eye’ to fraud and corruption (Heffernan, 2011, p. 104), meaning a psychological state of 
mind which assumes that the individual is broadly cognisant of the situational reality 
but chooses to ignore or deny it (Cohen, 2001, p. 5).  Feasibly, any preference for 
ignoring an instance of corruption might be attributed to fear, loyalty, apathy, or any 
number of factors.  States of denial thereby affect reporting of and investigations into 
corruption, acting as a driver to discourage response and thus offering a symbolic form 
of complicity in or tolerance of the practice.  
Should individual corrupt practices be commonplace – whether ignored, condoned or 
unrecognised – the net effect can resonate with Kelling and Wilson’s cumulative (1982) 
broken windows theory.  This theory focuses on the symbolic properties of crime and 
proposes that if a neighbourhood window is broken and left unrepaired, people will 
soon continue to walk past without noticing the build-up of gradual degradation.  
Applied to corruption, this theory would postulate that any inaction by observers of 
corrupt behaviour would result in the corrupt acts becoming naturalised in the 
organisational culture, thereby contributing to its normalcy and regularity.  
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2.2.2 Theories associated with the organisational environment 
It follows that in seeking to explain and elucidate the different meanings and 
understandings of corruption, the context and environment in which they are socially 
situated needs to be considered.  In this regard, the crime triangle, which stems from 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory, is the theory that crime occurs when 
a motivated offender and suitable target converge in an opportune place in the absence 
of effective guardianship (Clarke & Eck, 2003, p. 27).  Felson (1995, p. 53) defines 
‘guardianship’ as the presence of any person who ‘serves by simple presence to prevent 
crime and by absence to make crime more likely’.  In this sense, the person acts as a 
moral authority or mechanism of surveillance.  Guardianship may also be referred to as 
‘the physical or symbolic presence of an individual (or group of individuals) that acts 
(either intentionally or unintentionally) to deter a potential criminal event’ (Hollis-Peel 
et al., 2011, p. 54).  This implies that the guardian does not need to be an actual person, 
but instead may be a technology or ICAC or the media, for example, the activities of 
which inform citizens’ impressions.    
At a local level, guardianship could be the existence or effectiveness of ethical culture, as 
typified by management’s ethos and leadership.  The widely cited term ‘tone at the top’ 
is deemed to be a symbolically fundamental component in any anti-corruption regime.  
It is based on the premise that the CEO sets and maintains an ethical tone which then 
permeates into the wider organisation so that fraudulent, corrupt and unethical 
behaviours are not normalised or tolerated (ACFE, n.d.; Deloitte, 2015; PwC, 2010).  
Such a notion might align with the ‘ethical principal’ aspect within the ‘principal–agent’ 
model of corruption, in that any guardianship mandate rests with the GM and their 
setting of an ‘ethical’ tone.  This is a precarious supposition, if one considers Rothstein’s 
(2017a, p. 14) assertion that the agents at ‘the top’ are in fact the presumed principals 
earning the most from corruption proceeds.  Rothstein (2017a, p. 14) states that ‘such 
principals will have little incentive to change the incentives for their opportunistic 
agents that are engaged in corruption’.  Thus, it could be perceived that such a notion is 
referred to tokenistically which dilutes its importance and renders it cliched.  
While the ‘tone at the top’ concept is considered to be widely influential in regard to 
organisational culture, Shepherd and Button (2018, p. 2) observe that there is ‘little 
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empirical analysis of the cultural conditions which stimulate occupational fraud’.  
Shepherd and Button’s (2018) examination of organisational criminogenic 
characteristics concludes with a theory which they refer to as differential rationalisation 
theory.  As an addendum to differential association theory (Sutherland & Cressey, 2004), 
which focuses on the offender, differential rationalisation theory posits that 
organisations employ similar avoidable rationalisations to justify their decision not to 
tackle occupational fraud (Shepherd & Button, 2018, p. 18).  The authors observed the 
normalcy of fraud within many organisations, a practice influenced by and to some 
degree synched with broader economic imperatives and therefore avoidant of any 
criminal labelling.   
Developing on the aforementioned theoretical concepts, the following section engages 
critically with the term ‘corruption’.  It explores some of the difficulties in establishing a 
consensus of understanding and interpretation, based on the origins of corruption, its 
associated connotations, and other factors that inform perception and practice.  Through 
this exploration, corruption, as a concept, is deciphered and a definition is posited for 
the purpose of operationalising the findings of this thesis.  
2.3 The concept of corruption and its position in this thesis 
The literature on corruption is vast, with a range of disciplines providing insightful 
contributions to the subject.  Within this review of the literature, key works have been 
differentiated by considering aspects that might add value to the questions posed by this 
thesis and the approach taken. 
Corruption has stood the test of time as a subject that continues to interest scholars, 
practitioners, policymakers and the general public; yet, its definition, and efforts to 
measure it effectively and accurately, remains a subject of much debate.  There is 
widescale concord among experts that finding an international definition that can be 
agreed upon is problematic (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002; Johnston, 2005; Klitgaard, 
1988).  This has been a topic of contestation for many years (Johnston, 2005, p. 11) and 
appears unresolved in the present day (Rothstein & Torsello, 2014, p. 2).  One widely 
used and influential definition of corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain’ (Transparency International, 2018).  This definition is by no means a universal one, 
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but prior to exploring this further, it is pertinent to refer to the term’s origins and its 
diverse – i.e. historically and culturally contingent – meanings.  
Hindess (2012, pp. 2-3) indicates that corruption conjures up connotations of ‘impurity, 
intrusion or distortion’.  Similarly, Mulgan (2012, p. 25) states that ‘“corruption” is a 
term of unqualified ethical condemnation [and] to label any person or practice as 
“corrupt” is to stigmatise them as beyond the moral pale’.  Accordingly, labelling an act, a 
person, or an entity as ‘corrupt’ has distinctly negative connotations (Philp, 2015, p. 19), 
indicating untrustworthiness and unscrupulousness.  Such a stigma would have 
considerable implications for any person or council entity branded as such.  It 
potentially undermines their reputation, credibility and virtuousness, and erodes 
impressions that public servants or councils are, or might be, acting in their own 
interests rather than those of the community they serve.  Allegations of corruption, 
therefore, have the capacity to threaten basic tenets of the interaction order.  
Underkuffler (2013, p. 74) contends that corruption ‘confers a status’ on a person, 
namely ‘that evil has captured their essence and soul’, and yet this is not how everyday 
acts of corruption are necessarily experienced or perceived.  
Connotations such as these stem from the term’s Latin origin, corruptus, yet it is 
important to acknowledge that the meanings and practices associated with corruption 
have changed markedly over time and place (Wedel, 2012, p. 454).  This has 
implications for how practices are perceived, interpreted and managed in local 
government, especially given corruption has plural forms and situated manifestations.  
The concept of contemporary corruption, as Ritner (2011, p. 7) argues, should not be 
associated with the Machiavellian theory of corruption, which was considered to be 
more of a ‘political problem with systemic implications [rather than] a personal moral 
failing’ (Buchan, 2012, p. 82).  In contemporary society, citizens’ understandings would 
arguably be incongruent with the traditional or historical notions of corruption posited 
by Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (Mulgan, 2012, p. 25; Saxonhouse, 
2012, p. 39).  Aristotle was less concerned with ‘private misuse of public funds [but 
more so] the degeneration or dissolution of the polity itself’, argues Buchan (2012, 
p. 75).  Hindess (2012, p. 5) extends this argument, observing that since the late 
eighteenth century, corruption is no longer thought of as a ‘condition of the body politic 
[… but] has been used to designate problematic behaviour on the part of one or more 
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individuals, or behaviour that is often seen as a matter of using one’s public office for the 
purpose of illicit private gain’.  This has implications for any contemporary research 
conducted on local government.  By way of example, transgressions once tolerated 
within an organisation and dealt with managerially – such as abusing sick leave or using 
the organisation’s computer for personal business – are now subject to investigation and 
may result in disciplinary, and even criminal, action (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 5).  
‘Conduct that was legal is now corrupt’ and what was referred to as “honest graft” 50 
years ago is today’s ‘illegal conflict of interest’ (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 6).  On this 
basis, the original connotations of ‘moral decay’ are becoming increasingly detached 
from the meaning of corruption, which Buchan (2012, p. 89) argues is now largely 
affiliated with misdemeanours in public office.   Corruption seems to have been 
subsumed within the economic and political realm, rather than the moral and ethical, 
which may explain why much of the anti-corruption focus is on the economic 
implications.   
The language of corruption has changed, with increased reference to ‘forms’ of 
corruption or specific practices, such as bribery, nepotism and cronyism (Andvig et al., 
2000, p. 14; Mulgan, 2012, p. 25) featuring heavily in the discourse of corruption.  This 
transition is one that is not favoured by some scholars, who contend that this view is too 
narrow or technocratic; that corruption is not akin to individual failure but rather a 
societal phenomenon (Buchan, 2012, p. 73; Hindess, 2001, p. 7; 2012, p. 11).  However, if 
the rhetoric of corruption is confined to thinking of corruption as ‘infection of the body 
politic’ (Hindess, 2012, p. 5; Mulgan, 2012), a metaphor which posits that ‘the state’s 
constitution is connected like the head and limbs of a body’ (Harvey, 1999), the concept 
of corruption appears amorphous and difficult to disentangle.  It potentially dismisses 
individualised forms of corrupt behaviour that local government officials most likely 
experience and which ultimately come to inform the way they define the situated nature 
of corruption (Thomas, 1928, p. 572).  That said, it is argued that an exclusive focus on 
corrupt forms of behaviour ‘misses the social element that makes corruption a 
persistent problem’ (World Bank, 2014, p. 60).  Such a view is augmented by Mungiu-
Pippidi (2017, p. 8), who contends that ‘we should understand corruption as a social 
practice or institution, not just the sum of corrupt acts’.  Accordingly, the social and 
cultural elements are not disassociated from the corrupt acts or the events described 
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within this thesis, as structures and actions work interactively and concurrently.  
Juxtaposing these two aspects – that is, corruption seen as a systemic and individualised 
phenomenon – allows them to be systematically examined, with the aim of 
understanding not only the social practices that function to institutionalise corruption 
and contribute to its persistent nature, but also the institutional structures that help 
make corrupt conduct appear unexceptional or acceptable.   
This dialectic of corruption underpins the following review of literature on: factors that 
influence how local government employees may understand corruption; efforts to 
quantify and capture corruption; and factors which might heighten awareness of 
corruption, but also have an impact on its degree of pervasiveness and reification.  
Through exploration of such elements, the dynamics can be better understood in terms 
of their impact on efforts to manage corruption in local government, bearing in mind 
that corruption is not a single, but rather pluralised, phenomenon, and that social or 
‘lived’ impressions of corruption rarely correlate with formal definitions (Gorta, 2001, 
p. 13).  These factors are relevant in the context of corruption as a concept with a social 
meaning but with formal definitions potentially dominating the governance and 
regulatory endeavours at the coalface of local government.  It is in this empirical space, 
in building a deeper sense of what corruption means to those who are either implicitly 
or explicitly implicated in its operation, that this thesis seeks to contribute important 
knowledge.  
2.3.1 Defining and understanding corruption 
Corrupt behaviour is often considered to be synonymous with bribery (Johnston, 2005, 
p. 6).  Bribery may be the most recognisable form of corruption, yet many other 
practices have been designated as corrupt, including embezzlement, extortion, conflict 
of interest, nepotism and cronyism (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, pp. 3-9).  This is not an 
exhaustive list, and what comes to be regarded as corrupt is as much influenced by the 
situation as it is by the type of perspective – legal, social or moral – taken up (Gorta & 
Forell, 1995, p. 315). 
Banfield (as cited by Bjørnskov, 2011, p. 136) defines corruption as being 
‘unambiguously dishonest behaviour’, but this generalised statement may be associated 
with a series of acts (e.g. criminal or ethical violations) that may not conventionally be 
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perceived as corrupt.  The surreptitious nature of corruption is perhaps what sets it 
apart, being ‘a secret crime hidden in full view’ (Dormaels, 2014, p. 131).  Yet, even this 
account treats corruption as a criminal activity without acknowledging the inherent 
tensions and contradictions that exist when one is seeking to define and conceptualise 
corruption.  Such vague and limiting definitions of corruption neglect to account for 
economic and social variances (De Maria, 2008, p. 780), with bribery, as discussed 
further below, being one example that is understood differently across cultures and 
milieu (Larmour, 2008, p. 232; Recanatini, 2011b, p. 46; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, pp. 5, 
53).  Such influences cannot be ignored in Australia, which is a truly multicultural 
nation.  In Greater Sydney, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the NSW population 
(TCorp, 2013, p. 27), nearly 40% of all residents speak a non-English language at home 
(Ting, 2014).   
In dense areas of Greater Sydney, such as the Burwood LGA, where nearly 60% of 
residents speak a non-English language at home, Mandarin and Cantonese feature 
heavily (NSW Government, 2017a).  It seems pertinent, therefore, to note the potential 
influence of guanxi, a Chinese custom incorporating gift-giving obligations between 
parties that activate obligations of mutual assistance (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 72).  Guanxi 
is an integral feature of Chinese business interaction and is based on the cultivation, 
strength and endurance of relationships (Smart & Hsu, 2008, p. 177).  In 2010, three 
successive public inquiries were held by ICAC following their publication of guidelines to 
communicate anti-corruption messages in various community languages (ICAC NSW, 
2010a).  Each inquiry related to bribery and shared similar cultural circumstances, 
which featured as mitigation by those accused.  In two of these inquiries, the individuals 
were of Chinese descent (ICAC NSW, 2009a, 2009b), and in the third, the alleged corrupt 
act was perpetrated by a Korean (ICAC NSW, 2010b).   
Companies seem to be drawing attention to issues of culture and local custom as key 
contributing factors to the incidence of corruption (OECD, 2003, p. 135), yet it seems 
that cultural explanations are treated with less patience (Larmour & Wolanin, 2001, 
p. xi) and corruption is less accepted as an excuse for differing customs and values 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 18).  Notwithstanding, from a position of symbolic interactionism, 
when one is seeking to understand different forms of interaction between human beings 
(Blumer, 2007, p. 70), cultural influences and interpretations seem crucial in terms of 
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whether or not a person perceives their actions as corrupt, dishonest, illegal or wrong.  
For example, Hepkema and Booysen (1997, p. 415), as cited by Rose-Ackerman (1999, 
p. 53), note that bribery is illegal in Chile, but ‘accepting a bribe is not unless 
accompanied by other wrongdoing’.  However, in Taiwan, offering a bribe is not 
considered illegal (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 53).  In the Pacific Islands, behaviours 
which may appear corrupt to Westerners are viewed differently, with genuine ‘gift 
giving’ regarded by some outsiders as constituting corrupt practice (Larmour, 2008, 
p. 225).  Larmour (2012, p. 1) claims that ‘what looks like a bribe, is really a gift, and 
behaviours that appear to constitute nepotism are really genuine concern for one’s kin’.  
As each council’s customer base is diverse in its multicultural make-up, cultural 
variances potentially impact upon the interpretation and understanding of corruption 
and corruption-management strategies.  
From a sociological perspective, actors may be operating in a way that is oblivious to the 
corruption ‘label’ if gift-giving is not considered immoral or inappropriate (Shore & 
Haller, 2005, p. 17).  In Bauman’s influential work, the complications associated with 
personal interests and motives associated with of gift-giving and exchange are explored; 
he states:  
Human interaction succumbs to the pressure of two principles, which all too often 
contradict: the principle of equivalent exchange and the principle of the gift.  In the 
case of equivalent exchange, self-interest rules supreme [but] not so in the case of 
the gift; here, the needs and the rights of others are the main – perhaps the only – 
motive for action. (Bauman, 1990, p. 90)  
Mauss (2002 [1950], p. 50) proclaims that there are three themes of gift-giving: the 
obligation to give; the obligation to receive; and the obligation to reciprocate.  The last of 
these, reciprocity, was a key motivation for the actions identified in the ICAC’ 
investigation Operation Jarek, where suppliers were focused on making public officials 
feel ‘psychologically indebted’ (ICAC NSW, 2012, p. 109).  Out of 15 public authorities 
investigated, 14 were local councils, indicating the significant potential for such 
influence to manifest in local government.  Following the identification of what ICAC 
deemed to be ‘systemic’ corruption, recommendations were made to all councils in NSW 
(ICAC NSW, 2012, p. 8).  
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2.3.2 The designation of corruption  
Considering the above involvement of ICAC in identifying corruption, and how this 
might impart meaning and understanding to the term, it is worth considering how 
corruption is designated in NSW from a specifically regulatory standpoint within the 
public sector.  Corrupt conduct is defined under sections 7, 8 and 9 of the ICAC Act, but 
to fall within ICAC’s jurisdiction, it must be:  
Intentional wrongdoing either by a NSW public official or which affects a NSW 
public official that is serious enough to be a criminal offence or warrant 
disciplinary action or, for members of the NSW Parliament and local government 
councillors, amount to a substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct. (ICAC 
NSW, 2014a) 
By virtue of ICAC’s regulatory remit that wrongdoing must be serious or substantial, 
milder forms of corrupt conduct would not meet the criteria for attention by the ICAC, 
even if referred as an allegation.  This might be an important explanation for why more 
cases are not referred to ICAC by councils.  
Practices of corruption, as defined by the ICAC Act, include fraud and embezzlement,1 
which differ from practices of corruption that require collusion, such as bribery and 
nepotism, in that a single person can commit them (Sampson, 2010, p. 267).  It is argued 
that corruption and fraud should be theorised distinctively (Hodgkinson, 1997, p. 17); 
while their distinctions may be narrow (Doig, 2006, p. 118), there may well be 
unintended consequences of any definitional typology.  Confusion is created when 
cataloguing practices that are lawful – but otherwise ethically or morally wrongful from 
most perspectives – alongside unlawful practices.  By way of example, Graycar and Villa 
(2011, pp. 435-436) observe that many countries legislate against some acts of 
corruption, such as bribery, fraud and misappropriation, but the legislation fails to 
address other acts such as ‘patronage, abuse of discretion, nepotism … and conflict of 
interest’.   
Bribery and fraud, in particular, bestow economic benefits on corrupt participants, while 
nepotism and conflicts of interest do not (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 53).  The fact that 
these latter examples are not unlawful does not mean they would not fall within the 
 
1 Section 8(2) (e) and (h) of the ICAC Act respectively. 
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territory of corruption (Philp, 1997, p. 441; Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 797).  An 
important consideration for this thesis is that acts that are not legally forbidden could be 
considered more morally and socially acceptable (Gorta & Forell, 1995, pp. 316-317).  
This supports assertions made by Anechiarico (2009b, p. 84) that ‘a notable failing of 
public administration has been reliance on the law enforcement model for the control of 
corruption’, and that this may contribute to certain practices of corruption being 
omitted from view or ‘unseen’.  These are activities that are not illegal per se but that 
still breach public trust, referred to by Wedel (2015, p. 5) as the ‘new corruption’.  In this 
regard, the figurative reference to corruption as an ‘umbrella’ concept (Varraich, 2014, 
p. 3) seems worthy of note.  Beneath this umbrella of corruption, there are different 
situated cultural understandings which have been under-considered and relatively 
unexplored in the local government sector.  As such, any measurement or quantification 
of corrupt practices becomes challenging; these challenges are explored in the next 
section.  
2.3.3 Measuring the immeasurable  
It is argued that corruption typically takes place in secret, without witnesses and 
between complicit parties, rendering it invisible (Larmour & Wolanin, 2001, p. xii).  
Johnston (2012, p. 61) argues that ‘it is virtually impossible to measure corruption’.  Due 
its intangible and clandestine nature, some of the world’s most influential measurement 
efforts have been by proxy.  Within Heinrich and Hodess’s (2011, p. 20) exploration of 
such measurements, proxies take the form of perception-based indices, with two of the 
most widely used indices being the CPI, compiled and published by Transparency 
International, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), published by the 
World Bank Group.  The following literature regarding measurement indices is explored 
in terms of its usefulness to this thesis, especially in its accentuation of the problematic 
nature of defining corruption and, by virtue of this, observing and addressing its 
pluralised, and contextually specific, manifestations.  
Transparency International claims that its CPI, which was first launched in 1995, is 
‘widely credited with putting the issue of corruption on the international policy agenda’ 
(Transparency International, 2013b).  By inference, therefore, the topic of corruption on 
the international policy agenda was studiously ignored until this (recent) development.  
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Eminent scholars argue that perception-based indicators have advanced the study of 
corruption (Heinrich & Hodess, 2011, p. 31; Lambsdorff, 2006, p. 3), yet these indicators 
have also been criticised for various reasons (Hansen, 2012, p. 516; Hawken & Munck, 
2011, p. 23; Johnston, 2012, p. 67; June et al., 2008, p. 38; OECD, 2005, p. 10; Olken, 
2009, p. 950).  While it is not necessary to engage with each of these different criticisms, 
what is significant for this thesis is that the ‘perceptions’ aspect is frequently omitted 
when indices such as the CPI and WGI are reported on by the media; thus the indices are 
taken to reflect ‘actual levels of corruption’ (Abramo, 2008, p. 3).  While perceived 
corruption may be indicative of a number of issues, such indices do not measure the 
actual prevalence of the phenomenon itself (Treisman, 2007, p. 215) but rather 
‘epiphenomena’ (De Maria, 2008, p. 781), which again will be shaped by the diverse 
social meanings that underpin public understandings of corruption.  Such indices do, 
however, inform citizens’ views about corruption and arguably any impression they may 
have about its perceived nature, level and impact.   
As a means of contextualising this across the perceptions landscape, Transparency 
International’s CPI maintains that the general view of corruption in Australia is that it 
has increased in recent years (Transparency International, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 2015).  
In other studies, nearly half of surveyed participants thought that corruption had 
increased in the previous three years (Graycar, 2013, p. 5; McAllister et al., 2012, p. 12) 
and nearly two-thirds of surveyed participants (59%) thought that it had increased in 
the previous two years (Transparency International, 2014b).  At a more granular level, 
one survey conducted in Australia claims that only 11% of respondents stated that local 
government was ‘not at all corrupt’ (McAllister et al., 2012, p. 26).  In spite of these 
results, it is not clear to what degree the term ‘corruption’ applies to citizens’ 
experiences or why there is no moral panic at this time.  Only abstract and general views 
on corruption exist; being broad, such views neglect to unpack the component parts of 
corruption and how these then relate to different occupational milieus.   
A key observation is the fact that anti-corruption campaigns may have increased the 
perception that corruption is on the rise, but in fact, the level may not have changed at 
all (Sampson, 2010, p. 265).  The highly sensitive nature of corruption invariably attracts 
media attention, which in turn has the effect of potentially distorting corruption 
perceptions (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 15; OECD, 2005, p. 26).  Henceforth, 
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perceptions become higher than they would have been otherwise (Dreher et al., 2007).  
Publication of egregious incidents, or the controversial or dubious practices of high-
profile figureheads, are instantly newsworthy (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 25).  They 
inform local government employees’ interpretations of what corruption is and how it 
may materialise.  This is not the situated reality of witnessed corruption, but rather a 
perceived or approximated reality.  The relevance for this thesis is that a construct of 
corruption is created and the problem then becomes one in which corruption is reified 
by impressions of it rather than actual encounters with it.  The result is that low-level 
infractions and conduct perceived as less harmful (‘mundane’ corruption) are not 
identified as corrupt, as they are considered separate and distinctive from the 
scandalous forms of corruption which predominantly inform public opinion (Berger & 
Pullberg, 1965, p. 64).  These complexities are unravelled further below.  
2.3.4 Practices of corruption and their degree of classification 
Drawing on their distinction between corruption in poor and rich countries, Graycar and 
Monaghan (2015, p. 588) note that in Australia ‘demands for bribes would cause 
outrage’, but bribery is just one category of practice.  As previously registered, bribery 
has an economic benefit, unlike practices such as nepotism and conflict of interest 
(Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 165); it is frequently referred to synonymously with 
corruption (Johnston, 2005, p. 6), which means that other forms of corruption may not 
be front-of-mind and so may not be of paramount concern.  What is significant for this 
thesis is whether this has an impact on any observer’s reaction.  Does the perceived 
harm, obviousness or economic implication of an act, such as bribery, correlate to its 
degree of visibility and rifeness?   
In a study conducted in the Australian state of Victoria, the most frequently identified 
opportunities for corruption were ‘conflict of interest, followed by misuse of 
information, abuse of discretion and hiring friends or family for public service jobs’ 
(Graycar, 2013, p. 2).  Bribery was not recognised as an act that was prevalent, with only 
4% of respondents suspecting it to be taking place and less than 1% personally 
observing it (Graycar, 2013, p. 2).  However, over half of all respondents (54%) 
considered that bribery was the corrupt act that had the most damaging effects 
(Graycar, 2013, p. 15).  This may signify a lack of understanding about the harms of 
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other forms of corruption, or whether indeed public officials even associate these 
practices with corruption.   
Disentangling the elements of corruption, instead of referring to it as a broad 
phenomenon, was a key consideration in the context of the research problem posed by 
this thesis.  In the absence of a robust typology, which seeks to classify different 
practices of corruption, the concept of corruption appears to be broad, diverse and 
unquantifiable (Gorta, 2001, p. 14).  The term evidently means different things to 
different people, be they members of the public, employers, regulators or frontline 
employees.  Hence, any devised typology is limited in its usefulness, as it is dependent on 
how corruption is culturally understood, then recognised, reported and managed.    
Building on observations by Rothstein and Torsello (2014, p. 264), a key challenge in the 
approach to research of this nature was how best to examine first-hand encounters and 
observed practices of corruption from those who might work in the field.  In framing the 
design of the research and approach to the subject matter, inspiration was derived from 
the TASP framework (types, activities, sectors, places), which proffers an alternative 
unit of analysis to the perception-based indices (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p. 11; 
Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012, pp. 385-386).  The TASP method of classification is a 
working framework for evaluating a corrupt event, defined as follows:  
The event may arise from structural features, in which corruption is embedded in 
processes and tolerated, sometimes it is situational and fleetingly opportunistic.  
Sometimes the participants are willing, so the behaviour involves collusion, 
sometimes one participant is unwilling, and thus the behaviour is extortionate. 
(Porter & Graycar, 2016, p. 425)  
This method of classification was significant when considering potentially corrupt 
events; however, building on salient viewpoints noted within the anthropological 
literature, contextualisation was considered to be necessary in the analysis of 
corruption.  As an example, Torsello and Venard (2016, p. 37) state that anthropological 
research identifies ‘the significant intricacies involved in the unfolding of corruption … 
[that corruption is] a dynamic social reality linked to its social and political 
environment, which by nature changes over time’.  Such insights assisted in framing the 
research project and highlighted a need to elicit subjectively meaningful responses from 
project participants, while simultaneously examining the local government landscape 
and the different corrupt events which might transpire in a council environment.   
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In consideration of these observations, one particular focus of this research was 
investigating: whether these factors are acknowledged by local government employees, 
and if so, to what degree; and whether the concept of corruption is concentrated on the 
more spectacular forms of corruption that are investigated by ICAC and then 
subsequently sensationalised by the media.  This latter aspect is discussed below in 
terms of its potential impact on perception, understanding and cognition.  
2.3.5 Sensational corruption – the influence of the media 
The media plays a fundamental role in exposing corruption (Grimmelikhuijsen & 
Snijders, 2016, p. 345) to the extent that it is ‘perhaps the most important mechanism in 
public culture for the circulation of discourses on corruption’ (Gupta, 1995, p. 385).  
However, inconsistent media reporting has resulted in a distortion of public perceptions 
about corruption (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 173), with various factors affecting this.  
Dormaels (2015, p. 596) argues that ‘the media … applies the term corruption to define 
all kinds of public situations that are the result of bad governance’.  Osrecki (2015, 
p. 348) argues that ‘anti-corruption programs based on principal–agent models do not 
differentiate between corruption and functional deviance but frame all informal, i.e. 
intransparent, behaviour as potentially corrupt.’  Compounding the problem, 
Loves (2015, p. 159) contends that ‘the media can distort the reality of corruption 
events and investigations by pursuing their own agendas, which often distort and 
impact public opinion’.   
ICAC’s practice of holding  hearings in public are commended on the premise that public 
hearings expose corruption and encourage proactive anti-corruption behaviours (Aulby, 
2017, p. 1).  However, when media reporting of these events is disproportionate, 
sensationalised and focused on the salacious details which attract viewers and readers 
(Wilson et al., 2017, pp. 282-283), the public discourse is limited to a narrow rhetoric 
that focuses on individual pathologies, greed and power.  The implication for this thesis 
is that any media focus becomes synoptic in nature, creating a situation where ‘a large 
number view something in common which is condensed’ (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 219).  
A celebrification of political or high-profile figureheads being publicly prosecuted is not 
representative of everyday public officials’ experiences with corruption.  It not only 
disregards the broader implications of pluralistic practices of corruption, but diverts 
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attention away from their existence in various situations, structures and relationships 
(Clammer, 2012, p. 117).  This has the potential to create a disconnect with what council 
employees experience, and do, daily.  It also widens the gap between the more 
exceptional forms of corruption that attract media interest and pursuit by ACAs, with 
those that might be more mundane or nuanced. This perception gap is elucidated below.    
2.3.6 The perception and situated reality of corruption 
In their study of corruption compared between poor and rich countries, Graycar and 
Monaghan (2015, p. 592) note that in poorer countries, perceived levels of corruption 
are attributed to ‘lived corruption’, which is distinctly different to the basis of perceived 
levels of corruption in more affluent countries such as Australia.  That is to say, in richer 
countries, the perceived level of corruption is more subjective and not necessarily based 
on first-hand or personal experiences with different practices of corruption (McAllister 
et al., 2012, p. 12; Van de Walle, 2008, p. 233).  For example, in the case of bribery, 4% of 
people surveyed in Australia reported paying a bribe for a public service, whereas in 
India this figure is as high as 69% (Transparency International, 2017, pp. 16-17).  When 
different corrupt practices are further examined in this context, Zimring and Johnson 
(2005, p. 802) refer to acts such as bribery as being ‘crude and visible’ and distinctly 
different to ‘subtle and hidden abuses’, such as conflict of interest and nepotism, which 
they term the ‘dark figure of corruption’.  The authors contend that there is a ‘larger 
proportion of corrupt acts in complex and developed societies than in less developed 
nations’, which they attribute to ‘the adaptive tendency to hide higher-status offending 
in developed nations’ (Zimring & Johnson, 2005, pp. 802-803).  An example might be 
abuse of public office, which is more prone to detection in developed nations (Andvig et 
al., 2000, p. 82).  Heidenheimer (2009, p. 142) offers a reason for why this may be, 
stating that ‘the more complex the network of social interaction and the more 
complicated and diverse the ways that tangible benefits can be exchanged, the less likely 
it is that particular actions can clearly be labelled ‘“corrupt”’.  A focus on ‘tangible’ forms 
of corruption, such as bribery, keeps a focus on easily designated practices, and shifts 
attention away from more complex forms of corruption being enacted by employees 
who have a higher status or more influence (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).  In this regard, 
hierarchy and complexity feature as key influences affecting the determination of 
corruption within local government.   
32 
 
The literature in this regard is germane to this thesis, in terms of how the concept of 
corruption is interpreted and experienced by employees at the frontline in local 
government and whether efforts to address corruption are based on a priori knowledge 
of corruption or empirical data.  As a means of developing this theme, the literature 
review below explores recent historical interventions that may have led to different 
knowledge-building outcomes.   
2.3.7 The emergence of corruption studies 
Galtung (2001, p. 191) considered that there was an ‘eruption of corruption’ at the end 
of the Cold War, also referred to by Wedel (2012, p. 453) as the debut of the 
‘anticorruption industry’, and by Kuris (2015, p. 126) as the ‘Global anti-corruption 
movement’.  On this premise, Sampson (2010, p. 262) states that ‘every industry brings 
with it a new language, a new way of thinking about the world, a new discourse’.  
Sampson (2010, p. 262) refers to this discourse as ‘anti-corruptionism’, a concept that is 
referred to throughout this thesis.  Within this new discourse, concepts of transparency, 
accountability and corruption have been increasingly researched (Lyrio et al., 2018, 
p. 512) and written about (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017, p. 7).  
While Sampson (2010, p. 262) questions why the issue of anti-corruption suddenly 
became ‘hot’, one of the pivotal moments in history that led to this change in thinking 
was when a former World Bank president, James D. Wolfensohn, stated at the annual 
meeting of the World Bank in 1996, ‘let’s not mince words: we need to deal with the 
cancer of corruption’ (World Bank Group, 2016).  At this time, corruption was deemed to 
be a global problem (Johnson & Sharma, 2004, p. 1) and Mr Wolfensohn had ‘confronted 
head on a topic that the development community had long studiously ignored’ 
(Bhargava, 2006, p. 341).  The ‘c’ word was purposefully introduced (Andvig et al., 2000, 
p. 6) and from that time, concerted efforts to measure and address the phenomenon 
arose.   
Pivotal at this time was the rise of ACAs.  Considered to be ‘the most innovative feature 
of the anti-corruption movement of the last two decades’ (de Sousa, 2010, p. 5), many 
have emerged from a corruption scandal or integrity crisis (Huberts et al., 2008, p. 271).  
When an assessment of Australia’s ‘National Integrity Systems’ was conducted, it was 
observed that NSW ‘possesses the strongest integrity system of any Australian 
33 
 
government based on pure number of core integrity institutions’ (Brown, 2005, p. 27).  
However, Sampford and colleagues (2005, p. 101) contend that the success or failure of 
integrity institutions is dependent on the nature and strength of the integrity networks, 
not just the formal presence of those agencies.  Such perspectives might impart a public 
perception about ‘integrity institutions’ that is hyperbolic: imbuing citizens with a sense 
of assurance that the totality of corruption in local government is, and will continue to 
be, exposed and addressed.  The significance for this thesis is what degree of reliance is 
placed on ICAC, as the country’s veteran ACA.  If corruption is likened to a cancer 
(Bhargava, 2006; World Bank Group, 2016), a consideration explored in this thesis is 
whether ICAC is viewed (and performs) as the panacean cure.   
ICAC has finite resources, with an investigative remit that is confined to ‘serious and 
systemic’ corruption; hence, its mandate is circumscribed, as is its labour power.  
Pressure on its resources has been heightened in recent times, affecting what matters 
ICAC selects to investigate and those it chooses to disregard (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 3).  As 
ICAC’s focus is on ‘serious and systemic’ corruption, it is not necessarily invested in the 
mapping and tackling of everyday corruption, other than from an advisory perspective.  
Local government is a sector that falls within ICAC’s jurisdictional purview, yet it is 
observed that ‘a former ICAC Commissioner dismissed local councils as having an “an 
absence of real power” other than “a few relatively insignificant bylaws”’ (Cripps, 2008, 
p. 20, cited by Masters & Graycar, 2016, p. 47).   
The integrity framework in the NSW public sector incorporates other agencies besides 
ICAC; these include the Office of Local Government (OLG),2 the Office of the NSW 
Ombudsman and the Audit Office.  It is argued that these agencies should be ‘collectively 
responsible for combating misconduct and corruption’ (Public Sector Standards 
Commissioner, 2010, p. xi), but each has a determinate remit and suite of 
responsibilities.   
NSW was the first Australian state to establish an ACA in the form of ICAC.  It was 
influenced by the three-pronged approach3 of the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption of Hong Kong (ICAC Hong Kong) (Law, 2008, p. 82), recognised as a ‘model of 
 
2 The OLG was formerly called the Division of Local Government (DLG). 
3 In its annual report for 2012, the ICAC Hong Kong’s three functions had the following titles: (1) Operations, 
(2) Corruption Prevention and (3) Community Relations (ICAC Hong Kong, 2012, p. 83). 
34 
 
the way in which efforts to prevent and control corruption should be organised and 
implemented’ (Scott, 2011, p. 401).  The Australian states of Victoria and South Australia 
were the last two states4 to establish an ACA, in February and September 2013 
respectively.  The two territories established ACAs some years later: the Northern 
Territory established its Independent Commission Against Corruption in late 2018, 
modelled on the NSW ICAC (Northern Territory Government, 2018), and in mid to late 
2019, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) established an Integrity Commission 
(ACT Government, 2019).  Each state and territory ACA has a slightly different scope and 
remit; while investigating corruption within the public sector remains a responsibility of 
each ACA within its respective state or territory, it is conceded that ‘even like bodies 
vary significantly in their jurisdictions and functions‘ (Brown & Head, 2004, p. 5).  At the 
federal level  in Australia, the case is currently being made for a Commonwealth 
Integrity Commission (Attorney General’s Office, 2018).  
ACAs have not been highly regarded for their performance or impact (de Sousa, 2010, 
p. 20; Huberts, 2014, p. 182), with some scholars arguing that that they have failed to 
reduce corruption (Heilbrunn, 2004, p. 1) or ‘make more than a marginal difference in 
controlling official corruption’ (Anechiarico, 2009b, p. 85).  Many ACAs are considered 
‘toothless’, these being ACAs that lack law-enforcement or investigative powers: being a 
watchdog rather than a guard dog agency, so to speak (Kuris, 2015, p. 127).  To this end, 
Monaghan (2014) notes that ICAC’s effort to ‘fight … corruption is often less about 
getting runs on the board and more about creating awareness’.  It is not necessarily, as 
phrased by Cripps (2008, p. 33), the taking ‘of scalps’ (prosecution or condemnation of 
corrupt actors).  The significance of such comments for this thesis, in one regard, is not 
whether there is merit in such viewpoints, but that the anti-corruption focus is on the 
plight of a single, resource-scarce organisation.   In another regard, through ICAC’s 
public hearings and related media interest, public perception is arguably more attuned 
to its investigatory remit and regulatory clout as that attains a newsworthy identity and 
status.  As a result, the media coverage imbues a perception about ICAC and what it 
does; the instances of corruption it prosecutes become the object of public 
 
4 In addition to the NSW ICAC, Australia’s state ACAs are: Queensland – Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC Qld); 
Western Australia – Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC WA); Victoria – Independent Broad-based Anti-
corruption Commission (IBAC); South Australia – Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC SA); 
Tasmania – Integrity Commission. 
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understandings, with resultant perceptions of what corruption is and is not, who 
commits it, and what it looks like.   
To explicate this further, several scholars note that an ACA’s success is dependent on 
political will and commitment (Pope & Vogl, 2000, p. 7; Recanatini, 2011a, p. 565), but 
that it must also be focused, have good leadership, be specialised and well-resourced 
(Anechiarico, 2009b, p. 80).  From a resource perspective, NSW has the highest number 
of integrity institutions, but ‘a lower proportion of staff [are] dedicated to these 
functions … than some jurisdictions with only three or two’ integrity bodies (Brown & 
Head, 2004, p. 16).  The investigative division of ICAC operates with fewer than 45 full-
time equivalent (FTE) staff (ICAC NSW, 2017a, p. 6).  Yet it services nearly a third of the 
nation’s population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018) and has coverage of a public 
sector that incorporates more than half a million state and local government employees 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a).  Given these constraints, one wonders whether 
ICAC exists to satisfy public perception, functioning more as a symbolic entity than a 
capable monitory regulator.  ICAC must be able to grab and hold public attention on its 
targeted successes, but it only has limited capacity and resources.   
Concerns about suspected corruption within or against the public sector of NSW should 
be reported to ICAC, and in the 2015–16 reporting year, 2,436 matters were received by 
ICAC (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 15).  Of these, 656 were classified as complaints by members 
of the public, 605 were reports made directly by public sector agencies, and a further 
220 were classified as public interest disclosures; the remaining 955 matters fell into a 
different category, based on ICAC’s model of classification, with the main ones being 
‘enquiry’, ‘outside jurisdiction’, ‘information’ or ‘feedback’ (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 15).  
Of the 656 complaints from the public, 492 were attributed to one of five government 
sectors, with nearly half of these (295) being in relation to the local government sector 
(ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 17).  ICAC suggests that this might reflect the ‘high level of people’s 
interaction with local government and the personal interest many take in the decisions 
of their local council’ (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 17).  To some extent, this may be the case, but 
295 complaints about 152 councils suggest that there is either not much corruption or 
not much reporting by the near 8 million residents in NSW (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018).   
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Like all public sector authorities in NSW, councils have a statutory obligation to notify 
ICAC of any suspicion of corrupt conduct.  Such referrals must be made by the head of a 
public authority or its chief executive, who is the principal officer, and this is well 
communicated by ICAC to the array of public authorities in NSW (ICAC NSW, n.d.).  In the 
2015–16 reporting year, a total of 120 reports were made by the 152 councils to ICAC 
(ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20), which is relatively consistent with the number of reports each 
year either side (ICAC NSW, 2015, p. 21; 2017a, p. 20).  This indicates that many councils 
have not notified ICAC about any suspicions of corruption at all.  
Out of the 2,436 matters received by ICAC in 2015–16, 41 were subject to preliminary 
investigation, and full investigations were initiated in just 10 of those matters (ICAC 
NSW, 2016, p. 9).  As illustrated by Figure 2.1, 1,926 of these matters were subject to 
determination by the ICAC assessment panel (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 23).  
 
Figure 2.1. ICAC assessment decisions, 2015–16 (n=1,926) 
As shown, the majority of matters assessed by ICAC are closed without action or referral 
or are referred externally.  Most of the matters that are closed ‘are speculative in nature 
and lacking specific information’, according to ICAC (2016, p. 20).  Yet a number of 
credible referrals must fall within the bracket of 98% matters that are closed or referred 
internally, but not investigated.  While public sector authorities have a statutory 
obligation to report suspected corruption to ICAC, they may perceive such reporting as a 
reputational risk, as an overly burdensome bureaucratic or administrative requirement, 
or as an exercise in futility, especially when each time they are subsequently told that 
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ICAC will not investigate and that the council itself must conduct its own investigation.  
Undoubtedly, ICAC’s decision not to investigate would discourage further reporting of 
suspected corruption.   
Arguably, ICAC would be stretched beyond its already limited capacity if it were to 
receive more reports each year, which may serve as one explanation for the lack of 
regulatory follow-up.  As argued by Doig and Norris (2012, p. 267), ‘unless the ACA has 
… all the resources and staffing that it expects to be necessary to address the totality of 
corruption, then the role of the ACA must be strategic and, in terms of its existing 
resources and staffing, realistic’.  Hitherto, ICAC’s limited resources and staffing seem to 
have flown under the public and policy radar, noting further that ICAC’s investigative 
mandate is not on the totality of corruption, just practices that are categorised as 
‘serious or systemic (or both)’; that is, those practices that are transgressive of a socially 
created and constructed threshold.  This focus on the ‘tip of the iceberg’ appears to 
neglect the potential forms of corruption that might be submerged from view: those 
situated in the everydayness of council business.  
2.3.8 The potential for corruption within local government 
In the 15-year period between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2014, ICAC publicly 
reported on 106 investigations, of which nearly a quarter (23) involved local 
government agencies (ICAC NSW, 2014c) (for a full breakdown, see Appendix 1).  Of 
these 23 investigation reports, over 90% (21)5 have been in and around the Sydney 
metropolis and immediate surrounding regions6 (ICAC NSW, 2014e).  The number of 
councils in these regions amounts to 44, which collectively accounts for nearly a third of 
all councils in NSW.7   
This analysis depicts three noteworthy factors: first, that nearly a quarter of all publicly 
reported investigations conducted by ICAC have been in relation to local government 
 
5 For the purpose of this analysis, the following ICAC investigations have been omitted: Operation Jarek (investigation 
no 2 in Appendix 1) as ICAC determined to conduct enquiries across a number of public authorities; and Operation 
Bosco (investigation no 12) as this related to an individual ‘falsely represent[ing] himself as having certain academic 
qualifications … when applying for various public and private sector positions of employment between 1987 and 
2002’ (ICAC NSW, 2003, p. 7). 
6 These regions are (1) Inner Sydney – comprising 15 councils; (2) Outer Sydney – comprising 19 councils; (3) Sydney 
surrounds – comprising 5 councils; and (4) Illawarra region – comprising 5 councils. 




affairs; second, that the majority of each of these investigations has involved a council 
that is in or within close proximity to Sydney; and third, that many of these 
investigations have involved corrupt conduct by, or involving, the appointed or 
operational officials (employees), and not elected officials (mayor and councillors).  
As depicted by Figure 2.2, out of the 23 investigations, nearly three-quarters (17) were 
in relation to appointed officials, less than a fifth (4) were in relation to elected officials, 
and two investigations involved both elected and appointed officials.  
 
Figure 2.2. Breakdown of ICAC investigations involving appointed officials, elected 
officials, or both (2000–2014) 
As a means of placing this into context, local councils are extensively diverse and 
exceedingly disparate in size and geodemographic composition (Dollery et al., 2003, 
pp. 3-4).  At the commencement of this research project (2013), the number of 
constituents enrolled in each of the 152 councils varied from 1,000 to over 150,000 
(Electoral Commission NSW, 2014).  Each council’s physical size and its population 
density vary extensively.  The largest council in NSW is Central Darling which covers 
53,534 square kilometres, and the smallest council area is Hunters Hill at 5.7 square 
kilometres (DLG NSW, 2013, p. 10).  Regional areas typically have a much smaller 
population than the densely populated metropolitan areas, with Urana Shire Council 
having just 1,180 residents and Blacktown City Council having 312,479 residents, nearly 
265 times as many (DLG NSW, 2013, p. 10).  The most densely populated LGAs in NSW 
are in and around Greater Sydney, which account for just under two-thirds of the state’s 
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Statistics, 2013).  As such, the majority of councils are in and around the densely 
populated metropolis of Sydney.  It is not clear the extent to which these demographic 
factors might impact on attitudes or practices of corruption, but this is considered in the 
methodological discussion in Chapter 3.  
Given the fragmented and disparate composition of the NSW local government sector, 
there may well be different spatially and culturally situated perceptions about 
corruption and its level of prevalence.  As a sector, local government is considered to be 
more vulnerable to failure than state or federal government (Dollery et al., 2003, p. 212), 
with inherently greater potential for corruption than its state and federal counterparts 
(Dollery & Wallis, 2001, p. 14).  Stronger administrative and governance processes are 
mandated upon state government than on local government (ICAC NSW, 2017b, p. 81), 
and local government performs a greater number of high-risk functions than state 
government (ICAC NSW, 2010c, p. 7).  Examples include: discretion over land rezoning 
or development applications; inspection, regulation and monitoring of premises; and the 
issuance of fines and receipt of cash payments (ICAC NSW, 2010c, p. 8).  Councils employ 
many staff that work outdoors in the community some or all of the time, including beach 
lifeguards, environmental health inspectors, and parking patrol officers; many council 
staff work autonomously and exercise fairly high levels of administrative discretion.  
Some of these roles incorporate a regulatory and compliance remit, and these can have 
an inherently high potential for discretionary misuse (Jenner, 2015, p. 39).  
Given the limited levels of scrutiny and accountability in local councils, the potential for 
corruption to flourish is heightened (Vanstone, 2015).  This is compounded given the 
limited degree of oversight and intervention that rests primarily with ICAC (Berman, 
2016, p. 449).  It is claimed that ‘local government has long been fertile ground for the 
discovery of fraud, waste and abuse in the public sector’ (Anechiarico, 2009b, p. 80), and 
various characteristics of local government indicate why this may be.  For example, 
Klitgaard (2000, p. 5) states that local governments are susceptible to systemic 
corruption where municipal administrative systems are weaker than in national 
governments, low pay fails to attract high-calibre personnel and thus opportunities for 
corruption will be taken advantage of.  Dollery and colleagues (2003, p. 224; 2001, p. 14) 
agree with Rodden and Rose-Ackerman’s (1997) observations that features such as 
‘smallness’ and ‘intimacy’ make municipal governments particularly susceptible to 
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corruption.  As one example, Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997, p. 1549) note that 
smaller government jurisdictions have less market power.  In NSW, this was a common 
feature of the local government landscape until 2016, when a number of councils 
amalgamated: a move considered by Dollery and Wallis (2001, p. 17) as one that might 
‘moderate local government failure’, but not necessarily one that has altered the 
recognition and reporting of corruption.   
Some councils in NSW have an internal ombudsman position, but otherwise, no other 
specialist integrity body is in place locally that supplements the ACAs within the 
National Integrity System (Cripps, 2008, p. 32).8  The internal ombudsman concept has 
been recognised as an option that supports the integrity framework at the state level 
(Warburton & Baker, 2005, p. 5).  However, establishment of the position is at the 
discretion of each respective council and its significance and potency is utterly 
dependent on the un/willingness of the council to assess and respond to complaints, 
some of which may involve suspected corrupt conduct.  In 2012, there was a push for 
more council internal ombudsmen.  However, the Minister for Local Government at the 
time argued that ‘many councils lack the resources to maintain internal ombudsmen 
units but can achieve similar outcomes by having an effective complaints management 
policy in place’ (Grennan, 2012).  This rationale could certainly be considered 
excusatory verging on problematic, but it certainly served to limit the prism of this role’s 
focus to ‘complaint handling’.  Further, this rationale implies that an ‘effective 
complaints management policy’ serves as a panacea for corruption in local government, 
without actually stipulating or demonstrating any degree of understanding about what 
that policy should be, what it should address, and how it can be successfully enacted.   
The first council to set up such an internal ombudsman function, Sutherland Shire 
Council, deleted the role from its organisation in 2013.  This  followed an external report 
which noted that the internal ombudsman was an ‘optional service’ and that, as such, 
‘smaller councils unable to provide local ombudsman services must rely on the NSW 
Ombudsman’ (PwC, 2013, p. 128).  Resourcing again appears to be a reason in this 
regard, but the inference drawn also is that a role such as this is ‘optional’, implying that 
 
8 Please see the Preface if further elaboration of the internal ombudsman role is required from the author’s 
perspective as a practitioner. 
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dealing with corruption is an indulgence, not a necessity; that corruption is not a 
business risk, nor a significant enough occupational or public risk.  
Such comments further assume that the NSW Ombudsman has the requisite capacity to 
tackle the range of complaints that emerge, while failing to appreciate that it is not 
within the ambit of the NSW Ombudsman to investigate corruption.  Notably, the terms 
‘corruption’ and ‘corrupt’ are not mentioned once within the 134-page report prepared 
for Sutherland Shire Council (PwC, 2013).  Seemingly, the internal ombudsman function 
is taken to be a complaints management function, which fails to acknowledge its role in 
the prevention and exposure of everyday corruption at a local level (Pedroza, 2011, 
p. 11).  In two successive ICAC’ investigations reported on in 2009, an internal 
ombudsman raised the issue of suspected corruption within the council to ICAC, which 
then led to an ICAC investigation and subsequent findings of corrupt conduct (ICAC 
NSW, 2009a, p. 7; 2009b, p. 6).  Just prior to releasing the report, ICAC recommended the 
reinstatement of the internal ombudsman function at Wollongong City Council (ICAC 
NSW, 2008b, p. 135), following its investigation into one of the most infamous examples 
of systemic corruption within NSW local government, where ‘conflict of interest was 
rampant’ and the corruption was not overtly visible (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p. 134).  
A similar recommendation has not been made by ICAC in any other council investigation 
since, indicating that the role is not necessarily advocated at the oversight level at the 
present time.   
2.3.9 Why corruption disappears and becomes un/seen 
The above considerations highlight the tenuous nature of the internal ombudsman role, 
and the limited interest within local government to understand more about corruption 
or to manage either its risk or incidence.  To elaborate on this, it is worth noting that 
corruption is treated with different degrees of concern.  Specifically, corruption is not 
always seen to be wrong or harmful.  In 1968, Huntington (1968, p. 69) wrote: ‘at times 
… some forms of corruption can contribute to political development by helping to 
strengthen political parties’.  Four decades later, Anechiarico (2009a, p. 41) was 
surprised when he observed a small minority of attitudes exhibiting similar views in 
support of corruption.  As Piga (2011, pp. 145, 173) stated, in reference to Koenig’s 
(2009) assertion that corruption should be ‘defended’, ‘[t]he romantic view is 
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apparently back in fashion’.  Similarly, as noted by Leys (2009, p. 65), ‘it is natural but 
wrong to assume that the results of corruption are always both bad and important’, 
considering that bribery, as a particular corrupt practice, may contribute to cutting ‘red 
tape’ and inefficient bureaucracy.   
From there, deviant or corrupt behaviour may become interwoven with other socially 
acceptable practices, to the extent that individuals conform to the institutional culture 
(Merton, 2004, p. 64; Punch, 1996, p. 266) and are expected to act corruptly or 
capitulate (Persson et al., 2012, p. 457).  The perpetration of corrupt practices, whether 
seen as wrong or not, becomes almost hardwired into the culture and manifests as habit 
(World Bank, 2014, p. 60).  Defining and categorising corruption becomes problematic 
when there is no clear line between legitimacy and corruption (Johnson & Sharma, 2004, 
p. 3), but more so if corruption is regarded as not having harmful effects.  Of 
consideration for this thesis, some forms of corruption may be more obviously harmful 
and therefore condemned by the majority, rather than condoned.  To expand on the 
earlier discussion, these may be well-known or more explicit practices of corruption, 
such as bribery, which have an economic benefit and are unlawful.  Conversely, as 
explored further below, practices which are not unlawful, such as particularism and 
conflict of interest, are opaquer and more ambiguous in constitution, and do not 
necessarily have an obvious detrimental or harmful impact.  Notwithstanding, many 
employees within Victorian local government claimed to have observed such practices 
frequently (Graycar, 2013, p. 2).  Accordingly, if corruption is deemed to be in the ‘eye of 
the beholder’ (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 3; Holmes, 2015, p. 2; Olsen, 2014, p. 187), 
a key consideration for this thesis is to acknowledge that overt corrupt practices are 
arguably easier to identify than opaque practices.  Then, the importance for this thesis is 
whether this mediates different understandings around the acceptance of more 
clandestine practices within local government.  
Extending this consideration, it seems reasonable to assume that less overt or harmful 
practices are more likely to continue in perpetuity unless an organisation such as ICAC 
intervenes.  Such intervention is unlikely given the meagre number of referrals made to 
ICAC, and ’the rarity of ICAC’s decisions to intervene in lower threshold complaints.  
Hence, within the council environment, the designation of any activity as ‘corrupt’ 
seemingly remains open to interpretation, and then prone to neutralisation when such 
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practices are considered within the council environment to be acceptable, legitimate or 
justifiable (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 15; Granovetter, 2004, p. 3; Gray, 2013, p. 535).  
The activities may be organisationally and publicly unacceptable, but are not deemed to 
be culturally wrong, deviant or corrupt from the workers’ perspective.  The longer this 
continues, the less guilty workers feel about the conduct.  Lee and Guven (2013, p. 296) 
refer to this as the contagion effect.  In such situations, corruption is praxis.  This became 
evident following the identification of systemic corruption at Wollongong City Council, 
where the external perception was that the council appeared normal (Pedroza, 2011, 
p. 3).  In such a situation, a council maintains public innocence, but internally, practices 
are subject to cover-up, condoned or ignored (Cohen, 2001, p. 66).  Should systemic 
corruption of this kind be evident within a local council, Klitgaard (2000, p. 5) argues, 
‘anti-corruption measures are insufficient’.  If collusive practices are widespread, 
corruption is the norm, argues Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, p. 12); hence, norm-enforcing 
instruments that focus on deviation (e.g. codes of conduct, declarations, policies) 
become futile.  The preceding discussion is important for this thesis, in that views on 
anti-corruption instruments may focus on the more overt forms of corruption at the 
expense of addressing less overt and more abstruse – that is to say, institutionalised – 
forms of corruption.   
It seems pertinent to reflect on Blundo’s (2008, p. 29) observation that there is a risk of 
‘transforming the sociological inquiry into the police inquiry [by] excessively 
“criminalising” the practices observed’.  To précis the aforementioned discussion, 
corruption may encompass unlawful and lawful activities, hence it is not always ‘a secret 
crime hidden in full view’, as phrased by Dormaels (2014, p. 131).  Non-criminal 
practices, which may be construed as corrupt, may be perceived as less harmful or 
victimless, and therefore more entangled within the everydayness of council life.  
Examples of this are discussed further below.  
As one specific practice which is not unlawful, particularism is considered to be 
prevalent within organisations, but the practice is often deemed to be acceptable or 
legitimate by employees (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 12).  There is something of a denial of 
injury: the act does not seemingly result in any perceived degree of harm and is 
therefore fairly innocuous, even desirable, to the successful reproduction of the 
company’s ethos and culture (Sykes & Matza, 1957, pp. 667-668).  Hudson et al. (2017, 
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p. 2) note that particularism is a form of behaviour that ‘covers all personnel decisions in 
the working life of an employee, such as recruitment, selection, promotion and rewards, 
and circumvents objective or standard procedures’.  Notably, hiring friends of family for 
public sector jobs was frequently observed in the Victorian study (Graycar, 2013, p. 2).   
The relationship between particularism, the informality of institutions and higher 
organisational corruption is considered to be ‘theoretically underdeveloped, since the 
precise mechanisms underlying the causal link between particularism and corruption 
have not been fully understood’ (Rotondi & Stanca, 2015, p. 220).  Accordingly, the 
formal existence of anti-corruption measures do not necessarily account for the informal 
practices, interpersonal relationships and power configurations that exist deep within 
the lifeworld of organisational practice (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017, pp. 9-11).  Within the 
ageing workforce of local government (Hastings et al., 2015, p. 9), this is feasibly 
intensified if employees have worked together for lengthy periods (Bauman, 1990, 
p. 85).  Rotondi and Stanca describe this process as follows:  
The intrinsic psychological need for a positive self-image drives individuals to 
compare their own group with other groups to which they do not belong, giving 
preferential treatment to members relative to non-members.  In this perspective, 
humans are naturally sectarian and particularism is a feature of human nature that 
may not be easily changed. (Rotondi & Stanca, 2015, p. 231) 
Practices of corruption that are more clandestine, such as particularism, are complex for 
reasons such as those described above.  Even if such practices are systemic or routine, 
their presence, impact and perceived harms are subtle and inherently subjective 
(Johnson, 2004, p. 145).  Arguably, this affects observers’ reaction and in/action, as the 
less concerned observers are about such practices, the less likely that intervention is 
forthcoming and the more embedded the practices become.  Therefore, developing 
observations by Olsen (2014, p. 186), this thesis sheds light on the extent to which the 
‘nature and scale’ of any wrongdoing impacts on potential observers’ un/willingness to 
report perceived wrongdoing.   
A recent Victorian study conducted by the Australian National University (ANU) found 
that 34% of respondents said they would report corruption on the basis of suspicion 
alone, whereas 56% said they would only report corruption on the basis of hard 
evidence (Graycar, 2014, p. 279).  Similarly, a report commissioned by the Independent 
Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC), which reviewed the integrity 
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frameworks at six councils in the state of Victoria, noted that 71% of respondents felt 
that they would need hard evidence of corruption prior to reporting it (IBAC VIC, 2015b, 
p. 21).  As such, it is feasible that much is not reported to ICAC if potential observers to 
any corrupt act feel that they would not report corruption unless they had hard 
evidence: assumedly, the possession of tangible information or documentation, 
presumably uncovered via auditing practices or employee testimonies.  Therefore, more 
abstruse forms of corruption that do not have obvious materialities – such as conflicts of 
interest and particularism – are likely to remain under the radar.  The significance of this 
for identification and management of corruption is noteworthy and is explored below.  
The significance of the aforementioned insights of Hudson and colleagues (2017, p. 12) 
for this thesis is that potential observers to any corrupt act will base their decision to 
report it on their view of its un/acceptability.  This is discussed by Heidenheimer (2009, 
pp. 152-154), who refers to the interpretation of activity that everyday citizens consider 
corrupt, and how this situated frame of understanding and morality has the potential to 
affect their evaluation and tolerance of it.  A colour-coded classification of black, grey or 
white corruption is based on the opinion of the majority, and is defined below:  
Black corruption indicates that in that setting that particular action is one which a 
majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would like 
to see punished on grounds of principle.  Grey corruption indicates that some 
elements, usually elites, may want to see the action punished, others not, and the 
majority would be ambiguous.  White corruption signifies that the majority of both 
elite and mass opinion probably would not vigorously support an attempt to 
punish a form of corruption that they regard as tolerable.  (Heidenheimer, 2009, 
p. 152) 
Heidenheimer postulates that ‘behaviour can surreptitiously cross the indistinct line 
differentiating grey from black behaviour’, and that some forms of corruption regarded 
as grey in one setting may be viewed as white, ‘or quite acceptable’ in another milieu or 
cultural field (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 153).  In this regard, it is worth examining 
Heidenheimer’s reference to the opinion of the majority.  If public perception is 
informed predominantly by the media and ICAC in relation to certain categories or 
forms of corruption (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 171), then the majority are informed 
accordingly by this means, with different agendas and interpretations shaping their 
impressions (Dormaels, 2015, p. 596; Loves, 2015, p. 159; Osrecki, 2015, p. 348).  
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In a similar vein, Langseth (2012, p. 9) distinguishes between petty corruption and grand 
corruption.  Langseth (2012, p. 9) notes that petty corruption ‘develops and exists within 
the context of established governance and social frameworks’, and it is this aspect that is 
particularly germane to this thesis.  The exposure of grand corruption in the public 
sector arguably falls within the remit of ICAC’s jurisdiction, but petty corruption may 
escalate to grand corruption if it is not reported, or continues without intervention 
(Zyglidopoulos et al., 2009, p. 66).  The tolerance of petty (mundane) corruption is 
therefore a fundamental aspect to consider in this thesis, and for the generation of 
knowledge in this field.  Tolerance and acceptability may be pivotal factors mediating 
the visibility or wilful ignorance (Heffernan, 2011, p. 104) of forms of corruption which 
are seen as mundane or unexceptional.  That is to say, there may be a systemic unseeing 
and deniability of events that are transpiring every day and in full view.  In mid-2017, 
ICAC reported on its investigation into an accounting fraud conducted primarily by the 
chief financial officer at Botany Bay Council; the investigation identified a number of 
fraudulent activities, including falsification of invoices and solicitation of payments 
(ICAC NSW, 2017b).  However, many of the fraudulent activities evolved over the course 
of an 18-year period, and the ICAC report noted that many individuals were aware of the 
activities but did nothing about it, with complicity and indifference among some staff 
members (ICAC NSW, 2017b, pp. 38-46). 
Corrupt conduct that has been perpetrated over a significant duration, such as in this 
case, indicates a degree of institutionalisation and enculturation.  The aggregate of 
multiple, perhaps seemingly innocuous, corrupt events would contribute to this.  Even if 
potentially corrupt behaviours have not been overtly or consciously rationalised – in 
accordance with the techniques of neutralisation (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or the fraud 
triangle (Cressey, 1973) – it may be that they are simply not seen as wrong or 
problematic, historically or culturally, until they are challenged by an external authority 
such as ICAC (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, p. 141).  This approach is comparable with 
Kelling and Wilson’s (1982) broken windows theory wherein such activities are noted 
initially, but over time are ignored as they are unattended to, and then no one notices 
the gradual build-up.  After a while, practices of corruption which are seen, in that they 
are observed, but which are disregarded, become less and less noticeable.  Hence, over 
time, they become unseen: individuals continue to experience and see them but take 
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little notice or simply accept them as normal.  Corruption may flourish within a cultural 
environment where the deterioration of ethical and professional conduct is seen as 
normal by those within the organisation (Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008, p. 137).   
Organisational denial and complicity of this kind usually only surface when someone 
speaks out (Cohen, 2001, p. 66), yet it is debatable whether that someone would be 
guaranteed an avenue of redress in the absence of a capable guardian or an effective 
reporting framework.  If a council does not have the ability or willingness to address 
mundane forms of corruption when they transpire, and to intervene prior to their 
escalation, then unexceptional (petty) corruption has the potential to morph into 
exceptional (grand) corruption.   
2.3.10 Reporting corruption 
In terms of identifying and reporting on corrupt conduct, international studies suggest 
that ‘two in three (67%) people around the globe believe that ordinary people can make 
a difference in the fight against corruption’ (Transparency International, 2013c, p. 21).  
Further, these studies contend that 90% of respondents are willing to report corruption 
(Transparency International, 2013c) and an overwhelming majority of people in most 
countries stated that they would report corruption, with a staggering 92% of people in 
Denmark claiming this course of action (Graycar, 2013, p. 47).   
A key term used internally to report such wrongdoing is whistleblowing, which 
Transparency International (2013d, p. 4) defines as ‘the disclosure of information 
related to corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or hazardous activities being committed in or by 
public or private sector organisations’.  In NSW, legislative protection against reprisal 
action is afforded to public officials in the form of the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994 
(PID Act).  This legislation is considered crucial to managing corruption, as it is the 
‘insiders who often possess the most crucial information [but] due to their position 
within and dependency on the institution concerned, are seen as requiring assistance, 
incentives … and who may face the worst kinds of reprisals and consequences’ (Lewis et 
al., 2014, p. 5).   
In Australia’s largest whistleblowing study, 89% of respondent organisations had 
formal, written whistleblowing procedures or polices, and 90% of organisations had 
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processes for ensuring appropriate investigations or management actions in response to 
whistleblowing practices (Brown et al., 2016, p. 1).  Notwithstanding these structures, 
whistleblowing is considered to be one of the most ‘complex, conflict-ridden areas of 
public policy and legislative practice’ (Roberts & Brown, 2010, p. 56), and a number of 
studies indicate that citizens have limited knowledge of mechanisms for reporting 
corruption (Recanatini, 2011b, p. 45).  By way of example, four years prior to this study, 
a poll conducted by the ANU identified that around half of surveyed respondents ‘did not 
know to whom or where to report corruption’ (McAllister et al., 2012, p. 5).  Just one 
year after the introduction of legislative protection, in the form of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 19949 on 1 March 1995, the response to a survey conducted across 11 
organisations in the public sector arrived at a near identical finding: just over half of all 
respondents did not know of internal reporting procedures within their organisation 
(Zipparo, 1999a, pp. 84-85).  A study conducted by ICAC (2010c, p. 31) identified that 
87% of local councils had an internal reporting channel, yet only 43% of local councils 
had an internal reporting channel that the respondents knew how to use.   
Statutory protection against associated reprisal action appears to be fundamental as a 
means of encouraging reports about corruption, as indicated by the aforementioned 
whistleblowing studies and polls.  However, whether they are sensitive to the contested 
and messy framing of the phenomenon ‘corruption’, and the degree to which 
transgressions are perceived as being harmful or detrimental, is not clear.  Hence, what 
is significant for this thesis, is whether there is a disconnect between the regulatory 
structures which provide statutory whistleblowing protections and offer a means to 
report, with how effective and legitimised they are in reality.  
The importance placed on reporting frameworks is a salient one, as global studies 
consistently claim that the detection of fraud and corruption is most likely through 
reporting, qua whistleblowing (ACFE, 2012, p. 17; 2014, p. 19; 2016b, p. 11).  However, 
barriers and impediments exist within the occupational domain, regardless of the formal 
presence of reporting frameworks that might exist within councils.  In a survey 
conducted by the ANU on behalf of IBAC, nearly half (46%) of all respondents ‘would not 
feel confident they would be protected from victimisation should they report corruption’ 
 
9 Subsequently renamed Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994. 
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(Graycar, 2013, p. 14; 2014, p. 279).  In NSW, 65% of respondents stated that they felt 
confident that they would be protected from reprisal for reporting misconduct or 
wrongdoing, up from 58% in 2012 (Public Service Commission, 2015, p. 20).  This 
increase of 7% was considered to be ‘an improvement in the reporting culture’ 
(Ombudsman NSW, 2015, p. 22).  Although this figure was presented in a positive light, 
if 58% of respondents felt confident that they would be protected from reprisal action, 
the remaining 42% would presumably not feel confident, a finding similar to that 
identified by IBAC.   
Australia has long-established whistleblower legislation, and a number of frameworks 
that have been designed to encourage and enable reports to be made.  Hence, reporting 
should not be as complicated or unsafe as it might be in other countries (Recanatini, 
2011b, p. 46).  Still, under-reporting is usual within most organisations (Jensen & 
Rahman, 2015, p. 166), and in a general sense, it is argued that people will keep their 
heads down if they observe corruption (Johnston, 2012, pp. 59-60).  Punch (1996, 
p. 266) maintains that, in spite of compliance-based requirements such as codes of 
conduct and whistleblowing frameworks, people ‘submerge their wills, and shelve their 
consciences, in the interests of the organisation’.  Employees’ un/willingness is therefore 
a key component of obduracy, and one that will not necessarily be changed because a 
council implements anti-corruption measures.  Loyalty to colleagues, as well as to the 
organisation (Zipparo, 1999b, p. 273), may factor in employees’ un/willingness to 
report.  This may be especially true in councils where there are entrenched historical 
structures or examples of misuse of authority, or legacies of distrust between workers 
and management (Huberts et al., 2006, p. 283).  Cohen (2001, p. 68) terms this a ‘code of 
silence’ and it is also framed as a ‘blue wall, curtain, or cocoon of silence’ (Skolnick, 
2002, p. 7).  This cultural mechanism or structure either encourages or impedes efforts 
to address corruption (Skolnick, 2002, p. 12); it has been identified in the police cultures 
within the Australian states of NSW (Brown, 1997) and Queensland (Dillon & Gilling, 
2016).  Employees who speak up may be perceived as ‘dobbing in a mate’, this being a 
common cultural trope known to most Australians, but one that is considered to have 
little credence in ’contemporary society (Roberts & Brown, 2010, p. 56).  The value of 
exploring such concepts within this thesis is important for the extension of knowledge 
about corruption in local government, in terms of how it manifests and how 
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conventional programs designed to eradicate it may be limited in their effectiveness.  As 
acknowledged by Klitgaard (1988, p. 186), a culture of corruption is not that ‘everyone 
is corrupt but that almost everyone will be unwilling to report on the corrupt’.  
As discussed above, it seems pertinent to note that statutory protections exist to protect 
potential whistleblowers, and encourage reporting, but there may be a number of 
organisational and cultural complexities associated with raising concerns that are worth 
considering as part of the methodology in this study.  From there, if reports about 
corruption are forthcoming, it becomes pertinent to consider where such reports will be 
made and how the council will react and respond to them.  Witnesses to corrupt 
behaviour may consider the options available to them for raising concerns and, as 
explored below, it is likely that there will be a number of factors and elements that may 
inform their decision-making calculus.  These may include confidence in the reporting 
mechanisms, as well as the availability, and sensitivity and receptivity, of a person to 
report to.   
IBAC (2015a, p. 1) identified that, of the staff who would report corruption in local 
government in Victoria, ‘almost half of them (47%) would report to their immediate 
manager’.  Similarly, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (2016a, p. 10) 
noted that a direct supervisor would likely be the party to whom whistleblowers would 
report their concerns.   This is important, as managers are seen as key role players in the 
cultivation of institutional integrity within local government (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2013, 
p. 20), with a pivotal responsibility in terms of recognising and managing 
whistleblowing in their organisation (Roberts et al., 2011, p. 9).  As interpreted by 
Zipparo (1999a, p. 84), managers have the ‘potential to: (1) impact upon their 
employees’ awareness of relevant legal protection; (2) impact upon their employees’ 
attitudes to reporting corruption; and (3) provide a safe environment in which 
employees can make reports’.   
There are issues associated with this interpretation, however.  Much of the existing 
evidence notes that managers and supervisors inconsistently address concerns (CCC 
WA, 2013, p. 19) and often practise denial strategies (Cohen, 2001, p. 62).  Shepherd and 
Button (2018, p. 16) assert that ‘managers avoid the pro-active prevention of 
occupational fraud and turn a blind-eye to detected incidents unless the circumstances 
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dictate that the negative consequences of avoiding the problem outweigh the negative 
consequences of addressing it’.  Of note also is that managers may themselves be 
engaged in corruption in the course of their duties, either implicitly or explicitly.  The 
ACFE (2012, p. 43) reported that managers accounted for nearly half of all perpetrators 
of corruption in Oceania.  This fact arguably has the potential to cause distress and 
discomfort for any employee who knowingly identifies, or harbours suspicions, that 
their superior is acting corruptly.  Consequently, an employee may consider that they 
have done the right thing in reporting a suspicion to their manager.  However, if the 
manager fails to act on it appropriately or in a timely fashion, or if they dismiss the 
severity of the corrupt act, then the practice may continue.  The employee will likely 
then become disenchanted and demoralised, and thus disincentivised to report further 
concerns.  
2.4 Summary 
The theories discussed at the outset of this chapter inform the research questions and 
orientate the literature review which followed.  Together, they suggest that any attempts 
to understand or effectively address corruption in the local government sector are 
limited until more is known about the situated meanings and practices that local 
government employees attribute to corruption.  This review of the literature has 
assisted in formulating the research approach and has offered some tools to 
conceptualise the findings.  As a means of exploring the situated nature of corruption, it 
seems pertinent to appreciate that understandings and impressions on the ground are 
the complex result of institutional and cultural relations.  Accordingly, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the approach to exploring the nature and meaning of corruption within the 
context of local government is very much influenced by the perspectives of grounded 
theory, social constructivism and symbolic interactionism. 
Key insights have been identified as being relevant to the study, particularly those that 
relate to the importance of meaning and context, rather than regulatory confinement or 
legalistic definition.  These latter aspects are particularly relevant for this research 
project, to the extent that they have shaped different impressions and regulatory 
mandates, and thus informed citizens’ understanding of corruption.  Specifically, this 
thesis is concerned with the degree to which any regulatory mandates and associated 
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frameworks of definition may have compartmentalised views on corruption, 
representing corruption as a reductive concept, without necessarily considering how 
different types of subjectivity impact recognition, reaction and response.  Within the 
scholarly study of corruption, the didactical elements that have focused on the 
regulation, prosecution and measurement of corruption have been difficult to correlate 
with the situated practices on the ground, in terms of how these practices may be 
construed by those who see them, choose not to, or see them differently.  The realisation 
that corruption is a contentious practice and concept that is infused with different 
meanings and relevance becomes problematic for the furtherance of, and highlights 
some limitations in, the body of knowledge on corruption.  In this regard, the 
exploratory nature of the study proposed in the next chapter serves to advance the 
knowledge in this area within the situated context of local government.   
Chapter 3 will now proceed by introducing the research approach and the methodology 
of the study.   
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and methods that underpin the 
research undertaken, as discussed in previous chapters.  Although the terms methods 
and methodology are intrinsically associated, methods involves ‘data collection, data 
analysis, and possibly interpretation’, whereas methodology involves ‘everything from 
the worldview at the start of the research process to the last procedures of inquiry’ 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989, cited by Creswell, 2010, p. 51).   
In a more structured manner, Crotty (1998, p. 2) states that there are four elements to 
the research process, namely: (1) the methods that are proposed; (2) the methodology 
that governs the choice and use of methods; (3) the theoretical perspective that lies 
behind the chosen methodology; and (4) the epistemology that informs the theoretical 
perspective.  Each stage must be engaged before advancing to the next.  Accordingly, 
when building on the theoretical influences explored in Chapter 2, this chapter begins by 
introducing the rationale behind the methodological approach adopted in this thesis, 
which seeks to address the research question:  
How is occupational corruption perceived, interpreted and managed within 
NSW local government?  
3.2 Research approach 
The primary aim of this research was to explore the potential for corruption within the 
administrative realm of local government in NSW, especially via researching employee 
and regulatory perspectives and experiences.   
First-hand accounts from public officials employed on the frontline were acquired and 
examined, to gauge attitudinal perceptions and views, and to explore the officials’ 
subjective experiences of ‘everyday’ corruption and some of the meanings they ascribe 
to different workplace practices.  To complement this broad level trend data across a 
sample base of councils in NSW, a group of individuals with expertise in and 
responsibilities for addressing the prospect of corruption in local government were 
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interviewed.  By triangulating the acquired data, this research sought to develop a 
greater understanding about the nature and extent of social and cultural factors that 
differentially mediate occupational corruption within local government.  
3.2.1 Overview of research approach  
The approach to this research was pragmatic in orientation.  Greene and Hall (2010, 
p. 131) acknowledge that pragmatism affords the researcher greater epistemological 
and methodological flexibility; for this research, it meant that different practical means 
could be considered and utilised to address the research objectives.  This approach was 
valuable, as multiple perspectives invariably determine how corruption is perceived and 
addressed in local government; such perspectives may be based on opinion, derived 
from direct experience or mediated exposure, or influenced by any number of factors.  
The source of perspectives was considered particularly germane because, as discussed 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.6), many perceptions of corruption are based on indirect 
sources as opposed to first-hand or direct experience (McAllister et al., 2012, p. 12; Van 
de Walle, 2008, p. 233).   
Based on Eskola’s (1998, cited by Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 11) three most important 
epistemological positions in the social sciences – (1) positivism; (2) social realism; and 
(3) social constructivism – the main epistemological stance adopted in this research is 
social constructivism, with influence from social realism in the way data was validated 
and cross-referenced.  With social constructivism, ‘meaning is not discovered, but 
constructed [… and as such] different people may construct meaning in different ways, 
even in relation to the same phenomenon’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 9).  This is essentially the 
case with corruption, and it is this symbolic factor that drives the need to ascertain what 
meanings people attribute to corruption, from where these meanings originate, and to 
understand how such frameworks of understanding assist or inhibit efforts to manage 
corruption.  The social meanings that individuals ascribe to corruption in local 
government is pivotal to this causality, and may be affected by: employees’ experiences 
and understanding; demographic features, such as age, gender, ethnicity and socio-
economic status; social factors such as length of service; or what role the employee 
performs.   
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Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 13) note that ‘the constructivist paradigm assumes a 
relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (knower 
and respondent co-create understandings), and a naturalistic (in the natural world) set 
of methodological procedures’.  In the context of this thesis, this implies that individuals 
see corruption through different ‘lenses’.  The epistemological position of social realism 
acknowledges the relevance of these factors, as social reality is not objectively defined, 
but mediated by different perceptions, actions and interpretations (Curtis & Curtis, 
2011, pp. 12-13).  This is important, as the discourse and practice of corruption 
invariably mean different things to different people.  As explored in Chapter 2, this could 
be informed by many factors, such as differing understandings and definitions 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 11; Kurer, 2015); cultural influences (Larmour, 2008, p. 232; 
Recanatini, 2011b, p. 46; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, pp. 5, 53); and the context of the 
changing social and political environment that participants operate within (Torsello & 
Venard, 2016, p. 37).  What is key is the notion that participants have not approached 
the subject of corruption de novo and factors such as these inform and shape their views 
about its incidence in their locality or workplace.  These factors, and others, were 
therefore explored and contrasted, as it was deemed important to place respondent 
experiences and impressions into context.    
Grounded theory, defined as ‘the discovery of theory from data’ (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, 
p. 1), was the chosen approach for analysing the data and is one that draws on the 
pragmatic philosophy (Strübing, 2010, p. 580), as discussed further in Section 3.3.1.  
Through a sequential, mixed methods design, the results were verified through a 
process of triangulation, explained in Section 3.3.2.   
3.3 Methodology 
Methodology, also referred to as ‘research approach’ (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 287), has 
been defined as ‘the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice 
and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired 
outcome’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 3).  The methodological approach used in this research was a 
mixed methods one, which synergistically integrates, but also holds in tension, data from 
various sources (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2010, p. 5).  The aim was to determine the 
sampling frame and the choice of data collection techniques as a means of 
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understanding how the phenomenon of corruption is understood, interpreted and 
explained.  
3.3.1 Grounded theory to shape the methods 
In grounded theory, ‘data collection and analysis reciprocally inform and shape each 
other through an emergent iterative process’ (Charmaz, 2011, p. 360) and, ‘unlike most 
strategies of inquiry, grounded theory demands that data collection and analysis occur 
concurrently, rather than in a linear sequence’ (Dunne, 2011, p. 111).  As such, theory is 
derived from interrogation of the data (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 90) in combination with 
some of the conceptual frameworks which have informed the study design.  Key to this 
process of theory generation is that the three stages of data collection, coding and 
analysis are blurred and occur simultaneously and iteratively (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, 
p. 43).   
As quantitative data acquired during the first stage of this research required cross-
tabulation to differentiate between views and attribute them to particular factors, such 
as gender, position, length of service, et cetera, the views of Charmaz (2011, p. 361) 
were useful in that ‘grounded theory prompts us to study and interact with our data by 
moving through comparative levels of analysis’.  During both phases of research, many 
councils in NSW were facing the prospect of impending amalgamation, and it was likely 
that respondents’ views would be affected by changing structural conditions.  
Accordingly, participants’ views about corruption and its management in local 
government may be found to have shifted if such research were to be conducted months 
later.   
In relation to this, the views of Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 5) were heeded, that as 
‘phenomena are … continually changing in response to evolving conditions an important 
component of the method is to build change, through process, into the method’.  Despite 
the researcher being prepared to make any adjustments to the methods, in practice no 
impromptu modifications were required, but the prospect of structural reform did have 
a bearing on how the research instruments were considered conceptually.  Each was 
devised in a way that would mitigate changes in the structural landscape of local 
government as best as could be envisaged and prepared for.  As an example, questions in 
the survey design of Phase 1 (discussed in the next section) did not refer to any borders 
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or structural features of the respondent’s council.  The proclamation of 20 amalgamated 
councils in NSW took place on 12 May 2016 (NSW Government, 2017b), a few days 
before the final interview conducted during Phase 2 of this research project.   Hence the 
amalgamation of councils did not directly affect the gathering of data, but certainly had 
the potential to impact on how respondents reflected on their council and role.  
Glaser and Strauss (2008, p. 5) assert that ‘theory in sociology is a strategy for handling 
data in research, providing modes of conceptualisation for describing and explaining’.  
Quite aptly, therefore, Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 5) contend that ‘procedures of 
grounded theory are designed to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide 
a thorough theoretical explanation of social phenomena under study [and, as such,] 
grounded theory should explain as well as describe’.  As the process of coding took place, 
the coding of categories become theoretically saturated (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, pp. 111-
112), to the extent that the number of categories was directed and circumscribed by the 
patterns emerging in the data.  This is discussed further in Section 3.5.6.   
The grounded theory approach meant that different methods could be combined, a 
process of inductively generating theory as opposed to deductively testing a hypothesis, 
allowing new avenues of intellectual inquiry and themes to emerge.  Crotty (1998, p. 3) 
defines methods as ‘the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data 
related to some research question or hypothesis’.  As more than one choice of method 
was utilised in this research project, the chosen methodological approach for this study 
was mixed methods.   
3.3.2 Mixed methods  
There have been a number of definitions and standpoints on what constitutes mixed 
methods research (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2011, p. 285) and how, and under what 
circumstances, it should be conducted (Creswell, 2011, pp. 271-272).  Johnson and 
colleagues offer the following definition:  
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, 
analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration. (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 123) 
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Similarly, Leech (2010, pp. 257-258) observes the view of some researchers that mixed 
methods research incorporates quantitative and qualitative aspects into a single project.  
Typically, quantitative approaches constitute survey research, taking the form of 
statistical analyses, while qualitative approaches focus on narrative, experience and 
context, and aim to elicit richness in meaning (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 6).  Mixed 
methods research may also encompass data which has a variety of nuances and such 
data may be acquired using different approaches (Morse, 2010, p. 340).  This may 
incorporate analysis of data sourced from the ‘grey literature’, including online research 
reports, survey results or unpublished theses.  These might not be peer reviewed or 
academic in orientation, but if such literature were to be excluded, without due 
assessment of their quality, one might be missing a valuable contribution to the research 
under study.  As discussed in Section 3.3.3, a qualitative and quantitative research 
approach was adopted, but the third aspect of a tripartite design included a systematic 
content analysis of investigation reports produced by the NSW ICAC to produce further 
context and insights (see Appendix 1).  
3.3.3 Justification of the mixed methods approach 
Greene and colleagues (1989, p. 259) outline five general purposes for which 
researchers might like to use mixed methods: (1) triangulation; (2) complementarity; 
(3) development; (4) initiation; and (5) expansion. These purposes were subsequently 
developed by Bryman (2006, pp. 105-107) who compiled a detailed list of 16 reasons for 
mixing methods (see Appendix 14 for a summary of these).  Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011, pp. 61-62) acknowledge each of these reasons, but state that although listed 
reasons provide a general framework, it is important for researchers to identify and 
reflect on why they choose to combine methods.  In this study, the employment of mixed 
methods was deemed to be the best means of addressing the research questions (Plano 
Clark & Badice, 2010, p. 285), but also to explore the meaning of corruption from a 
variety of perspectives and scales: what it meant to employees at the frontline and how 
they experienced it (Phase 1); what it meant to practitioners who have expertise and 
responsibilities for governing it (Phase 2); and for each of these strands and phases, to 
be informed by published investigation reports involving local government conducted 
by the ICAC.  
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Operationally, real-world constraints posed a problem in the collection of empirical data 
and this highlighted some important methodological concerns, particularly during 
Phase 1 of the mixed methods study.  Specifically, gaining access to credible empirical 
data from local government employees about their perceptions and experiences 
regarding corruption within their place of work was exceptionally fraught.  On this basis, 
and explained further below, the views of Bamberger and colleagues (2010, p. 621) 
were registered, that a well-designed mixed methods approach would seek to mitigate 
such constraints, by integrating data from multiple sources and using ‘triangulation to 
strengthen the validity of estimates’.  Because just a sample of councils formed the initial 
research base, a limitation in the gathering of data was the improbability of yielding 
generalisable results in relation to the NSW local government sector.  This may have 
been limited further if just one research method was adopted.  By employing different 
methods and speaking with different stakeholders, validity could be enhanced, and by 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods, the benefits were greater than reliance 
on each alone.  For example, a purely quantitative approach would have restricted any 
ability to interact and engage with research participants, but this became possible by 
integrating the qualitative component.  This offered the ability to probe and question on 
issues of note, thus strengthening the validity of estimates or broad-brush data gained in 
the quantitative stage (Bamberger et al., 2010, p. 623).   
Each research stage was well thought-out, to ensure that data gained from different 
sources was based on similar, complementary or comparable assumptions about 
corruption within the operational context of local government (Mason, 2009, p. 35).  
This meant that consideration could be given to the sequence of stages.  By conducting 
the quantitative component first, it was considered that this would impact on the 
knowledge-building process, by informing the nature of questions in the qualitative 
component.  On reflection, this sequence proved to be useful, not knowing, during the 
first stage of research, how local government employees might see corruption in their 
lifeworld.  
The purpose of the research was not to solve any debates about the definition of 
corruption, but to explore how those who encounter it (Phase 1) and those who address 
it (Phase 2) perceive, understand and interpret different practices and observations; and 
to ascertain the existence of any contradictions.  While each phase of research had a 
60 
 
different aim and strategy, each followed the same ‘“logic of inference”’, by linking 
arguments, inferences and assertions with evidence based on identical principles and 
standards (Brady et al., 2004, pp. 18-20, cited by, Goldthorpe, 2007, p. 4).  This allowed 
for a more synergistic integration of the data sets, aligning each within the underlying 
aims and questions of the broader research study.  In this sense, the ‘pragmatic stance 
advances mixing multiple sources of evidence to attain and modify knowledge [… and is 
an] active and iterative process of establishing warranted assertions as they are applied 
in new experiences’ (Greene & Hall, 2010, pp. 132-133).   
In the design of the research instruments, Yin’s (2006, p. 41) note of caution was heeded, 
regarding the importance of integrating mixed methods into a single study so that 
neither method sits alone in parallel to the other.  As an example, Yin (2006, pp. 42-43) 
asserts that qualitative studies address “process” questions, whereas quantitative 
questions address “outcome” questions, and that a study ‘would be strengthened if both 
the quantitative and qualitative methods each addressed some aspect of both process 
and outcome questions’.  On this basis, Phase 1 of this study, which was predominantly 
quantitative, included a qualitative element.  This allowed respondents to give an open-
ended explanation about why they answered a question in a particular way or an 
opportunity to elaborate on their reasoning.  This resulted in a degree of crossover 
between techniques used, and it presented an opportunity to address the complexities 
of the same problem from different scales and in a more agile fashion (Yin, 2006, p. 44).  
Moreover, this strategy provided a richer, thicker dimension to the quantitative phase, 
which sought to underpin the broad-level data with an enriched understanding.  
Further elaboration on the stages of the sequential mixed methods study is outlined 
under Section 3.3.6.  The following summarises the mixed methods study, which 
comprised a tripartite design, incorporating three distinct methods.  Each stage 
informed the next, but also looped back to the former.  
The design comprised three parts: (i) analysis of ICAC investigation reports relating to 
local government; (ii) attitudinal survey (Phase 1); and (iii) in-depth and active 
interviews (Phase 2). These are described below.    
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i. Analysis of ICAC investigation reports relating to local government   
This was used to provide context for the design of the two empirical case studies, listed 
below.  A taxonomy of local government investigations conducted by ICAC over the 
course of a 15-year period indicated that the majority of investigations publicly reported 
by ICAC involved practices of corruption conducted by or involving appointed officials in 
local government as opposed to elected officials (see Appendix 1 and Figure 2.2).  On 
this basis, the subsequent research instruments focused on the prospect of corruption 
by, or involving, the appointed officials (employees), a population hitherto under-
researched in contemporary studies.  
ii. Attitudinal survey (Phase 1)  
A questionnaire was sent to a sample of councils in NSW and was voluntarily completed 
by employees of the participating council.  This questionnaire also incorporated a 
qualitative component, with respondents given an opportunity at various stages to give 
reasons for their answers or to provide an open-ended narrative or elaboration if there 
was anything further they wished to add.  
iii. In-depth and active interviews (Phase 2) 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a number of stakeholders who have 
expertise and responsibilities for addressing corruption in local government.  Broader 
elaboration on the interviewee base is discussed in Section 3.5.2.   
Through implementation of a tripartite design, this mixed method approach sought to 
explain, as well as describe, causal explanations for how corruption may manifest in 
local government and why reporting is presently considered to be low.   
The administered survey (see Section 3.4) provided surface-level data across a breadth 
of diverse and disparate councils in NSW, while connecting with the ensuing qualitative 
aspect of the research.  Building on the knowledge produced via the first two stages of 
the study, the qualitative interviews with anti-corruption practitioners or guardians 
provided a richer and deeper level of understanding of how corruption tends to manifest 
in local government (see Section 3.5).   
62 
 
Ultimately, this approach sought to develop both policy and practitioner knowledge on 
this phenomenon with a view to identifying strategies and structures which could 
meaningfully impact on policies seeking to reduce corrupt practices in local government.  
3.3.4 Influence of the researcher 
Throughout the interview process, perspectives are likely to stem from both the 
researcher and the respondent.  Luff (1999, p. 701, cited by, Warren, 2002, p. 84) refers 
to these as ‘“fractured subjectivities”’, noting that both parties do not ‘speak to each 
other from stable and coherent standpoints, but from varied (and constantly 
transitioning) perspectives’.  Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 12) offer a similar viewpoint, 
stating that any account given by a respondent during an interview would be based on 
that person’s lens.  They state that ‘any gaze is always filtered through the lenses of 
language, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity … [T]here are no objective 
observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of, and between, the 
observer and the observed’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 12).  In seeking to explicate what 
corruption means to participants, this was especially important, as participants’ 
perceptions and exposure to subject matter, both in situ and in popular media, would 
have informed their perspective at that time, as well as their present state of mind as 
they completed the questionnaire or responded to the interview questions.  The 
influence of such factors invariably shaped the content and flow of the interview and 
necessitated a degree of understanding, when sense was being made of the responses 
during analysis (Warren, 2002, p. 84).   
Responses given by participants, and the positions they were speaking from, may have 
been personal, professional or simply from a standpoint that they felt most comfortable 
with.  The mixed method research design sought to accommodate this, by synthesising 
quantitative with qualitative approaches in order to elicit richer, thicker descriptions at 
different scales (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 128).  Data from each phase was respectively 
assessed, analysed and then integrated and triangulated in anticipation of emerging 
patterns and themes (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127).  As discussed in subsequent 
chapters, contradictions and nuances emerged, and this did importantly highlight how 
understandings of corruption are influenced by different perspectives, which have a 
contingent effect on how it is then managed and addressed.  
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Based on views put forward by Curtis and Curtis (2011, p. 48), a social realist approach 
was considered appropriate, recognising that while interviewees would have some pre-
conceived notions before the interview, emergent knowledge may be created during the 
research process in that new ideas may be embryonic.  This viewpoint is observed by 
the creators of grounded theory, who acknowledge that ‘the researcher does not 
approach reality from a tabula rasa.  He must have a perspective that will help him see 
relevant data and abstract significant categories from … scrutiny of the data’  (Glaser & 
Strauss, 2008, p. 3).  Therefore, the researcher’s role and influence, as the key research 
instrument, was essential to the success of the study and the interpretation and 
arrangement of emerging data (Patton, 2015, p. 700).  As Ravitch and Riggan (2012, 
p. 11) contend, ‘personal background, professional role, and social location need to be 
viewed as methodological considerations worthy of critical attention’.10  These 
attributes were considered thoroughly during the design stages.11 
The researcher’s professional experiences working as a practitioner in the corruption 
governance field undoubtedly played a fundamental role in how the study was 
formulated and operationalised.  Biases have the potential to manifest at the design 
stage or during data collection, as well as when analysis is being conducted or when 
writing up (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010, p. 619).  The researcher recognised that biases 
could manifest subconsciously, and did not seek to avoid any type of inherent bias, but 
remained mindful of it and how bias might inadvertently be projected on the research 
participants and research materials.  To mitigate this risk, measures were applied to 
limit any perception of influence on the object of inquiry by fully disclosing the nature of 
the inquiry to participants during both phases of research, and emphasising that this 
project was in no way affiliated with the researcher’s occupation12.  A documented audit 
trail of correspondence and transcription of interviews was retained to minimise any 
misinterpretation.  Moreover, the researcher’s supervisory team, and close contact with 
them throughout the research process, also acted as a means of critically interrogating 
and problematising any assumptions in the design and administration of the research.  
 
10 This experience is detailed further in the Preface. 
11 As an example, the researcher’s occupation as a full-time employee of a council in NSW was openly disclosed, and 
survey respondents were advised that this particular council would be purposefully excluded from the sample.   
12 This is outlined in more detail in Appendix 4 and Appendix 6. 
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3.3.5 Reliability and validity in the research  
This section outlines how the research approach was enacted and experienced in light of 
the potentially conflicting data collection instruments and procedures that were 
employed.  While one argument is that rigour can actually be enhanced by merging 
distinct approaches, including grounded theory (Johnson et al., 2001, cited by, Dunne, 
2011, p. 113), this research observed the view of Curtis and Curtis (2011, p. 72) that 
‘research is only considered to be rigorous when it aligns with accepted standards of 
reliability and validity’.  The authors contend that ‘reliability measures the extent to 
which the analysis of data yield results that can be repeated or reproduced at different 
times or by different researchers [and] validity measures the extent to which the 
research is accurate and the extent to which claims can be made based on the research’ 
(Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 72).  These principles were considered at each point of the 
research process to guide and orientate the research practice, as discussed below.  
Building on the notion of reliability, Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 15) note that ‘no theory 
that deals with social psychological phenomena is actually reproducible in the sense that 
new situations can be found whose conditions do not exactly match those of the original 
study, although major conditions may be similar’.  They contend that ‘a grounded theory 
[approach] is reproducible in the limited sense that it is verifiable’ (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990, p. 15).  With this in mind, an online survey tool captured data acquired throughout 
the quantitative survey, the details of which are fully documented.  As previously 
discussed, the results from the survey had a bearing on how subsequent stages of this 
mixed methods research study were designed, developed and executed.  The crucial 
aspect of this, therefore, was to ensure that research questions were piloted, refined and 
tested as extensively as time would allow.  This is discussed further in Section 3.4.5.   
Curtis and Curtis (2011, p. 91) argue that ‘a key aspect of validity is the 
comprehensiveness of the variables used [which] can be enhanced by using multiple 
sources of evidence’.  Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 125) refer to Schwandt’s (1997) 
definition of validity as ‘how accurately the account represents participants’ realities of 
the social phenomena and is credible to them’.  This was especially important during the 
survey component of the research, as the questionnaire was the only tool of 
communication and therefore had to be clear, simple, time-efficient and as unambiguous 
65 
 
as was possible.  During the interviews, participants had more of an opportunity to 
clarify any ambiguities about the meaning of terminology.  Once the research 
commenced, verification strategies continued to be employed as the inquiry 
materialised (Morse et al., 2002, p. 18).  This was done through the checking of survey 
responses during the six weeks that the survey was open.   
During this time, quantitative data was interpreted, compared and contextualised, a 
practice enhancing rigour and generating knowledge (Brannen, 2005, p. 180) while at 
the same time informing the ensuing design of the qualitative research.  A particular 
challenge was ensuring that respondents were aware of and reminded that the research 
was seeking to explore corruption at the occupational level of local government.  Despite 
this, it became clear within some of the responses that delineating between the 
occupational (employees) and elected (councillors) domains was not easy.  Some 
respondents saw corruption as occurring at an elected level and less, or not at all, at the 
operational level.  In itself, this proved an interesting finding, and aided the design of the 
semi-structured interviews which followed.  It highlighted a need to be more explicit 
about the setting that was being explored within the interviews, but also gave a reason 
to explore, with interview participants, more about corruption within the occupational 
realm and why it may, or may not, be seen by those who work in that milieu.  
Given the sequential nature of adopting a complex mixed methods approach, 
triangulation was a viable and apt validation procedure.  Triangulation searches ‘for 
convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or 
categories in a study’ (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 126).  It is used as a means of 
recognising the multiplex dimensions and realities that accommodate social phenomena, 
and seeks to ensure that each method, as realistically as possible, complements or 
nuances the others in the pursuit of knowledge (Mason, 2009, pp. 190-191).  Rather 
than seeking a definitive truth about corruption, the research sought more to explore 
the subjective realities of corruption from different perspectives and scales, to establish 
if there were continuities and to establish and probe areas where divergences were 
identified.  
At a practical level, the exploratory stages of the research sought to ensure that the focus 
aligned with ideas and themes emergent in the literature.  During the fieldwork 
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component, the researcher was acutely aware of the need to employ reflexivity, defined 
by Curtis and Curtis (2011, p. 288) as the ‘process of being self-reflexive or self-aware in 
the research process’.  In doing this, the researcher was conscious of how the method of 
documentation might be influenced (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 101), in terms of choosing what 
was recorded and what was left out, and ensuring an openness to interpretations and 
responses that might trouble or contradict the developing thesis.  As discussed within 
Section 3.3.4, the existence of bias was not entirely avoidable, so the researcher 
remained cognisant of its potential to influence data collection and analysis, and was 
mindful to ensure that this was mitigated as much as possible.  As an example, different 
skills and assumptions were reviewed at various stages, including the conceptual, 
design, research, analytical and writing-up stages of this thesis.  This included the 
drafting of many mind maps, and keeping a journal of notes containing ideas, 
assumptions and avenues.  These maps and journal notes provided an overview of 
existing and emerging topics to research, and an ideas trail to continually reflect on and 
refine.  Moreover, as previously mentioned, the researcher’s supervisory team acted to 
trouble and ‘open out’ some of the habitual and dominant modes of approaching the 
phenomenon of corruption.  
3.3.6 Research design 
As identified in Chapter 2, there are a number of limitations with the framing of 
corruption in popular culture and in the academy, and the multitude of ways in which it 
can manifest and materialise.  The epistemological challenge was to find out, through 
interaction with stakeholders in local government, distinctive and decisive answers to 
questions that cannot be acquired through other means.  As outlined earlier 
(Section 3.3.3), the research design embraced the use of three sequential methods of 
analysis, each of which bore relevance to the study as a whole, but which specifically 
addressed the intellectual gaps identified in the literature.  
The views of Hall and Howard (2008, cited by Creswell, 2011, p. 279) were significant in 
this regard, in that cognition of a synergistic typology would seek to ensure that no 
research method was dominant, but that each instead was ascribed equal weighting in 
accreting the evidence base.  A synergistic mixed methods approach combines 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques at both the conceptual and 
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implementation level (Nastasi et al., 2010, pp. 320-321), and this influenced the design 
of both research components.  As such, from a conceptual perspective initially, and 
building on a review of the literature, it was notable that investigation reports by ICAC 
(which are publicly available) have overwhelmingly focused on appointed officials as 
opposed to elected officials, in spite of the fact that that the former are not necessarily as 
newsworthy as the latter.  Therefore, from an implementation perspective, the 
appointed officials’ perceptions and experiences of corruption and its management at 
the everyday level seemed important to capture and analyse.  The research design 
sought to explicate the attitudinal views of appointed officials, within different local 
government roles and functions, affording participants with an opportunity to express 
their opinions anonymously.  A consideration was that the research design and method 
needed to accommodate the fragmented and heterogeneous make-up of local 
government in NSW.  This is discussed more intricately in Section 3.4.  
Subsequently, semi-structured interviews with individuals who had been involved in, or 
who had an interest in addressing, corruption in local government, were perceived to be 
the most apposite means of eliciting perspectives from subjects in a controlled 
environment.  This approach is discussed in Section 3.5.  
3.4 The attitudinal survey 
The primary goal of the questionnaire used in Phase 1 of the mixed methods study was 
to acquire an overview of: the types of corruption that may be evident in local 
government; factors that make local government susceptible or resistive to corruption; 
the extent to which councils are aware of and willing to respond to corruption; and the 
mechanisms or controls either envisaged or in place to manage and address corruption.  
The online survey sought to ascertain potential differences between council employees 
where possible.  While responses addressed aspects of questions proposed by this 
thesis, it was envisaged that there would be contrasts between councils in different 
areas, and between different types of workers within those entities.  Some of those 
differences might identify factors such as inability, reticence or unwillingness by senior 
employees to effectively manage the risk or reporting of corruption.  Alternatively, 
divergences could be informed by council compositions, including their affluence, 
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location and demography.  Therefore, the questionnaire design sought to identify and 
assess which ‘type’ of council respondents came from, while being aware of the need to 
ensure individual respondents could not be identified as per ethical protocols.  
3.4.1 Rationale behind choice of councils 
In December 2011, the OLG engaged NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) to undertake a 
financial assessment of all 152 councils in NSW.  The scope of this assessment was 
expanded in March 2012 to include financial sustainability and benchmarking, resulting 
in a ‘comprehensive, independent analysis into the financial sustainability of every 
council in NSW’ (OLG NSW, 2014).  
This exercise assisted greatly in determining the choice of councils to use in the sample, 
but also with establishing the demographics of each region and LGA.  In particular, the 
assessment influenced the sample frame by highlighting salient differences between 
councils such as size, geography, population demographics and council affluence.  While 
each council is responsible for its LGA, Flavel (2013, p. 69) considers that council 
boundaries are  ‘arbitrary constructs, subject to change and not necessarily reflecting 
shared communities of interest’.  The research approach sought to address such 
variations pragmatically.  
In terms of geographical variations affecting the sample, it was pertinent to observe that 
‘in the 10 years to 2011, the Greater Sydney area accounted for nearly three quarters of 
the state’s population growth [with] approximately 64% of the state’s population 
resid[ing] in the Greater Sydney area’ (TCorp, 2013, p. 27).  This profile influenced the 
sampling frame, in accordance with Bell’s (2009, p. 145) comments, such that ‘sampling 
techniques [were] employed in order to produce a sample which is, as far as possible, 
representative of the population as a whole’.  The choice of sample councils was 
underpinned, inter alia, by these considerations.  The document, Comparative 
Information on NSW Local Government (DLG NSW, 2013) provided demographic 
statistics in relation to each of the state’s 152 councils and was used as the basis for 
assessing the appropriateness of councils in the sample base.  With the assistance of this 
publication, a number of factors were used to formulate a table of councils that would 
subsequently be invited to participate in the attitudinal survey (a list of these factors is 
outlined in Appendix 2).  
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In addition to demographic factors, two further aspects were considered pertinent.  
First, some councils in NSW have been involved previously in ICAC investigations, which 
may have influenced employees’ perceptions of corruption management and its 
prevalence within local government, or indeed, their perception of the manner in which 
incidences of alleged corruption have been historically and are currently addressed.  
Second, councils that have an internal ombudsman, as a form of in-house formal 
guardian, were considered to be a basis of comparison with those that may not have had 
this figure or that had an alternative internal complaint-handling, investigative or anti-
corruption remit.  With this in mind, and in compiling the sample base, it was considered 
appropriate to include a number of these councils in the invitation to participate.  This, it 
was reasoned, might produce interesting comparisons on how organisational structure 
mediates how employees both perceive and respond to suspicious practices.  
In light of the fact that there was no guarantee that all councils in the sample would 
accept the invitation to participate in the study, a bottom-up approach to formulating 
the sample was taken in the first instance, by listing councils that differed in the above 
respects until saturation point was reached (Morse, 2010, p. 347).  This resulted in a 
matrix of 35 councils.  
3.4.2 Approach to councils 
Once the final sample of councils was compiled, a letter (Appendix 3) was sent to each 
council’s GM inviting their endorsement of the initiative and requesting the participation 
of the council in the study.  The letter was accompanied by a survey participant 
information sheet (Appendix 4) and each GM, or their delegate, was asked to complete, 
sign and return a remittance slip (Appendix 5).  The remittance slip asked the GM to 
indicate whether the council wished to participate in the research and to specify a 
named contact for the survey link to be sent to, being a person who could then 
disseminate the online survey to all of the council’s employees via email.  Councils were 
asked to indicate their intention to participate by completing the remittance slip and 
returning it within three weeks.  This timeframe was stipulated in an effort to secure 
commitment from councils in a timely fashion.  Several councils required further contact 
after the three-week period lapsed, as discussed further in Section 3.4.3.  
70 
 
The study invitation stressed that the research would be an independent, analytical 
study, based on a wide range of councils in NSW, and emphasised the comparative 
nature of the inquiry to mitigate concerns the GMs might have as to why they were 
selected for inclusion.  Each council was advised that this would be the initial request 
and that, should they wish to participate in the study, a separate email would be sent to 
them soon after which would include: (1) an online survey hyperlink; (2) a covering 
message that could be forwarded to employees to introduce them to the survey; and 
(3) a tailored participant information sheet13 (Appendix 5), ensuring that employees 
were adequately informed about the study, their right to participate or decline, and the 
various protections put in place.  
3.4.3 Councils that agreed to engage in the study 
From the 35 councils that were invited to participate in the study, only 11 councils 
agreed to be involved (32%).  Another 20 councils indicated that they did not wish to 
participate in the study (57%), and 4 (11%) did not respond to the invitation. 
Of the councils that agreed to participate, one council felt that it would be too onerous to 
expect all employees to be involved (Council 3), and only agreed to participate on the 
basis that 20 members of staff would be invited to complete the questionnaire.  Some 
councils simply stated that they would not be participating in the study, while others 
gave more thorough reasons.  Such reasons given may have been credible and 
understandable; however, there was little effort required of councils other than to 
forward the questionnaire to each of their employees with a pre-prepared covering 
letter.  As only one-third of invited councils were willing to participate, it could be 
inferred that the majority of GMs were reticent about participating, for various reasons.  
This finding builds on salient observations that conducting research on the reality of 
corruption can be problematic, especially when the nature of the topic is culturally 
sensitive (Kalof et al., 2008, p. 116; Rothstein & Torsello, 2014, p. 264).  
Because more than two-thirds of invited councils did not accept the invitation to 
participate, it was considered that validity in the ensuing results might have been 
 
13 This participant information sheet was tailored to the participant of the questionnaire and differed from the one 
initially sent to GMs, which was more general and related to the wider concepts and focus of the study.  This received 
approval from the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee on 10 March 2015 (Protocol number: 2014/641). 
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affected.  However, the 11 councils that formed the final sample base represented a 
comprehensive, diverse and disparate array of council types.  Therefore, taken together, 
the knowledge produced would go some way to ensuring the validity and enhancing the 
quality of the research.  What this process did highlight, however, was the high degree of 
autonomy and discretion bestowed on GMs as public service guardians, and the leverage 
these officials can possess on the possibilities of empirical data collection.  If 
‘transparency [is] the surest way of guarding against corruption [as it] helps increase 
trust in the people and institutions on which our futures depend’ (Transparency 
International, 2018), then this process highlighted a lack of transparency, and presented 
as one of the main barriers in attempting to conduct empirical fieldwork on local 
government corruption.  Such barriers are a research issue acknowledged by Rothstein 
and Torsello (2014, p. 264), who note that there is a desire to read about ‘first-hand 
encounters with corruption [but there is a] hesitation to describe what is taking place in 
the field’.   
According to the publication, Comparative Information on NSW Local Government: 
Measuring Local Government Performance 2011–12, the total number of FTE staff across 
the 11 councils in 2012–13 was 5,125, with an average of 282 per sampled council (DLG 
NSW, 2013).  While the response rate to the ANU survey, Perceptions of Corruption in the 
Victorian Public Sector: Report to IBAC, was 18% (Australian National University, 2013, 
p. 1), it was accepted that there would be no way of knowing how many people may 
respond to this survey at each council, as the demographic composition of each is vastly 
dissimilar.  A summary of the response rate is discussed further at Section 3.4.8.  
3.4.4 Sample of councils 
For each of the councils that agreed to participate in the study, an email with a hyperlink 
to the online questionnaire was sent to the nominated contact (Appendix 8).  This was 
prefaced with a covering letter, for adaptation in any electronic message that the council 
wished to send to recipients, and the survey participation information sheet  
(Appendix 6).  
Councils were advised that the survey would be open for six weeks in an effort to 
accommodate staff schedules and availability.  
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3.4.5 Questionnaire design 
The original concept for the questionnaire was that it would be a modified ‘spin off’ of a 
survey previously submitted to public servants within the Victorian Public Service 
(VPS), as part of a research project conducted by the ANU and the Social Research 
Centre (SRC), commissioned by IBAC (Australian National University, 2013).  However, 
upon further scrutiny of this questionnaire, it was considered that, while some aspects 
of that survey could be adapted for the purpose of this research, more needed to be 
known about other factors that might have a bearing on the questions pursued in this 
research study.   
With that in mind, additional measurements were included in the questionnaire in order 
to enrich the quality and diversify the focus of the research.  Furthermore, it was 
considered that more needed to be known about participants’ demographic details, 
including:  
• the highest educational attainments of participants;  
• the age range of participants; 
• whether participants had managerial or supervisory duties; 
• the salary range of participants, to acknowledge low-, medium- and high-income 
earners, and therefore to distinguish between job classifications; and  
• the core business areas of the participants.  
Such details were deemed desirable to enable potential cross-tabulation of results, and 
to glean whether particular responses to questions (i.e. perceptions and experiences) 
were related to one or more of these structural variables.  
Additionally, in close consideration of the three components within the crime triangle 
(Clarke & Eck, 2003, p. 27), a variation on other question types was preferred, such as:  
• participants’ comparative perceptions of corruption levels within their place of 
work and within other councils in NSW (Targets);  
• whether participants considered that local government was more susceptible to 
corruption than other parts of the public sector, and if so, why (Offenders); and  
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• whether participants had received Code of Conduct training, and if there was a 
correlation between such training and its ability to influence an employee’s 
awareness of corruption and dis/incentivisation to report (Guardianship).  
The reasons for expanding the survey in this way was to elicit a greater understanding 
about differences that could be attributed to attributes of LGAs, attributes of councils 
specifically, and whether efforts (or otherwise) to implement compliance-based 
initiatives, such as training and publication of a Code of Conduct, affected employees’ 
experiences and practices.  
The following steps were taken to enhance validity of the quantitative research design:  
i A discussion of key issues in relation to the proposed research questions at the 
design stage, prior to its compilation.  This included: distinction between types of 
corruption, reporting of corruption, the risk of corruption, and the prospect of 
corruption in the context of how it might manifest in local government. 
ii Testing of the questionnaire design with colleagues from the Local Government 
Internal Ombudsman Network (LGION), to ascertain whether the proposed 
questions were clear, value-free, unambiguous, and would capture responses 
adequately. 
iii A pilot study: a number of selected individuals were asked to complete the 
questionnaire in a word-processed format to ascertain whether it was 
administratively appropriate and easy to follow, that the questions were easily 
understood, and that it was not too onerous to complete from a time and effort 
perspective (see Section 3.4.6).  
Subsequently, the questionnaire was tested again to further gauge its user-friendliness 
and length of time to complete.  Pertinent concerns in relation to the first iteration of the 
questionnaire were that it took too long to complete and that the order of questions did 
not flow well.   
With this in mind, the second iteration of the online questionnaire sought to refigure 
and improve its structure, resulting in the compartmentalisation of the questions into 
five sections: (1) perceptions of corruption; (2) reporting mechanisms; (3) awareness of 
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management mechanisms; (4) demographic composition of participants; and 
(5) organisational characteristics (See Appendix 7 for a detailed description of these 
categories and Appendix 8 for a breakdown of all questions).  The logic of these 
categories and their sequence was to distinguish each participant’s’ position within their 
council’s diverse array of business functions, and to enable comparison, if required, with 
data gained elsewhere in the survey.  
Each category was methodically generated in view of the fact that, inevitably, some 
participants may start the questionnaire, but not finish it.  In particular, Demographic 
composition of participants (Section 4) and Organisational characteristics (Section 5) 
were put to the end of the questionnaire, as being less critical sections than the first 
three.  The sequence of the first three sections sought to approach the subject matter in 
a generalised way before delving into more specific issues and measurements.  The 
duration of the actual questionnaire when rolled out was anticipated to take between 10 
and 15 minutes, which was considered to be close to the ideal survey length median of 
10 minutes (Revilla & Ochoa, 2017, p. 563).  
3.4.6 Pilot study 
Various colleagues within local government, and other contacts, provided comment and 
constructive criticism of the questionnaire instrument throughout its various iterations.  
The salient features of the survey, the proposed research and its methodology, were also 
discussed in a presentation to the LGION on 18 November 2014, with the intention of 
seeking professional endorsement and assessing the survey’s applicability to various 
local government workplaces.  This forum incorporated internal ombudsmen from five 
councils14 in NSW, as well as representatives from the OLG and ICAC.15  Following this 
presentation, the ensuing feedback and subsequent discussions with colleagues, slight 
refinements were made.  Primarily, this was in relation to Section 5 of the questionnaire, 
to ensure that comparison accounted for nuances in respondent positions and roles 
across councils.   
 
14 These were Burwood Council, Hurstville Council, Warringah Council, Wollongong Council and Wyong Council. 
15 On this occasion, a representative from the Office of the NSW Ombudsman was unable to attend. 
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3.4.7 Questionnaire design – finalisation of the research instrument 
When the draft questionnaire had been finalised, it was converted to an online version 
using SurveyMonkey, a platform for distributing online surveys.  It was piloted in this 
format to ensure that configuration, and question logic and sequence, worked 
effectively.  The online survey was tested on a number of occasions, each time with a 
different response, to ensure that it could be easily understood and completed, and was 
not onerous, sensitive or time-consuming.  
Despite some issues in online survey design also existing in traditional survey formats, 
such as accessibility for marginalised groups and sampling (Wright, 2005), online 
surveys are efficient, minimise the potential for error, and have the benefit of 
distribution across a wide geographical and demographic base.  That said, a limitation is 
that data capture is limited to computer users.  Consideration was given to production of 
the questionnaire in hard copy format, which could be completed by council employees 
who did not have access to such technology within their workplaces.  However, to do so 
had the potential to skew responses by giving favour to particular council workers, such 
as outdoor staff, that in turn could compromise study reliability.   This means that there 
are always limitations on the data being produced by such inquiry, as some groups 
within local government would not have accessed the survey.  However, given the 
response rate from each council (see Section 3.4.8), wider participation within a council 
would not have added significant weighting to the data acquired.  
The chosen online survey medium, SurveyMonkey, has the ability to send the same 
survey to multiple recipients, but with functionality that enabled monitoring of each 
council’s participation.  Essentially, this meant that if a council had agreed to participate 
in the questionnaire, but then did not forward the survey hyperlink among their 
respective employees, this would be apparent to the researcher.  In the survey 
participant information sheet (Appendix 6), participants were made aware that neither 
they nor their participating council would be identifiable, but this functionality was 
considered necessary to enable cross-council comparison and assess participation.  
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3.4.8 Response rate from Phase 1 of the mixed methods study 
The survey was sent to participating councils in the week commencing 11 March 2015 
and closed on 24 April 2015.  One council did not submit any responses, despite their 
earlier agreement to participate in the study.  This transpired to be a benefit of the 
platform’s functionality to ascertain where respondent responses stemmed from, as this 
particular council was not used in subsequent analysis.  
Accordingly, the responses reflected survey completion by appointed officials at 10 
councils in NSW, as outlined in Appendix 9.  While the 10 councils are not named, survey 
participants would potentially be able to identify their council from the details 
contained within this table, and would, of course, know that their council was in this 
sample base.  Efforts were, however, made to avoid any way to distinguish one council 
from another, by compartmentalising attributes of each council, such as number of FTE 
staff, size of population, and geographical size of LGA, into brackets.   
The hyperlink to the questionnaire differed slightly when sent to each council, which 
enabled attribution of responses to the corresponding council.  For the purpose of 
reference, each is referred to by number (Council 1, Council 2, and so on to Council 10) 
so as not to make any council readily identifiable.   
The final sample of councils that participated provided a distinct representation 
across NSW.  By having a sample of 10 councils, each operating independently and 
autonomously, the potential for bias or compromise was mitigated heavily, as responses 
emanated from employees at councils that had no affiliation with the others.  Further, 
participants were not aware of which other councils had been invited to take part in the 
study, nor did they know those that contributed and those that did not.   
No two councils were identical in terms of the characteristics detailed above; fittingly, 
councils differed in a number of other ways, which enhanced the study’s validity by 
increasing the comprehensiveness of variables.  These variations included differences 
in: each council’s composition, such as the size and type of the geographical area it 
covered; its FTE staff base; the size of the population it served; and the locality’s socio-
economic profile.  Differences were further attributed to each council’s financial 
sustainability, outlook and infrastructure management.  To aid further, three councils 
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had an internal ombudsman and four had been involved in a previous ICAC 
investigation.   
The survey received 251 total responses of which 197 were completed responses.  The 
composition of the 251 respondents across the 10 councils is illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. Number of responses per council (N=251) 
As illustrated, the number of respondents from each council varied.  While the group 
average number of FTE staff across councils in NSW is 282 (DLG NSW, 2013), the 
number of FTE employees within councils can vary considerably.16  Figure 3.2 
represents the participation rate at each council, based on the number of responses 
received as a percentage of the FTE base of that council, and shows that there is a 
significant disparity in participant response rates.  The participation rate ranges from 
2% (Councils 1 and 3) to 16% (Council 8).  A caveat must be emphasised, however, as 
the FTE base does not account for alternative employment types, such as volunteers, 
part-time employees, casual staff members or seasonal staff, who may have also 
completed the survey.  As there would be no way of knowing with any certainty how 
many staff would be employed by each of the participating councils during the period 
that the survey was available, the FTE staff number is relied upon as a good indication of 
the size of each council’s employment base.  To encourage confidence in the findings, the 
sections in the questionnaire, Demographic composition of participants (Section 4) and 
 






















Organisational characteristics (Section 5) allowed responses to be placed within the 
context of the participant’s individual role, so their employment type could be identified 
if required. 
 
Figure 3.2. Participation rate as percentage of FTE staff 
With the exception of the one council which agreed to participate in the survey on the 
understanding that only 20 employees would be invited to undertake the questionnaire 
(Council 3), the completion rate for the remaining 9 councils is significantly low.  Even at 
Council 3, only 5 of the 20 invited employees completed the questionnaire.  Indeed, 
across the breadth of councils, as the actual number of employees at each of these 
councils would be higher than the known FTE base, the response rate from each council 
is less than that depicted in Figure 3.2.  It could be inferred, therefore, that most council 
employees were less inclined to complete the questionnaire than those at Councils 4, 7 
and 8.  If reliance was placed on one or two councils alone, this may have a bearing on 
any outcomes.  However, across the sample of 10 councils, the sum of 197 completed 
responses invokes greater confidence in the findings; nevertheless, the low participation 
rates do highlight a significant limitation in terms of any capacity to make claims of 
representativeness (O'Rourke, 1999, p. 107).  While a greater proportion of councils 
were invited to participate, as discussed in Section 3.4.3, just under a third agreed to do 
so (see Figure 3.1).  If a greater number of councils participated, or if more councils were 
invited to participate, a higher response rate would have been likely; on reflection, this 
may have been a wise option to improve the response rate.  That said, there would be no 



































The aggregated responses provided salient, attitudinal insights across local government 
in NSW, and this in itself helped to inform the focus of the follow-up semi-structured 
interviews, specifically around the meaning of corruption, organisational attitudes 
towards it, and appetite, or strategies, to manage it.  This is discussed further in 
Section 3.5.  Further, responses derived from this sample base would serve as credible 
and diverse examples that broadly reflected the demographic make-up of NSW.  In 
particular, 6 of the 10 councils were metropolitan councils, and 1 was on the 
metropolitan fringe, which aligned nicely with the representation of the state’s 
population, with nearly two-thirds of the state’s population residing in the 
Greater Sydney region (TCorp, 2013, p. 27).  
For the purpose of broader comparison, the 152 council entities that existed in NSW at 
the time of the study is presented in Appendix 16, as derived from data provided by the 
OLG (2020).  This assists in placing the sample of 10 councils within the broader 
framework of NSW council entities.  While there are some surface-level resemblances 
between the 152 councils, such as gender differentiation and average taxable income, 
there are also much greater divergences with regards to size, socio-economic status, size 
of population and the largest industry employer within any LGA.  Councils are 
geographically diverse, yet operate within the same regulatory parameters of corruption 
control, with ICAC, and other oversight bodies, placing mandatory obligations onto the 
local government sector as a whole.  This allows for some comparability, and a strength 
of surveying 10 different and diverse council entities.  However, this is also a limitation 
given that the sample should not be construed as representative of the entire network of 
councils. 
Given these, and in consideration of the relatively small sample base that has been 
examined in this thesis, it was conceded that it would be difficult to state in 
generalisable terms that any particular difference or similarity between council type 
(e.g., rural/regional; affluency; professionalisation, gender differentiation or salary 
range of population served) would have a strong bearing on the general attitude or 
impressions towards corruption or corruption-management by the employees.  This 
would be an interesting and important avenue to consider and explore, but it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.   
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3.4.9 Analysis of attitudinal survey 
While SurveyMonkey offered some analytical tools, the data generated was 
subsequently analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) as its 
functionalities offered a greater ability to analyse, compare and cross-tabulate 
responses than those provided by SurveyMonkey.  
Once the data was migrated to SPSS, it underwent an initial clean-up as a means of 
validating its trustworthiness, to ensure that comparisons could be made.  For example, 
questions in SurveyMonkey that invited respondents to tick ‘all that apply’ required 
blank spaces to be changed to a ‘2’ in order to function effectively in SPSS.  This process 
ensured the integrity of the data with a view to ascertaining whether there were any 
invalid responses or obvious mistakes.   
The opportunity was also taken to consolidate some findings into a separate variable, for 
subsequent cross-tabulation.  For example, if a respondent had stated that they had 
either suspected or witnessed at least one of the corrupt practices listed, respectively, in 
Questions 8 and 9, the number of corrupt practices either suspected or witnessed was 
categorised under a separate variable for comparison with other social or demographic 
factors or data gained elsewhere.  This helped explain a number of contradictions, which 
are discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
The free text responses were migrated into NVivo, a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software (CAQDAS) package.  The rich narrative provided by some of the 
respondents assisted in contextualising their responses to the quantitative component.  
The process of coding for the analysis is elaborated further at Section 3.5.6.   
3.4.10 Demographic analysis of questionnaire respondents (Phase 1)  
For the purpose of contextualising the analysis presented in the following three 
chapters, the demographic composition (gender, age and salary range) of public officials 
who participated in the quantitative component of this research project is described 
below.  For a more detailed breakdown and discussion, see Appendix 10.  
The demographics are based on the 197 respondents who completed the survey and 
therefore answered this question.  As such, it does not capture respondents who started 
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the questionnaire but did not complete it.  In summary, the following highlights the 
demographic composition of respondents:  
• A slight majority of them were male. 
• Two-thirds were over 40 years of age. 
• Half earned less than $90,000 per annum. 
• Respondents were evenly sampled from across local government functions. 
• Half had worked for more than one council. 
• Almost half had worked in local government for more than 15 years. 
The respondent pool is reflective of the ageing workforce in local government (Hastings 
et al., 2015, p. 9), with less than a quarter of all respondents being under 40 years of age, 
and nearly half of all respondents claiming to have worked within local government for 
more than 15 years.  The ageing workforce bears a degree of correlation with length of 
service, suggesting that many local government employees tend to spend their whole 
careers in public service, with many transferring their service between councils.  
Accordingly, the sector could be considered to be quite insular, with local government 
officials likely working with, and therefore knowing, one another.   
Across the sample base of councils, it was conceded that representation would not align 
totally, given the survey was voluntary and completeness was reliant on respondents’ 
willingness to engage with the study and respond candidly to the survey.  As employees 
at each participating council had the option of completing the survey, without incentive 
or coercion, it is somewhat reassuring that a wide and well-balanced representation was 
obtained.  While this should not be taken to be representative of local government in 
general, nor of local government in the jurisdiction of NSW, it does inspire confidence in 
the significance of the findings.  
3.5 Qualitative interviews with anti-corruption figures 
The design of the interviews went through a similar process of testing and refinement 
following the analysis of the attitudinal survey, the literature review, and the sample of 
ICAC investigation reports.  This approach conforms with a mixed methods iterative 
design process, with findings attained from the former stage informing and influencing 
the next component of the study (Nastasi et al., 2010, p. 320).  This process also helped 
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determine the composition and suitability of interviewees, and the contributions that 
each was able to make to the research problem being investigated.  The rationale of the 
interviews was to correlate the perceptions and understandings of corruption by those 
who may encounter its incidence on the front line with those who are seeking to expose, 
reduce and address it.  These linkages, nuances and divergences are explicitly discussed 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
3.5.1 Concept and design 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 3) state that ‘qualitative research is a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world [and] consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that make the world visible’.  Therefore, in setting the scene for this approach, 
observations by Gubrium and Holstein (2001, p. 57) were noteworthy, in the sense that 
the qualitative interview needed to elicit the ‘nuances of understanding and the depths 
of experience’.  The accounts obtained from the interviews were fundamental in terms of 
understanding: what meanings people ascribe to corruption as a concept; what their 
views and awareness were of acts that they construed as corrupt; and how meanings 
and understandings differ from person to person and context to context.  Not only did 
this dimension complement the previous stages of research, it presented an opportunity 
to delve deeper into such understandings and findings.  
The configuration of the interview can be somewhere between structured, semi-
structured and unstructured (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 29).  In consideration of each, and 
in order to avoid any restriction put on the type or format of data acquired from the 
interview process, the interviews followed a semi-structured approach.  In this way, 
interviews had a loose structure, but were organic and collaborative in dynamic, 
allowing the interviewer the freedom to probe on issues of note and to seek further 
exploration via follow-up questions.  Essentially, ‘the goal [was] to explore the range and 
depth of shared meanings in an area’ (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 58).   
To develop the discussion within Section 3.3.4, the impact that the interviewer had on 
the interview process was important to acknowledge.  An interviewer ‘may have a role 
to play in the creation of knowledge during the interview, in so far as the interview 
process may stimulate the participant to reflect on or articulate ideas for the first time 
or in a new way’ (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 48).  Such a concept aligns with the social 
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constructivist approach, in that new information is constructed through the interview 
process (Curtis & Curtis, 2011, p. 47).  
3.5.2 Purpose of interviews  
Warren (2002, p. 83) posits that ‘the purpose of most qualitative interviewing is to 
derive interpretations, not facts or laws, from respondent talk’.  In the context of this 
study, interviewees’ interpretations were based on their impressions and reflections of 
corruption in the local government setting in which they had experience or were 
engaged, specifically from the perspective of their being tasked with controlling or 
overseeing the management of corruption in local government.  This notion had 
relevance, building on Warren’s (2002, p. 83) approach to qualitative interviewing, in 
that conversations help ‘frame [problems] more substantively and interactionally, 
aiming to understand the meaning of respondents’ experiences and life worlds’.  Platt 
(2001, p. 51) insightfully reflects on the evolution of interviewing over the last century, 
claiming that interviewing has gone some way to breaking down barriers between 
interviewers and interviewees, ‘co-opting respondents instead of using them’.  This 
resonates with the concept of what an interview entails, defined as a ‘conversation with 
a purpose’ (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 67; Mason, 2009, p. 67; Platt, 2001, p. 50) that 
is ‘achieved through active engagement by interviewer and interviewee around relevant 
issues, topics and experiences’ (Mason, 2002, p. 225).   
As denoted by Holstein and Gubrium (2011, p. 341), ‘everyday realities are actively 
constructed in and through forms of social action’.  The fact that interviewees have 
worked or do work in the business of corruption governance, undoubtedly influenced 
their interpretations and opinions, and these may have arisen as a result of their social 
interactions, perceptions and exposure to corruption.  With this in mind, theoretical and 
purposeful sampling ensured that a broad spectrum of individuals were selected for this 
aspect of the study, ‘consisting of participants who best represent or have knowledge of 
the research topic’ (Morse et al., 2002, p. 18).  Key individuals, each of whom had 
significant experience and credentials in their respective field as anti-corruption 
practitioners, were purposefully selected on the basis that they would likely offer 
insightful perspectives on corruption practices in local government (Collins, 2010, 
pp. 357-358).  Snowball sampling (Warren, 2002, p. 87) was used to grow the 
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respondent base, so other suitable individuals could be approached and their expertise, 
experiences and contributions gleaned.   
The interviewees occupied roles that could be construed as having a formal, direct or 
indirect guardianship mandate.  The intention was not to seek and make empirical 
generalisations, such as those attained in the survey, but rather to illuminate and enrich 
data gained from that phase with deeper levels of understanding (Patton, 2015, p. 264).  
The interviewing of a GM was considered, but given the reaction to the survey invitation, 
and the low acceptance rate by councils, this course of action was not pursued on the 
likely basis that there would be some reluctance or even resistance.  If this course of 
action had been taken, and a GM agreed to participate, it was also considered that their 
view could be taken to be representative of the GM community and might even be 
construed as self-serving or defensive.  Given ICAC’s regulatory mandate, a request was 
made to interview a Senior Corruption Prevention Officer from ICAC.  However, this 
request was declined as permission was not granted by the then Executive Director of 
Corruption Prevention.  While this is unfortunate, some of the interviewees who did 
participate had worked for ICAC previously or had real-time interactions with ICAC in 
their current capacity.  
Interviews were conducted with a range of individuals until a point of saturation was 
reached in terms of substantive and thematic insights and the eliciting of sufficient 
information (Morse, 2010, p. 347).  This transpired to be 11 interviews, but an open 
mind was kept to conducting further interviews if a suitable and interesting opportunity 
arose.  Each interviewee was informed on the interview participant information sheet 
(Appendix 12) that they would be given a pseudonym and not be identifiable in the 
results section and in any subsequent publications.  This was accompanied by a covering 
letter (Appendix 11) and an interview consent form (Appendix 13).  Prior to proceeding 
with these formalities, initial contact was made either by telephone, email, in person or 
via an introduction, and a synopsis of the question schedule was discussed in advance of 
the interview.  The interviewees’ occupational roles and biographies are outlined in 
Appendix 15.   
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Interviews were conducted between 8 January 2016 and 16 May 2016.17  While many of 
the interviewees worked in a council in NSW at the time of the interview or previously, 
their breadth of experience covered more than a dozen councils.  This was often 
augmented with work experiences in state and federal government, as well as current or 
former employment at, or working with, one or more of the state’s oversight or anti-
corruption bodies.   
3.5.3 Demographic analysis of interviewees (Phase 2)  
Demographic factors such as ethnicity and age were not sought from any interviewee.  
These features were not considered to be materially relevant to the topic under study, 
but more so, the interviewees’ credentials and breadth of expertise.  Gender was almost 
evenly represented, with six of the interviewees being male, and five being female.  All 
interviewees were interviewed in Sydney, in person, with the exception of one who was 
interviewed over Skype due to geographical constraints.  
3.5.4 Compilation and analysis 
A semi-structured interview format meant that the nature and duration of the interview 
could be controlled and organised.  This allowed for questions to be asked, based on 
certain themes or framed parameters, in order to elicit meaningful accounts by probing 
on particular matters.  It also enabled the respondents to steer the conversation around 
issues that were meaningful for them.  In turn, this aided the subsequent analysis of the 
data.  
Ruiz Ruiz (2009, p. 4) identifies three levels of discourse analysis: (1) a textual level; 
(2) a contextual level; and (3) an interpretive level.  He goes on to state that while the 
third and final level is the aim of the analysis, each level takes place in a circular and 
bidirectional manner, only concluding ‘when the analyst considers that the research 
objectives have been achieved’ (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009, p. 5).  This approach was followed, with 
interpretation of the discourse informing the manner in which it was contextualised and 
presented.   
 
17 Approval to proceed with interviews was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee 29 October 2015 
(Protocol number: 2015/654). 
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3.5.5 Transcription and analysis of interviews 
Each interview was fully transcribed in accordance with the conventions developed by 
Jefferson (1974), who advocates that notation should represent words as they are 
pronounced (Tracy & Mirivel, 2009, p. 155).  ‘The analysis of data collected in research is 
referred to as coding’, state Curtis and Curtis (2011, p. 44).  Hence, as a technique 
employed in textual analysis, the content of each interviewee was coded and categorised 
(Ruiz Ruiz, 2009, p. 7).  As coding is a ‘strictly inductive method’ (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009, p. 7), 
the manner in which data was read was significant and required a systemic and 
conscientious approach to ensure that derived findings were credible and rigorous 
(Patton, 2015, p. 653).  Mason (2009, pp. 148-149) identifies three ways that data can be 
read: literally, interpretively or reflexively.  Making sense of the interview data was 
interpretative, in that meanings were based on what the data meant or represented 
(Mason, 2009, p. 149).  Yet, as the data was acquired through the framed environment of 
a semi-structured interview, reading it was also reflexive, owing to the nature of the 
interaction between the interviewer, and the interviewee (Mason, 2009, p. 78).  A 
limitation of this approach is that findings can become shaped by the interviewer’s bias 
and’ predispositions (Patton, 2015, p. 653), resulting in skewed knowledge.  Cross-data 
consistency with the other methods employed in this research project sought to 
minimise the potential for such bias and predispositions to influence the analysis, which 
is more prone to occur in a single-method study, as Patton (2015, p. 661) suggests.  
Each interview transcript was read through, several times, with notes made as audio file 
were listened to.  This assisted in making sense of the data, to clarify any inaudible 
aspects, and to gauge whether what was being heard or seen contradicted or 
complemented the survey results attained during Phase 1.  
3.5.6 Coding and categorisation 
Coding ‘enables grounded theorists to discern processes that might otherwise remain 
invisible’ (Charmaz, 2011, p. 372), with three types of coding available in grounded 
theory research: open, axial and selective.  These are described as follows:  
Open coding is the interpretative process by which data are broken down 
analytically … In Axial coding, categories are related to their sub-categories, and 
the relationships tested against the data … Selective coding is the process by which 
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all categories are unified around a ‘“core”’ category, and categories that need 
further explication are filled in with descriptive detail.  This type of coding is likely 
to occur in the later phases of a study. (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, pp. 12-14)  
Axial coding best describes the analytical approach undertaken for the purposes of this 
thesis and this was done using the CAQDAS package NVivo.  NVivo allowed all 
transcribed interviews to be uploaded in word-processed form for subsequent sorting, 
summarising and determination of appropriate theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2011, 
p. 363).  Coding and analysis occurred in conjunction with each other, as per the process 
advocated by Glaser and Strauss (2008, pp. 101-102).  While reading and interpreting 
the data, several notes were made about the emerging themes and how they integrated 
with the findings of the survey, when data was coded.  Such notes were relatively 
undeveloped and unstructured, but assisted in the analytical induction of themes and 
how findings from each of the data sets might align with the four sub-questions.  Using 
NVivo, categories were created which provided the basis for subsequent analysis and 
integration with the questionnaire data.  All of the responses were analysed, and themes 
emerged within each of the categories proved to be quite extensive (a full list of the 
categories and subcategories is available within Appendix 17).  A variety of means were 
used to make sense of the data, such as annotation of key excerpts, colour-coding of 
themes to a sub-question and a review of the number of different instances that featured 
within any particular theme.  While many of the emerging themes were insightful, some 
did not concretely align to the sub-research questions or focus of the thesis in general, 
and as such, only the ones that had particular relevance to the study - and the questions 
pursued - are referred to within the subsequent findings’ chapters at the relevant 
juncture. 
3.6 Triangulation of data 
The process of triangulating data acquired from mixed method studies aims to make 
sense of conflicting and inconsistent patterns, divergences, and potentially competing 
explanations (Patton, 2015, pp. 653-661).  In this project, data derived from each of the 
mixed-method stages was integrated and cross checked in order to seek corroboration 
between the quantitative and qualitative data (Bryman, 2006, p. 105), as a means of 
enhancing credibility in the findings than otherwise might have been achieved by a 
single-study alone (Patton, 2015, p. 661).  By converging and corroborating the results 
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attained during the two phases of the mixed methods study, many conflicting and 
inharmonious patterns became apparent.  As a means of negotiating such contradictions, 
comparisons were made between data acquired from each source, to ascertain the 
extent of any complementarity between them.  This process also assisted in prioritising 
and negotiating which data to present in this thesis; in some instances, the lack of 
complementarity was particularly noteworthy in terms of how each participant base 
saw corruption in their lifeworld.   
Through synthesis of these data sets, differences and divergences emerged. These 
themes are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in accordance with the existing literature 
and the underpinning theoretical influences.  Paradoxical findings and rival explanations 
are indicative of the real-world nuances associated with understanding, interpreting and 
addressing corruption in local government, as a truly situated, symbolically loaded and 
messy phenomenon.   
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has detailed the methodology that was applied in this research.  As has 
been shown, the pragmatic paradigm informed the research methodology, with a 
grounded theory and mixed methods approach taken to the data collection and analysis 
processes.  The findings are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and a discussion of their 
significance and implications follows in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores what corruption means to those who might observe and respond 
to it within local government.  It is based on a broad snapshot of attitudinal perceptions, 
and synthesised with a richer exploration of key narratives drawn from respondents 
and interviewees.  Through an exploration of different perceptions, experiences and 
interpretations, there are distinctive contradictions and disconnects between the 
perception of corruption, its level and degree of pervasiveness, and the everyday 
realities of occupational corruption.  There is a general belief that corruption in NSW 
local government is declining, and does not exist to a great extent within the council 
workplace.  Many impressions are attributed to the perceived efficacy of the ICAC, as 
sensationalised by tabloid media.  Yet, there is an acknowledgement that this focus on 
high-level and high-profile matters, often seen to involve elected officials, does not 
capture the lower-level or less exceptional forms of corruption that may take place 
within the administrative realm of local government.   
This chapter highlights how such impressions have been formed, noting that much of 
this knowledge has been created by the structures that have been implemented to 
address corruption within local government and the broader public sector of NSW. 
4.1.1 Perceptions of corruption 
Based on the results of the attitudinal survey, Figure 4.1 sets the scene for this chapter, 
highlighting that over a third of respondents think that corruption has decreased in NSW 
in the last 5 years.  This is more than the sum of respondents who thought that 




Figure 4.1. Respondents’ views of the level of corruption in NSW in the last 5 years 
(n=249) 
This signifies that the majority of local government employees feel that corruption is on 
the decline or is stable while only a minority thinks that it has increased; a ratio of 
nearly 4:1.  This predisposition contrasts substantially with the views of respondents in 
other studies that have sought to measure the degree or level of perceived corruption.  
From a service/sector level perspective, a similar number of respondents within the VPS 
thought that the level of corruption within Victoria had increased (17%) yet a noticeably 
lower amount (9%) thought it had decreased (Australian National University, 2013, 
p. 5).  At a national level, 43% of surveyed participants thought that corruption in 
Australia had increased in the previous three years while only 7% thought that it had 
declined (Graycar, 2013, p. 5; McAllister et al., 2012, p. 12).  Accordingly, by way of 
comparison, less than 1 in 10 respondents from the Victorian survey (9%) and the 
national survey (7%) thought that the level of corruption is on the decline, but this 
figure is nearer 4 in 10 (a total of 37.8%) among NSW local government respondents. 
According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, ‘few people 
[surveyed in the Asia Pacific region] think that corruption is on the decline’ 
(Transparency International, 2017, p. 4), with 1 in 5 people believing that the level of 
corruption has decreased, and 1 in 3 people (34%) thinking that corruption had 
increased in Australia (Transparency International, 2017, p. 9).  Similarly, on a global 
91 
 
scale, Australia’s ranking on Transparency International’s CPI shows a decline between 
2012 and 2015, from 7th to 13th (Transparency International, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 
2015).  Noting that the CPI is corroborated by localised studies that extend a similar 
view, the local government findings seem confounding, as they are completely in 
contrast.  While it is not obvious at this stage why this might be, this is potentially 
noteworthy in terms of how corruption is viewed and managed in this particular sector.  
4.1.2 Influencing factors 
To elicit a deeper understanding of their predispositions, respondents were invited to 
provide an explanation for their views.  Diverse views were expressed, each indicating 
how respondents’ impressions were formed, from which sources, exposures, 
experiences or encounters.   
One respondent thought that the level of corruption had ‘increased a lot’, stating:  
‘You see more in the media, like TV and newspaper talking about it.’  
(ID-127, Council 8) 
This response in particular highlights that corruption and its perceived degree of 
management and pervasiveness is linked strongly to external sources, especially the 
media.  Increased media interest has led to this respondent’s belief that there is more 
corruption now than 5 years ago; the level might not have changed, but this is the 
instilled perception that arises from anti-corruption campaigns and showcased 
corruption investigations (Sampson, 2010, p. 265).  Another respondent had the same 
rationale behind their thinking that corruption had ‘decreased a lot’: 
‘ICAC and the media have been active in identifying and making public 
practices to which a blind eye had been turned in the past.’ (ID-34, 
Council 8) 
The same substantive phenomenon has informed two quite different responses; one 
respondent correlated increased media attention with significantly more corruption 
while another perceived that corruption has reduced for the same reason.  As observed 
within Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.9), concerns have been expressed regarding the media’s 
reference to the concept of ‘corruption’, as a term that is either overused, under-
informed, or one that has the potential to distort public perception (Dormaels, 2015, 
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p. 596; Graycar & Monaghan, 2015, p. 592; Loves, 2015, p. 159; Masters & Graycar, 2015, 
p. 173; Osrecki, 2015, p. 348).  The above comments show that such factors can sway 
public perception in diverse directions. 
Two further respondents also cited ICAC as the reason that corruption had ‘decreased a 
lot’, stating: 
‘Strict policies and procedures have been put in place to make this more 
transparent, and this has occurred since ICAC has been involved in the 
news.’ (ID-209, Council 2) 
‘ICAC has been more active in investigations and taking offenders to court.’  
(ID-224, Council 8) 
Accordingly, a variety of factors feature as being influential in respondents’ perceptions 
about any change in the level of corruption in NSW local government, with particular 
emphasis on: 
• the enhancement of policies and procedures; 
• the presence of ICAC; and 
• increased media interest. 
Indirect sources such as the media feature as a key influencer in respondents’ 
understanding of corruption and its prevalence in NSW local government, as found in 
other Australian studies (McAllister et al., 2012, p. 12).  ICAC and the media – in general, 
or as a specific subset (‘the news’, ‘TV’, ‘newspaper’) – were referenced by three of the 
four respondents referenced above, as a reason behind why they thought corruption had 
decreased.  Media interest in local government corruption is informed significantly by 
the work of ICAC, as opposed to other investigative or law-enforcement bodies, such as 
the police.   
It is broadly observed in the literature that opinions and perceptions of corruption are 
heavily informed by third-party accounts rather than through direct experience or 
observation (Abramo, 2008, p. 3; Johnston, 2002, p. 867; Van de Walle, 2008, p. 233).  
The media, in particular, is a most influential source of influence on public opinion, but 
the media’s focus tends to be on the scandalous forms of corruption (Anechiarico & 
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Jacobs, 1996, p. 15).  Only a small aspect of local government corruption is brought to 
the attention of the public, who then form a view about its perceived level and nature. 
In addition to these external factors, many of the respondents who considered that the 
level of corruption had ‘decreased’ attributed their impressions to increased awareness, 
greater vigilance or improved controls and governance arrangements.  These were 
coded under ‘positive control and exposure arrangements’ in NVivo, with the following 
comments indicative of respondents’ views about why corruption had ‘decreased’: 
‘There has always been corruption in local government but I think a lot 
more is being done to prevent and address the issues through training etc., 
so it may have decreased a little.’ (ID-104, Council 7) 
‘It is no longer accepted within councils and council employees who are 
corrupt are identified and punished.’ (ID-202, Council 5) 
‘Internal and external auditing processes, internal ombudsman, 
introduction of corporate plans and policies, anti-fraud and corruption 
newsletter and other initiatives.’ (ID-188, Council 2) 
A range of factors have informed respondents’ explanations for the existence of 
corruption and the nexus between efforts to manage corruption with its level of change 
in the past 5 years.  This could be indicative of a change in cultural acceptance, as 
exemplified by one of the above responses, ‘It is no longer accepted’, supporting 
observations that organisational attitudes to workplace deviances have changed in 
recent times (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, pp. 5-6).  The emphasis on ‘positive control 
and exposure arrangements’ indicates a degree of ‘visibility’ regarding what is being 
done to curtail the incidence of corrupt conduct within organisations, more so now than 
in previous years.   
However, given broader observations in the literature that corruption is not ‘on the 
radar’ of many public agencies (IBAC VIC, 2014, p. 1; Van der Wal et al., 2016, p. 3), one 
might wonder what these anti-corruption endeavours might look like, what they focus 
on, and how effective they are.  Noting the limited context, these comments are 
somewhat speculative, abstract and imbued with a degree of affectedness.  By way of 
example, one comment referred to an internal ombudsman, assumed as a form of 
capable guardian.  Yet, out of the 152 councils in NSW at the commencement of this 
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study, just a handful of councils employed someone in an internal ombudsman function.  
This indicates a limited appetite among councils for such a role, which is discussed 
further in Chapter 6. 
Respondents’ views that the level of corruption has declined omit to elaborate on which 
practices they believe fall within this broad concept of ‘corruption’, who might 
perpetrate such acts, and to what extent.  What is apparent, is that many respondents 
hold a view that efforts to address corruption in local government are effective, as a 
result of localised anti-corruption endeavours.  
The data in Figure 4.2 shows that the majority of respondents accepted that there was a 
degree of corruption within their council.  More than half of all respondents (a total of 
59.4%) said that there was either ‘little’, ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of corruption within their 
council, yet 1 in 5 (20.8%) respondents said that no corruption exists within their 
council.  
 
Figure 4.2. Respondents’ views on the extent of corruption existing within their council 
(n=202) 
A similar study in Victoria, albeit with Victorian state government respondents, reported 
almost identical results in that 61% replied little or some, 22% said none and 16% did 
not know (Graycar, 2014, p. 275).  Notably, the findings suggested that respondents 
recognise the existence of corruption to a limited extent.  This potentially reveals a level 
of acceptance that corruption exists; maybe a ‘socially optimal’ level of corruption, as 




















the costs incurred by corruption, thereby creating a tolerance of infractions which are 
deemed to be moderate or mundane. 
A respondent who thought that there was little corruption in their council stated:  
‘A number of cultural backgrounds view some practices as acceptable, and it 
is very difficult to address this through policy.’ (ID-114, Council 7) 
This respondent’s comment refers to the cultural acceptance of some practices that may 
be tantamount to corrupt conduct.  A well-known example in this regard is the 
customary exchange of gifts (MacNaughton & Wong, 2007, p. 89).  
Immigrants to Australia have more than doubled in the past two decades, with the 
majority settling in NSW (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b).  Considering 6 of the 
10 sampled councils were metropolitan, it seemed likely that increased reference to 
culture, ethnicity or custom would feature among respondents from these councils; yet, 
that did not transpire to be the case.  While the offer of a gift creates a sense of an 
obligation to receive, and consequently, an obligation to reciprocate (Mauss, 2002 
[1950], p. 50), the practice of guanxi, which is commonplace within Chinese 
communities, is considered to be an ‘integral part of doing business’ (Smart & Hsu, 2008, 
p. 177) and ‘a necessary part of everyday life’ (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 74).  Once one 
understands these customs, it becomes clear that a symbolic form of ‘policy’ would be 
limited in its ability to change such long-established practices. 
A contrary perspective was identified during Phase 2 of the research study, presenting a 
broad divergence between survey respondents’ views and interviewees’ views.  Three 
interviewees reflected on their experiences with ethnicity and culture as factors that 
influence or impact upon the understanding of corruption, as well as on councils’ ability 
to address corruption.  These perspectives are presented below:  
‘In the examples that I can think of … an elderly [Italian] gentleman … who 
thought it was quite okay to offer money to council staff because that’s how 
he’d always seen things done in his country and assumed that was the way 
it was done here … So, what one person perceives as being corrupt, another 
person thinks is normal behaviour. I think that’s an issue in that not 
everybody has the same expectations, probably because it is a mixed society 
with mixed beliefs and mixed cultural backgrounds, what is considered 
corruption … I think councils could also work closer with the different 
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cultural communities … A lot of these people at the moment, like this 
woman who rang me, one of her three words of English was ‘“corruption”.’  
You’ve got the two sides, one that has learnt that if they say this word they’ll 
get a reaction straightaway, then you’ve got the other side who don’t 
understand what corruption is at all and don’t think anything they do is 
corrupt, like my little Italian man.’ (Interviewee 11) 
‘I think we need to acknowledge that there are specific cultures in particular 
in situations where new migrants arrive into the area. They might be 
coming from a context where particular behaviours are accepted, tolerated 
or just are normal. Without identifying the specific ones there are cultures 
where simple parking arrangements are just completely foreign to them, 
where bribery is the norm, where providing gifts or giving gifts to officials 
who provide a service is accepted as the norm and actually is required.’ 
(Interviewee 1) 
‘Say a health inspector goes out to do an inspection of a premises, and one 
of the owners of the shop comes from a different cultural background or 
from a culture where a fee for service would be common from their 
background and they don’t necessarily understand the local culture.’ 
(Interviewee 7) 
A disconnect is evident, in that out of the 251 respondents surveyed, only one 
respondent expanded on the issue of custom and culture as a factor that may influence 
the risk or incidence of bribery.  Yet, 3 of the 11 interviewees explored this notion more 
intricately, from a hypothetical standpoint as well as an experiential one.  Rothstein 
(2017b, p. 11) asserts that ‘morally blaming the culture of a nation is not very different 
from saying “you are all dishonest and bad people”’.  Yet, the above interviewees were 
seemingly cognitive of different cultural and societal influences within Australia’s 
pluralistic society and how these might impact on corruption and its potential within 
local government.  They noted that different cultural impressions have a bearing on how 
corruption is understood.  It is feasible that there may be a broader conception among 
the respondent base that corruption cannot be written off as an excuse for differing 
customs and values (Johnston, 2005, p. 18), and hence custom and cultural backgrounds 
are not factors that affect the risk or incidence of particular practices of corruption.  
There may be a broader appreciation of the association between custom and culture, 
with less patience for cultural mitigation (Larmour & Wolanin, 2001, p. xi; OECD, 2003, 
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p. 135).  This may explain its absence in any commentary by those completing the 
survey. 
Without exploring what the concept of corruption means to people or expanding on 
respondents’ experiences with examples of corrupt practices, the fact that 1 in 5 
respondents (see Figure 4.2) believe that there is no corruption within their council 
suggests they believe that corruption does not exist in any form.  This seems 
inexplicable given the significant attention paid to corruption during the past three 
decades (Bjørnskov, 2011, p. 135; Kuris, 2015, p. 126; Wedel, 2012, p. 453); the 
increased attention paid to corruption by the media (Islam, 2014, p. 442; Rothstein & 
Varraich, 2017, p. 7); the number of complaints made to ICAC in relation to local 
government being three times more than the next most complained about sector (ICAC 
NSW, 2016, p. 17); and nearly a quarter of ICAC’s publicly reported investigations being 
in relation to local government (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 17).  ’The following commentaries 
from respondents at two different councils offer some insight into why they feel that 
corruption does not exist within each of their councils:  
‘I feel the current processes are too constricting for something to happen at 
this stage.’  (ID-179, Council 1) 
‘The people I know currently provide their service to the council in good 
faith.’  (ID-121, Council 10) 
Building on these narratives, two-thirds of respondents think that the level of corruption 
in their council was ‘about the same’ as, ‘lower’ than, or ‘much lower’ than in other 




Figure 4.3. Respondents’ views of whether they felt that corruption existed within 
their council, cross-tabulated with the perceived level of corruption at 
other councils (n=202) 
The analysis indicates that respondents predominantly believe that corruption is more 
prevalent in other councils than in their own, highlighting something of an ‘us and them’ 
dualism (Bauman, 1990, pp. 40-41, 159).  Respondents feasibly view their own council 
as being superior to other councils, which are regarded with scepticism.  Similar findings 
were identified in a study of local government employees in Victoria, with only 12% 
believing that corruption was a problem in their workplace, despite more than half of 
them (56%) believing that corruption happens in other councils within the state of 
Victoria (IBAC VIC, 2017a, p. 5). 
This dichotomy, between ‘us and them’, is also referred to as an ‘in-group or out-group’ 
scenario, and these imagined distinctions relate to an antagonistic relationship between 
workplace cultures on performance and identity grounds (Bauman, 1990, p. 41).  
Authoritarian personality styles were exemplified by comments that fell within the 
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some respondents were not amenable to the idea that corruption might manifest within 
their council (Bauman, 1990, p. 48).   
To explore the extent of any divergences between councils, responses within councils 
were compared.  Figure 4.4 reveals how varied respondents’ views are about the extent 
of corruption within their particular council.  At least one person from every council said 
that there was no corruption within their council, with the exception of Councils 3 and 5.  
 
Figure 4.4. Extent of perceived corruption within each respondent’s council (n=202) 
At Council 8, a metropolitan council with between 500 and 1000 staff, a fifth of all 
respondents (13 of the 63) said that there was no corruption at their council, but more 
than twice as many (a combined total of 31) said that there was ‘little’ (20) or ‘some’ 
(11).  Noting the small number of respondents from Council 4, a metropolitan council 
with fewer than 200 staff, all six respondents stated that there is no corruption within 
their council.  With the exception of this council, the ratio of respondents who said ‘little’ 
or ‘some’ is higher than those who said none at all other councils.  Should this not 
indicate a level of tolerance, it might imply a degree of conservatism, cultural denial, 
even misplaced arrogance, any of which might be socially endemic to the extent that 
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2001, p. 5).  Through the lens of one respondent, a richly elaborative statement was 
significant in terms of differences between councils:  
‘My current council deals with corruption very well and encourages staff to 
report any wrongdoings of staff. My previous council on the other hand was 
extremely corrupt and bullied staff into doing the wrong thing all the time. 
It was known that any resident could reverse any decision when asking the 
mayor directly. Quite a few staff were employed due to [the] favouritism of 
[the] senior executive or due to someone in their family already working at 
council. A contact person existed for staff to report corruption, but no one 
dared to go to this person out of fear. Staff friendly and loyal to the 
executive team received pay increases and other types of remuneration. 
“Difficult” staff were openly targeted and investigated.’ (ID-31, Council 8) 
This respondent’s comments highlight a vast disparity between two councils, indicating 
that they can and do differ extensively, despite the regulatory framework and 
parameters of each council being the same.  The above comment indicates that an 
organisational arrangement and cultural system of their former council nurtured 
corruption, with cronyism and nepotism featuring, combined with other misfeasance, 
such as workplace bullying.  
Nepotism and cronyism – practices of corruption which might be categorised as 
‘particularism’ –  are considered to be quite ‘an ongoing societal issue of great concern to 
the public’ (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 1).  If respondents deem there to be either little or 
some corruption in their council, while at the same time having a view that it is at the 
same level as it was five years ago, its degree of tolerance could be affiliated with 
Heidenheimer’s (2009, pp. 152-154) colour-coded classification as being either white or 
grey, rather than black.  Likewise, the perceived level or degree of corruption could be 
sporadic, routine or rare (Johnson, 2004, p. 145), but again, based on the little and some 
predominance, unlikely to be pervasive or systemic.  Corruption in this category may be 
construed as ‘petty corruption’ but not indicative of ‘grand corruption’ (Langseth, 2012, 
p. 9; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2016).  These observations are germane to 
Johnson and Sharma’s (2004, p. 2) assertions that ‘corruption can … be rated in terms of 
the community’s level of tolerance towards it’, and in this sense, one might consider that 
the degree of tolerance is quite high for many council-appointed employees.   
101 
 
The general view of respondents, that there is either little or some corruption in local 
government, but that the overall level is lower than it was 5 years ago, supports the 
academic literature cited above.  If the level has declined, this indicates that respondents 
believe there to be more corruption 5 years ago.  Respondents are not necessarily 
concerned about it or are prepared to accept it at this level, as this marks an 
improvement in its perceived level of incidence: to below a threshold of tolerance or 
acceptability.  Respondents may be getting used to corruption and its normalcy within 
the organisation, and are accepting of it, akin to Kelling and Wilson’s (1982) broken 
window theory, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1).  Thus, respondents’ growing 
tolerance of corruption has contributed to its unseen nature, with little or some 
corruption being an everyday reality, akin to a mundane organisational or workplace 
practice.  This occupational familiarity of ‘little C’ corruption is unremarkable, appearing 
in stark contrast to the scandalous forms of corruption that feature in popular news: ‘big 
C’ corruption. 
On the basis of this assumed ambivalence, the impact of the media and its ability to 
inform different perspectives about corruption, is explored at this juncture.  
4.1.3 Perceptions attributed to external factors such as the media 
An ICAC/media synthesis featured in some respondents’ remarks referred to earlier, 
when asked if the level of corruption has decreased or increased in the past 5 years.  
Many respondents referred to the media as an outlet that has informed their thinking, 
and this presented as a distinct theme.  The following comments stood out as 
explanations for respondents’ different perceptions regarding the level of corruption in 
local government: that corruption has increased, decreased or stayed the same.  The 
quantum of comments highlights the influence that the media has in driving perceptions 
about corruption and creating a knowledge base about what corruption is and its 
generalised prevalence and significance.  
A reason given for the existence of corruption in this respondent’s council was:  
‘Recent press attention.’ (ID-5, Council 5) 
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In comparison with the perceived level of corruption in other councils, this respondent 
claimed that they did not know if the level of corruption in local government had 
changed, but stated:  
‘We haven’t had any media scandals lately, so possibly we are better than 
some.’ (ID-136, Council 1) 
Respondents who felt that the level of corruption in local government had ‘increased a 
lot’ in the last 5 years gave the following reasons:  
‘You see more in the media, like TV and newspaper talking about it.’  
(ID-127, Council 7) 
‘Perceived to have increased due to public awareness increasing through 
media.’ (ID-207, Council 8) 
‘I have only been with local government for 18 months. The media definitely 
highlights an increase across the sector.’ (ID-38, Council 8) 
A respondent who thought that the level of corruption in local government had 
‘decreased a little’ attributed this to:  
‘Media scrutiny, especially by ABC journalists and due to whistleblowers.’ 
(ID-65, Council 10) 
In contrast, a respondent who believed that the level of corruption has ‘stayed the same’ 
stated:  
‘Even though it appears to be more prevalent due to media report of ICAC 
enquiries I still think it’s stayed the same.’ (ID-112, Council 7) 
Some respondents correlated increased media interest with an increase in corruption, 
while another respondent correlated media interest with a decrease in corruption.  A 
further respondent acknowledged that, despite increased media attention and coverage, 
the level of corruption may not have changed in 5 years.  Without drawing a correlation 
with respondents’ comments and their views on the level of corruption, the 
commonality is that these respondents’ impressions about corruption in local 
government have been informed by the media, as opposed to first-hand experience, 
supporting observations in the corruption studies literature (Graycar & Monaghan, 
2015, p. 592; McAllister et al., 2012, p. 12; OECD, 2005, p. 26).   
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Such factors offer an insight into what corruption means to local government employees.  
Impressions of corruption, as a term, have been formed based on a priori knowledge, by 
indirect sources such as the media, as opposed to sensory experience and direct 
exposure.  Localised knowledge-building artefacts, such as training courses, codes of 
conduct and advisories from in-house personnel and management, did not feature as 
sources of information in this regard.  This has potential ramifications for how everyday 
practices might be construed in the workplace, indicating that some activities might 
appear to be normal, acceptable or insufficiently serious, as underpinned by the ‘low’ 
and ‘some’ predispositions (Figure 4.3).  If respondents’ understandings about 
corruption was based on a posteriori knowledge – in this sense, real-world observations 
and experiences of corruption and corrupt practices – one might wonder whether 
corruption-related reporting to ICAC would be far greater that the 120 reports made 
each year.  
The creation of public knowledge is related to the observance of investigations and their 
outcomes, as highlighted by the media, but based on the work of ICAC.  If the propensity 
of media reporting in NSW is fixated on the work of ICAC, this assumes a somewhat 
synoptic view (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 219), where many viewers focus on a very small 
aspect of what is a far greater phenomenon.  By virtue of this, public knowledge is 
limited to matters that: (1) fall within the purview of ICAC’s jurisdictional and regulatory 
mandate, being matters which are assessed as potentially serious or systemic (or both); 
and (2) are influenced by newsworthiness, media drivers and media agendas.   
In Pope’s seminal publication, the TI Source Book, the media featured as one of the key 
national integrity pillars (Pope, 2000b, 1996).  Yet, noting that just 0.5% of all matters 
referred to ICAC result in formal investigation (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 9) and therefore 
result in public reporting, a significant degree of potential corruption flies beneath the 
public’s radar.  Moreover, a socially engineered construct of corruption is created.  The 
variety of opinion about what types of corruption feature in local government, to what 
extent, and in what form, is severely circumscribed.  Opinions about corruption are not 
reflective of the reality of corruption, as explored within Chapter 5, much of which is 
unattended to, if it is even identified and then reported.  There is no other mechanism of 
data capture.  This narrow focus results in a refining and redefining of corruption, which 
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in turn, has the potential to reify practices which do not frequently fall within the same 
base of comparison.  
As the media as a whole, along with its various constituents (‘ABC journalists’, ‘news’, 
‘newspapers’, ‘TV’), contributed to respondents’ understandings about the level of 
perceived corruption in local government, this was probed further in the semi-
structured interviews.  Under the theme heading, ‘media’, the following comments 
support the aforementioned views expressed by some survey respondents, correlating 
ICAC’s work and the media reporting of it with increased awareness about corruption:  
‘I think the awareness has increased. Certainly, I mean, the level of media 
attention dedicated to corruption in particular, the scrutiny that our sector 
is under, local government in particular, has brought it to light. I mean, most 
of the headlines in the newspapers when it comes to corruption relate to 
local government.’ (Interviewee 1) 
‘… come back to the early questions about scale, severity, some people 
wouldn’t necessarily see one-off stealing … as corrupt conduct under ICAC’s 
eyes. When they read the media articles about high level corruption, Eddie 
Obeid’s and Botany Bay’s18 and all of this kind of big scale stuff, do you think 
they affiliate all of these different things and say, well if I do this in my 
workplace that’s corrupt conduct, or do you think that there’s only big scale 
stuff is corruption and therefore I’m never going to be in that mix?’ 
(Interviewee 7) 
‘… I think it’s shaped by what the media puts out there. All we tend to see 
are the ICAC public hearings and the high-level serious cases where millions 
of dollars have been accepted in bribes. That’s typically not what the 
average person will come across in their work.’ (Interviewee 9) 
The above comments indicate that practitioners believe that the media and ICAC have 
dramatically influenced public knowledge about corruption, anti-corruption and the 
existence of each in local government.  However, the latter two comments above 
distinguish between the type of corruption pursued by ICAC and reported on by the 
media with the everyday practices that council employees engage in and may or may not 
consider to be corrupt.  Particularly, ICAC’s perceived focus on the ‘big scale stuff’ or 
 
18 The interviewee’s references here are in relation to ICAC investigations reported on in 2017.  The former reference 
relates to an investigation involving Edward (Eddie) Obeid Sr, a former NSW Labor minister (ICAC NSW, 2017d) and 




‘high-level serious cases’ is not congruent with everyday practices which local 
government officials might observe or experience in the course of performing their 
duties.   
These views reinforce the implications of ICAC’s awareness and regulatory endeavours.  
The concept of corruption is fleetingly cited and linked to the regulatory efforts of the 
state’s ‘watchdog’, but in doing so, the disconnect between the perception of corruption 
and its reality is intensified.  Practices of corruption that are not brought to the fore 
remain hidden, but take place in full view: normal, everyday happenings that resides 
within employees’ thresholds of comfort (little, some, or even none, as indicated by 
Figure 4.2).  The commonness and relative tolerance of this degree of corruption is 
seemingly reasonable, according to those in the council, and accordingly, must be 
unchallenged (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, pp. 139-141). 
Undoubtedly, only a marginal amount of corruption is exposed, as such focus is on a 
minuscule number of matters assessed and pursued by ICAC, without consideration of 
ICAC’s limited capacity or restricted mandate.  Out of the 251 respondents in the survey, 
there was no indication that this was acknowledged by any respondent when accounting 
for their response.  One commonality in the accounts given by respondents and 
interviewees is that ICAC is the cynosure of corruption.  Publicity about corruption, being 
predicated on the work of ICAC, has increased awareness of it; however, an adverse 
effect of this purported success is the increased disconnect by those who are best placed 
to observe, and respond to, corrupt practices on the frontline.  
This interviewee framed this issue in terms of its impact on employees’ understanding 
and interpretation of corruption, as well as their level of tolerance:  
‘The other thing that we’ve suffered from is the media coverage of the really 
bad stuff because I think what it allows people to do is absolutely that 
[commit corruption]. You know, no one’s calling ICAC on me so it’s not 
really corrupt. No one’s gone to governance so I don’t have the internal 
auditor or the governance manager on the phone to me saying “Hey, what 
are you doing?” so it’s not really corrupt. It’s almost like the penalty defines 
the behaviour rather than the behaviour being recognised in and of itself.’ 
(Interviewee 4)  
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This comment suggests that the effect of media reporting on how corruption is 
addressed at the frontline is exacerbated by the absence of a capable guardian: a 
fundamental component of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory.  
References to ICAC, the ‘internal auditor’ or ‘governance manager’ could each feature as 
a capable guardian in this example (Hollis-Peel et al., 2011, p. 54).  The absence of a 
capable guardian in this sense strengthens the ability for any potentially corrupt actor to 
rationalise or justify their behaviour, as they are not being held to account.   
The interviewee’s comment regarding ‘penalty defines the behaviour rather than the 
behaviour being recognised in and of itself’, aligns with Kurer’s (2015, p. 36) salient 
assertion that perceptions of corruption are often linked with ‘punishment, not whether 
the act is corrupt or not’.  This notion somewhat assists in the understanding of different 
scales of corruption.  Once a threshold is culturally established, everything else is 
adjusted accordingly and that sets the bar of tolerance. 
The focus of media coverage was discussed further in the interviews, in the context of 
whether such focus was predisposed toward the elected representatives or the 
appointed officials.  The former are democratically elected by the community to 
represent their best interests (Dollery et al., 2003, p. 103) and are, therefore, the visible 
and legislative – and thus newsworthy – public face of a council.  These interviewees 
elaborated on the focus towards the elected level. 
‘Let’s face it, your elected officials are far more public. It’s far more sexy for 
a newspaper to be reporting on a councillor who’s done something corrupt 
than it is on some low-level council staff officer, or even some more senior 
council staff officer … Having said that, if a council does act corruptly you 
want that exposed publicly. The problem is that that’s sexy from a 
newspaper’s point of view or the media’s point of view. Just the same as if 
something hits ICAC and ICAC takes it on, that’s sexy from the media’s point 
of view.’ (Interviewee 2) 
‘It’s taken seriously at their [elected] level because it sells newspapers, it’s 
seen as sexy.’ (Interviewee 5) 
‘I think that the sexy stuff happens at the councillor level. It’s really 
embarrassing, daggy stuff when it’s the operational things ... councillors do 




As quoted by the last interviewee, corruption at the operational level was considered to 
be ‘daggy’, an Australian colloquialism meaning unfashionable or banal.  Each of the 
three views conveyed a near identical impression: a focus on ‘sexy’ corruption, centred 
on the elected officials as opposed to the appointed officials, has the result of rendering 
reductionist frameworks of meaning vis-à-vis what corruption is and is not.  The 
propensity for attention to focus on various contemporary references to corruption, as 
misdemeanours within public office (Buchan, 2012, p. 89) – especially featuring high-
profile figures being castigated for past mendacities – detracts from the operational 
dynamics of local government.  Such examples might be newsworthy, as the ideology of 
‘altruistic democracy’ is compromised (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 44).  However, it 
means that ‘daggy’ – read low-level bureaucratic – corruption remains largely ignored.   
Media coverage, which focuses on the political economy of corruption, might focus on 
egregious incidents by public figures in positions of power, superficially imbuing them 
with a celebrity status.  One of the most common examples in recent times within NSW 
involved a deputy mayor of Auburn Council, a metropolitan council in the greater west 
Sydney region, who notoriously closed his own street to host an extravagant wedding 
(Munro & Saulwick, 2017).  Within the survey theme of ‘councillors’ – this being the 
elected public figures of local government – the following comments were attributed to 
respondents from Council 8:  
‘Based on the recent reported cases and matters before ICAC. Mostly to do 
with the elected councillors. Corruption at staff level has reduced a lot.’  
(ID-23, Council 8) [This response was given for the respondent’s perception 
that the level of corruption in local government had increased a lot in the 
past 5 years.] 
‘I believe any major corruption that occurs isn’t within the day to day 
operations from staff but in the highest levels of council as has been proved 
recently by the ICAC.’ (ID-28, Council 8) 
‘Not by staff, however by councillors and political figures.’ (ID-26, Council 8)  
‘Employees are usually very clean, “council” on the other hand …’  
(ID-32, Council 8) 
‘All ticks above relate to councillors, not staff.’ (ID-34, Council 8) 
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The above viewpoints indicate a stark contrast between the elected and appointed levels 
of local government; an observation that corruption by employees has reduced, or is 
relatively non-existent, while corruption by councillors remains active.  The first two 
respondents attributed their view to recent intervention by ICAC, supporting the 
deduction that employees’ views and perspectives about corruption in local government 
are heavily shaped by what the media publicises, as based largely on the work of ICAC.   
With reference to Sutherland and Cressey’s (2004) differential association theory, and 
Cohen’s (2001) denial theory, one might contend that the employment of socialisation 
techniques by respondents from Council 8 have resulted in a subconscious belief that 
corruption either does not exist, or is not in the same league as that reported on by ICAC.  
This point comes out in the comments quoted above ‘Not by staff’, ‘Employees are 
usually very clean’ and ‘not staff’, and is supported by the findings within Figure 4.4, 
where a fifth of all respondents claim there to be no corruption in their council.  The 
strong correlation of views from respondents at Council 8 suggest that this belief is more 
evident within this council than others in the sample, potentially reflecting the 
composition of elected representatives within this particular council.  Feasibly, the 
actions of the elected councillors are viewed so negatively by the employees, that their 
own actions, or those around them at the appointed level, are not even questionable.  
Some comments, again from respondents at Council 8, develop this assessment further, 
distinguishing between the prospect of employees committing corruption compared 
with councillors and the susceptibility or opportunity of each:   
‘… employees have both less opportunity or ability; however “council” often 
misuses tax payers [funds]’ (ID-32, Council 8) 
‘Councillors do not give regards to any of the procedures and code of 
conduct so more prone to corruption.  Staff, however, are bound by major 
controls put in place in today’s environment there is no chance of any 
serious corruption’ (ID-23, Council 8) 
Many views expressed by respondents from Council 8 are contemptuous of the elected 
body.  Two respondents’ comments, ‘there is no chance of any serious corruption’ and 
‘any major corruption that occurs isn’t within the day to day operations from staff’, shed 
light on the spectrum of corruption, indicating that there is a form of threshold based on 
severity.  Given the above comments, any form of corruption engaged in by staff or 
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within the administrative jurisdiction, is categorised as lesser.  If an acceptance of 
corruption resides within a ‘socially optimal’ level, this is not sustainable, as corruption 
‘feeds on itself’ (Osrecki, 2015, p. 343) and breeds more corruption; a term referred to 
as the ‘corruption trap’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 3).   
If petty corruption of this kind is entrenched within the organisational complexities of 
local government, any potential reporter of corruption might concede that there is little 
point in referring their concerns to ICAC, especially when 80% of matters assessed are 
‘closed without referral’ (ICAC NSW, 2016, pp. 19-20).  In this regard, as argued by 
Osrecki (2015, p. 343), ‘a moderate, socially optimal level of corruption will produce 
tolerance for that level and will slowly influence people’s behaviour – more and more 
severe corrupt behaviour will be tolerated, ultimately resulting in a sub-optimal level’.  
In contrast with the abovementioned views conveyed by respondents in the survey, 
three interviewees each felt that corruption at the elected level is restricted, but at the 
operational level there is more susceptibility:  
‘I think in terms of the greater risk, I think there is a much greater risk for 
your – what I will call the bureaucrats’ side of council rather than the 
elected side, simply by virtue of the fact that most decisions made by the 
council effectively are made by the bureaucrats. Okay your policy decisions 
and that side of stuff are made by the councillors, but particularly given in 
most councils anyway, there’s far less decisions now being made by 
councillors around development, which is where big corruption is always 
possible.’ (Interviewee 2) 
‘The elected level, there’s only so much – I mean you control a lot of things, 
but you’re not controlling the everyday operations. So, things like tendering 
of projects etc, that’s the operational level. The elected level as I said, tends 
to be conflict of interest issues. It tends to be developers from my 
experience, developers are the problem.’ (Interviewee 3) 
‘I think it’s easier at a staff level than it is at a councillor level, simply 
because I think there’s fewer opportunities for a councillor. In reality 
they’re only brought into a decision-making process every now and then 
and there’s a degree of transparency around it, and also, they’re much more 
public facing, so they’re in the community, the community knows what 
they’re doing, what they’re not doing and people know.’ (Interviewee 6) 
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The above comments observe that there are limited opportunities at the elected level, as 
there is greater transparency and scrutiny.  However, at the operational level, there is a 
broader and more dispersed decision-making remit, coupled with a range of 
opportunities which might allow corruption to flourish.  These views go some way to 
complementing observations in the literature, which predominantly refer to the fact that 
the operational nature of local government is infused with significant functions that 
pose high risks of corruption (ICAC NSW, 2010c).  From a review of the literature, there 
are few references to corruption at the elected level.  Hence, it is noteworthy that 
comments from survey respondents conveyed a commonly held view that more serious 
or pervasive forms of corruption would be predicated to the elected body over the 
appointed.  As one interviewee said:   
‘I think it’s given much more attention for elected officials.’ (Interviewee 3) 
This highlights the disconnect between perception and reality.  A range of corruption 
risks exist within the operational domain, yet if the focus is on the elected level, these 
become under-considered by those who work within the council.  This is potentially 
supported further by the scalability concept, the subjectively different degrees of 
severity and seriousness, and the newsworthiness of those who might be acting 
corruptly.  Adding to their above comment, Interviewee 3 stated: 
‘Well I think in terms of small stuff, so when we talk about risk because 
we’ve got to talk about likelihood and consequence so I think the likelihood 
around like council rangers is higher but the severity or the level of the 
corruption would be sort of more serious around elected officials.’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
This same interviewee extended the above insight as an aspect of corruption risk, noting 
the difficulties with addressing corruption as a corporate risk:  
‘If someone really wants to work their way around the system they’ll do 
that and if they can’t they might go elsewhere and try and do it somewhere 
else because it’s their dynamic, you know, it’s not like other risks.  Well, 
once you find a control for a risk the risk then reduces by a certain amount 
and you have your residual risk and that’s it.  Where corruption risk is quite 




As acutely remarked above, the risk of corruption differs from other corporate risks.  
The risk would be compounded if a council fails to accurately recognise the many ways 
that corruption could materialise or dismisses corruption at the operational level 
because of its perceived level of seriousness and low public interest.  
A focus on elected-level activities, attributed to their greater visibility, compounds any 
perception that the prospect of corruption within the operational domain is less existent 
or less significant.  However, despite the activities of the elected officials supposedly 
being independent of the administration, the two are unavoidably interlaced, as 
explored below.  
4.1.4 How councillors’ behaviour can negatively influence the employees 
Two interviewees elaborated on their experience of councillors’ behaviour and how 
such behaviour resonated with the operational side of council:  
‘I think there was visible corruption at the top [elected level]. It kind of 
paralysed everything down through the system … and that combined with 
the natural conservatism of the GM, he’d been there a long period of time 
and … his mantra was business as usual and it had been twisted into we 
actually do nothing adventurous, which was a great pity.’ (Interviewee 10) 
‘A lot of them [councillors] were wearing it [Code of Conduct complaints] 
like badges of honour – oh, I’ve had 49 against me – why are you here – this 
is my fifth.  Some people had over 40 against them.  So that says to me if the 
worst that happens to them is they’re sent off to a class, there’s no real 
repercussion … The staff too must wonder how many times people get away 
with things before something is taken seriously.’ (Interviewee 11) 
Visible corruption with impunity on the part of the elected officials signifies that the 
actions and behaviours were brazen, as evidenced in Interviewee 11’s comment, ‘there’s 
no real repercussion’.  The interviewee’s last comment, that ‘staff too much wonder how 
many times people get away with things before something is taken seriously’, is 
indicative of issues that may exist within Council 8, noting the disdainful remarks made 
about councillors. 
Notably, one interviewee considered that corruption was easier to perpetrate at the 
appointed level but perceived it as more prevalent at the elected level:  
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‘I think it’s easier to do at the operational level. I think it’s harder at the 
councillor level, which then started me thinking then, my god, why do they 
keep doing it. Like why is there so much more councillor stuff than there is 
operational stuff.’ (Interviewee 6) 
This respondent’s perception, that there is more corruption by councillors than within 
the operational domain, is unsupported, since significantly more ICAC investigations 
have been orientated to the appointed officials (see Appendix 1).  However, it highlights 
that, even to this interviewee, it must seem that way because of the public visibility of 
regulatory endeavours.  The interviewee considered corruption to be more difficult to 
perpetrate at the elected level, but this view was not shared by many of the respondents 
in the survey, further highlighting a variance of understanding.  People often fail to see 
corruption (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p. 134), and these divergences highlight how 
corruption perceptions differ from everyday realities.  From the perspective of symbolic 
interactionism (Blumer, 2007, pp. 68-69), any meanings ascribed to corruption by those 
best placed to experience it will undoubtedly impact or influence any action or inaction. 
The following five comments, with four from respondents at Council 8, expand on these 
divergences, highlighting a perceived degree of superiority by the elected councillors 
which imbues them with a sense of impunity:  
‘Staff have strict controls in place … but councillors think there are no one 
above them.’ (ID-23, Council 8) 
‘Elected representatives should be treated as the employees are and held 
accountable and punished – always two sets of rules running.’ (ID-111, 
Council 7) 
‘As our recent experience has shown, there is a very difficult line between 
the actions of councillors and staff. The former have caused us grief, 
derailed a major project and subsequently taken pernicious action towards 
staff in, it turned out, a corrupt attempt to furthering individual interests. 
[Name of Council redacted] Council’s reputation was damaged and the staff 
suffer for that despite there being, within council, a strong work and probity 
ethic and a structure and training to handle corruption risks.’  
(ID-34, Council 8) 
‘Councillors in the past do not seem to have a good sense of what 
constitutes corruption.’ (ID-21, Council 8) 
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‘Whilst there’s been a few high profile cases of operational staff acting in a 
corrupt fashion, it’s pretty obvious that when there is a corruption problem 
within a council, it’s with the elected officials, and the overwhelming 
majority of corruption within councils has been and will continue to be at 
that level, if only because that’s where so many decisions are made that 
impact upon vested interests, particularly developers, where decisions are 
made that can be worth well into the hundreds of millions range.  Sadly, that 
tends to not be addressed because politicians are treated like modern 
aristocracy.’ (ID-36, Council 8) 
The quantity of comments from respondents at Council 8 demonstrate the divergence of 
views from respondents at this council, highlighting in this context an ‘us and them’ 
dualism (Bauman, 1990, pp. 40-41).  The actions and conduct of some elected 
representatives in Greater Sydney have received notoriety in recent times – for example, 
at City of Ryde Council (ICAC NSW, 2014d), Hurstville Council (OLG NSW, 2016) and 
Auburn Council (Munro & Saulwick, 2017) – and these comments indicate that some 
respondents believe that councillors are held to a different standard of accountability.  
Within Queensland, similar examples of alleged corrupt conduct or misfeasance in 
public office have implicated a few elected-level officials, and in doing so, have publicly 
tarnished the local government sector, resulting in a supposed perception that local 
government is a ‘hotbed for corruption’ (Solomons, 2018). 
The public spectacle of these infamous instances does little to explain what conditions 
contribute to the incidence of corruption.  Notably, while the comments above from 
respondents at Council 8 are somewhat derisive, respondents from the remaining nine 
councils did not express similar views in such magnitude.  However, two comments 
alluded to the blurred boundaries between elected and official functions.  In particular, 
how councillors have exerted influence on their council employees, irrespective of 
prohibitive clauses within the NSW Model Code of Conduct (OLG NSW, 2015, pp. 13-14) 
which exist to ensure a clear delineation between the elected and administrative realms 
of local government:  
‘Undue operational influence by councillors and elected officials’ (ID-143, 
Council 1)  
‘There is a culture of “just do what the politicians want” regardless of 
legislation, EEO etc.  If you want to keep your job AND thrive/progress you 
need to “bend the rules”.’ (ID-3, Council 5)  
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The second of the two comments identifies how pressures and power differentials can 
compel public officials to capitulate to the social pressure of complicity in practices 
which might be construed as corruption (World Bank, 2014, p. 60).  As Mills (2000 
[1956], p. 343) puts it, while there may be ‘corrupt men in sound institutions [… Such] 
institutions are corrupting many of the men who live and work in them’.  Through three 
traits of power – authority, manipulation and coercion (Mills, 2000 [1959], p. 41) – the 
social pressure to capitulate becomes difficult to resist.  If the above comments have 
substance, an employee’s personal conscience may be attenuated if they feel pressure to 
‘bend the rules’ (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, p. 144), but equally, there may be a 
subconscious, or even conscious, willingness to acquiesce.  By putting self-interest above 
personal morality, integrity diminishes and the organisation nurtures a structural and 
institutional immorality (Mills, 2000 [1956], p. 343).  Noting this, and the perceived 
exertion of influence by councillors, the organisational and architectural composition of 
local government is explicated further below in view of its ability to facilitate or hinder 
the incidence of corruption.   
4.1.5 The architecture of local government 
The distinctive architectural composition of a council was described by this interviewee:  
‘We can’t ignore that there are these two other spheres that are gravitating 
around the administration.  I mean, the administrative body, of the council, 
while at times we would like to think of it as an isolated organisation, it’s 
not isolated.  It’s there simply to perform a function which is serving the 
elected members to deliver on the aspirations and the needs expressed by 
the community and the stakeholders and deliver on that vision that they 
democratically set on behalf of the community who elected them.’ 
(Interviewee 1). 
This interviewee addressed the inevitable difficulties that exist within local government, 
focusing on relations between the elected councillors and appointed staff.  While elected 
councillors are prohibited from influencing operational decision-making, the 
administrative body exists to accommodate the councillors in the course of their civic 
duties.  An architectural contradiction is created which places all council officials in a 
precarious situation if they operate under duress and feel compelled to ‘bend the rules’. 
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Several interviewees provided these insightful perspectives about the nature and 
structure of local government and its features, noting differences to other institutions or 
industries. For example:  
‘I think local government is unique in terms of the elected officials and the 
closeness to the whole organisation.’ (Interviewee 9) 
From a spatial, supervisory perspective, this view was put forward: 
‘Local government’s one of those things which is difficult in terms of a lot of 
the work that gets carried out happens out there, so it’s not just happening 
in this building, so there’s no line of sight of what people are actually doing 
and that’s always a bit of a challenge.’ (Interviewee 3) 
The above two statements highlight the personalisation of local government and its 
tendency to create conditions for corruption.  They indicate that corruption would not 
be as inherent within other sectors or industries, as they do not have the same degree of 
interaction with a client base.  In the first comment, councillors are the face of council, 
elected by their constituents, but operating with a closeness to the day-to-day 
operations.  The second comment acknowledges the inherent degree of autonomy that 
many frontline officials have in the course of day-to-day operations.  This elaborates on 
the notion of discretion, but with reduced oversight, thereby conforming, to some 
degree, with Klitgaard’s (1988, p. 75) formula for corruption.  Council employees 
conduct health inspections, tend parks and recreation services, and inspect and regulate 
business premises.  All councils have service locations detached from their head offices, 
and these might include community centres, libraries, leisure centres, theatres and 
airports (ALGA, 2019).  
To extend such considerations, following are some comments from interviewees who 
acknowledged councils’ proximity to their client base as a factor that has the potential to 
generate conditions for particular types of corruption:  
‘I think one of the other things with local government is the proximity to its 
client base. State government, whilst you certainly get corruption, it’s not as 
close to its client base as local government is by definition. I think that can 
lead to a problem particularly in terms of inappropriate gift giving, making 
decisions for friends and neighbours. All of these sort of low-level 
corruption …’ (Interviewee 2) 
116 
 
‘I guess any legislative or regulatory framework has certainly an obstacle 
that we have human beings or government place in front of customers or 
people that are obviously trying to get something from us.  Whether it is a 
permit to build a house or an extension or build a tower or close a road or 
get a parking permit, we are putting hurdles effectively and creating a 
system that creates barriers. The system is obviously created to create 
equality and accountability but it certainly can be viewed by some people as 
obstacles to overcome.  So if there’s a shortcut to take between you and a 
profit or an advantage that you might be getting from our organisation, for 
example, and you might be willing to attempt that road.’ (Interviewee 1) 
The above comments highlight salient features about local government’s susceptibility 
to corruption: that the administrative functions serve to support the elected function; 
that there is ‘closeness’ to the client base, thereby indicating also that such proximity is a 
causal factor; and that a lack of supervision is coupled with comparatively high levels of 
discretionary decision-making.  These structural features are worthy of reflection while 
keeping in mind Weber’s (1947) ideal type configuration of bureaucracy, which 
contends that there should be a clear delineation between formal and informal life 
(Bauman, 1990, pp. 79-83).  In the context of local government, employees’ social 
identities and private interests are taken to be detached from the official roles that 
employees play in the council, which are formalised and centred around controls and 
hierarchies and are governed by an array of policies and procedures (Adler, 2012, 
p. 246).  In reality, it is not possible to create this depersonalisation, because beyond the 
formal veneer there is always an informal institution (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017, p. 10) with 
different interpersonal relationships and degrees of human interaction (Bauman, 1990, 
p. 85).  Nevertheless, the symbolic presence of ‘positive control and exposure 
arrangements’ within the formal structure of the organisation is seen in a positive light 
by many frontline employees (see Section 4.1.2).  However, these employee perspectives 
potentially neglect to consider the informal, interpersonal and relational influences that 
can facilitate more mundane forms of corruption, which may be perceived and 
experienced by frontline employees as entrepreneurialism, a means of providing job 
satisfaction, or ways to make formalised work repertoires more subjectively meaningful. 
(Ditton, 1977, pp. 173-174). 
The strength of relationships plays a fundamental role within the formal structure of any 
organisation (Walton, 2005, pp. 569-570), albeit they are often intangible and 
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unsolidified.  Human bonds, self-interests, loyalties and inherent prejudices are 
examples of factors that may impact upon the dispassionate, objective or meritorious-
based decisions that public servants are expected to enact.  This may be why the 
following interviewees felt this way, albeit the second comment highlights the 
unreliability of controls:  
‘I do feel that local government’s more vulnerable but I haven’t quite put my 
finger on why.’ (Interviewee 3) 
‘I think that if every staff member in our organisation was of a mind to 
engage in corrupt conduct, I think that there would certainly be 
opportunities for a lot of people to do a lot of damage.  That’s terrifying … 
In my role, for example, I could do all sorts of shit and no one would know.’ 
(Interviewee 6) 
Noting that proximity of council services might explain why some forms of corruption 
exist more than others, the latter interviewee’s comment accentuates the extent of 
opportunities within councils’ administrative jurisdiction, being one of the three 
components within Cressey’s (1973) fraud triangle.  Moreover, the fact that ‘no one 
would know’ if such opportunities were exploited highlights the potential for corruption 
to manifest in the absence of appropriate oversight or scrutiny.  This risk would be 
compounded if any anti-corruption focus is skewed towards the elected function over 
the appointed, or if operational corruption is dismissed as being insignificant.  The 
opportunities and skills that one might acquire during the course of their employment, 
or as a result of their occupational status (Dormaels, 2015, p. 596), highlights a key 
vulnerability to the possibility of corruption; environmental conditions within the 
organisation bring offender and target together, without oversight or effective 
guardianship (Clarke & Eck, 2003, p. 27).   
4.2 The disconnect between perceptions and reality 
The media and ICAC together set and define the tone of what corruption is and what is 
means, but the consequence is that the focus is on manufacturing and prosecuting the 
spectacle of corruption, and not its practice.  This has the potential to widen the gap 
between what citizens understand corruption to be and how they might encounter its 
incidence in their workplace.  This is acutely captured in the excerpt below.  
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‘The media and regulators seem to focus exclusively on the big-ticket items 
e.g. bribes or salacious activity ... In reality these two kinds of corruption are 
a) fairly contained i.e. involving one or three persons and b) not really that 
huge in terms of actual impact on outcomes. What is ignored in the 
corruption focus is the “death by a thousand paper cuts” stuff – the 
nepotism that may result in an informal network of people who subtly 
control the place, the leadership culture that may subtly punish compliance 
with norms/power, lack of systems or skills resulting in lots of small 
financial losses etc. I think the focus on the bigger, more dramatic, one-off 
stuff actually works against you in terms of helping organisations 
understand that corruption can actually be an aggregate of seemingly minor 
things and this cluster can be far more damaging to an organisation over 
time than a councillor dancing on a table with a stripper or someone 
stealing $10k from kitty. This is my biggest frustration in general as 
someone who has worked in public sector systems for 20 years. Finally, I 
think “corruption” is an element of a broader issue … councils tend not to 
have good systems in general – lots of regulation but not great systems. The 
other thing I think is that when corruption is found (e.g. someone dancing 
on a table after stealing $10k) the media and public punish the whole 
organisation even though the corruption actually only involved one or three 
people. This is manifestly unfair/damaging to organisational 
culture/wellbeing as well as then discouraging people from reporting the 
small things that happen in every organisation and need to be rooted out 
and dealt with …’ (ID-126, Council 10)  
This enlightening commentary alludes to several issues that are worthy of exploration.  
The introductory part of the comment builds on the aforementioned reference to the 
public reporting of local government corruption, contending that ‘the media and 
regulators seem to focus exclusively on the big-ticket items’.  The aggregate of seemingly 
innocuous corrupt practices does not fall within the same spectrum.  Mundane 
corruption is vastly distinct from exceptional forms of corruption that attract ICAC and 
media interest.  
The respondent’s observation that this focus ignores the ‘nepotism’ that exists, suggests 
a cultural norm of corruption that is unaddressed.  Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, p. 8) argues 
that ‘institutionalised corruption is based on informal particularism’, and this seemingly 
features as a causality behind the resultant aggregation of less significant forms of 
corruption.  As indicated by several phrases within the above comment, different 
degrees of furtiveness become enmeshed within the daily working life of local 
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government, fostered through a culture of preference and partiality: ‘the nepotism that 
may result in an informal network of people who subtly control the place’, with the 
extent and normalcy of such practices reified by  ‘the leadership culture that may subtly 
punish compliance with norms/power’ [emphasis added].  These illuminating conditions 
foster the acceptance of corrupt behaviours; a structurally normative situation is 
created within the organisational subculture, which conflates everyday business with 
occupational deviance (Ditton, 1977, pp. 173-174). 
While it might be prudent not to confine corruption to a suite of practices that are 
perpetrated by individuals (Buchan, 2012, p. 73; Hindess, 2001, p. 7; 2012, p. 11), the 
practice of ‘nepotism’ is one that seems to lead to this gradual working up and 
infiltration of corruption throughout an organisation.  This highlights how social 
relations of corruption can foster a cultural conformity.  While nepotism is traditionally 
defined as a practice where a person in a position of power or influence favours a 
member of their family, usually to provide a job, the expression is used more widely now 
(Pope, 2000a, p. 197).  It is a practice that features within the contemporary language of 
corruption (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 14; Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, pp. 3-9; Mulgan, 2012, 
p. 25) but also one that is often deemed to be acceptable or legitimate by employees 
(Hudson et al., 2017, p. 12).  This is explained further within the next chapter.  
As contended by the above respondent, a potentially unintended consequence of the 
media and ICAC nexus is that people are discouraged ‘from reporting the small things 
that happen’.  This accentuates some of the implications of the public anti-corruption 
agenda: a focus on elected officials or the more scandalous forms of corruption that are 
pursued by regulatory bodies has contributed to a corruption disconnect that remains 
studiously under-considered and under-researched.  Such examples may be 
newsworthy for their sensationalistic properties, but the implications are that the 
normative framework and meaning of corruption is established.  As contended by 
Ashforth and colleagues (2008, p. 675), ‘even if the causes of corruption are not entirely 
systemic, the consequences are’.  This is explored below. 
4.2.1 The implications of increased awareness 
In seeking to thematically examine the nature of the publicity implications, the theme 
‘increased awareness’ was used to code comments.  When asked if ‘public and 
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organisational awareness of corruption is higher now’, the following interviewees 
stated:  
‘Yes, and it is through bodies such as ICAC … I think it makes a difference 
having statutory obligations and that oversight and the media attention. 
(Interviewee 9) 
‘I think the publicity and the exposure to some of the nastier scandals, and 
not just in local government of course but across a range of public agencies, 
I think there’s a much greater public awareness of the problem and the 
connotations.’ (Interviewee 8) 
‘Yes … I think because of some of the large-scale news items to do with 
corrupt behaviour – the Auburn [Council] example being one. Various 
politicians and whatever that have been dragged in front of ICAC.’ 
(Interviewee 11) 
‘Yes, I think it certainly is.  I think the ICAC’s done a great job around that.  
Although now I think certainly in New South Wales people are more aware 
with these type of recent issues ...  But people certainly have a good 
understanding of corruption and I think David Ipp19 did a good job sort of 
really bringing it into the everyday conversations of people by going after 
really high-profile politicians and not being afraid to make examples of 
them… So it could be exactly the same as what it was 20 years ago but 
ICAC’s work and public awareness has probably heightened the awareness.’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
The last sentence of Interviewee 3’s statement indicates that, even though awareness of 
corruption may be higher now, that does not necessarily mean that the level has 
changed, just that a heightened awareness is attributed to ICAC.  The focus on ‘high 
profile politicians’ has resulted in not only a perceived tarnishing of democratic 
legitimacy, but also that ICAC is symbolically more than the organisation it actually is.  
ICAC’s investigative pursuits imbue citizens with a perception that it is a law-
enforcement agency, not a commission of inquiry, or as Kuris (2015) puts it, a guard dog 
not a watchdog.  Hence, public perception is influenced by the range of matters that ICAC 
chooses to pursue.  When ICAC’s limited resourcing and financial constraints are also 
taken into account (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 3), there is a viable probability that ICAC is set 
up to fail in the eyes of the public, which seems focused on its investigatory endeavours.  
 
19 Former ICAC Commissioner – November 2009 to January 2014. 
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The focus on ICAC’s investigative remit neglects to consider its other functions of 
corruption prevention and education (Gorta, 2006, p. 206), which accord with 
Monaghan’s (2014) view that ‘fighting corruption is often less about getting runs on the 
board and more about creating awareness’.   
ICAC’s limited mandate is, therefore, subject to misapprehension, which has implications 
for how corruption is discursively constituted within councils.  If the symbolic grandeur 
of public hearings remains focused on high-profile figureheads, there is a risk that lesser 
forms of corruption will be treated as exempt from consequence because they are 
considered too small or innocuous and will not warrant ICAC intervention.  The 
following comments show how interviewees think that ICAC has changed the landscape: 
‘We’re still miles ahead of where we were back in the 1980s before ICAC 
existed. Of course, at least there’s that level of understanding around 
corrupt conduct, whereas before it was open slather.’ (Interviewee 2) 
‘So we have all heard stories about council officers in the seventies 
receiving big gifts for Christmas from developers and suppliers. There’s 
widespread acknowledgement and awareness now within the employees 
that that is not acceptable, even amongst the community and some of the 
suppliers and the contractors … So in a sense that has improved, but while 
those were fairly obvious situations of, you know, a case of beer coming to 
the council officers … any other behaviour that’s hidden may be still going 
ahead.’ (Interviewee 1) 
‘I think organisations are quite good at identifying or getting better at 
identifying corrupt conduct. I wonder if they’re not as good at identifying 
other forms of wrongdoing because they now have this lens of is it corrupt 
conduct, do I need to report it to ICAC?’ (Interviewee 9) 
Interviewee 2 stated that it was ‘open slather’ in the early 1980s before ICAC’s inception.  
The latter two comments, however, highlight how the discourse on corruption has 
transitioned.  Overt practices are now ‘not acceptable’, but while some practices clearly 
designated as corrupt appear in the spotlight, others potentially disappear.  The 
interviewees do not elaborate on what those behaviours may be or how they might be 
explicated, but there is a sense that the ‘hidden’ behaviour may be less prone to the 
corruption label: thus, it feasibly falls within the ‘dark figure [or zone] of corruption’ 
(Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 802). 
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It is debatable whether regulatory endeavours by the likes of ACAs such as ICAC have 
broadened, in a positive way, the public’s understanding of the range of behaviours that 
might influence these efforts or pigeonholed them.  A reductionist attitude to corruption 
seems evident, with anti-corruption endeavours construed as ideological remedies (see 
Section 4.1.2).  Efforts seem less concerned about unpacking corruption to understand 
more about the conditions that contribute to its situatedness, which is perhaps why anti-
corruption strategies are not working as well as they could and might be thought of, in 
ecological terms, as unsustainable (Clammer, 2012, p. 124).   
ICAC is deemed to be the ‘go to place’, but this interviewee augments the above 
observations regarding the ‘corruption disconnect’ from a guardianship perspective:   
‘I think the disconnect is that ICAC is seen as the corruption watchdog but 
the watchdog doesn’t have any teeth and that’s the part that the public 
doesn’t understand.  If an organisation has the power to point a finger and 
do a whole investigation but then have no power to actually enact anything, 
which is exactly what ICAC doesn’t have, that doesn’t make sense to the 
public.  If you’re investigating you should be able to bring a charge or 
penalty for doing the wrong thing, not hand it all over to the police who 
then have to start again.  That just doesn’t make sense.  [Interviewer: ICAC 
might say that they’re there to expose corruption, not prosecute corrupt 
actions].  … Then why isn’t it a joint thing?  One sensationalises it and brings 
it out into the public, so the public’s aware, but then nothing happens.’ 
(Interviewee 11)  
The above remark emphasises how corruption is sensationalised by ICAC’s investigative 
undertakings.  This might well be ICAC’s intention – to raise the awareness of corruption 
while simultaneously promoting the ICAC brand – but, as contended by Loves (2015, 
p. 242), it would be prudent for ACAs, and those charged with governing their mandate, 
to recognise their own institutional limitations.  A ‘corruption watchdog [that] doesn’t 
have any teeth’ is a concept explored by Kuris (2015, p. 127), who asserts that many 
‘watchdog’ ACAs that lack law-enforcement or investigative powers could be perceived 
as ‘toothless’.  ICAC hearings are held in public, but because ICAC is a commission of 
inquiry and not a law-enforcement body, the burden of proof is not to the criminal 
standard, which means evidence can be heard that would not be admitted in a criminal 
court of law.  The public airing of evidence that cannot be acted upon potentially 
diminishes ICAC’s perceived standing. Nevertheless, a proportion of the respondent base 
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within the attitudinal survey correlated ICAC’s regulatory endeavours with a decrease in 
corruption. 
Hitherto, the anti-corruption rhetoric fuels a speculation among respondents that 
corruption has been reduced (see Section 4.1.2).  The ramifications of this resultant 
perception include: circulation of corruption discourse infused with embellishment and 
creation of limited views about corruption: what it is, who perpetrates it, how it is 
addressed, where it might be and, by default, where it might not be.  At a practical level, 
there may be latent ramifications.  For example, if ICAC is not taking punitive action, 
then rationalised actions of any corrupt actor are reinforced, on account of the fact that 
ICAC is seen to set the agenda.  When 0.5% of all matters subject to assessment by ICAC 
result in full investigation (see Figure 2.1), this reinforced rationalisation might be a 
factor that contributes to organisational ambivalence about corruption and that tempers 
imputations of corrupt behaviour.   
4.2.2 Ambivalence about ICAC  
Such perspectives might indicate why only a minuscule number of matters are referred 
to ICAC.  As argued by this interviewee, many corrupt practices, especially those that 
may be construed as petty, would fall short of ICAC’s remit:  
‘I think when people think of ICAC they think of the big-ticket items.  Like 
they think kickbacks, they think consents that shouldn’t be given, all of that 
kind of – you know, bribery … I don’t think staff at an operational level think 
it can happen to them.  I think they think ICAC’s for the big players.’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
This is another example of the disconnect between regulatory impression and 
regulatory response.  A void exists between ‘everyday’ forms of corruption that may be 
experienced by local government employees and those that meet the ICAC criteria for 
intervention.  Several interviewees reflected on their experience in referring matters to 
ICAC, and the subsequent ICAC response:  
‘The problem I see with local government in NSW is there’s a complete lack 
of enforcement.  Because yes, you have the oversight agencies; however, 
time and time again, in my experience, you go to one of the oversight 
agencies to try and get some help with an issue and they say it’s not big 
enough for us. Now ICAC – and it’s been reinforced recently with the 
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clarification around their powers – they’re only to look at systemic and 
endemic corruption. That’s fine, that’s what they’re there for. The problem 
is, who looks at the non-systemic corruption? Or who looks at the 
corruption which at this stage is not systemic but will get there if it’s not 
checked?’ (Interviewee 2) 
This comment develops on the ‘death by a thousand paper cuts’ reference, highlighting a 
void in anti-corruption efforts that is not currently addressed: the ‘non-systemic 
corruption’ that does not meet the ICAC threshold (Yates & Graycar, 2020, p. 89).  Such 
instances either do not reach ICAC, as indicated by the mere 120 reports made by 
councils themselves (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20), or if they do get reported, 80% are closed 
without referral (ICAC NSW, 2016, pp. 19-20).  These instances, which are ‘not big 
enough’ to warrant ICAC intervention, will ‘get there if [they are] not checked’, claims 
the above interviewee.  If low-threshold corrupt acts remain unchecked, they continue 
in perpetuity.  There appears to be a lack of recognition at the frontline that this may be 
the case, with 1 in 5 respondents claiming there to be no corruption within their council 
(see Figure 4.2).  
Wide-ranging references in the literature indicate that studious attention has been paid 
to oversight/integrity agencies or ACAs.  It is notable that eminent scholars have argued 
that ACAs have only a marginal impact on the reduction of corruption (Anechiarico, 
2009b, p. 85), if any at all (Heilbrunn, 2004, p. 1).  Some scholars are dubious about their 
success (de Sousa, 2010, p. 20; Huberts, 2014, p. 182), while others believe their success 
is largely attributed to factors such as political acceptability and will (Brown & Head, 
2004, p. 23; Huberts et al., 2008, p. 276; Pope & Vogl, 2000, p. 7; Recanatini, 2011a, 
p. 565), and staff resourcing (Anechiarico, 2009b, p. 80; Brown & Head, 2004, p. 23).  
Within NSW, each of these factors has affected ICAC’s perceived efficacy (Nicholls et al., 
2016; Robertson, 2016).  Despite such studies, there seems to be little appreciation of 
ICAC’s impact on the everyday understanding of corruption.   
Expanding this point, there is a lack of cogent theoretical or empirical research 
examining the extent or impact of strategies to address organisational corruption 
(Osrecki, 2015, pp. 337-338) or the cultural conditions which might facilitate 
occupational fraud and corruption (Shepherd & Button, 2018, p. 2).  Rather, some 
scholars contend that there is little need for any local integrity model in NSW because of 
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the supposedly strong oversight network (Huberts et al., 2008, p. 276).  However, a 
focus on ICAC’s investigative endeavours keeps the public’s attention on ‘sexy’ 
corruption and away from ‘daggy’ corruption, thus allowing any forms of unexceptional 
corruption to continue without intervention.  This misplaced assurance within the 
scholarly domain, and a tendency to examine the efficacy and remit of the ACA, 
potentially neglects to assess a fundamental aspect of administrative and operational 
corruption within a sector that is inherently disjointed.   
These interviewees reflect on ICAC’s response to aspects of administrative corruption 
brought to their attention: 
‘The perception of ICAC is unless you’re taking brown paper bags through 
your car window they’re not going to be interested, and that’s partly I think 
anecdotal but it’s also partly because I have over the years come across 
people who’ve been to ICAC and ICAC just go “We’re too busy. That’s not big 
enough. We’re not interested.”’ (Interviewee 4) 
‘I’m not sure what your experience is; ICAC obviously review all matters of 
corruption, and how many have they ever come and taken over, from your 
perspective? My perspective, none. I’ve reported a lot of corrupt matters to 
ICAC. ICAC tend to come in on what they perceive as a high profile, and I’m 
sure they’ve got their assessment criteria, I know they have. But once again, 
if it doesn’t get ICAC on the front page of the papers, they don’t tend to be 
interested.’ (Interviewee 5).   
The above comments indicate that ICAC’s decision-making process on investigations is 
influenced by political, organisational and symbolic interests.  To some extent, through 
the lens of their guardianship mandate, interviewees conveyed different views from 
those of many respondents from the sample base of councils.  The interviewees may 
have biases or prejudices towards a particular way of thinking, having been immersed 
within roles that are accustomed to the notion of corruption.  Notwithstanding, the 
contrast in views is notably evident.  ICAC is seen to be the panacea by some 
respondents, who attribute low levels of corruption to the visibility of punitive sanctions 
against high-profile figureheads.  A degree of ‘celebrification’ is evident, with public 
figures transformed into personalities on the scaffold of public opinion and 
accountability (Driessens, 2012, p. 641).   
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The spectacularising of corruption, generated by ICAC and the media, has constructed a 
dual reality of the corruption problem and the anti-corruption solution, with ‘[ICAC] 
going after really high-profile politicians’ and ‘large scale news items to do with corrupt 
behaviour [and] various politicians and whatever that have been dragged in front of 
ICAC.’  ICAC arguably recognises that its success and reputation is contingent on the 
positive attention paid to it by the public (Davenport & Beck, 2001, p. 3).  Survey 
respondents do not necessarily have first-hand knowledge of ICAC, only a symbolic 
perception.  Their perceived reality of ICAC is largely shaped by media messages and 
regulatory impressions, whereas many interviewees’ views stem from first-hand 
experiences.  When respondents and interviewees’ respective views are synthesised, the 
reality of the corruption problem and the reality of the anti-corruption solution are at 
odds.  There is greater scepticism among many interviewees of ICAC, its mandate, and 
choice of investigative selection than among many respondents, who hold a somewhat 
idealistic view.  This interviewee commented on the differential way that ICAC is 
perceived as operating: 
‘You know, we’re a big out there council, we’re doing great stuff and ICAC 
would want to really take us out. You know, we’d be a notch in their belt. 
Whereas if you’re a smaller council they’re not going to care so much, unless 
you’re doing something horrendous.’ (Interviewee 4) 
Any choice to investigate corruption within a particular council on the basis that it 
would be a ‘notch in their belt’ supports the impression that ICAC chooses to pursue or 
reject matters for self-interested reasons.  Public confidence in ICAC was referred to by 
this interviewee: 
‘I think there’s a lot of [misplaced] confidence in people that if you were 
serious enough you could go to ICAC and you’d be taken seriously and the 
matter would be investigated.’ (Interviewee 8) 
Irrespective of political, organisational or symbolic factors which might influence their 
choice of investigative pathway, ICAC’s mandate is restricted to serious and systemic 
corruption, which by default assumes that a threshold needs to be met.  The public’s 
confidence that reports will be taken seriously and investigated by ICAC is largely 
unsupported but is reinforced by ICAC’s continued presence in popular news.  In reality, 
if and when corruption reports are made to ICAC, but then subsequently rejected, these 
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rejections arguably could disincentivise future corruption reporters and allow the 
tolerance of corruption to continue.  This consideration is explored more intricately in 
the subsequent chapters.  
Quite possibly, ICAC is regarded as a paragon of anti-corruption best practice and 
oversight.  Its regulatory endeavours have been influential in setting the agenda for anti-
corruption within local government, establishing a paradigmatic stance on what 
corruption is, and by virtue of, what it is not.  Within ICAC’s pursuit of some matters over 
others, a semblance of corruption has been constructed and staged, but one that is not 
necessarily aligned with everyday realities.  The vocabulary of corruption has been 
defined and conceptualised by ICAC, but there have been unintended consequences 
(Hao, 1999, p. 406), namely that routine forms of corruption fall short of the current 
anti-corruption focus; employees do not necessarily associate their perceptions of 
‘corruption’ with the daily working practices which might or might not be construed as 
‘corrupt’; and reports to ICAC from councils are low, possibly for these reasons.  The 
supposed threshold that must be attained for ICAC to intervene means that lower 
threshold corruption is potentially dismissed or disregarded by virtue of its lack of 
seriousness.   
The discourse of corruption is often metaphorically infused with medical terminology.  
By way of example, corruption has been referred to as an ‘underlying disease’ (Clammer, 
2012, p. 124); an infection of the body politic (Hindess, 2012, p. 5; Mulgan, 2012); a 
moral decay (Buchan, 2012, p. 89); and a cancer or contagion (Bhargava, 2006, p. 341; 
Byrne, 2017; World Bank Group, 2016).  Such references indicate that corruption has 
started off small but has then metastasised and taken hold; thus, it is taken to be 
systemic or serious, such that it might warrant ICAC intervention, if ICAC chooses to act.  
However, by then, corruption has become intertwined within the very fabric of the 
organisational architecture; this does not happen overnight, but over time.  To develop 
Groenendijk’s (1997, p. 207) observation, the identified corruption at that stage might 
be perceived as a social phenomenon, but the actions to that point have been made by 
individuals.   
Through a limited prism of information and anti-corruption performativity, some 
corrupt practices have come into focus, and a capable guardian in the shape of ICAC, 
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visibly active in the public domain.  When ICAC was established in 1989, Australia did 
not have an ACA, and corruption was a relatively new concept in the discourse of public 
administration (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 6; Bhargava, 2006, p. 341).  At that time, 
corruption was ‘open slather’, according to one interviewee, and there is considerable 
acclaim for the increased awareness about corruption that has developed in the last 
three decades.  Undoubtedly, the emergent implications of establishing ICAC would have 
been unforeseen and incalculable (Karapin & Feldman, 2016, p. 441); yet, there is a 
notable absence of academic or practical literature exploring any implications, such as 
how selectivity in corruption investigations and prosecutions have symbolic effects on 
the wider social body or how corruption is meaningfully understood as a lived and 
environmental phenomenon.  Overt forms of corruption may have been addressed, but 
more surreptitious and richly nuanced forms of mundane corruption fall out of focus 
altogether.   
4.3 Summary 
This chapter has not sought to engage in the discussion about what corruption is, but to 
establish a baseline spectrum of how those on the frontline might see the issue of 
corruption from their situated position and how they might respond to it.  Notably, any 
daily and sensory experiences of corruption tended not to inform survey respondents’ 
views about the assumed level of corruption within their council or its degree of change 
in the past 5 years, these being informed predominantly by the accessibility of indirect 
information or supposed anti-corruption remedies. 
This chapter augments how subjective and abstract corruption is when those who work 
within local government are invited to identify with it.  The everyday reality of 
corruption, in terms of its prevalence within the council environment, is disassociated 
from its perception as a phenomenon that is well addressed and adequately governed.  
Anti-corruption performativity is visible at different levels and in different ways.  From 
artefacts that supposedly manage and control corruption (policies and procedures), to 
the increased attention by the media and their likening of the term corruption to the 
work of the ICAC, a socially engineered understanding of corruption and anti-corruption 
has been created.  The disconnect and lack of association between perception and reality 
is one that emerges as quite significant within this chapter.  This is important within the 
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scholarly study of corruption as it highlights that corruption is imagined in a very 
different way to how it is potentially enacted. 
The different ideas about corruption – in terms of what it is, what it is not, where it may 
manifest, and by whom – have been informed largely by symbolic ideas about ICAC as an 
organisation designed to address corruption within NSW local government, but with 
little comprehension of its actual size, scope and mandate.  One of the key implications 
highlighted in this chapter is that administrative or occupational corruption is seen to be 
insignificant, and incongruent with the ‘sexy’ forms of corruption that are pursued by 
ICAC, and then popularised by the media.  These are seen to involve elected officials 
rather than appointed officials, and vastly different in nature to the administrative 
context, which is potentially unconcerning, unremarkable or within a socially-optimal 
threshold of tolerance.  Subtler forms of corruption risk being overlooked, but may be 
just as insidious, or more so, as they gradually build up and become entrenched within 
an organisation.  In the broader context of this thesis, this chapter has salient 
implications.  Namely, a formal effort to control corruption by a prominent and popular 
body, such as the ICAC, has latent risks and indirect costs that have not been explored to 
date.  As one aspect, it is clear that the much broader existence of corruption in local 
government is potentially disregarded unless it aligns to a formal or legalistic notion, or 
matters are akin to those that are popularised in the media.  
Chapter 5 proceeds to explore these issues, by examining and contrasting respondents’ 




CHAPTER 5: THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CORRUPTION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the degree of potential corruption within local government, and 
how corrupt tendencies, as framed by regulatory definitions, become hard-wired into 
the organisational and cultural lives of councils.  Building on Chapter 4, this chapter 
highlights how more complex and nuanced practices of corruption have become 
institutionalised, and explores the nature and extent of these within the sample of 
council environments.  Many of these practices are hidden from view, as they are more 
abstruse or less prone to the label of corruption; while bribery conjures up the ‘brown 
paper bag’ imagery, in fact conflict of interest is the most common feature of corruption 
within NSW local government.  This chapter further explores thresholds in the perceived 
un/acceptability or harmfulness of corruption, and reasons for many employees’ 
disinclination to report their suspicions of corruption. 
5.2 The normalcy of corruption 
Survey respondents were asked for their views on nine different practices, each of which 
might be construed as, or potentially constitute, corrupt conduct within the purview of 
ICAC’s jurisdictional mandate.  The same classification of practices explored the views of 
respondents, as to whether: (1) they believe that an opportunity exists within their 
council for the act to take place; (2) they have ever suspected any of the acts take place 
within their council; and (3) they have directly witnessed any of the acts taking place 
within their council.  This is illustrated by Figure 5.1, with each category reflected as a 




Figure 5.1. Comparison between opportunity for, suspected and witnessed corruption 
within each respondent’s Council 
The four most frequently witnessed forms of corruption were: (1) conflict of interest; 
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information or material; and (4) abuse of discretion.  These were also the four most 
common acts that were suspected, albeit not with the same corresponding weighting.  
These matched the four most frequently observed acts in the study of Victorian public 
servants (Graycar, 2014, pp. 278-279) and also of local government employees in 
Victoria (IBAC VIC, 2017a, p. 8).  
Despite the fact that nearly half of all respondents thought that the opportunity existed 
for bribery to take place (47.7%), just over 1 in 10 respondents have ever suspected an 
act of bribery (11.8%) and less than 1 in 50 have ever witnessed bribery (1.6%).  
A similar finding was identified in the Victorian study, with only 2% of Victorian public 
servants claiming to have directly observed bribery (Graycar, 2014, pp. 278-279).  One 
might think that the observation of bribery within local government might be higher 
than that at the state level, as there is a greater deal of interaction between councils and 
members of the community who may be more sensitive to the decisions of their local 
council (ICAC NSW, 2015, p. 17), such as developers, residents, ratepayers and local 
contractors, to name a few.  However, comparisons between state and local government 
in Victoria suggest that this is not the case (IBAC VIC, 2017a, p. 8; 2017b, p. 8).  Despite 
the rare observance of bribery in both studies (NSW and Victoria), many respondents 
thought there was an opportunity for it to occur.  This may viably be attributed to the 
fact that the term bribery is often deemed to be synonymous with the term corruption 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 6).  This limited focus detracts attention from other more 
clandestine, less delineable, forms of corruption (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).  In NSW, 
conflict of interest and preference to hiring family or friends for public sector jobs 
(particularism) have been witnessed by nearly a third of respondents (32.3% and 29.1% 
respectively).  These results reinforce the argument that perceptions of corruption do 
not correlate with direct experience and measurable realities (Masters & Graycar, 2015, 
p. 173).   
The level of claimed witnessing of conflict of interest (32.3%) shown in Figure 5.1 is 
slightly higher than that identified in the IBAC report, which noted that 20% of local 
government employees in Victoria have observed a conflict of interest (IBAC VIC, 2017a, 
p. 8).  The IBAC report aptly observes that ‘failure to declare or properly manage 
conflicts of interest is not, of itself, corrupt but can represent misconduct or be an 
element in corrupt conduct’ (IBAC VIC, 2017a, p. 7).  However, the TI Source Book states 
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that ‘a conflict of interest arises when a person, as a public sector employee or official, is 
influenced by personal considerations when doing his or her job.  Thus, decisions are 
made for the wrong reasons’ (Pope, 2000a, p. 195).  Arguably, there is a slight lack of 
cohesion between the two definitions, with the TI Source Book taking a more resolute 
view.   
Each of the top four frequently witnessed and suspected behaviours are not criminal 
violations, but may be considered as ethical ones, and as such, their perpetration may be 
permitted as long as they are not unlawful (Gorta & Forell, 1995, pp. 316-317; Philp, 
1997, p. 441; Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 797).  The extensive complexities around their 
component parts makes labelling them ‘corrupt’ less likely than more overt forms of 
corruption with more tangible forms of exchange (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 142), and this 
might explain why they are suspected and witnessed in vast quantities or more prone to 
acceptance.  
Divergences between different practices reinforces how richly nuanced corruption is.  
Notwithstanding, this does little to assist everyday practitioners, policymakers or 
academics to develop their understanding around the existence of corrupt practices, 
when public service employees’ impressions are predominantly informed by media 
publication of high-profile cases.  It is argued that corruption tends to be more visible at 
the lower levels (Gupta, 1995, p. 384), but any degree of ‘visibility’ seems to be subject 
to a degree of administrative normality, considering the claimed observances of 
‘conflicts of interest’ and ‘preference to hiring friend or family’.  Other administrative 
practices of corruption, namely, ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘misuse of information or 
material’, have been witnessed by 1 in 5 respondents (20.5%), further highlighting their 
commonness.  Each of these four practices would feasibly fit within the typology of 
‘corruption’, according to ICAC’s legislative mandate, but are potentially too mundane to 
warrant any form of interventionist response.  
Whether these observations indicate that the acts are designated as corrupt by those 
who claim to have suspected or witnessed them is not conclusive.  It may be that those 
who suspected or witnessed these infractions did not necessarily see them as corrupt, or 
that those who were committing the acts, did not either (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 15; 
Rosenblatt, 2012, p. 241).  This highlights the contingent and situated nature of 
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corruption: any practice designated as corrupt is influenced by definition and context, 
factors which shape in what light and significance acts are regarded. 
These figures support the notion that there is a degree of cultural normalcy when one 
considers that the majority of respondents believe that there is only ‘little’ or ‘some’ 
corruption within their council (see Figure 4.2).  Of particular note is the close 
correlation between the perceived opportunity for particularism to take place 
(preference to hiring friends or family) with the levels suspected and directly witnessed.  
This furthers the observation in the previous chapter about the potentially embedded 
roots of particularism, resulting from power-based inequalities and discrimination 
(Rosenblatt, 2012, pp. 239-240), but the close correlation further highlights its 
habituation (Cohen, 2001, p. 46).  Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, p. 12) remarks that ‘when the 
dominant norm is particularistic, the distinction between grand and petty corruption is 
about as meaningful as remarking that a crime happens in a train or an apartment 
building [in that] neither indicates the nature or the mechanism of the crime’.  As a 
means of examining this idea, the machinations of particularism are explored later in 
this chapter, apropos respondents’ views about how damaging particularism is 
perceived to be (Section 5.3.2).  At this juncture, it is worth exploring the interesting 
disconnect between what respondents claim to have observed with what is actually 
reported.  
5.2.1 The vast amount of under-reporting  
While based on a relatively small sample of local government employees in 10 councils 
in NSW, the data behind Figure 5.1 indicates that 156 acts of corrupt conduct have been 
‘directly witnessed’ by 127 local government employees, with many respondents 
claiming to have witnessed more than one act.  
If this sum of 156 witnessed acts of corrupt conduct from employees at 10 councils is 
used to extrapolate its prevalence across all 152 councils in NSW, then this figure would 
amount to 2,371 witnessed acts of potentially corrupt conduct by just 1,930 employees.  
In June 2016, when there were 54,300 local government employees in NSW, 1,930 
employees equated to 3.6% of the local government workforce in NSW (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2017a).  If the ‘suspected’ category were to be used as an indicator – 
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which is the basis on which referrals to ICAC should be made – then the extrapolated 
degree of suspicion would be much higher.  
On the basis that just 120 referrals were made to ICAC by councils in 2015–16, this data 
highlights a significant discrepancy between suspected corruption and those cases 
referred to ICAC for actions designated as ‘corrupt’.  In particular, the extrapolation 
indicates that less than 5% of local government employees may have witnessed 20 times 
more than that referred to ICAC.  It is not possible to know when each of the 
respondents witnessed or suspected each of the different practices identified in Figure 
5.1, whether each practice was unique, a one-off incident, or a sequence of events over a 
period of time.  As such, this extrapolation cannot be directly cross-tabulated with 
ICAC’s annual reporting figures.  Notwithstanding this, when one considers that just 
0.5% of all ICAC matters progress to ‘full investigation’ and become publicly known (see 
Figure 2.1), the opposite metaphoric reference, ‘tip of the iceberg’ seems apposite: much 
suspected corruption remains submerged from view.  
As a means of exploring why such a disconnect is evident, respondents’ observation of 
corrupt practices was cross-tabulated with their perception about the level of 
corruption within their council.  The results identified salient disparities.  As noted 
within Chapter 4 (Figure 4.2), 1 in 5 (20.8%) respondents believe that the level of 
corruption within their council is none.  This is a strong assertion and signifies that 
respondents do not consider corruption to be present in any way, shape or form, within 
their own locality.  However, of this portion of respondents who stated that corruption 
does not exist within their council, nearly a third (a total of 30.1%) claim to have 
suspected at least one corrupt act (see Figure 5.1), while nearly 1 in 6 respondents (a 
total of 16.1%) claim to have directly witnessed at least one act (Figure 5.2).  Hence, in 
spite of denials that corruption exists within their own council, many respondents have 
suspected or witnessed a corrupt practice.  This data was not categorised by council 




Figure 5.2. Crosstabulation of respondents who stated that there is no corruption at 
their council but claim to have either suspected or witnessed a corrupt act 
To elucidate the factors which might explain the disconnect between perceptions of 
corruption in the workplace, on the one hand, and the realities of encountering it, on the 
other, it is worth noting the moral dimensions of corruption and its escalatory potential.  
One interviewee phrased it this way:  
‘Corruption is that feeling that you have when you know you’re not doing 
the right thing. It’s really easy to point to things like it’s a brown paper bag. 
It’s when you do something for your own personal benefit when you should 
be working in the public interest. It’s accepting a gift that you shouldn’t 
accept to make a decision that you shouldn’t be making. So that’s probably 
capital C corruption, ICAC corruption. But I think that in reality it all comes 
from the same sort of poor judgement or early bad decisions.’ 
(Interviewee 6)  
This interviewee’s interpretation of corruption aligns with the principal–agent model 
referred to in more contemporary literature (Holmes, 2015, p. 1), as an individually 
perpetrated act or misdemeanour within public office (Buchan, 2012, p. 89), more so 
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(Buchan, 2012, p. 73; Hindess, 2001, p. 7; 2012, p. 11).  In this regard, the comment, ‘it’s 
really easy to point to things like a brown paper bag’, makes a symbolic reference to 
bribery.  This supports the purported indistinctness between the terms bribery and 
corruption (Johnston, 2005, p. 6; Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163), and is feasibly disregarding 
of the more ‘subtle and hidden abuses’ that fall within the ‘dark figure of corruption’ 
(Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 802).   
This ‘visualisation’ of corruption, through a principal–agent lens, focuses on the more 
identifiable transgressions which result in a tangible exchange of benefit.  This level of 
compartmentalisation has the potential to inhibit views of what corruption is and how it 
might manifest in different ways, resulting in a failure to see corruption and its many 
layers.  At this juncture, there are evident tensions between mundane, everyday forms of 
corruption (as suspected and witnessed by some respondents), and those practices of 
corruption that have been designated and prosecuted as corruption by ICAC and 
reported in the media. 
The expression ‘capital C corruption, ICAC corruption’ in the above comment is 
significant in this regard, because it supports the previously alluded-to summation that 
there are varying degrees of corruption, with those higher on the scale of seriousness 
being associated with the work of ICAC.  By default, forms of corruption that fall within 
the lower end of the spectrum risk abandonment.  As noted within Chapter 4, many 
respondents referred to matters undertaken by ICAC, and reported by the media, as the 
basis of their reason for thinking that corruption had decreased (see Section 4.1.2).  This 
implies the existence of a subliminal threshold that exists within the local government 
culture, similar to concepts and theories about the threshold at which a stimulus is 
noticed, derived from the psychology discipline (Carpenter, 2012, p. 125).  Such a 
threshold might apply to sensory experiences of corruption, with any degree of 
ambiguous or attenuated corruption being unnoticed or misattributed.  This might go 
some way to explaining the divergence between ‘capital C corruption’, the serious and 
systemic corruption investigated by ICAC, and more mundane, everyday forms of 
corruption that might fall beneath public notice.  
At any stage of intervention, if intervention is indeed forthcoming, the acceptable 
language which supposes a subliminal threshold has, by its very nature, mitigated and 
138 
 
neutralised any taint of moral defect (Mills, 1940, p. 906).  Within the organisational 
realm, corrupt practices have become quotidian, even automatic thinking for some 
individuals, who previously might have viewed the perpetration of such practices with 
derision or contempt (World Bank, 2014, p. 60).  This process may unfold for many 
reasons, but in this case, there has been a spiral of divergent norms, with council 
employees potentially failing to see anything wrong (Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008, 
p. 137).  Any motivation is not only neutralised by the corrupt actor (Weber, 1947, 
pp. 98-99), but habitually perpetrated by otherwise decent people who become less 
sensitised to the nature of the conduct as they have accepted an account that justifies 
their actions as permissible or even legitimate (Rorty, 1998, p. 105).  
5.2.2 The scalability of corruption – from unexceptional to exceptional 
As indicated in Figure 5.1 and discussed in Section 5.2.1, various practices that may be 
construed as corrupt appear to be prevalent in many NSW councils.  Many of these 
practices have been suspected or witnessed by respondents who concurrently maintain 
that corruption does not exist within their council (Figure 5.2), signifying a degree of 
inertia and acceptance on the part of the respondents.  To illustrate the inferred 
threshold, following are some insightful perspectives from interviewees:  
‘I think people see corruption as a big scale thing.  They don’t see it as “the 
things I do daily, can contribute towards being corrupt conduct”.  I don’t 
think they do and I think the relevant person who’s the reporting officer 
might not actually see it that way either.’ (Interviewee 7) 
‘I think that’s [differences in scale and type of corruption] not understood 
very well, I have to say, a lot of the less serious forms of corruption. I think 
people tend to think it is the brown paper bag, cash in hand; where really 
timesheet fraud, technically, is corrupt conduct and I don’t think many 
people out there would consider that corrupt conduct.’ (Interviewee 9)  
‘I think there’s not enough awareness of it.  I think when people think of 
corruption they think of the big end of town, but they forget other things 
like pinching the stationery and who knows whatever else, which of course 
at the end of the day is only very minor, but if you’ve got a thousand staff 
doing that then that makes a big difference.’ (Interviewee 11) 
These perspectives go some way to explaining why various corrupt practices are 
seemingly naturalised within the occupational culture of councils.  The ‘big scale’ or ‘big 
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end of town’ references conform with Heidenheimer’s (2009, p. 152) colour-coded 
classification of black corruption as well as the concept of grand corruption (Langseth, 
2012, p. 9; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2016); that is, acts significant enough 
that they may be investigated by ICAC or attract media interest.  A focus on such  
high-profile corruption – that which attracts media interest following investigative 
action by the ICAC – has generated a cultural disregard of low-level corruption, which 
could be construed as unexceptional or mundane; viz, the everyday is distinctly different 
to the exceptional.  
If local government employees neglect to reconcile everyday workplace activities with 
corruption, the tolerance of everyday corrupt acts not only continues but it potentially 
metastasises – to use the medical metaphor of corruption as a cancer – to the point of 
becoming endemic.  This process was infamously identified at RailCorp, following 
investigation by ICAC (ICAC NSW, 2008a, p. 5).  In such a culture, even if a ‘guardian’ 
were to be present, being the third component of the crime triangle (Clarke & Eck, 2003, 
p. 27), it would not necessarily be a ‘capable’ one; it would be ineffectual, as the 
everyday practices would be so extensively mediated that they would become ‘un-
visible’: corrupt practices might exist, but those in or around them would not see them 
or would consciously choose not to.  
One interviewee stated it this way:  
‘I think it’s a little bit like the old broken window theory in that if you 
tolerate minor indiscretions by your staff, that’s probably going to lead to a 
culture that breeds a worse form of corruption and a tolerance for this 
misbehaviour.  I think councils need to address it at all levels, regardless of 
how minor or major it seems to be. (Interviewee 8) 
In a scenario such as this, a tolerance of unexceptional corruption would viably nurture 
an environment in which lay observers fail to see anything wrong with the environment 
around them.  This interviewee associated this concept with the broken windows theory 
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982), a metaphor that advocates that minor discretions and 
violations are important and should not be ignored, and one of the theoretical influences 
behind this study (see Section 2.2.1).  Any focus on ‘everyday corrupt acts’, as advocated 
by Graycar and Villa (2011, p. 422), would be challenging, if those observing the acts 
disregard them as insignificant or do not designate them as ‘corrupt’. 
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The above interviewee acknowledges that, over time, the organisational culture will 
decline if small acts of corruption are unchecked, but it may be that such practices keep 
the organisational culture operating, as observed by Ditton (1977) in his ethnographic 
study of a bakery where ‘fiddling [was] normatively contingent upon a subculture’ 
(Ditton, 1977, p. 173). Several scholars consider that corruption will continue to exist as 
it is an integral part of the social, economic and cultural organisational dynamic of any 
organisation (Clammer, 2012, pp. 123-124; Gupta, 1995, p. 376; Hasty, 2005, p. 272).  
This might explain the apparent acceptance of many forms of corruption as normal, as 
illustrated by Figure 5.1; many council officials do not notice activities or behaviours 
which might be construed as everyday, minor infractions.  However, one might wonder 
whether structural, architectural or hierarchal conditions are created that facilitate or 
hinder the degree of pervasiveness of corruption (Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 801).  Do 
these conditions contribute to the degree of social, economic or cultural organisational 
dynamics at some councils more so than others (such as at Council 8, based on the 
aforementioned analyses) or is the regulatory structure of oversight and governance a 
facilitator in this regard?  At this juncture, the ICAC categorisation of corruption is 
explored, as a potential influence on the prevalence and normalcy of corruption within 
local government.  
5.2.3 The ICAC categorisation of corruption 
The ICAC Act is part of the legislative framework that governs all public officials in NSW 
and therefore defines how corrupt conduct is understood and categorised, investigated 
and prosecuted.  It is, therefore, a foremost point of reference.  As argued by Andvig 
(2006, p. 337) ‘corrupt transactions … have to be related to a set of rules’; however, such 
rules have the potential to detract from the broader concept of corruption, which has 
implications for how local government employees understand and interpret different, 
potentially corrupt, scenarios.  As explained by one interviewee:  
‘The ICAC Act includes a number of issues that are categorised as 
corruption. Sometimes we tend to limit that view to a few specific 
behaviours. I take a broader view, so more almost like a social issue, rather 
than just a legalistic list of issues of behaviours.’ (Interviewee 1)  
This is a noteworthy observation in that it highlights how the legislative definition 
compartmentalises corruption and corrupt acts or behaviours, focusing on the 
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individual, rather than the system, and inhibiting any broader view of corruption.  
Moreover, the legislative definition is not concerned with understanding why any 
person might choose to engage in corrupt activity, but even on this basis, it assumes that 
any decision was by conscious choice.  
The regulatory framework and parameters of ICAC, together with its governing 
legislation, decree whether certain behaviours constitute corrupt conduct in the NSW 
public sector.  While this framework undoubtedly exists for good reason, it abstracts 
corruption from its socially situated context, despite the fact that ‘systems and 
individuals are mutually reinforcing’ (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 1).  There is a risk that 
regulations presume that the environment, as Buchan (2012, p. 73) puts it, is ‘un-
corrupted … with boundaries supposed to [prevent] the contamination of corruption’.  
These symbolic ‘boundaries’ are somewhat exhibited within respondents’ comments as 
being effective remedies to corruption (see Section 4.1.2).  Taking individuals out of the 
social, structural or cultural context heightens the disconnection of understanding, yet 
the existing anti-corruption discourse compounds this problem when the main source of 
information available to local government employees and the public alike is ICAC.  Any 
existing or proposed typology of corrupt practices fails to account for the complex and 
convoluted nature of corruption, when it is classified in such a fashion:  
‘I actually think that there’s some things that are in [the] definition of 
corrupt conduct that perhaps shouldn’t be there … if it’s captured under 
another umbrella. So, if it’s theft it’s theft. … Same with fraud.’ 
(Interviewee 6) 
The above comment used the term  ‘umbrella’, which is a concept referred to by 
Varraich (2014, p. 3) when describing relationships between different corrupt types.  
The two acts cited by the above interviewee (fraud and theft) are categorised as 
examples of corrupt conduct under section 8(2)(e) and (f) of the ICAC Act, but are both 
criminal infractions also.20  This has the potential to confuse and conflate understanding, 
especially when criminal violations are grouped with ethical ones, such as the four acts 
most frequently suspected and witnessed by council employees (see Figure 5.1).  One 
interviewee built on this notion, but furthered this by illustrating how some corrupt 
actors utilise the confinement’s of ICAC’s legalistic definition to justify inaction:  
 
20 As an example, fraud is a criminal offence in NSW under section 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
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‘I mean, obviously we have a definition of corrupt conduct legally in this 
jurisdiction because of the ICAC Act. Now that has its uses absolutely, but I 
think if we’re going to talk about ethical practice rather than corruption … 
I personally hold the view that we should have a much broader definition of 
what is corrupt. Because the problem is that the ICAC Act is there to govern 
the ICAC and what they deal with, and that’s perfectly legitimate. They have 
to have parameters … You couldn’t actually operate them without those 
parameters. The problem, however, is that those who wish to act in their 
own interests – shall I put it that way – now use the ICAC definition of 
corruption to say it doesn’t fall within that, therefore it’s fine. And that I 
think is the problem.’ (Interviewee 2)  
Extant literature refers to the rationalisation of corrupt practices by corrupt actors 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 15; Granovetter, 2004, p. 3; Gray, 2013, p. 535).  However, 
the interviewee’s observation, that the ICAC definition is used as an avoidance 
rationalisation in the organisational milieu, lends support for Shepherd and Button’s 
(2018, p. 18) contention that corporate managers employ similar avoidance 
rationalisations to justify their decision not to tackle occupational crime or deviance.  In 
the context of this interviewee’s remarks, corruption is perceived more from a ‘legalistic’ 
point of view if the person has a higher social status (Dormaels, 2015, p. 12).  In this 
sense, reference is made to the legislative jurisdiction of the ICAC Act.  This would assist 
in keeping the focus away from the higher echelons, where corruption may be complex 
and richly nuanced, instead focusing on single public service agents and easily 
designated forms of corruption (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).  This comment goes some 
way to providing one explanation as to why suspected corruption in local government 
might not be referred to the ICAC, and therefore fails to come to light.  
On the basis that some potentially corrupt practices may be suspected or witnessed 
frequently (Figure 5.1), it can be posited that these practices are more likely to continue, 
with a third of employees who suspect these infractions conceiving there to be no 
corruption in their council.  Moreover, the reporting of corruption, by anyone who 
observes such a practice and wishes to speak up, is potentially inhibited if such practices 
are deemed to be the social norm (Dormaels, 2015, p. 606).   
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5.3 Eye of the beholder 
The observance of corruption and its degree of normalcy is further influenced by its 
perceived scale and severity, as remarked on by this interviewee: 
‘Yes, and gee, isn’t that a grey scale, and of course I think people see it from 
different sides like that, too. So, what one person perceives as being corrupt, 
another person thinks is normal behaviour.’ (Interviewee 11)  
This comment highlights how the socially situated and contingent nature of corruption 
affects perceptions and understanding, adding context to the view that corruption is in 
the ‘eye of the beholder’ (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 3; Holmes, 2015, p. 2; Olsen, 
2014, p. 187).  Johnson and Sharma (2004, p. 3) contend that there is no ‘rigid line 
separating what is legitimate from what it corrupt’.  Heidenheimer’s (2009, pp. 152-154) 
colour-coded scale offers a form of classification in this regard: what one person views 
as permissible (white, or on the lighter shade of grey), another person may view as 
deplorable (black, or on the darker shade of grey).  This highlights the complexities of 
classification, but also the importance of locating corruption culturally and socially, as 
any misfeasance is only corrupt when it is designated as such by the ‘beholder’.  One 
interviewee stated:  
‘I’m sure there are things that are seen to be greater and lesser crimes. I 
think anything that’s – what’s that beautiful phrase – “ICAC-able”, people 
would probably say is fairly severe.’ (Interviewee 4)  
The term ‘ICAC-able’ enriches understanding on the perception threshold, referred to 
earlier, indicating that the threshold is influenced by perceived severity, but also ICAC’s 
designation of corruption in accordance with its regulatory jurisdiction.  In this sense, 
the designation is set at a very high bar, with just 2% of matters receiving any form of 
preliminary investigation by ICAC and 80% closed without referral (ICAC NSW, 2016, 
p. 23); the continuum of tolerance is somewhat facilitated by this high threshold.  
Specifically, there would be little incentive for councils to report matters to ICAC if the 
perceived scale or severity falls short of the ‘black’ or ‘ICAC-able’ level of corruption.  
Further, this offers councils an avoidance rationalisation and a supposed rationale to 
cover up the corrupt transgression(s).   
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This subliminal threshold compounds difficulties with cataloguing corruption based on 
severity and seriousness.  It possibly supports a focus on everyday corrupt acts (Graycar 
& Villa, 2011, p. 422) as a means of breaking down the concept of corruption: from a 
single problem, which is too large and amorphous to address, to one that can be 
examined systematically.  This may form part of a tutelage remit within any 
guardianship role, as remarked on by this interviewee:  
‘I think part of the problem is that we need to be reminded regularly what it 
[corruption] actually is and where the level of black and white actually 
stops. There are always going to be areas of grey and I think that’s when you 
guys [internal ombudsmen] would become very handy because if you’re not 
sure you need someone to ask.’ (Interviewee 11)  
This interviewee considered that the role of an in-house point of contact, such as an 
internal ombudsman, is pivotal to educating employees on corruption and its varying 
degrees of severity, with a realisation that ‘there are always going to be areas of grey’.  
Another interviewee made a similar comment, correlating this degree of understanding 
with councils’ ability to react and respond:  
‘They would be most likely to raise it as a management issue and then it 
would be up to someone like me to say that’s … actually a corruption issue.’ 
(Interviewee 3)  
In the absence of an in-house point of contact, which might function as a form of ‘capable 
guardian’, the above interviewee notes that corrupt acts would be viewed as a 
‘management issue’ and not a ‘corruption issue’, suggesting that less obvious infractions 
would not be designated as corrupt or might be moderated.  In the absence of any 
standardised and accredited awareness or education in this space, knowledge is attained 
through indirect sources.  In Western Australia, it was identified that many councils lack 
the internal capacity to manage the risk and reality of misconduct and corruption (CCC 
WA, 2013).  This lack risks tempering the degree of perceived significance. 
Consequently, it is likely that such matters would not be reported, or otherwise attended 
to appropriately.  If dealt with as a ‘management issue’ as opposed to a ‘corruption 
issue’, it is also likely that the mode of assessment and response would alternate and this 
would have implications for the person reporting it who did construe the act of 
behaviour to be corrupt and might have expected a more punitive sanction to apply.  As 
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a result, this might further disincentivise reporting.  This is explored further in 
Chapter 6.  At this juncture, it is worth elaborating on the issues associated with the 
designation of some practices as corrupt, on the basis that any degree of interpretation 
has implications for how it is addressed.  
5.3.1 The designation of corruption 
Within a review of the literature, it was considered that the community set the bar for 
what establishes a ‘wrongful exercise of public duty’, and the degree of tolerance 
(Johnson & Sharma, 2004, p. 2; Philp, 2009, p. 47).  Yet, within each council, employees’ 
interpretation of corruption, in its various guises, forms and degrees of extensiveness, 
determines what comes to light based on a subliminal threshold or ‘barometer’.  If 
particular acts of corruption are not considered to be damaging, then the prospect of 
them coming to light would arguably be lesser than other corrupt acts that might be 
considered more severe; namely, those at the ‘ICAC-able’ end of the barometer.  The 
following section reflects on respondents’ perceptions regarding the most damaging 
forms of corruption that their council could harbour.  
5.3.2 Harbouring corruption  
As illustrated within Figure 5.3 below, the most damaging act of corruption was 
considered to be ‘Misuse of funds’ followed by ‘Conflict of interest/personal interest’ and 
‘Bribery’.  ‘Nepotism/unfair recruitment/promotion processes’21 were considered to the 
least damaging acts of corruption that councils could harbour, despite being the second 
most frequently suspected and witnessed act of corruption and having the closest 
correlation between opportunity, suspicion and direct witnessing (see Figure 5.1).   
 
21 Interchangeably referred to as particularism to incorporate all favouritism-type acts of corruption, as the salient 




Figure 5.3. Respondents’ views on the most damaging acts(s) of corruption that their 
council could harbour (n=200) 
When considering how different practices of corruption may be categorised within the 
spectrum of severity, one argument might be that they are influenced by the perceived 
harm, or lack thereof, of the offending act (Becker, 2003, p. 70).  In this regard, it is 
notable that particularism, which includes all forms of favouritism in personnel decision-
making (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 2), as listed in Figure 5.3, is perceived as the least 
damaging act for local government officials to perform.  
This supports the notion that not all corrupt practices are considered in the same way 
and highlights the importance of distinguishing between different forms of corruption as 
opposed to viewing all forms as a homologous group (Porter & Graycar, 2016, p. 426).  
On the basis that particularism stands out at the bottom of this scale as being the least 
damaging, it is deduced that this practice is more permissible than others, supporting 
observations that many respondents perceive it to be acceptable or legitimate (Hudson 
et al., 2017, p. 12).  Particularism does not have an economic benefit or immediate 
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Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 165), which was viewed as more damaging by twice as 
many respondents (Figure 5.3).  When this is contextualised with the fact that 
particularism features as one of the most suspected and witnessed corrupt acts (see 
Figure 5.1), it reveals a degree of  routineness and institutionalisation (Ashforth & 
Anand, 2003, p. 3).  An excerpt from one respondent’s comment, referred to earlier, 
illustrates this:  
‘What is ignored in the corruption focus is the “death by a thousand paper 
cuts” stuff – the nepotism that may result in an informal network of people 
who subtly control the place, the leadership culture that may subtly punish 
compliance with norms/power, lack of systems or skills resulting in lots of 
small financial losses etc.’ (ID-126, Council 10) 
The lack of appreciation of this concept within the ‘corruption focus’, as emphasised by 
this respondent, is feasibly attributed to the supposed lack of recognition of its 
potentially damaging effects (see Figure 5.3), yet conflictingly, its rather malleable 
nature and ubiquitous presence (see Figure 5.1).  
Traits of this nature were referred to within ICAC’s report into fraudulent practices at 
Botany Bay Council, perpetrated by the chief financial officer and others, which took 
place over the period of nearly two decades (ICAC NSW, 2017b).  The report noted that 
‘under-skilled staff were able to obtain their positions at the Council because 
recruitment processes were informal and often subject to influence by senior Council 
staff’ (ICAC NSW, 2017b, p. 75).  Several staff, including the main protagonist, were 
‘engaged without a genuine competitive, merit-based selection process’, with one 
employee quoted as saying that ‘staff just bring their mates to work’ (ICAC NSW, 2017b, 
p. 75).  While the ICAC report noted that ‘staff lacked the requisite skills and experience 
to perform their roles effectively’ (ICAC NSW, 2017b, p. 74), the focus of 
recommendations was on governance and audit failures, with just one of nine 
recommendations touching upon the inherent cronyism that was evident at Botany Bay 
Council.  Accordingly, this form of corruption is not widely accentuated in terms of its 
significance in general or within the industry of local government.  This may have a 




5.3.3 Recruitment in local government: ‘A closed shop’ 
During the interviews, the practice of particularism was elaborated on as an 
omnipresent feature of local government administration:  
‘It comes down to relevance of corruption in local government more 
broadly as well – about having open recruitment processes and encouraging 
new blood to come into an organisation, rather than this internal nepotism 
that goes on, because if you have essentially a closed recruitment system as 
I saw at [name of Council redacted], where your senior managers are all 
being promoted from underneath within the organisation. And again, the 
powers that be justified that and I’ve heard it justified on the basis, “oh but 
we want to give our good people development opportunities.” That’s how 
they justify it and therefore ethical recruitment practices can go out the 
window. But that’s how they justify it. Now apart from the fact that the 
practice in itself in my view is completely unethical, the downside from an 
organisational perspective is you’re not getting your fresh blood in. You 
therefore don’t get a fresh wash-in of water into the culture and therefore 
any bad cultural aspects you have are emboldened and further embedded 
into the organisation, and at a more senior level.’  (Interviewee 2) 
It is worth exploring this issue in terms of the cultural and structural organisational 
dynamics that foster this practice.  Its prevalence, as a corruption risk, was elaborated 
further by the same interviewee:  
‘So I think that the closed shop, if I can use that phrase for it, although it has 
other connotations of course, but the closed shop organisational approach, I 
think, is a big factor for corruption risk. I think the lack of understanding 
generally around what’s ethics and what’s not, and the over-reliance on the 
ICAC definition of corrupt conduct. I think that’s the problem.’ 
(Interviewee 2) 
‘But again, you increase the risk factors associated with the closed shop 
mentality and the closed culture … a culture which is ethical by definition 
will never be a closed culture. A culture which is corrupt by definition will 
usually be a closed culture.’  (Interviewee 2) 
The ‘closed shop’ approach is like a culture of ‘jobs for the boys’, a semantic reference to 
cronyism, albeit the interviewee phrases this ‘internal nepotism’.  The interviewee 
identifies the enablers of this practice as being a ‘lack of understanding [and] over-
reliance on the ICAC definition of corrupt conduct’.  As argued by Granovetter (2004, 
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p. 11), any corruption entrepreneur is well placed to ‘choose strategic targets who are 
centrally located in networks that … best serve his goals … [and] will most likely 
leverage his efforts’.  This appositely sums up why corrupt practices at Botany Bay 
Council (ICAC NSW, 2017b) were permitted to flourish. 
The above interviewee’s contention that ‘bad cultural aspects … are emboldened and 
further embedded into the organisation’ describes a situation where potentially such 
actions are not even being perceived as corrupt.  In the eyes of those who influence or 
observe such practices, the institutionalisation of socially constructed accounts 
rationalise and legitimise particularism, to the extent that it continues unconsciously 
and automatically without any comprehension that anything is wrong (Ashforth & 
Anand, 2003; World Bank, 2014).  
These interviewees reflected on their experiences with forms of particularism within 
particular councils:  
‘[Name of council redacted] has a very high tolerance of things like 
nepotism, you get families and generations that have worked for the same 
employer.’  (Interviewee 10) 
‘I worked at a council where every second person had the same surname. 
Like there were just areas that were full of people’s relatives. The council 
was a very big employer and it was a very big employer of unskilled labour. 
So, it actually had quite a key role in that community. It was a council where 
a lot of, particularly the outdoor labour force, were local, local to the local 
government area and it was almost a rite of passage or a way that people 
who came from quite disadvantaged backgrounds got a foot into the 
workforce, and were looked after in the workforce.  So, you know, you’re 
talking about guys who perhaps didn’t do very well at school or didn’t finish 
their schooling.  It was a council that managed all of its own outdoor 
functions, so it serviced all of its own trucks.  There was lots of opportunity 
for at the time unskilled labour and I think there was a very long tradition of 
nephews, sons, brothers, cousins finding their way into that workforce.’ 
(Interviewee 4) 
These comments refer to nepotism in the sense of family members being recruited into 
the same council, not as a result of their competences, but instead as a consequence of 
their kinship and social capital.  Noting that the meanings of corruption have changed 
over time and place (Wedel, 2012, p. 454), it is feasible that the tolerance of these more 
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overt forms of nepotism have decreased or are not as prevalent as they once were, but 
that this practice has evolved:  
‘I think particularly historically there’s been a lot of nepotism, which doesn’t 
get talked about a lot as corruption but ultimately is, and I’ve seen that all 
the way through my local government career.  Both nepotism in terms of 
long-term employees but also nepotism in terms of relatives of elected reps, 
and that’s still today prevalent, not as prevalent as it was when I started 
working in local government which was, oh gosh, a long time ago: I think 
about 1999, when it was rife.’  (Interviewee 4) 
Of particular note in the interviewee’s observation that ‘nepotism … doesn’t get talked 
about a lot as corruption’, which goes some way to explaining why it is perceived to be 
one of the least harmful acts of corruption (Figure 5.3).  The evolution of this form of 
favouritism in the appointment or recruitment of personnel is a concept alluded to by 
Bellow (2003, p. 19), who considers that ‘new nepotism [is] not the return of something 
tribal and archaic but the transformation of an ancient practice into a new and more 
acceptable form’.  Employees in advantaged positions are more likely to advance than 
those who do not have such social capital or networks, attributed to factors such as 
status, gender, and socioeconomic origin (McNamee & Miller, 2014, p. 83).  Key factors 
nurture this informal practice of social exchange, with intangible, yet well established, 
degrees of trust, and reciprocal factors featuring predominantly (Popczyk, 2017, p. 50).  
Accordingly, noting the long service of many survey respondents, it can be deduced that 
some of them may have been appointed or promoted favourably, and were therefore 
inclined to respond in a particular way.  This was kept in mind when looking at the 
results of cross-tabulating respondents’ views about the tolerance of particularism 
(Figure 5.3) with demographic data.  Thus, more than two-thirds of respondents (25 of 
the 36) who claim to have directly witnessed a preference to hiring friends or family for 
council jobs, have managerial or supervisory responsibilities some (16.7%) or all 




Figure 5.4. Correlation between direct witnessing of particularism and whether 
employees have managerial or supervisory responsibilities (n=36) 
The findings above suggest that employees in supervisory and managerial roles can and 
do recognise the commonness of potentially corrupt practices when invited to.  To place 
this in the context of a NSW baseline, the last census of local government employees 
highlighted that about a quarter (17%) of local government employees had supervisory, 
managerial or executive responsibility (DLG NSW, 2011, p. 16).  This was comparable 
across metropolitan, regional and rural councils.  Accordingly, this highlights that a 
small portion of the workforce – those with managerial or supervisory roles – have a 
greater tendency to see, but simultaneously accept, the practice of particularism.   
As identified within Chapter 3, managers and supervisors play a key role in the 
development of integrity frameworks and practices within local government (Hoekstra 
& Kaptein, 2013, p. 20) and can facilitate the institutionalisation of corruption (Ashforth 
& Anand, 2003, pp. 6-7).  However, the purported lack of concern regarding the impact 
of nepotism and cronyism arguably compounds its degree of visibility.  Its perceived 
degree of severity is at the lower end of the spectrum, when compared to other forms of 
corruption such as bribery (see Figure 5.3); this focus on more severe forms continues 
to undermine any attempt to expose or govern the less tangible forms of corruption that 
may be committed by the elite (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).  If a council’s culture is based 
on particularism, advancement can very easily be based on connections rather than 
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‘Managers at my council reward favourite, yet incompetent, staff with 
promotions, upgrade to higher duties and salaries.  My council has a culture 
of bullying, harassment and intimidation by certain managers (who are then 
protected by HR).’ (ID-231, Council 8)  
The mention of a ‘culture of bullying, harassment and intimidation’ indicates that other 
insidious practices are intrinsically linked to particularism within this council.  The 
antecedents of workplace bullying and corruption are somewhat similar, in that the 
cultural environment either fosters ethical or unacceptable behaviour, through the 
various in/actions of management (Stouten et al., 2010, p. 18).  While there is an 
absence of empirical research linking workplace bullying with corruption (Hutchinson 
et al., 2009, p. 213), the nexus between the two is becoming stronger, to some extent, in 
recent studies (ACFE, 2018, p. 46).  To some scholars, bullying is, in and of itself, a form 
of corrupt behaviour (Hutchinson et al., 2009, p. 213), though frequently unrecognised 
as such (Vickers, 2013, p. 95). 
This interviewee reflected on the interpersonal dynamics which might result in partial 
treatment towards one person or group over another, for self-interested reasons:  
‘I’ve seen in plenty of organisations, local government in particular, and 
probably local government worse than anywhere else in the government 
sector, … this nepotism and … promoting those who you want, because 
they’re going to be yes people, they’re going to give you what you want, and 
circumventing processes around that. That is corruption.’ (Interviewee 2)  
The impetus behind this practice in councils is, as alluded to by the above interviewee, 
to ensure that ‘yes people’ are favoured in the promotion process. That is to say, 
favouritism is shown to employees who acquiesce and conform instead of challenging 
the status quo.  As they advance within the organisational hierarchy, they are more 
prone to a higher immorality, as a consequence of their biographies, but also (relatedly) 
because they have less conscience about their decision-making practices, argues Mills 
(2000 [1956], p. 343).  As one person’s position or influence benefits another, an 
obligation to reciprocate is inherently created, impacting upon the ongoing and 
pervasive nature of corruption with agents appointed and promoted to protect each 
other (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 132).  Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 3) contends that corruption 
breeds more corruption, yet the reciprocity may be elusive and immaterial.  Indirect and 
intangible forms of reciprocity, such as complicity in decision-making, enhance the 
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social norm of particularism (Jones, 2016, p. 10).  These subtle, yet potent practices and 
realities rarely feature on popular news channels.  Even though ICAC referred to this 
practice within its investigation into Botany Bay Council in 2017, it paid scant attention 
to its prevalence as a key structural and cultural contributor to the corrupt practices 
which continued for nearly two decades (ICAC NSW, 2017b).   
Clearly, respondents perceive and interpret practices of corruption differently, and there 
is a divergence in terms of which corrupt practices are more or less harmful.  ‘ICAC-able’ 
forms of corruption – those that fall within ICAC’s jurisdictional mandate – are 
extensively distanced from the mundane forms of corruption that are suspected and 
witnessed routinely.  This not only reveals that much suspected corruption is failing to 
come to light, but also highlights its degrees of institutionalisation.  Such 
irreconcilabilities underpin the ambiguity of corruption.  To elucidate this point, the next 
section compares respondents’ perceptions of corruption with their intention to act 
upon them, depending on any perceived degree of wrongfulness, scale or severity.  
5.4 Unspoken corruption 
Out of 201 respondents surveyed, 1 in 5 respondents (39 out of 201) have declined to 
report corruption that they either suspected or witnessed.  A further 16 respondents 
(8%) preferred not to say, which may indicate that they too have likely declined to 




Figure 5.5. Number of respondents in each council who declined to report corruption 
after suspecting or witnessing it plus those who preferred not to say (n=55) 
With further reference to symbolic interactionist ideas, it becomes evident that each 
observer has deemed the act or practice in question to constitute corruption.  The fact of 
the assessment here, however, is that each person has chosen not to act.   Apart from 
Council 4, the proportion of respondents who have declined is relatively consistent, 
though at Council 5 – a medium-sized metropolitan council in an above average socio-
economic area – nearly two-thirds of respondents (a total of 12 out of 20) have either 
declined to report or preferred not to say.   This response is nearly 50% higher than the 
next highest-ranking council (Council 10), indicating that there may be other deep-
rooted organisational or cultural issues occurring within Council 5.  It is in this sense 
that, as Klitgaard (1988, p. 186) puts it, ‘one can speak of a culture of corruption, which 
requires not that everyone is corrupt but that almost everyone is unwilling to report on 
the corrupt’.   
At Council 4, no respondents have declined to report suspected corrupt conduct, which 
suggests that they have either experienced corruption and reported it or have not 
experienced corruption at all.  The number of responses from this council was not 
sufficient to say with any certainty whether this response would be the same of a larger 
sample, although it is noted that all respondents from this council also felt that the level 
of corruption at the council was none.  
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5.4.1 Reasons for not reporting  
Respondents who stated that they declined to report corruption after suspecting or 
witnessing it were asked what the reasons were.  Out of 10 pre-defined reasons (see 
Question 18 in Appendix 8 for full list of questions), five stood out in particular, as 
illustrated by Figure 5.6.  Thus, many concerns about potential corruption have not been 
raised for a variety of reasons, with more than half (53%) of all respondents who 
declined to report corruption believing that they would be ‘branded a trouble maker’.  
Around 2 in 5 (42%) of all respondents stated that they declined to report their 
concerns because they did not feel that they had enough evidence to support their 
suspicion, an aspect that is explicated further within Chapter 6.  Out of the top five 
reasons, lack of evidence is the only one that does not have a connection with other 
people, indicating that intangible and cultural reasons impact on a person’s decision not 
to report corruption.  Corrupt acts risk being permitted through passive observation, 
where those who see them, but omit to act on them, give them a form of approval 
(Cohen, 2001, pp. 69-70).   
These reasons indicate that there are internal cultures or workplace environments, 
which foster a non-reporting of corruption.  Potentially, there may be inter-council 
contrasts that contribute to this, with different factors being more influential in the non-
reporting of corruption at some councils over others.  Given the small number of 
respondents in this sample (38), it did not seem fruitful to systematically explore this by 
attributing these broad brush responses to the 10 councils in the sample.  Rather, it 
seems more beneficial to acknowledge that whistleblowing legislation, associated 
regulatory frameworks and processes are limited in their ability to encourage and 




Figure 5.6. Top five reasons selected by respondents who declined to report corruption 
after suspecting or witnessing it (n=38) 
Some respondents gave free-text reasons under the category other which were coded 
under the theme ‘managerial influence’:  
‘I had a discussion with my manager who did not take my concerns 
seriously.’ (ID-115, Council 10)  
‘I mentioned to my superiors informally but never lodged a formal report as 
I did not want to rock the boat or be targeted, given the person was a 
politician.’ (ID-245, Council 8)  
‘My supervisor was aware and did nothing.’ (ID-223, Council 8)  
The above respondents allude to different means of raising their concerns about potential 
corrupt conduct, noting managerial awareness but inaction: ‘I had a discussion with my 
manager’; ‘I mentioned to my superiors informally’; and ‘My supervisor was aware’.  
These highlight the pivotal role that managers and supervisors have, as acknowledged by 
several scholars in a review of the literature within Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.10) (Hoekstra & 
Kaptein, 2013, p. 20; Roberts et al., 2011, p. 9; Zipparo, 1999a, p. 84), and how they are 
likely to be the initial recipient of any report about suspected corruption (ACFE, 2016a, 
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features as a salient impediment to the addressing of corruption.  It would be reasonable 
to conclude that employees would likely feel further disincentivised to report future 
incidences on the basis that no action was forthcoming previously.  
In light of the dominant international and domestic literature that has been published on 
whistleblowing, particularly around the prospect of reprisal action and the prevalence of 
processes and procedures (Brown et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2014; Transparency 
International, 2013d), the impediments to reporting are explored below.  
5.4.2 The prospect of reprisal action 
Exposing corruption is heavily reliant on reports being made by observers (ACFE, 2012, 
p. 17; 2014, p. 19; 2016b, p. 11), yet the prospect of reprisal or retaliation for voicing 
concerns remains a fundamental inhibitor affecting public officials’ un/willingness to 
report.  This is highlighted by Figure 5.7, which shows that just 2 in 5 respondents 
(37.5%) felt confident that they would be protected from associated reprisal action if 
they were to report corruption to a person within their council.  
 
Figure 5.7. Whether respondents would feel confident that they would be protected 
from reprisal action (n=200) 
Nearly 1 in 4 (24.5%) respondents felt unsure that they would feel protected from 
associated reprisal action.  Accordingly, just under 2 in 3 respondents (a total of 62.5%) 
either did not feel confident that they would be protected from associated reprisal 
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say.  This pivotally indicates that many observers of corruption would likely not act on 
their concerns, in spite of whistleblowing polices, processes and legislation. 
Figure 5.8 below attributes responses to each of the 10 councils sampled to ascertain 
whether the results are weighted to any council or generalisable across the sample base.  
It is presented as number of respondents per council, rather than a percentage, to more 
clearly depict differences between councils.  
 
Figure 5.8. Respondents’ views on whether they would feel confident that they would be 
protected from associated reprisal action, by council (n=200) 
At Council 9, which is the only rural council in the sample, no one felt confident that they 
would be protected from associated reprisal action.  Councils 4 and 6 are the only two 
councils that each have a greater percentage of respondents who would feel confident 
about being protected from reprisal action than otherwise, albeit, this is only slightly so 
with Council 6.  The data above suggests that many suspicions of corrupt conduct would 
not be reported, if nearly two-thirds of employees feel that they would not be protected 
from associated reprisal action.  When this same question was posed in a survey 
conducted by the ANU, on behalf of IBAC, similar findings were noted, with 46% of those 
surveyed stating that they ‘would not feel confident they would be protected from 
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However, these findings contrast with the People Matters Survey 2014 which indicated 
that 65% of respondents stated that they felt confident that they would be protected 
from reprisal for reporting misconduct/wrongdoing, a figure that was up from 58% in 
2012 (Public Service Commission, 2015, p. 20).  The Office of the NSW Ombudsman 
attributed this to ‘an improvement in the reporting culture’ (Ombudsman NSW, 2015, 
p. 22).  A viable hypothesis is that reporters may feel greater protection from reprisal 
action for raising concerns of ‘misconduct/wrongdoing’ in contrast to reporting 
concerns of ‘corruption’, thereby indicating a degree of stigmatisation to the term 
‘corruption’.  However, the test of this question is the prospect of reprisal action for 
raising a concern and fear of reprisal action might be likely regardless of the nature of 
the issue raised.  Notably, what is clear is that there are a number of contradictions, with 
significantly less respondents in this study feeling confident about supposed protections 
than those within the People Matters Survey.  While this may be attributed to different 
categorisations, with the term ‘corruption’ infused with provocatively negative 
connotations (Ashforth et al., 2008, p. 671; Hindess, 2012, pp. 2-3; Mulgan, 2012, p. 25), 
this might not be the reason at all.  It could be that this positive reinforcement with the 
People Matters Survey is simply to enhance and enforce regulatory efforts and promote 
whistleblowing frameworks.  This would mean that genuine impediments to reporting 
then become under-considered.   
Respondents were invited to give any reason for answering the question on their 
decision to report in a particular way, and a number of comments indicated several 
causal factors, including the ‘role of the corrupt actor’.  For example:  
‘Dependent on the person.’ (ID-87, Council 7)  
‘Depends on their level in the organisation.’ (ID-26, Council 8)  
Other comments referred to degrees of reticence based on ‘breach of confidentiality’:  
‘Things are not always kept 100% confidential.’ (ID-196, Council 5)  
‘These matters are never kept confidential.’ (ID-9, Council 5)  
‘I don’t trust the reporting mechanism.  I feel that it would be revealed.’  
(ID-89, Council 7) 
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‘Information does not stay confidential even if a protected disclosure is 
submitted.’ (ID-232, Council 8) 
Some comments were based on employees’ previous ‘experience or observance of 
others’:  
‘I have been black lined previously.’ (ID-111, Council 7)  
‘I have witnessed the treatment of people who bring up items that are 
unsavoury or who make strong criticisms.’ (ID-65, Council 10)  
‘I have reported corruption in previous councils and paid the price for being 
honest and blowing the whistle on someone.’ (ID-24, Council 7) 
Without more context, it is assumed that the term ‘black lined’ means that the 
respondent has been negatively or unfavourably treated for raising an issue.  The other 
comments indicate that potential reporters have been disincentivised from reporting 
concerns, because of their perceived treatment of others who have done so previously.  
Collectively, there is a strong indication that respondents would not feel confident that 
they would be protected from associated reprisal action if they were to report a concern 
about corruption to a person within their council.  
In terms of identifying what form(s) of reprisal action might transpire, respondents 
stated the following:  
‘Believed I would be targeted.’ (ID-149, Council 6)  
‘Thought I would be sacked.’ (ID-136, Council 1)  
‘I feared repercussions i.e., loss of employment – labelling as a whistle 
blower.’ (ID-92, Council 7)  
‘I would be/am worried about being victimised if I report corruption.’  
(ID-183, Council 8) 
These comments highlight a degree of self-preservation, expounding Bauman’s (1990, 
p. 131) assertion that ‘self-interest and moral duty point in opposite directions’.  
Otherwise, these insights might be construed as excusatory, symptomatic of the 
‘bystander effect’, with the above comments potentially being ‘retrospective 
justifications for past inaction’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 70).  Either way, there is a societal 
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acceptance of the corruption, reifying corrupt practices by omitting to call them out and 
see them effectively prosecuted.   
In conjunction with the earlier finding that 1 in 5 respondents declined to report 
suspected corruption (Section 5.4), this self-preservation aspect furthers our 
understanding about why some instances of corrupt conduct may not be coming to light 
nor rectified.  Also, it signifies why respondents correlate everyday activities with 
corruption yet may decline to do anything about it.  This challenges the general view that 
corruption is non-existent within a respondent’s council, as depicted by a fifth, or 1 in 5, 
of the respondent base (Figure 4.2), and further reinforces the inherent contradictions 
and tensions that exist which within the occupational lifeworld of local government.  
This is discussed in more detail below.  
Table 5.1. Correlation between ‘witnessed’ corruption (n=161) and whether 
respondents had declined to report 
 
Whether respondents have thought about 
reporting corrupt behaviour or activity in 
their council, but decided not to 
Yes No 
Prefer not 
to say Total 
Number of acts that 
have been witnessed 
(1–9) 
0 8 71 5 84 
1 6 23 5 34 
2 6 11 3 20 
3 10 3 1 14 
4 5 1 0 6 
5 1 0 0 1 
6 1 0 0 1 
7 1 0 0 1 
Total 38 109 14 161 
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As identified within Table 5.1, out of the 38 respondents who thought about reporting 
corrupt conduct in their council but decided not to, over three quarters (a total of 30) 
have witnessed one or more of the nine corrupt acts shown in Figure 5.1.  Three or more 
of these acts have been witnessed by nearly half (a total of 18) of the 38 respondents.  
This highlights a strong affiliation between these nine acts and each one’s designation as 
a corrupt practice.   
This is further supported by the data within Table 5.2 which shows that out of the 39 
respondents who have thought about reporting corrupt behaviour or activity in their 
council, but decided not to, 37 claim to have suspected one of more of the acts outlined in 
Figure 5.1.  Additionally, three or more of these acts have been suspected by more than 
three quarters (a total of 32) of the 39 respondents.   
Table 5.2. Correlation between ‘suspected’ corruption (n=201) and whether 
respondents had declined to report 
 
Whether respondents have thought about 
reporting corrupt behaviour or activity in 
their council, but decided not to 
Yes No 
Prefer not 
to say Total 
Number of acts that have 
been suspected (1–9) 
0 2 68 2 72 
1 1 26 2 29 
2 5 17 4 26 
3 10 15 6 31 
4 10 11 1 22 
5 5 3 1 9 
6 2 4 0 6 
7 2 1 0 3 
9 2 1 0 3 
Total 39 146 16 201 
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This indicates that many concerns which may relate to specific forms of corrupt conduct 
have not been reported but have been correlated with one or more of the nine corrupt 
acts categorised within Figure 5.1.  On the basis that many scholars consider corruption 
to be ‘in the eye of the beholder’ (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 3; Holmes, 2015, p. 2; 
Olsen, 2014, p. 187), these nine practices seem to be a suitable baseline typology that 
would go some way to assisting practitioners and policymakers streamline their 
educational efforts to address the more richly ingrained practices, whether suspected or 
witnessed, that fail to come to light.  
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.10), several scholars identify reasons that 
employees of an organisation might not speak up, such as: loyalty to colleagues and the 
employer (Zipparo, 1999b, p. 273); a tendency to avoid the stress of reporting (Johnston, 
2012, pp. 59-60); mistrust or a lack of confidence in the reporting system (Graycar, 
2013, p. 14; 2014, p. 279); or a lack of knowledge about reporting mechanisms 
(McAllister et al., 2012, p. 5; Zipparo, 1999a, pp. 84-85).  The last of these reasons can, to 
some extent, be addressed within the education domain, by raising awareness about the 
mechanisms for reporting, but the first three come down to individual and interpersonal 
factors.  
If observers omit to report, corruption continues and becomes more normalised the 
longer it is unattended to (Dormaels, 2015, p. 606).  It is this aspect that is worth noting 
on the basis that there is a vast disconnect between suspected and witnessed events, 
with the purported degree of corruption within local government and its perceived 
decline in the past 5 years.  Prior to exploring this further, it is worth considering any 
degree of normalisation in the context of councils’ efforts to encourage reporting of 
corruption.  
5.4.3 Whether councils do enough to encourage employees to speak up against 
corruption 
Figure 5.9 indicates that out of the 197 respondents sampled, just over half (53.8%) felt 
that their council did enough to encourage employees to speak up, and out, against 
corruption.  This means that nearly half of all surveyed respondents do not think that 
their council does enough to encourage employees to speak up against corruption, or 




Figure 5.9. Respondents’ views on whether their council does enough to encourage 
employees to speak up against corruption (n=197) 
This reveals that many councils are not doing enough to encourage employees to speak 
up against corruption, but even if they were, potential reporters may still not feel safe 
doing so.  One respondent who said that their council does do enough to encourage 
reporting made this comment:  
‘I believe council works hard to prevent corruption and make it possible for 
corruption to be reported, but as an employee, I would still feel unsafe and 
unsure that reporting corruption would be wise.’ (ID-123, Council 8)  
Similarly, a respondent who did not feel that their council did enough to encourage 
reporting made this comment:  
‘Encouraging people is not the problem – the reality is that people who 
speak out are likely to suffer reprisals regardless of protections.’  
(ID-126, Council 10)  
Each of the above comments, from respondents at separate councils, acknowledge 
awareness and prevention efforts, but concede that there are inherent problems 
associated with the reporting, investigating and prosecuting of corruption.  There is an 
indication that employees will fail to speak up against corruption despite prevention or 
awareness efforts.  A cultural trope of not ‘dobbing in’ was identified within the study, as 
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5.4.4 A culture of not ‘dobbing in’ 
It was identified in the survey that many concerns will not be raised by employees who 
do not wish to ‘dob in their mates’.  This colloquialism was explored in Chapter 2 as one 
that has traditionally existed as a feature of Australian identity; however, it was largely 
dismissed as a real issue in today’s workplace society that purportedly understands and 
appreciates how reports about corruption should be made (Roberts & Brown, 2010, 
p. 56).  In spite of this, several interviewees cited this idiom, considering it to be a salient 
impediment towards the exposure of corruption in Australian local government:  
‘Unfortunately, there’s a bit of a culture in Australia, you don’t dob.  I think 
that would refer to what I see as one of the biggest impediments, and that is 
the Australian culture of not to be seen dobbing on your mates.  The 
potential ostracising of someone who does have the guts to go to the 
manager and say, “look, this guy is stealing council coffee or this guy put in a 
timesheet last week that was fraudulent,” it’s the peer pressure in an 
organisation that doesn’t have a proper anticorruption culture would be the 
biggest impediment.’  (Interviewee 8)  
‘You’re up against both people’s idea of mateship … Dobbing people in is a 
huge bridge for people to go across.’  (Interviewee 10)  
One interviewee considered that this concept was not ‘Australia-specific’, stating:  
‘A lot of cultures have something similar, whether it’s in Europe and it’s 
seen as supporting these totalitarian governments and I just think across 
cultures it’s going to be a disinclination to do it. I don’t think Australia is 
alone in that aspect.’  (Interviewee 9)  
However, when asked if this was ‘Australia-specific’ another interviewee stated:  
‘Absolutely, and I think it’s dying out but it is, it’s traditionally been – it 
started as a class-based thing ... The most positive way of saying it is that 
you solve the problem yourselves without involving others but it very 
quickly translates into we don’t dob on each other to anybody outside of our 
little group, and that’s really negative.’  (Interviewee 10)  
Accordingly, 3 of the 11 interviewees contended that the notion of ‘dobbing in’ continues 
to exist as a feature within NSW local government, despite a strong observation in the 
literature that whistleblowing frameworks exist and that individuals are aware of 
protections against associated reprisal (Roberts & Brown, 2010, p. 56).  This notion 
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could be likened to similar concepts, referred to as a ‘code’ or ‘cocoon’ of silence, a 
‘curtain’, or a ‘blue wall’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 68; Skolnick, 2002, p. 7): unwritten but well 
understood concepts that keep issues contained, implying that anyone who might speak 
up would be excoriated for doing so.  Building on the discussion in Section 5.4.1, it is 
argued that observers would be disinclined to speak up because of social peer pressure, 
and this would likely enhance any degree of perceived ostracism.  
Such a concept would be aggravated by the inherently ‘closed recruitment culture’ that 
was identified with in Section 5.3.3.  The existence and normalcy of particularism would 
lead to this contingence, as there is a degree of unconcern that particularism is harmful, 
or even wrong.  Drawing on denial theory (Cohen, 2001, pp. 58-59) and the associated 
techniques of neutralisation, there is a general denial of injury (Sykes & Matza, 1957, 
pp. 667-668).  Those engaging in or benefiting from particularism, or those who observe 
its incidence, neutralise its wrongfulness because there is no or little perceived harm 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 60).  Particularism has likely contributed to this cocoon of silence, as 
employees have suspected or witnessed particularism, but do not speak up because it is 
socially interwoven within the fabric of local government.  As a corruption risk, it is not 
seen as such in its evolved form (Bellow, 2003, p. 19).  Yet, it arguably could be one of 
the most insidious forms of subterfuge, as it scales the history of corruption and 
reproduces the culture by similar members joining the clique that has benefited those 
before them.  This is considered below, in light of respondents’ perception of risk 
management.   
5.5 The risk of corruption 
Despite the fact that many instances of suspected or witnessed corruption have been 
identified (see Figure 5.1) and that many instances of suspected corrupt behaviour have 
not been actively reported, many survey respondents had a positive view about how 
well their council handles the risk of corruption.  As illustrated by Figure 5.10, nearly 
two thirds (60.6%) of sampled respondents consider that their council handles the risk 




Figure 5.10. Respondents’ views on whether their council handles the risk of corruption 
well (n=218) 
It is pertinent to note that this refers to the handling of corruption risk, not the handling 
of reports; that is, proactive prevention, as opposed to reactive response: how councils 
proactively manage or mitigate corruption risks, but not how they then reactively deal 
with it when it is observed or reported.  
This finding was cross-tabulated with respondents’ answers as to whether they had 
declined to report suspected corrupt behaviour or activity.  As shown by Table 5.3, 4 out 
of every 5 respondents (108 out of total of 134) who claim that they have never thought 
about reporting corruption within their council considered that their council handles 
the risk of corruption well.   
Of the 39 respondents who have declined to report suspected corruption, 28 do not 
agree that their council handles the risk of corruption well, accounting for more than 
two-thirds of the respondent base.  However, of the respondents who claimed that their 
council handles the risk of corruption well, 11 respondents had declined to report 
suspected corruption at their council while 3 preferred not to say.  One might consider 
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their council handles the risk of corruption well, but generally speaking, there is a 
correlation between willingness to report and perceived handling of corruption risk.  
Table 5.3. Correlation between employees who considered that their council handles 
the risk of corruption well with those who had thought about reporting 
corruption but decided not to (n=186) 
 
Number of respondents who 
have thought about reporting 
corrupt behaviour or activity in 
their council, but decided not to Total 
Yes No 
Prefer 
not to say 
Whether respondent 
agreed or disagreed or 
their council handles the 
risk of corruption well 
Agree 11 108 3 122 
Neither agree 
or disagree 
15 13 9 37 
Disagree 13 13 1 27 
Total 39 134 13 186 
To develop some enriched understanding about the prevention and control of 
corruption as a risk, a number of comments emerged as a theme from the qualitative 
survey responses.  A total of 42 responses from the survey were coded under the theme, 
‘positive control and exposure arrangements’, shedding light on respondents’ views 
about the type and nature of efforts to prevent corruption, raise awareness and 
encourage reporting.  Notably, out of the 42 responses coded under this theme, just over 
a third (15) originated from respondents at Council 8, indicating a particular emphasis 
on such efforts at this council.  Some of these are outlined below. 
Respondents who considered that the level of corruption in local government had 
‘decreased a lot’ attributed their response to these reasons:  
‘I believe it has to do with the improved procurement and governance 
frameworks in the industry.’ (ID-18, Council 8)  
‘More is known about types of corruption and staff are being educated 
about corruption.’ (ID-222, Council 8)  
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‘Governance systems for staff have been put in place to reduce the ability to 
be corrupted.’ (ID-111, Council 7)  
‘Improved internal systems and high level of publicity for poor behaviour.’ 
(ID-2, Council 1)  
A respondent who believed that the level of corruption in local government had 
‘decreased a little’ attributed their response to this reason:  
‘Implementation and updating of policies and corporate documents and 
tighter scrutiny since Operation Jarek.’ (ID-188, Council 2)  
A respondent who believed that the level of corruption in their council was ‘lower’ in 
comparison with other councils, attributed their response to this reason:  
‘We have regular fraud/corruption training. Also established procedures, 
chains of command, review by management in decision making etc.’  
(ID-61, Council 8)  
One respondent who believed that the level of corruption in their council is ‘much lower’ 
than other councils gave this reason:  
‘Internal and external auditing processes, internal ombudsman, 
introduction of corporate plans and policies, anti-fraud and corruption 
newsletter and other initiatives.’ (ID-188, Council 2)  
These reasons may explain why nearly two-thirds of respondents consider that their 
council handles the risk of corruption well (see Figure 5.10).  There are indications of 
corporeality, with councils implementing a variety of anti-corruption initiatives, thus 
imbuing employees with a perception that corruption has been curtailed or controlled.  
Collectively, they could be construed as a form of imprimatur of anti-corruption, 
especially if implemented following a recommendation from the state’s authority on 
corruption, being ICAC.  This is illustrated by reference to Operation Jarek, an 
investigation undertaken by ICAC and reported on in 2012 (ICAC NSW, 2012).   
Such endeavours might minimise opportunities for public officials to engage in corrupt 
activities, by increasing the likelihood of detection or incentivising honest behaviour.  
Yet, it seems paradoxical that councils are adequately attending to the risk of corruption 
when simultaneously, many opportunities for corrupt acts continue to exist (see Figure 
5.1).  Moreover, as aforementioned, richly nuanced forms of corruption – such as conflict 
170 
 
of interest, particularism, abuse of discretion and misuse of information – have been 
simultaneously suspected and witnessed to a significant degree in spite of these visible 
anti-corruption efforts.  Without delving into the many shades of grey that might exist 
between white (tolerable) and black (intolerable) corruption (Heidenheimer, 2009, 
p. 152), the extensive references to the type of initiatives which might fall within the 
ambit of ‘positive control and exposure arrangements’ (procedures, education, 
improved frameworks and systems, etc.) are deemed by many respondents to be an 
effective remedy for all forms of corruption. 
The comments below acutely highlight the fallibility of, and over-reliance on, preventive 
controls and governance systems:  
‘It doesn’t matter how solid or how tight my processes are or how good I 
think we have this nailed on the head, if someone wants to act outside they 
will act outside it.’ (Interviewee 6)  
‘That’s where the rubber hits the road. You can write all the manuals and 
don’t take this the [wrong] way, I think these are fantastic, but all of this 
sort of stuff, if it’s all just going on a barren field, it’s not going to do 
anything.’ (Interviewee 10)  
The latter comment supports the view that, despite measures designed to prevent 
corruption (such as processes/manuals), they will be futile in an organisation that 
generates corrupt working cultures and practices, similar to observations made by 
Klitgaard (2000, p. 5).  The formal existence and promulgation of anti-corruption 
endeavours do not necessarily account for the informal practices, interpersonal 
relationships and power configurations that exist, claims Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, pp. 9-
11).  Accordingly, one wonders to what extent employees’ morality has been shaped by 
the council’s collective social culture (Punch, 1996, p. 266), and to what extent this has 
resulted in a culture that is indifferent to everyday corruption.  If the dominant norm 
within a council is the tolerance of nuanced forms of corruption that are easily 
subsumed within culture and practice, then these will prevail regardless of any formal 
rules, governance or anti-corruption initiatives (Mishra, 2006, p. 341).  This is especially 
the case if employees have discretion and flexibility in the manner in which they 
perform their role (Shore & Haller, 2005, p. 6).  If any observer omits to report the 
suspected or witnessed infraction, as 1 in 5 respondents have (see Section 5.4), anti-
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corruption efforts become no more than a tick-box exercise, ‘window dressing’ or 
tokenistic (Osrecki, 2015, p. 349).  This issue is considered below, in the context of the 
Code of Conduct, a document that governs the way that public officials are expected to 
act and behave, and reputedly a widely implemented and relied upon anti-
fraud/corruption control (ACFE, 2018, p. 27).   
5.5.1 The Code of Conduct 
Every council in the state of NSW has a Code of Conduct (ICAC NSW, 2010c, p. 18), 
prescribed on a ‘model code’ that is promoted state-wide by the OLG (2013b).  Yet, ICAC 
has noted that employees from a number of councils in NSW continue to act contrary to 
their Code of Conduct, associated policies or training (ICAC NSW, 2012, p. 6).  Despite 
this, when respondents were asked why they thought that the level of corruption in local 
government in NSW had decreased in the past 5 years, these comments were made by 
three respondents from different councils:  
‘My council has rigorously amended it[s] Code of Conduct to prevent 
corruption from occurring.’ (ID-231, Council 8)  
‘More conscientious about Code of Conduct and other processes.’  
(ID-79, Council 1)  
‘Certain councils have put in place solid code of conduct procedures.’  
(ID-169, Council 7)  
Akin to the way that laws reflect the accepted practices within society, the Code of 
Conduct typically represents organisational values and ideals (Brien, 2001, p. 66).  
Across the breadth of sampled councils, 87.2% of respondents considered that the Code 
of Conduct training they received sufficiently conveyed the importance of having a 




Figure 5.11. Whether respondents felt that the Code of Conduct training they received 
sufficiently conveyed the importance of having a workplace culture that 
rejects the idea of corruption as being acceptable (n=187) 
This might support the observation that organisations have moved away from 
enforcement of rules that govern ethical conduct by actors, towards changing the culture 
and collective consciousness into one that rejects the notion of corruption and supports 
integrity (Mulgan & Wanna, 2011, p. 416).  From one standpoint, the presence of formal 
training has communicated to employees at the front line the existence of a Code of 
Conduct and the importance of having a workplace culture that rejects the idea of 
corruption as being acceptable.  However, this has viably transitioned into a view that its 
universal adoption will limit corruption.  A Code of Conduct is often in place when 
fraud/corruption is perpetrated and then identified (ACFE, 2018, p. 26) and the mere 
presence of a formal Code of Conduct will not prevent or limit unethical behaviour, 
claims Zipparo (1998, p. 2).  Such codes ‘fail because the structure and culture of the 
organisation is not conducive to ethical action’, argues Brien (2001, p. 64).  Despite these 
perspectives, the Code of Conduct remains something of a cornerstone ‘control’, yet this 
interviewee remarked on its degree of embedment within the council environment:  
‘The Code of Conduct in most organisations is dealt with once when people 
start and it’s a cursory application.  There’s only one organisation I’ve 
worked at where the code of conduct was probably taken seriously.  Other 
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This reinforces the ‘tick-box’ concept, and underpins the findings in Table 5.4 below, 
which reveal that 28 of the 38 respondents who have declined to report suspected 
corruption also believed that their council sufficiently conveyed the importance of 
having a workplace culture that rejects the idea of corruption as being acceptable.  
Accordingly, this equates to nearly 3 out of every 4 employees.  
Table 5.4. Cross-tabulation between respondents’ views about the Code of Conduct and 
whether they had declined to report on suspected corruption (n=186) 
 
Whether respondents have ever 
thought about reporting corrupt 
behaviour or activity in your 
Council, but decided not to. 
Total Yes No 
Prefer not 
to say 
Whether respondents thought that the 
Code of Conduct training they received 
sufficiently conveyed the importance of 
having a workplace culture that rejects 
the idea of corruption as being 
acceptable. 
Yes 28 125 9 162 
No 10 8 3 21 
Prefer not 
to say 
0 2 1 3 
Total 38 135 13 186 
This calls into question the operational and cultural usefulness of the Code of Conduct as 
a mechanism in the prevention or deterrence of corruption, or as a means to expose 
corruption through reporting, as perceived by some respondents.  One might cynically 
believe that councils comply with this compliance-based requirement as it shows that 
they are ‘seen’ to be doing the right thing.  Supporting Interviewee 7’s view that the 
Code of Conduct ‘is dealt with once when people start and it’s a cursory application’, 
nearly all respondents (94.5%) had attended Code of Conduct training since being 
employed by their Council (Figure 5.12).  
Across the broader network of  public sector agencies in NSW, nearly all (98%) staff are 
aware of their organisation’s Code of Conduct with ‘nearly three quarters having read or 
referred to it in the last 12 months’ (Public Service Commission, 2015, p. 30).  Hence, 
awareness of the Code of Conduct is almost universal, and a place of reference for 
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council employees, but whether such training influences employees’ willingness to 
report corruption is questionable.  The ‘basis of public integrity must be both 
compliance and value orientated’, argues Anechiarico (2009b, p. 85).  Yet, when 
respondents were asked if they felt more or less inclined to report suspected corruption 
as a direct result of their attendance at this training, more than half of the respondent 
base (56.4%) said that they felt ‘no different’ (Figure 5.13); this indicates that such 
training is limited in its ability to modify attitudes or behaviours.   
 
Figure 5.12. Code of Conduct training attendance (n=199) 
 
Figure 5.13. Whether respondents felt more or less inclined to report corruption as a 
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Despite 1 in 5 (40.4%) respondents claiming that they felt ‘more’ inclined to report 
corruption as a result of their attendance at Code of Conduct training, this has not 
transitioned into reality.  As identified in Table 5.4, nearly 3 in 4 respondents who have 
suspected corruption and declined to report it have also attended Code of Conduct 
training and agreed that it sufficiently conveyed the importance of having a workplace 
culture that rejects the idea of corruption as being acceptable.  Accordingly, Code of 
Conduct training will not necessarily influence a person’s actions or behaviour in terms 
of reporting or acting on their concern.  Some employees will remain reluctant to report 
corruption despite receiving such training.  What remains are the organisational and 
cultural barriers that disincentivise reporting and inhibit the exposure of corruption.  
These continue to remain in spite of a Code of Conduct or similar compliance-based 
protocols. 
Governance by rules, whether formalised in law or a Code of Conduct, policies and 
procedures, attempts to regulate and govern human behaviour, by establishing a 
foundation of order and compliance in terms of how humans should interact and behave 
(Bauman, 1990, p. 182; Fuller, 1969, p. 205).  As noted by Heller (1989, pp. 302-303), 
some people will ‘follow the rules but at the same time rebel against them in mind and 
heart’.  Rules may delineate between right and wrong (Brien, 2001, p. 67), but 
potentially stifle human creativity, devalue integrity and professionalism, and 
potentially inhibit any organisational responsiveness (Warren, 2006, p. 804).  
Accordingly, typical anti-corruption instruments, such as codes of conduct, policies and 
declarations, lose their salience and become forgotten about, devaluing their impact on 
the prevention of corruption (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 17).  Such perspectives are 
noteworthy when considering corruption and anti-corruption measures; while the 
evidence above highlights their lack of effectiveness in many respects, councils continue 
to embrace such measures.  They purport to show that corruption is taken seriously, but 
the efforts are performative: tokenistic endeavours that give the outward impression of 
good governance.  Inwardly, the reality of corruption is very much subsumed within 




This chapter’s contribution to the thesis is centred around a posteriori knowledge of 
corruption, as opposed to a priori knowledge, as explored in Chapter 4.  This chapter has 
revealed, on one hand, that anti-corruption endeavours are visibly evident – even 
correlated with a perception of reduced corruption or decreased risk – but on the other 
hand, there is an institutionalisation of corruption that is a prominent feature of local 
government bureaucracies.  Through a systemic examination of particular acts and 
behaviours, there is an everydayness of corruption, with several practices of corruption 
featuring in particular.  These are more nuanced, less overt, and lower on the perceived 
scale of severity or seriousness.  They have less affiliation to the term corruption, and 
are quite dissimilar to bribery, a well-known practice and one that still resonates as 
being harmful, despite its rare existence within local government.  As one practice that is 
quite prominent, particularism is widely observed, yet seen as the least harmful form of 
corruption.  It has been predominately suspected and witnessed by employees in 
managerial or supervisory roles, but as it is not accentuated or brought to the public’s 
attention, its pervasiveness is not recognised. Particularism is, however, a most notable 
feature of local government administration. 
In general, this chapter highlighted that practices of corruption have been routinely 
suspected or witnessed in quantities that appear to be estranged from the perceptions of 
their levels of incidence explored in Chapter 4.  This chapter identifies that the 
commonly suspected and witnessed practices that exist do not conform with the more 
formal or legalistic examples that are pursued by the ICAC.  Not all of these observations 
or suspicions have been articulated by employees, because of social stigmas and other 
inhibitors; hence, as they have not been reported, they have not been responded to.  The 
personal cost and perceived risk of reporting suspicions of corruption remains high, in 
spite of different modes of regulatory governance, such as whistleblowing policies and 
frameworks that facilitate confidential reporting.  As such, valuable knowledge about 
corruption and its everydayness has not surfaced, and this has implications for how anti-
corruption measures are designed and implemented.  For the broader objectives of this 
thesis, this presents as a major consequence, in that potentially corrupt behaviour has 
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become emboldened over time, as it has manifested but has been largely ignored or 
tacitly accepted.    
The findings within this chapter elucidate the equivocal nature of corruption, indicating 
that it presents in different forms within local government, in spite of different 
programs of governance, or well considered anti-corruption controls, such as codes of 
conduct. There are fundamental considerations that have a bearing and centre around 
the existence of a major paradox, where the perceived level and perceived reality of 
corruption is vastly at odds with the situated reality.   
Chapter 6 develops these insights through a focus on the architectural and 
administrative composition of councils. 
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CHAPTER 6: COUNCILS’ APPETITE FOR CORRUPTION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the influence of political, social and structural forces on the 
different organisational approaches to corruption management.  On the surface, councils 
are seen as reactive, rather than proactive, with a tokenistic approach towards the 
management of corruption, rather than genuine appetite.  When suspicions of 
corruption have been reported, they have either been met with no response, or an 
unsatisfactory one. 
Noting that councils are diverse social entities, the findings within this chapter reflect on 
different cultural and structural influences which impact on the means and mechanisms 
of response.  The chapter also highlights how the diverse and diffuse nature of corrupt 
practices, as explained in the previous chapter, are not captured or explicated within 
councils because of the limited focus on corruption management, augmented by 
different constraints and inhibitors.   
6.2 The anti-corruption agenda 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some forms of corruption are easier to describe and designate 
as such by the majority, yet any restricted gaze means that more opaque forms of 
corruption fall out of view: practices that might be unethical, rather than unlawful, such 
as those suspected and witnessed by a significant proportion of respondents (see Figure 
5.1).  For example, one interviewee stated:  
‘Councils generally tend to focus on the much more binary on paper 
provable things … that kind of “I can prove it”. If I can prove it or it’s in that 
traditional mould so it’s easier for people to accept that that’s corrupt 
conduct … inappropriate decision-making, all that kind of stuff, not 
declaring gifts.’  (Interviewee 6) 
This example highlights that councils tend to deal with forms of corruption that fit the 
‘traditional mould’ or are ‘provable’, which potentially means that subtler, less obvious 
forms of corruption, fall outside public notice.  In a similar vein, one interviewee stated:  
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‘What we’re talking about there is with organisations it would be very easy 
to pick off low-hanging fruit to use the metaphor. And therefore, you’re seen 
to be doing the right thing.’ (Interviewee 2) 
While some scholars argue that corruption tends to be more visible at the lower levels 
(Gupta, 1995, p. 384), the above interviewees’ observations indicate that councils attend 
to low-level visible corrupt practices purposefully, so that the council is ‘seen to be doing 
the right thing’, by ‘pick[ing] off the low-hanging fruit’.  This is akin to a ceremonial or 
performative endeavour but without any real or genuine appetite to unearth corruption.  
To extend the metaphor, if anti-corruption efforts focus on the ‘low-hanging fruit’, the 
roots of corruption risk remain firmly embedded in the ground, keeping the attention off 
the higher branches (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).   
As identified through ICAC’s investigation at Wollongong City Council, those distantly 
implicated in the corruption failed to see the everyday events as corrupt (Graycar & 
Prenzler, 2013, p. 143) to the point that cultural toleration became systemic.  In this 
situation, corruption remains unchecked.  As elaborated on by this interviewee:  
‘They [councils] pay lip service to it [corruption], but it is in the too hard 
basket. It’s one of those things that has the potential to take the eye off the 
ball of the senior executives. Directors, general manager, if you’ve got major 
frauds happening in the background, it’s just something you don’t want to 
know about. And by the way, once the council’s become aware that there’s a 
major fraud in council and you get dragged up before council to explain 
yourself, you don’t need that grief. So why address it in the first place?’ 
(Interviewee 5) 
The remarks ‘lip service’ and ‘it’s just something you don’t want to know about’ signify 
degrees of corporate denial, coupled with inertia, suggesting that it would be more 
convenient to wilfully ignore corruption, than to risk dealing with it (Heffernan, 2011, 
p. 104).  This interviewee further identified a degree of managerial apathy:  
‘I think it’s way down the list of things to be done.  It’s a bit like audit and 
risk – it’s one of those, you should be doing it but who really cares?’ 
(Interviewee 11)  
Despite any formal, structural mechanisms that might exist within the organisational 
hierarchy, there is a degree of indolence when it comes to addressing corruption.  It is 
argued that ‘in the absence of scrutiny, corruption can flourish’ (Vanstone, 2015), but 
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the lack of scrutiny is conceptualised by the remark, ‘who really cares?’.  When 
Klitgaard’s (1988, p. 75) formula is re-examined, that corruption equals monopoly, plus 
discretion, minus accountability, it is notable that many councils operate in a 
monopolistic fashion, autonomously, and with much discretion.  Compounding these 
forces, a lack of accountability is exhibited by the degree of apathy. 
When the plausibility that anti-corruption measures, such as codes of conduct, and 
recommendations stemming from an ICAC inquiry, might result in reduced corruption 
was explored, this interviewee provided an illuminating insight:  
‘So … [name of Council redacted] Council’s actually been through an ICAC 
inquiry and they’ve implemented all the recommendations but really I’m 
not sure that they’re really embedded properly.  I think it was sort of a bit of 
a tokenistic approach.’ (Interviewee 3) 
‘So, when ICAC’s going to an inquiry they’re very good about talking to the 
agency involved and trying to work with them about what they can do to 
actually improve their systems and that it’s then up to the leadership of the 
entity to sort of say “okay, we need to fix these things” and create a more 
resilient organisation.  But in some agencies that just doesn’t happen.  It’s 
treated as a bit of “oh the ICAC have been and gone, we’ll just do what we 
have to do to sort of implement their recommendations instead of actually 
using it as an opportunity for continuous improvement”.’ (Interviewee 3) 
While ‘implementation’ demonstrates to ICAC that the council has sought to embrace the 
value of anti-corruption recommendations, the reality would seem that these are only 
done to placate ICAC.  The supposed implementation of these anti-corruption initiatives 
could be likened to Osrecki’s (2015, p. 349) concept of ‘window dressing’ or ‘tokenism’, 
in that they are merely formal changes.  This interviewee observed the difference in 
council approaches:  
‘The history of the organisation might have led to a particular approach.  
For example, ours having gone through an ICAC inquiry a few years ago, 
we’ve taken an approach that was fairly restrictive and … fairly strong 
approach in relation to detection and cultural training and zero tolerance in 
relation to some particular behaviours.  Others are more flexible … so some 
people settle for what is the minimum requirements and that is good 
enough until something blows up in their face.’  (Interviewee 1) 
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This comment reflects a particular council’s approach to corruption, noting that this was 
only undertaken reactively, following ICAC intervention.  As such, corruption remains 
hidden until the point of such intervention, this seemingly being the necessary catalyst 
for organisational change: 
‘I think until the big thing happens, like the Ryde example with the mayor,22 
then very little attention gets paid to any corruption work.’  (Interviewee 3) 
‘I think it’s heavily dependent on whether council have been through some 
kind of enquiry or not … I think enough [is] being done by state government 
to direct local government.  I just don’t think local government are doing 
enough.  They’re not responding to that.’  (Interviewee 3) 
‘The more I meet other councils and see what level they look at things, the 
more my view of them is getting eroded.  The horrifying reality I think is 
until a council is actually tainted with some kind of corrupt behaviour they 
don’t think it’s a problem, and how do you address that unless there is 
something that is compulsory and really spells out what is corrupt 
behaviour and what is not.’  (Interviewee 11) 
Similar to findings in a review of Victorian public sector agencies, corruption does not 
appear to be ‘on the radar’ of councils in NSW (IBAC VIC, 2014, p. 1; Van der Wal et al., 
2016, p. 3).  Based on the above comments, this is likely to remain the case, unless a 
council is subjected to the likes of an ICAC inquiry.   
6.2.1 Reactive nature of local government 
Building on the above impressions, the reactive culture of local government was deemed 
to be a distinguishable aspect making it more susceptible to corruption.  As observed by 
these interviewees:  
‘I think local government is a reactionary beast.  A lot of people are quite 
happy to just turn up, get their paycheque, move on, “this is my area, as long 
as I don’t have a problem I don’t want to know about it”.  I think until there’s 
actually a problem, most people don’t actually fix anything.’  (Interviewee 7) 
‘Government agencies but most organisations are fairly reactive when it 
comes to these issues.  We don’t want to acknowledge that there might be 
systemic or specific issues within the organisation, simply because it’s a 
 




self-defence mechanism where we feel that our organisation that we are 
managing is doing well. … There’s typically a reaction, so when the problem 
occurs then we react to it.  And then we create frameworks and situations to 
address those issues and then that urgency obviously declines over time 
and we feel that obviously that framework is not necessary anymore until 
the problem presents itself again in the future.’  (Interviewee 1) 
As alluded to within the above comment, there is a sense of cultural denial that 
corruption is a risk (Cohen, 2001, pp. 58-59).  The reality of corruption might seem 
disconcerting to those who have a role in a council as a moral agent to act and respond; 
it becomes difficult to entertain the idea that co-workers and colleagues might be 
dishonest or corrupt, and if they are, that they may have to intervene (Cohen, 2001, 
p. 24).  Accordingly, proactive intervention or risk management becomes more unlikely, 
which means that the causalities of corruption remain unexplored.  As explained further 
below, employees’ length of service may be a facilitator in this regard:  
‘I worked for one council where the executive management team turned 
over a little bit, they’d work for five years or so and then they’d move on, 
and then you get some fresh blood through, which meant organisational 
change and culture benefit and values.  The general manager’s been here 30 
years.  A couple of the directors have gone from their apprenticeship all the 
way through to director.  I don’t know whether or not they’re interested.  
They might not have necessarily been exposed to a different way of doing 
things, or a different way of looking at things.’ (Interviewee 7) 
‘I think it’s very typical of local government.  Three of the councils I’ve 
worked at have had long-serving staff members being in the organisation.  
They live locally.  It’s nice and easy.  Not a lot of pressure to move on.  As 
long as you’re doing your job then you can continue on … when there’s long-
serving staff members consistent, then I don’t think they necessarily have 
the appetite.’ (Interviewee 7) 
These comments support the closed recruitment concept referred to within 
Section 5.3.3, being a cultural feature of local government which has a correlation 
with its structural hierarchy.  Employees have attained a status of seniority, with 
asymmetrical power differentials, and through these, there are traits of ‘fatigue and 
disenchantment’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 116): a degree of managerial inertia.   
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The above interviewee noted that the GM has been employed by a council for 30 years, 
and is surrounded by subordinates (directors) who commenced their employment at the 
same council on an apprenticeship.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, corruption was a 
suppressed concept prior to becoming popularly discussed 30 years’ ago. (Andvig et al., 
2000, p. 6; Bhargava, 2006, p. 341).  Since then, meanings and practices associated with 
the term corruption have changed (Wedel, 2012, p. 454) and these would have impacted 
on the situatedness of corruption within councils themselves.  Within Interview 7’s 
council, however, a degree of organisational lethargy likely remains.  The lack of ‘fresh 
blood’ has facilitated a culture that is stagnant, without new ideas and innovation .  As 
observed by the interviewee: ‘when there’s long-serving staff members consistent, then I 
don’t think they necessarily have the appetite’ to address corruption.   
This possibly highlights how one council’s approach might differ from another’s.  From a 
structural perspective, councils’ tendency to recruit and appoint staff members from 
within the council potentially emboldens any collective denial that corruption is real, 
furthering the disconnect between exceptional and everyday corruption.  When the 
cultural discourse is united, a shared unconscious commitment between employees 
shapes and insulates individuals from moral culpability (Cohen, 2001, pp. 64-66; Punch, 
1996, p. 266).  Employees’ attitudes towards corruption become enshrined within the 
organisational environment as a situational reality.  This may explain why 1 in 5 
respondents believe that there is ‘no corruption’ within their council, yet concurrently 
have suspected or witnessed as least one corrupt act (see Section 5.4).  Echoing Rorty’s 
(1998) seminal paper on how easy it is to be corrupt within the corporate environment, 
this interviewee identified the slippery slope of corruption, demonstrating how the 
routineness of corruption had become organisationally entrenched:  
‘And that was part of their just business as usual, keep it quiet, keep 
tracking along. But over years it just eats away and everything becomes 
a little bit corrupt, a little bit inefficient, a little bit unchallenged.’ 
(Interviewee 10) 
Another interviewee framed it this way:  
‘It comes down to priorities, and that’s cultural: “This is how we’ve done it 
for years and we’ve never had a problem”. There’s a lot of people who know 
a lot of people, and they’ve been here 30 years, of course they’re going to 
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know a lot of residents who will contact them directly as opposed to going 
through appropriate lines, and I think that can be a significant problem and 
I think that’s a cultural issue as opposed to everyone going, well no this is 
the line.  I think those lines get blurred and they get blurred between the 
elected council and staff, and then I think the blurred lines come in when 
people don’t necessarily think there’s a problem or why do we need to 
change.’ (Interviewee 7) 
Issues of tradition and habituation feature here, building on the organisational 
characteristic that the workforce comprises many long-standing employees.  In turn, this 
belief has compounded the ‘blurred lines of corruption’, extending Johnson and 
Sharma’s (2004, p. 3) observation, that there is no distinct line on corruption, but also 
that such lines do not remain static.  Over time, distinctions between the legitimate and 
the illegitimate get murkier if long-serving employees are recalcitrant, intensifying the 
tacit approval of more ambiguous forms of corruption by the collective who are more 
inclined to succumb (Punch, 1996, p. 266).  At this stage, as phrased above, ‘people don’t 
necessarily think there’s a problem.’ 
This is illustrated below, where two survey respondents from the same council 
(Council 8) were resolute in their view that, during the course of their long-standing 
tenure, there was little corruption:  
‘Having been here for 17 years, there has been very little corruption seen.’ 
(ID-35, Council 8)  
‘Been here 17 years, little corruption to start with.’ (ID-36, Council 8)  
On this basis, the demographic make-up of respondents is compared below with their 
view on how corruption is understood.  When the number of respondents who believed 
there was no corruption in their council was cross-tabulated with their demographic 
data, more than half (21 of the 38) of the respondent base have been employed in local 




Figure 6.1. Respondents’ length of employment in local government cross-tabulated 
with the occurrence of corruption (n=187) 
The impression of little or no corruption is quite absolute, and suggests that corruption 
is not, or barely, evident, in any way, shape or form.  Should individual corrupt practices 
be suspected or witnessed by employees who feel this way, it may indicate that, in their 
minds, the supposed corrupt acts have not crossed the subliminal threshold that was 
discussed in Section 5.2.2.  The perceived level of seriousness falls somewhere between 
the white or light grey forms of everyday corruption and not within the black forms of 
exceptional corruption (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 152).  Conversely, such practices are not 
designated as corrupt, highlighting that corruption is differentially understood.  This 
may be by design and intention, but as alluded to by some of the above comments, may 
also have been largely influenced by a cultural normalcy that has been nurtured over 
time (Chibnall & Saunders, 1977, p. 152).   
To explore this further, respondents’ length of service was compared with the number of 






















A lot Some Little None Don't know Prefer not to say







Figure 6.2. Cross-tabulation between respondents’ length of service and number of 
corrupt acts suspected (n=187) 
 
Figure 6.3. Cross-tabulation between respondents’ length of service and number of 
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The above figures show that various practices have been suspected and witnessed by 
respondents who have differing years of service, without any particular attribution to a 
key group.  Tolerance is arguably subjective, but could be influenced by the culture of 
the council if one concedes that individuals succumb to the organisational norm (Punch, 
1996, p. 266), become socialised within a corrupt culture or capitulate to peer pressure 
(Beugré, 2010, p. 534; World Bank, 2014, p. 60).  This may or may not be exemplified by 
their level of willingness to designate the behaviour as corrupt and this too may be 
affected by any number of factors, such as: the corrupt actor(s); any observers or 
complicit parties; the perceived severity of particular forms of corruption; the 
anticipated benefits or harms; or its degree of cultural acceptance within the 
organisation.  Such mindsets to corruption are explored below to ascertain whether, and 
to what extent, the organisational context facilitates, rationalises and ignores corruption.  
6.2.2 Mindsets to corruption  
The use of justifications, commonly described as rationalisations, stems back to the 
seminal works of Sykes and Matza (1957, p. 666), and features prominently in the 
scholarship of fraud and corruption studies (Gorta, 1998, pp. 74-76; Wells, 2004, pp. 11-
12).  This focus on the individual actor was summed up by this interviewee:  
‘People have a sort of a rationalisation about why it’s okay for them to do it 
on this occasion. You think, wow, did you go and stand in front of the mirror 
and run that line at yourself? You wouldn’t be convinced; why would I be 
convinced? It’s just nonsense; you’ve built it as a bit of a defence in your 
head … I think quite often it’s a shock. Quite a shock that oh my god here I 
am … Well in my role because it’s usually head of HR or head of employee 
relations and you just see the penny drop and they think wow, I’m really in 
the shit. Like I’m actually here getting told that I’m probably about to be 
dismissed and that’s probably the first time they’ve seriously thought about 
why am I here at all.’ (Interviewee 10) 
This comment resonates with the individualistic nature of rationalisation, being an 
avenue that is relatively unexplored from a systemic perspective within the public 
sector (Gannett & Rector, 2015, p. 165).  The employee’s actions have been nurtured by 
a culture that rationalises the behaviour, but the realisation dawns on the individual 
when their behaviour is questioned by an external party (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, 
p. 34).  The example above was not considered to be a legitimate or reasonable 
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rationalisation by the interviewee, hence the taint of moral defect was not neutralised 
(Mills, 1940, p. 906; Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 54).  However, if mundane practices are 
more prevalent, in that they are interlaced within the fabric of the organisational 
culture, it becomes clear that there is a degree of normalcy.  Hence, there is a cultural 
acceptability: a vocabulary of motives is situated within the council environment 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 59; Ditton, 1977, p. 149), resulting in a routineness of activity that is 
either not perceived to be corrupt or too mundane to warrant concern. 
This degree of organisational un/visibility can be facilitated by personnel in strategic or 
line management levels (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2013, p. 20; Zipparo, 1999a, p. 84) but also 
by colleagues and clients engaging in such practices.  Several interviewees identified this 
as a means of condoning behaviour by personnel who hold higher status positions, and 
this could be construed as a form of avoidance rationalisation for corruption, analogous 
to Shepherd and Button’s (2018) theory of differential rationalisation. For example:  
‘I think there’s a wilful blindness to it when it affects senior people who are, 
if I can use the phrase, on the A team … as long as they’re on the inner or the 
A team I call it, people largely become protected species. So, I think that 
willingness is largely driven by that.’ (Interviewee 2) 
The interviewee uses the idiom, ‘wilful blindness’, which is a legal term in origin, but has 
come to define any situation in which people purposefully shut their eyes to a situation 
(Heffernan, 2011, pp. 2-3).  The interviewee referred to two further expressions: 
namely, that corrupt actors may be on the ‘A team’, and if so, they were a ‘protected 
species’.  This practice, which is based on and influenced by favourable interpersonal 
relationships, is characterised by the preferential treatment of some personnel by those 
within positions of power and influence.  
As argued by Andvig et al. (2000, p. 132), ‘organisations characterised by entrenched 
corruption are likely to have developed a system where agents are protecting each 
other’; within the above example, this protection is extended to a particular inner group.  
Any degree of mutual assistance or protection is more established the longer that 
personnel work together (Bauman, 1990, p. 85).  Yet, there is a degree of layered 
ambiguity which compounds this; namely, those in or around this scenario may not see 
their actions as culpable, complicit, or even corrupt.  A structural amorality feasibly 
exists (Mills, 2000 [1956], p. 343), one that is characteristically numb to corruption: a 
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council’s operational and strategic decisions are made by personnel who are socially and 
psychologically similar, with an interchange based on a convergence of interests (Mills, 
2000 [1956], pp. 287-288).  Accordingly, the council’s bureaucratic arrangement shapes 
a ‘collective conscience or organisational mind’ (Punch, 1996, pp. 242-243): a situational 
morality within the collective mindset is shaped and framed by those who see, do not 
see, or choose not to see, un/ethical issues in what they do and what the others around 
them do.  This is somewhat symptomatic of local government; it highlights a collectively 
relaxed morality towards corruption, and one that percolates down the hierarchy, as 
this interviewee stated:  
‘My experience is, it’s usually the supervisor or the person who you’re 
asking to take action in relation to it who does the rationalisation. “Oh 
they’re a good employee, it’s just a one off.” It’s like well how do you know? 
Seriously, how do you know?  And I even find that when you’ve got HR as 
well, I’ve had to listen to people bitch and moan about staff a lot and then 
something will happen and you’ll be like here you go and they’ll go: “Oh, I 
don’t know. He seems reasonable.” So yeah, I think the rationalisation … 
I think I see it more from the person who’s the supervisor, the person who 
needs to help you get it dealt with.’ (Interviewee 6)  
The above observation is comparable with Shepherd and Button’s (2018, p. 16) theory, 
noting that ‘managers … turn a blind-eye to detected incidents unless the circumstances 
dictate that the negative consequences of avoiding the problem outweigh the negative 
consequences of addressing it’.  The advocation of practices which rationalise or 
neutralise corrupt or deviant actions become an evolved and learned process if allowed, 
thereby promoting a culture that is tolerant of such indiscretions (Sutherland & Cressey, 
2004, p. 67).  In this sense, those who see and witness corruption, but then witness the 
cultural condoning of said acts by management or human resources staff, will likely feel 
disincentivised to report their observations on the basis of the council’s inaction.  During 
the ICAC inquiry into Wollongong City Council, systemic corruption within the council 
manifested, with many corrupt practices condoned and rationalised by senior managers, 
yet the external perception was that the council was normal (Pedroza, 2011, p. 3).   
The following section further explores the reporting of corruption.  
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6.3 Reporting corruption 
This section focuses on actions by council employees to expose corruption through 
reporting: where their concerns were raised; and how well the concerns were managed.  
Descriptive findings will be presented, prior to analysis.  
As indicated within Figure 6.4, 1 in 6 (16.8%) respondents claim to have personally 
reported behaviour or activity that they suspected to be corrupt.   
 
Figure 6.4. Whether respondents had personally reported corrupt behaviour or activity 
(n=202) 
Of the respondents who indicated that they had made a report of corruption, the 
majority (30 out of 34) made the report to an internal source as opposed to an external 
source (Table 6.1).  This indicates that respondents had a preference for reporting 
suspected corruption internally within their council, thus highlighting the importance of 














Yes No Prefer not to say
191 
 
Table 6.1. Reports of corrupt behaviour (n=34) 
 
Where report was made 
Total Internally Externally 
Personal reporting of behaviour or 
activity which was suspected to be 
corrupt, in the respondent’s capacity as a 
public official 
30 4 34 
Total 30 4 34 
However, as indicated by Figure 6.5, out of the 30 respondents who made reports 
internally, only 1 in 3 (11) felt that their report was dealt with effectively, signifying that 
concerns about corruption are not being adequately attended to.  
 
Figure 6.5. Whether reports about corruption were dealt with effectively, broken down 
by internal and external referral (n=34) 
Whether this was deliberate or otherwise is not clear, but it does highlight that concerns 
about corruption – in the eye of the person who has reported, anyway – have been 
raised but have not been adequately dealt with.  If this figure is extrapolated, it would 
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irrespective of mandatory reporting requirements placed upon councils.  Moreover, this 
calls into questions who, within each council, is, or is not, attending to concerns about 
corruption raised by employees.  
Given that 2 in 3 internal reporters were either not satisfied or received no feedback, it 
is arguable that for this majority there would be no encouragement or incentive for 
them to report further concerns or suspicions about corruption.  If this hypothesis is 
correct, the collective conscience about organisational deviance would be entrenched 
and a culture of antipathy towards anti-corruption nurtured: viz, why would a public 
official voice their concerns, if no one is listening?  The structure of reporting would be 
weakened by a culture that is disinterested.  
When the findings are placed into context, there is a disconnect between councils’ 
perceived ability to effectively handle the risk of corruption (see Figure 5.10) and 
encourage reporting (see Figure 5.9), and their perceived inability to effectively deal 
with such reports when they are made.  As about a third of employees claim that their 
internal report was dealt with effectively (Figure 6.5), it is feasible that many councils 
are ill-equipped to manage and investigate reports about suspected corrupt conduct.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.10), this issue has been identified within many 
councils in Western Australia (CCC WA, 2013, p. 19).  The reason may simply be 
incompetence or incapability.  Given the disappointment of respondents in the way that 
their internal reports were addressed, any perpetrated corruption likely continues 
without remedy, deepening its roots and becoming more embedded in the council 
culture.   
On the basis that much is supposedly reported internally, the following analysis 
identifies where reports about suspected corruption might be directed.   
6.3.1 Where reports about corruption are currently made 
As identified earlier, within Table 6.1, nearly 90% of respondents claim that they have 
made their reports known to someone internal to the council.  To elicit which source 
within councils would likely receive such reports, respondents were asked to indicate 
where they would make their reports.  Figure 6.6 shows that almost 1 in 3 (31.3%) 
would report suspected corruption to their manager.  This finding is similar to other 
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studies which indicate a propensity for reporting to either the immediate manager or 
supervisor (ACFE, 2016a, p. 10; IBAC VIC, 2015a, p. 1).   
 
Figure 6.6. Where reports about corruption might be made (n=80) 
The next preferred avenue is claimed to be an external agency, such as ICAC, with less 
than 1 in 6 (15%) respondents claiming this course of action.  From there, a variety of 
internal sources are likely to be notified of any suspicions of corruption by employees.  
This has the potential to obfuscate how concerns are addressed across a diverse and 
fragmented council landscape, when each recipient of any report may have a different 
means of assessing and investigating any concern.   
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.10), the structures around whistleblowing policy 
and legislative practice receive much attention, with scholars highlighting issues 
associated with reporting mechanisms (McAllister et al., 2012, p. 5; Recanatini, 2011b, 
p. 45; Roberts & Brown, 2010, p. 56; Zipparo, 1999a, pp. 84-85).  The findings within 
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be the initial recipient of any report about corruption, noting respondents’ earlier 
comments that their managers or supervisors were aware of corrupt conduct but 
declined to act (see Section 5.4.1).  This indicates that managers may be habitually 
inclined to ignore some practices of corruption.  As habitual tendencies become more 
commonly accepted, there is less need for any vocal justification, as the actions become 
routine and require less legitimisation (Bauman, 1990, p. 118).  Managers will likely 
continue to act in such as manner unless a self-serving interest leaves them with little 
choice other than to act (Shepherd & Button, 2018, p. 16).  At this stage, self-preservation 
will override choice (Bauman, 1990, p. 115).  Two respondents used the ‘blind eye’ 
idiom to describe this process within the organisational hierarchy of local government: 
‘There is not a culture of performance management; rather, managers are 
guided to turn a blind eye.’ (ID -136, Council 1)  
‘Because management do it [commit corruption], lower level staff are 
frightened of losing their jobs so turn a blind eye. But if it was the other way 
around, people would be fired and dragged over the coals. There is 
systematic bullying in this council.’ (ID-11, Council 5)  
The psychology of turning a blind eye implies that the facts are evaded by choice (Cohen, 
2001, p. 5).  It indicates a cultural acceptance of corrupt practices (Merton, 2004, p. 64), 
with internal practices condoned, ignored or subject to cover-up (Cohen, 2001, p. 66).  
While the first respondent claimed that ‘managers are guided to turn a blind eye’ 
(emphasis added), the second respondent claimed that ‘lower level staff … turn a blind 
eye’ (emphasis added) to managers committing corruption.  This is a salient 
observation, considering that managers account for nearly half of all perpetrators in 
Oceania (ACFE, 2012, p. 43).   
A cultural nurturing of this concept was infamously identified during ICAC’s 
investigation into RailCorp, where there was a ‘norm of withholding information’ (ICAC 
NSW, 2008a, pp. 38-39).  Despite a vast number of respondents highlighting the 
perceived strength and rigour of existing controls within their council (see Sections 4.1.2 
and 5.5.1), the concept of ‘wilful blindness’ highlights the fallibility of over-reliance on 
formal processes for reporting.  As aptly contended by Gilbert and Sharman (2014, 
p. 74), it is not the ability of those to report, but their disinclination to.  An illuminating 
insight is provided by this interviewee:  
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‘I would say is that if you turn a blind eye to the little stuff, where does that 
road end? That’s why I do take the view that you have to be black and white 
about this and you can’t justify dodging up the timesheet that week because 
you don’t feel that you were given recompense to what you deserved.’ 
(Interviewee 2)  
The interviewee’s example of a feasible rationalisation, that ‘you can’t justify dodging up 
the timesheet that week because you don’t feel that you were given recompense to what 
you deserved’, resonates with Ditton’s (1977) exploration of ‘fiddling’ and pilferage 
within a bakery in the south-east of England in the early 1970s.  Ditton explored the 
notion of rationalisations at this level in an ethnographic study, noting that many 
employees saw fiddling and pilferage as ‘subsidising [of] wages’ or ‘part of the job’ 
(Ditton, 1977, p. 171).  Within local government, there may be a tendency for some acts, 
such as bribery, to manifest (Graycar & Villa, 2011, p. 422), or as exampled by the above 
interviewee’s comment, low level forms of fraud.  However, focusing on the more 
tangible, low level and easy to designate forms of corrupt conduct such as these, and not 
the richly nuanced forms that remain socially interwoven within the organisational 
fabric, potentially dismisses the broader potential for corruption within local 
government; the predominant practices identified within Figure 5.1 are examples of this.  
Arguably, neither should be examined exclusively, but rather understood as an 
entanglement.   
When reflecting on the vast number of corrupt practices suspected and witnessed by 
many local government employees (see Figure 5.1), one could surmise that a blind eye 
has been turned in more cases than not.  Many respondents from the survey declined to 
report suspected corruption, with many referencing cultural factors behind their 
decision: primarily, they were ‘worried about being branded a trouble maker’, 
‘discouraged from [reporting]’ or ‘thought it best to say nothing’ (see Section 5.4.1).  
The decision not to report, in these instances, is undoubtedly a conscious one: the 
observer has identified a practice of corrupt conduct but has subsequently decided not 
to speak up.  These reasons may be logical, in the mind of the observer anyway, but 
equally, they could also be construed as avoidance rationalisations.  This is where the 
observer has denied or played down any consciousness of guilt or obligation on their 
part, acknowledged that they have suspected or observed corrupt practices, but found it 
acceptable to remain silent.  This might indicate a culture of silence: an unwritten 
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injunction to the reporting of corruption (Skolnick, 2002, p. 7).  As observers become 
passive bystanders, the endorsement of the corrupt practices identified within Figure 
5.1 becomes possible through a culture of tacit complicity (Cohen, 2001, pp. 69-70).  
To elucidate this point further, here are more instances of interviewees referring to 
‘turning a blind eye’:   
‘The difficult thing is being a whistleblower. Going along and turning a blind 
eye is the easy thing, and that’s what happens … there’s a culture of blind 
eye, particularly the blue-collar side, not so much the white-collar side.’ 
(Interviewee 4)  
‘One of the big issues that came out of Wollongong Council was the fact 
there was far too much discretion given to a female planner in terms of the 
approvals that she gave to certain developments, albeit corruptly.  There 
was far too much of that hands-off approach by the general manager. I 
understand that the actual group manager in charge of the planning area 
attempted several times to intervene and approached the general manager 
about this particular female planner’s behaviour and was told basically to 
back off.  So, corruption went to the top.’ (Interviewee 8) 
The latter interviewee’s observation refers to ICAC’s investigation into corruption at 
Wollongong City Council (ICAC NSW, 2008b).  Systemic and localised opportunities are 
considered to be environmental factors that allow corruption to manifest (Graycar & 
Sidebottom, 2012, p. 389); these were evident at Wollongong City Council, but there was 
a purported failure to ‘see the corruption’ (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, pp. 134-135).  The 
perpetuation of the corruption was intensified as a blind eye was turned by key 
observers, including by the GM (ICAC NSW, 2008b, p. 79).   
This notion bears semblance to some of the aforementioned issues: that many observers 
of potential corruption fail to speak up; that corrupt acts can be excused or justified, not 
just by those who engage in them, but also by those who observe them, and choose not 
to act; and that the role of the GM, as the council’s chief executive, is critical in the 
facilitation or disruption of corruption and its degree of institutionalisation.  
Arguably, such factors impact upon the already layered complexities associated with the 
observance of corruption.  From the position of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 2007, 
pp. 68-69), an influential factor affecting individuals’ visibility of corruption is the 
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subliminal threshold: some forms of corruption are seen as more or less severe or 
detrimental than others based on moral, economic and utilitarian calculations (see 
Section 5.2.2).  As explored below, such factors impact upon what corruption is, what it 
entails and what the harms are; consequently, once corruption is noticed, the suspicion 
then either transitions into a report or a form of intervention, or into inaction: the 
observer continues routinely as the corruption is tolerated or ignored.   
6.3.2 Influence of scale and severity 
Perceptions of corruption are influenced significantly by the media and ICAC public 
inquiries (see Section 4.1.2).  The narrowness of their focus widens the gap between 
what public officials see as being corrupt and what they witness routinely and may or 
may not report on.  Many causal factors impact upon reporting, such as: the perceived 
seriousness of any perceived corrupt conduct; its nature and scale; its frequency; the 
relationship between the parties; and the type and quality of the evidence (Olsen, 2014, 
p. 186).  These factors have not been examined in great depth within local government, 
indicating that they are not deemed to be characteristically significant in the study of 
corruption at this level, either from a scholarly or practitioner point of view.  
Conceivably, the multifaceted intricacies are too difficult to unravel, as observed by one 
interviewee:   
‘I think that’s partly going to depend on what sort of misconduct and 
corruption are we talking about, because I think it varies. I think the 
willingness to report will vary between the different types.’ (Interviewee 2) 
Similar considerations featured within respondents’ free-text responses in the 
questionnaire, as part of Phase 1 of the study.  Based on the responses outlined in Figure 
6.6, comments made by respondents in this regard were coded under the theme ‘scale 
and severity’ when contemplating who to direct their report to.  Each is presented below 
with the key variable underlined for emphasis:  
‘It would depend on the level of corruption.’ (ID-14, Council 5)  
‘It would depend on the type of corruption and who was involved.’  
(ID-74, Council 8)  
‘Depends on the activity.’ (ID-153, Council 1)  
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Out of these three comments, four distinguishing variables related to corruption feature 
as impediments to reporting, namely the: (1) level; (2) type; (3) activity; and (4) who 
was involved.  References to ‘type’ or ‘activity’ constitute two of the four dispositions in 
the TASP (types, activities, sectors and places) model of classification (Graycar & 
Prenzler, 2013, p. 11), although it is not clear from the respondents’ quotes whether 
they are adopting the same meaning.  Under the TASP model, different types of activity 
may include personnel management, procurement, delivering programs or services 
(Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, pp. 10-11); as observed within Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.8), 
councils have an inherently vast array of corruption risks that are associated with their 
functional nature (ICAC NSW, 2010c, p. 14).  
These distinguishing features may be understood in terms of Johnson’s (2004 , p. 145) 
observation that any tolerance of corruption is dependent on its level of pervasiveness 
and frequency, further alluding to the layered ambiguities associated with corruption 
and the reporting of corruption.  The identification of these factors highlights that failure 
to report is not just from the fear of reprisal action, which features as a key reason for 
not reporting, supporting the findings in Section 5.4.1.  Demographic features, such as 
gender, age and position, might impact on any employee’s decision to report or not 
report (Mazerolle & Cassematis, 2010, pp. 135-144).  Arguably, a broad array of 
informalities exist within any organisation, which makes such categorisation difficult 
and always ex post facto.   
When interviewees were asked to what extent they thought that employees were willing 
to report behaviour that they feel is corrupt, one interviewee who had worked at ICAC, 
and subsequently within a council, stated:  
‘In general, my experience at the ICAC, I think they’re pretty willing but I 
think I wouldn’t see it here [within the council] … I feel like there’s not the 
volume that I was aware of when I was at the ICAC so I think that perhaps 
they’re reporting through a different mechanism … even though we talk 
about public interest disclosures a lot and people are aware of what they 
are, I just don’t get them.’ (Interviewee 3) 
This interviewee’s viewpoint highlights a salient disparity between their previous 
experience at ICAC and their current experience within a council.  When this interviewee 
worked at ICAC, reporting appeared to be frequent, but in the interviewee’s local 
199 
 
government working environment, frequent reporting does not seem to be the case.  The 
interviewee reflects on the fact that matters are not brought to their attention, 
speculating that they may be reported through a different mechanism.  As identified in 
Section 6.3.1, such reporting might be through any one of a number of internal sources, 
if the issue is even reported.  
In addition to any inherent variables relating to corruption, such as the level, type, 
nature of the activity or who was involved, any person’s decision to raise a concern 
would be informed by the availability and tangibility of any evidence, as explored below.   
6.3.3 Evidential basis for reporting corruption 
As shown in Figure 6.7, over 2 in 3 (70.9%) respondents stated that they would report 
corruption with actual evidence whereas less than 1 in 4 (23.6%) stated that they would 
report corruption on the basis of suspicion alone. 
 
Figure 6.7. The basis on which respondents claim they would report corruption within 
their council (n=199) 
In similar studies, 34% of respondents said that they would report corruption on the 
basis of suspicion alone, whereas 56% said that they would only report corruption on 
the basis of hard evidence (Graycar, 2014, p. 279).  A review of integrity frameworks at 
six Victorian councils identified that 71% of respondents felt that they would need hard 
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nature of much corruption compounds the likelihood that many acts will go undetected, 
as they may not be visible to anyone other than the parties involved, third parties who 
may be implicated, or lay observers (Larmour & Wolanin, 2001, p. xii).  As councils’ GMs 
are ‘under a duty to report to the Commission [ICAC] any matter that the person 
suspects on reasonable grounds concerns or may concern corrupt conduct’,23 they need 
not be in possession of actual evidence; hence it is likely that a great deal of suspected 
corrupt conduct or behaviour may not coming to light if this is the basis on which 
concerns will be raised.  The above findings underpin a view postulated earlier, that this 
mandatory reporting requirement is arguably ineffectual, given that a meagre 120 
reports were made by councils in the 2015–16 reporting year (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20).   
The hypothetical nature of the responses illustrated in Figure 6.7 highlights that the 
majority of observers would only report on the basis of ‘actual evidence’, but this in 
itself could be utilised as an avoidance rationalisation; a means of pacifying their own 
consciences, perhaps, while undertaking the denial of responsibility (Sykes & Matza, 
1957, p. 667).  Specifically, while a significant proportion of respondents claim that they 
only would report corruption with actual evidence, it is questionable whether they 
actually would do so if they encountered such a situation.   
Out of the 47 respondents in Table 6.2 who said that they would report corruption 
based on suspicion alone, more than a third (18) claim not to have suspected any of the 
corrupt acts identified within Figure 5.1.  The remaining 29 respondents (nearly two-
thirds) have suspected at least one corrupt act, with half (15 of the 29) suspecting three 
or more corrupt acts (Table 6.2).  
 
23 Section 11(2) of the ICAC Act. 
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Table 6.2. Cross-tabulation between number of respondents claiming to report 
corruption if suspected and number of corrupt acts suspected (n=199) 
 
The basis on which corruption would be reported, if 
thought to be present in a respondent’s council 
Total 










Number of acts suspected 
(1–9) 
0 18 50 3 0 71 
1 6 22 1 0 29 
2 7 18 0 0 25 
3 4 23 2 2 31 
4 3 18 0 1 22 
5 2 5 2 0 9 
6 4 2 0 0 6 
7 2 1 0 0 3 
8 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 2 0 0 3 
Total 47 141 8 3 199 
To extend this, and delineate between suspicion and witnessing, should an employee 
directly witness a form of corruption, they are assumed to be in possession of prima 
facie evidence through direct observation.  Yet, as indicated within Table 6.3 below, 
when the number of respondents who claim they would report corruption if in 
possession of actual evidence is cross-tabulated with their direct observance of one or 
more acts, half (a total of 57 out of 113) of respondents have directly witnessed at least 
one of the corrupt practices listed in Figure 5.1.  This indicates that of all respondents 
who claim they would report corruption based on actual evidence, nearly half of them 




Table 6.3. Cross-tabulation between number of respondents claiming to report 
corruption with actual evidence and number of corrupt acts directly 
witnessed (n=160) 
 
The basis on which corruption would be reported, if 
thought to be present in a respondent’s council 
Total 










Number of acts witnessed 
(1–9) 
0 25 56 3 0 84 
1 5 27 0 1 33 
2 3 16 0 1 20 
3 1 10 2 1 14 
4 4 2 0 0 6 
5 1 0 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0 0 1 
7 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 39 113 5 3 160 
The second-highest reason given by respondents for not reporting corruption was that 
they did not feel that they ‘had enough evidence of their suspicion’ (Figure 5.6), which 
indicates that even through first-hand observation, many incidences of behaviour which 
respondents have recognised as corrupt conduct remain unreported.  Even with ‘actual 
evidence’, many respondents are disinclined to speak up, and it is pertinent to refer back 
to the remaining four of the five most cited reasons, which all involve intangible, 
interpersonal and cultural reasons, the most common one being ‘they were worried 
about being branded a trouble maker’ (see Figure 5.6).  As Bauman (1990, p. 66) notes, 
we ‘worry about how our actions would affect the image of ourselves held by those who 
watch us’, and this arguably features as a key reason for not raising concerns, despite the 
apparent existence of ‘evidence’.  
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Without teasing out the various scenarios that respondents might have experienced, it 
can still be broadly argued that inherent organisational tensions and contradictions 
compound the already difficult nature of defining what corruption is and understanding 
why and how it exists.  When one considers the correlations among the perceived 
decline in corruption within local government, the work of ICAC, the presence of the 
media, and the promulgation of controls that supposedly prevent corruption, the above 
observations seem paradoxical.  
This paradox touches upon the inherent disconnect that appears to be under-considered 
in the current scholarship of corruption and anti-corruption.  The notable internal 
constraints on anti-corruption efforts, as discussed earlier, are examples of gatekeeping 
factors (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 3) within councils, in that they facilitate a social and 
organisational reality, or unreality, of corruption and of anti-corruption efforts.  
Different impressions are facilitated primarily by external factors, such as the media and 
ICAC.  However, an internal, localised educational undertaking could be facilitated by a 
formal guardian within each of the 128 councils, if that person had responsibility for the 
development of an ethical workplace culture and the embedding of associated processes 
(Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, pp. 133-134).  The presence of gatekeepers combined with 
the absence of a formal guardian arguably heightens the obfuscation of corruption on 
the ground, keeping any potential corrupt practices out of public view.   
The next section explores councils’ different in-house approaches for receiving and 
responding to alleged corruption, keeping the guardianship concept in mind, prior to 
exploring the role of the GM as a potential gatekeeper (one who might facilitate the 
incidence of corruption or who might fail to disrupt or prevent corrupt activity), or a 
gate opener (one who might disrupt, educate about or prevent corrupt activity).  
6.3.4 In-house point of contact 
As shown earlier (Figure 6.6), respondents indicated that suspicions about corrupt 
conduct would be reported to any number of internal personnel, as opposed to an 
external agency such as ICAC, with nearly 1 in 3 being inclined to inform their manager.  
Figure 6.8 shows that 5 in 6 respondents (83.7%) stated that their council has an in-
house point of contact to whom suspicions of corruption could be made, such as an 




Figure 6.8. Whether councils have an in-house point of contact to whom suspicions of 
corruption can be made (n=202) 
At the time of conducting the survey in Phase 1 of this study, only a handful of the 152 
councils in NSW had an internal ombudsman, this being a form of in-house capable 
guardian that supplements the integrity framework at the state level (Warburton & 
Baker, 2005, p. 5).  Yet all councils in NSW must nominate an employee who can receive 
and assess matters about corrupt conduct.24  Based on the data within Figure 6.8, 
respondents might deem this nominated person to be their ‘in-house point of contact’, 
but this would not necessarily indicate that the person is a formal guardian.  It is 
possible that reports about corruption are directed to such personnel, notwithstanding 
that managers seem to be a natural point of referral about activities associated with 
corruption.  This highlights a number of organisational complexities, noting the 
aforementioned observations that some managers have omitted to attend to staff 
members’ reports about corruption or have turned a blind eye.  From a review of the 
literature, there is a lack of available data comparing and contrasting how allegations of 
corruption are assessed and addressed by ICAC.  This may be worth considering for any 
further research.  
To consider an alternative notion, if inherent particularism is prevalent within local 
government, with a closed shop recruitment culture intertwined within the architectural 
 
24 The Office of the NSW Ombudsman requires that all councils must have an Internal Reporting Policy, based on how 
complaints will be assessed, in accordance with the PID Act.  Accordingly, a Disclosures Coordinator must be 
nominated.  This nominated person must also fulfil the role of a Complaints Coordinator, a person who manages Code 
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fabric of local government, this would contribute to the intrinsic code of silence that 
exists (Cohen, 2001, p. 68).  For employees, it would be seditious to ‘dob in’  a co-worker, 
and betray the loyalty of colleagues or the organisation (Huberts et al., 2006, p. 283; 
Zipparo, 1999b, p. 273), and many interviewees considered this to be a cultural 
impediment (see Section 5.4.4).  If likened to Felson and Eckert’s (2018, pp. 95-99) 
notion of a crime multiplier, the longer that the corrupt act is unattended to, the more 
likely it is that further forms of corruption will intensify.  The indoctrination of such 
practices become intermingled and the observers fall into the ‘corruption trap’ (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999, p. 3).  
Notwithstanding this inherent paradox, a salient observation is that, out of all 
respondents who stated that their council has an in-house point of contact to whom 
suspicions of corruption could be made, more 1 in 4 (a total of 28%) either did not feel 
comfortable speaking to their in-house point of contact (17.9%) or did not know 
(10.1%) (Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.9. Cross-tabulation between in-house point of contact and whether 
respondents would feel comfortable speaking to them about suspected 
corruption (n =168) 
When these findings are applied to the sample base of councils, it can be seen that 
generally, the majority of respondents who claimed they had an in-house point of 
contact said they would feel comfortable speaking with that person if they had a 
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Table 6.4. Comfort about speaking to the in-house point of contact, by respective 
council (n=168) 
 
If a respondent had a suspicion of corruption, 
whether they would feel comfortable speaking 
to their in-house point-of-contact about it 
Total Yes No Don’t know 
Responding council Council 1 12 1 0 13 
Council 2 9 0 1 10 
Council 3 3 1 1 5 
Council 4 4 0 0 4 
Council 5 10 7 2 19 
Council 6 10 0 0 10 
Council 7 19 4 5 28 
Council 8 39 12 6 57 
Council 9 2 0 0 2 
Council 10 13 5 2 20 
Total 121 30 17 168 
At Council 5, just over half all respondents (10 out of 19) said they felt comfortable 
speaking to their in-house point of contact if they had a suspicion of corruption, which 
means that almost half did not feel that way.  At Councils 7, 8 and 9, about two-thirds of 
respondents felt confident in speaking to their in-house point of contact, which again 
means that about a third did not feel confident or did not know.   
As such, the mere presence of an in-house point of contact does not necessarily mean 
that employees will feel confident raising their concerns directly with that person.  If 
employees have an in-house point of contact, such as an internal ombudsman, but are 
reluctant to speak with that person, there remains a cultural unwillingness to speak up 
and the purported acts of corruption remain unattended to.  To explore this, six 
comments made by respondents were coded under the themed ‘in-house Point of 
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Contact’, with three of these originating from respondents at Council 5.  The following 
comments offer a degree of insight into the role of the in-house point of contact, the 
person who occupies that role, and the reporting framework in place:  
‘The [internal ombudsman] is an ethical person, but the preventative 
control framework is weak and awareness is low.’ (ID-196, Council 5)  
‘I am concerned about their [the in-house point of contact’s] loyalties, will 
they maintain my anonymity? Would weigh up the impact on me if they 
didn’t before reporting something. I don’t want to lose my job.’ (ID-86, 
Council 7) 
‘Because [name of Council redacted] has many senior officers who have 
demonstrated a high level of ethics and integrity and they are also the in-
house contact persons.’ (ID-18, Council 8)  
A respondent who did not state that they would feel comfortable speaking to their in-
house point of contact gave this response:  
‘Our corruption officer is brilliant. I just don’t trust that our system would 
cope with this – so many layers to the fallout that comes after 
whistleblowing.’ (ID-126, Council 10)  
The above comments indicate that, despite having an in-house point of contact, there 
is a degree of scepticism or a lack of confidence in the reporting mechanisms, 
compounded by the stigmas associated with reporting.  Fear of reprisal looms, despite 
an acknowledgement of a whistleblowing framework and the presence of an in-house 
point of contact who ostensibly operates within a (quasi) guardianship mandate.  
Of the three comments that emanated from respondents at Council 5, two cast personal 
aspersions on the in-house point of contact at that council.  These comments were made 
following their response to the survey, wherein they stated that they would not feel 
comfortable speaking to that person:  
‘That person has worked with council for some 30 years and has been 
suspected of hushing things up before.’ (ID-5, Council 5)  
‘Management use [internal] ombudsman to wrongly target innocent staff, to 
scare them. I have been subject to this bullying.’ (ID-11, Council 5)  
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The above comments, with reference to the in-house point of contact at Council 5, stand 
out among the others, and highlight a number of interpersonal dynamics which impact 
upon reporting in spite of the formal guardianship role that the person occupies.  The 
comments denote that, even with an in-house point of contact – in this case, an internal 
ombudsman – respondents from Council 5 feel they would have little recourse through 
that person. 
The second comment makes specific reference to ‘bullying’, which was mentioned 
earlier, and is considered by some scholars to be a form of corrupt conduct in and of 
itself (Hutchinson et al., 2009; Vickers, 2013).  The nexus between bullying and 
corruption does not feature heavily in the anti-corruption literature, suggesting that the 
two are treated distinctly, as opposed to conjointly.  Of the few references that correlate 
bullying with corruption, Patterson (2013, p. 16) contends that ‘both thrive on fear and 
silence’, but observes that the two are regulated, governed and treated differently: 
‘Bullying is relegated to being an HR grievance issue [and] while we have developed a 
mature view towards corruption, we lag way behind on bullying’ (Patterson, 2013, p. 8).   
The Queensland CCC’s identification of ‘improper use of influence and power by senior 
members’ at Ipswich Council (CCC Qld, 2018, p. 7) alluded to similar features within the 
aetiology of workplace bullying and corruption.  However, the term ‘bullying’ did not 
feature in the 75-page final report, Culture and corruption risks in local government (CCC 
Qld, 2018), despite the media’s observance that bullying and corruption had been 
‘festering for years’ (The New Daily, 2018).  This somewhat signifies that any regulatory 
approach towards corruption is quite insular.  Generalised efforts to address corruption 
neglect to consider the similar power differentials found in bullying and omit to 
correlate the coalesced determinants of each.  This may provide one explanation of why 
issues were ‘unchallenged and unreported’ at Ipswich Council (CCC Qld, 2018, p. 7).  In 
this regard, it is worth considering the above two comments from respondents in 
Council 5, in conjunction with the finding that at Council 5, 60% of the respondent base 
have suspected or witnessed corruption but have declined to report it (see Table 6.1).  
These findings signify a culture of corruption and possibly bullying at Council 5, despite 
the presence of an in-house point of contact who may operate as a formal guardian.  This 
highlights the futility of such a role in a system that is inherently corrupt (Klitgaard, 
2000, p. 5). 
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The following section provides some richer, thicker descriptive discussion regarding the 
current methodologies for assessing and addressing corruption in local government, 
with the guardianship mandate in mind.  
6.4 Assessing and responding to corruption – councils’ Achilles heel 
Each of the below interviewee comments, although slightly different, align with a 
particular theme: that a range of approaches are taken by councils when responding to 
reports about corruption, with a general view that, overall, the approaches are 
ineffective.  Key structural factors appear to be a commonality between the comments.   
One interviewee stated: 
‘Each council is basically different. Some councils in New South Wales have 
an internal ombudsman role that’s given the task to detect and then 
investigate these issues … for other councils those responsibilities are 
assigned to the legal office, to the governance officer, to the principal officer. 
So, it varies. Sometimes [it’s] the human resources section, so there is 
confusion at times … Often the people who are dedicated to running the 
investigations, whether they be in HR or an internal ombudsman or 
governance role, they’re not provided with specific training in relation to 
how to undertake an investigation or to write reports, how to collect 
evidence, how to record interviews, how to run interviews. And so often … 
the officers are ill-equipped. They’re not equipped to then provide a strong 
case that will actually lead to disciplinary action being taken against the 
officers who have breached code of conduct.’ (Interviewee 1)  
The CCC WA acknowledged a number of issues associated with managers, rather than 
trained investigators, investigating misconduct, and the inconsistencies that were being 
applied because of differing managerial views (CCC WA, 2013, p. 19).  One interviewee 
gave their perspective on the reality of this issue within NSW local government:  
‘I think there’s a direct conflict of interest in itself because often it might be 
given to the manager who’s managing that person in the first place. Firstly, 
it could tip them off as to what the issue is. It makes it an awkward working 
relationship with them in the long run. They’re more likely to believe the 
responses being provided because they work with them – like they’ve got a 




‘Managers have to do their own investigations simply through a lack of 
resources … I think a lot of local government managers are coming up from 
being engineers, they’re accountants, they’re town planners.  They’re not 
criminal investigators. They’re not people who are trained in doing 
investigations into human resource matters.  Doing things to an extent 
needed that if it was challenged in court would stand up.’  (Interviewee 7)  
These comments acutely reflected on the many issues that different approaches present:  
‘Where does it [the report] go? The local manager. Local manager buries it. 
It’s not in your interests to raise those sort of issues. If it’s serious enough 
you might go and see the HR manager or the HR rep. Half the time they 
wouldn’t know what to do anyway … HR reps are not there to do fraud 
work, they’re there to do personnel work. So, if it’s a disciplinary issue, sure 
it belongs to them. They’re not there to investigate, they’re not there to 
manage investigations, they’re not there to manage fraud and corruption 
risks, they’re just there to act on them at the end of the day if there’s any 
disciplinary issues that come up.’  (Interviewee 5) 
‘I think the investigative ability of councils to deal with these issues 
internally that aren’t necessarily at the ICAC level … I think that is sadly 
lacking … I still think there’s a deficiency in terms … if it’s not something 
they would refer to ICAC. Bear in mind, the terms of reference to ICAC are 
that really if it’s something that meets the criteria of the ICAC definition of 
corruption there is obligation to record it. There is not an obligation on 
ICAC to investigate it but there’s an obligation for us to record it. So, yes, we 
would record it and ICAC may come back and say, “Thank you for that. 
We’ve noted that but we’re now going to refer it back to you for your 
investigation.” I think that’s the Achilles heel of councils, is their ability to 
deal … with the minor stuff. … Something that’s perhaps a larger scale and 
that doesn’t quite meet the criteria that would initiate ICAC allocating to 
some of their investigators, I think … that’s where the weakness lies, the 
weakness in terms of getting statements, getting the person in and 
interviewing them in a manner that would satisfy a court of law, in terms of 
natural justice, principles of evidence, the elements of the offence and all 
that sort of stuff. I think that’s where the serious deficiency lies.’  
(Interviewee 8)  
The above comments refers to key structural and cultural flaws in terms of how 
corruption is addressed in local government, signifying a shortcoming in the local 
integrity framework of local government and an absence of ‘capable guardianship’, this 
being a key component in the prevention of crime, according to Clark and Eck’s (2003) 
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crime triangle.  This was idiomatically referenced by one interviewee as local 
government’s ‘Achilles heel’, a concept which posits that a single weakness will, despite 
strength in other areas, lead to its downfall.  Even when matters are referred to ICAC – if 
such matters attain referral status and are referred – there is a strong likelihood that the 
matter will be closed (see Figure 2.1).  If matters are then referred back to the public 
authority, this situation results in a perpetual loop, without any sufficient means of 
redress or a clear picture of the corruption landscape.  To date, given the situated reality 
of everyday corruption, and the inherent fearfulness about reporting, discussed in 
Chapter 5, much corruption is not being adequately addressed, if at all.   
A handful of councils in NSW have an internal ombudsman, a position akin to formal 
guardianship.  Following a public inquiry into Auburn City Council in 2017, the inquiry 
commissioner stated in the final report that ‘consideration should be given to ensuring 
that all councils have a person in such a position’ (Beasley, 2017, p. 232).  However, the 
above interviewee comments indicate that this role needs to be more than a mere 
delegation.  The courage, independence and capability of the role’s occupant would 
arguably impact on its real or perceived degree of efficacy, which would be contingent 
on the structural rigour of the role.  Where the role currently exists, it could be 
interpreted as quasi-independent, as it resides within the council structure and is 
therefore not wholly independent (Ombudsman NSW, 2013).  However, as noted by the 
interviewee below, each council’s internal ombudsman operates differently and not in 
accordance with any professional standing or standardised approach: 
‘I think they all [councils] make their own decisions about it really. I mean I 
think [name of Council redacted] took that pretty seriously but when I got 
to [name of a different Council redacted] what I walk in on was an 
investigation. They didn’t actually have a format to write up an 
investigation report. They didn’t have a process for doing an investigation ... 
They didn’t have all the recording devices and things; they didn’t even own 
them.’ [Interviewer: So even with an ombudsman, they didn’t have an 
investigative framework?] Oh he’d kind of work out who he’d chat to but 
there was no kind of process, they didn’t record anything, so it was all just 
handwritten notes which went through. They really didn’t want to be 
looking at much anyway. So again, that’s a council operating under the same 
legislation that you’re operating under here but just no framework at all. 
And then coupling that with the fact it was not at all proactive, like you 
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could see why there wasn’t much emphasis on solving corruption.’ 
(Interviewee 10)  
This interviewee compared two councils that had an Internal Ombudsman, noting that 
they differed extensively.  A contradiction between structure and cultural appetite is 
evident.  Two pertinent remarks distinguish one council’s’ lack of appetite for 
addressing corruption: ‘They really didn’t want to be looking at much anyway’ and ‘it 
was not at all proactive, like you could see why there wasn’t much emphasis on solving 
corruption’.  As identified earlier, while some respondents spoke favourably of the 
person who occupied the role of internal ombudsman at their council, they were still 
reticent about speaking to that person for a number of reasons.  At one council 
(Council 5), two respondents made scornful remarks about the employee who occupied 
the role of the internal ombudsman; hence these bear a degree of correlation with the 
above interviewee’s comments, that the mere appointment of a person to that role does 
not mean that there will necessarily be an ‘emphasis on solving corruption’.  As 
elucidated further below, even the appointment of an internal ombudsman can be 
perfunctory. 
6.4.1 The formal guardian – internal ombudsman 
From a structural perspective, the role of an internal ombudsman can viably supplement 
ICAC’s investigative function (Pedroza, 2011, p. 11), yet one interviewee made this 
comment:  
‘I think to a certain extent all organisations have some level of internal 
conflict.  How do you get round that? There’s two ways of getting round it. 
One is you have external agencies doing the work. Now I do think … it is to 
do with being able to respond to corruption. Within the local government 
sector, whilst I think the utopian model of an internal ombudsman is 
effective, sadly the utopian model doesn’t really exist anymore. And that 
ceased to exist because of vested interests … unless they have guaranteed 
independence, and as we’ve seen at [name of Council redacted], even when 
that’s written into council policies, senior people can just go ahead and 
change the policies without even referring it to the council because vested 
interests are at play. So unless it’s something that’s legislated I think it’s 
always going to have certain problems.’  (Interviewee 2) 
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These observations indicate how the internal ombudsman function has evolved, 
recognising that it is not robustly independent or sufficiently autonomous.  In the 
interviewee’s experience, ‘vested interests’ influenced the internal ombudsman role: a 
gatekeeping feature within councils that inhibit the addressing of corrupt conduct, but in 
itself, a potential ‘abuse of power’ by key decision-makers and influencers.  Vested 
interests, as a means of curtailing the independence or efficacy of the internal 
ombudsman function, would not necessarily be construed as ‘corrupt’, as those with 
such interests feasibly do not consider their actions to be wrong as they do not see that 
the rules apply to them (Becker, 2003, pp. 70-71).  This interviewee believes that the 
structural conditions within the council facilitate this.  
Pedroza (2011, p. 11), referring to two successive ICAC investigations into two councils 
which both commenced as a result of reports made to ICAC by each council’s internal 
ombudsman (ICAC NSW, 2009a, p. 9; 2009b, p. 6), contends that the internal 
ombudsman function does not conflict with the role of ICAC.  However, while each 
report resulted in investigative attention by ICAC, each investigation uncovered that the 
corrupt actors had a similar modus operandi: namely, that an external party sought to 
improperly influence a council official at Ku-ring-gai Council and at Warringah Council.  
Reporting of corruption of this type and at this level – by an external party and involving 
a lower-level staff member – ‘demonstrates’ that councils are serious about corruption, 
but again, in a tokenistic manner.  Appetite is limited to matters that might be palatable.   
With further reference to Kurczewki’s (2004, p. 163) concept, such a focus detracts from 
the more clandestine or complex forms of corruption among the higher echelons within 
councils.  To further this point, visible action by the council demonstrates a tokenistic 
degree of corruption control, not genuine appetite; in this case, a presentational tactic to 
manage external, and internal, impression and perception, but driven by self-serving 
interests (Hooghiemstra, 2000, p. 60).  This was evidenced by interviewees earlier in 
this chapter (Section 6.1), with Interviewee 6 remarking that ‘councils generally tend to 
focus on the much more binary on paper provable things … if I can prove it or it’s in that 
traditional mould … it’s easier for people to accept that that’s corrupt conduct …’;  and 
Interviewee 2 remarking, ‘it would be very easy to pick off low-hanging fruit, to use the 
metaphor. And therefore, you’re seen to be doing the right thing’.  The metaphor 
referred to in the latter comment is elaborated on below.  
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‘The minute you start climbing up the tree to start picking off some more 
juicy stuff, that’s when the problems can start … you start endangering 
people who they wish to protect. Not necessarily because they want to 
condone whatever might be going on, but because they’ve got some other 
reason for wanting that person in that position or whatever, and therefore if 
that’s threatened, you’ll then start to threaten the status quo. And so the end 
result then tends to be that either you get your wings clipped or you get 
disbanded completely. And I’ve been in both scenarios.’ (Interviewee 2) 
According to the above interviewee, the tenability of the internal ombudsman was in 
question when staff within the higher echelons were investigated, resulting in a 
curtailment of independence and then disbandment.  This highlights how influential the 
internal power differentials can be in the enablement or disruption of corruption.  
Moreover, the notion that internal personnel become endangered emphasises the rich 
complexities associated with corruption, as well as its subsequent management and 
potential implications for the council’s stability: the ‘status quo’.   
This calls into question the practicability and achievability of an internal ombudsman, 
being a formal guardian, when the role is subject to the will and influence of the council 
itself.  There is a risk, or even a reality, that the role is merely symbolic: a ceremonial 
effort to appease the community; to convince constituents that the council is serious 
about integrity, transparency, accountability, and all manner of concepts which would 
negate any perception that council officers might be acting in an untoward manner.   
While there was a push for more internal ombudsmen some years ago (Grennan, 2012), 
and a view that all councils should have a person in such a role (Beasley, 2017, p. 232), 
the decision to appoint one is at the discretion of each council’s GM; hence, inherent 
power relations can become influential, as explored below.  
6.4.2 The tone at the top 
The GM is the chief executive of the council and its operational lead, and any operational 
decisions are subject to their determination.  A free-text response that stemmed from a 
survey respondent sets the scene for the discussion that follows in this section:  
‘Nothing will change while there are rogue councillors who manage GMs’ 
performance contracts.’ (ID-136, Council 1)  
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Should GMs lack the courage to question the dominance of the elected representatives, 
this fear would permeate into the organisational culture if the directions of the elected 
officials were corrupt or unethical.  Much of the anti-corruption literature argues that 
the tone comes from the top (ACFE, n.d.; Deloitte, 2015; PwC, 2010), but as the elected 
officials can appoint and summarily dismiss the GM (OLG NSW, 2011, p. 18), this makes 
it difficult for any GM to call out such behaviour.  When this issue was explored during 
the interview fieldwork, some interviews made comments that unravel this issue in 
terms of its power differentials. For example:  
‘The other major issue is that the elected members hold quite a bit of power 
when it comes to … managing the general managers or the CEOs.  They hold 
quite a bit of power in relation to the CEO’s contract and their performance 
reviews … While they are … required to set the policy and the direction of 
the organisation from the policy point of view, they often get involved with 
the operational decision-making of the administrative side of council.  And 
that is where the risks are in my opinion.’ (Interviewee 1)   
‘Councillors are supposed to actually only talk to the directors or the 
general manager, and generally they do … But they have for a variety of 
reasons, and they always have their reasons, they will always have their 
abilities or whatever, they’re able to push through to get … this comes back 
to my issue about the GM’s contract. The GM can’t give frank and fearless 
advice to the people that employ him. Just like if I walked into the GM’s 
office and said “Hey, I think you’re doing a crap job of this. What I really 
think you should do ...” Like, would I do that? No. Would I frame it politely? 
Yes. If he said, “No, go away”, would I? Of course I would … I think that 
opens up a huge, huge opportunity for corrupt behaviour.’ (Interviewee 4)  
‘The general manager as the CEO of the council has responsibility for 
corruption risk. So when a councillor behaves in a corrupt manner, it’s not 
in that general manager’s interests to attack any of the councillors, because 
they’re the ones that are going to vote on the general manager’s payrolls, on 
renewal of contracts. It’s not in the general manager’s interests to get 
offside with any councillor.’  (Interviewee 5)  
Some interviewees reflected on questionable experiences:  
‘I believe it could be definitely a risk.  If a councillor rings up, “My mate has 
just got this parking fine, your contract’s up next week, can you help us out 
dealing with the parking fine?” ... I think there is a risk to the organisation 
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when the head of the organisation, who is the reporting officer for so many 
things, has got such an intertwined link with the employers or the elected 
officials, who all have different invested interests and problems.’  
(Interviewee 7) 
‘One of the councils I investigated, they used to call the general manager the 
– what was his name – the 12th councillor or 13th councillor or something. 
He was manipulating, he was playing politics, he was in there drinking with 
them after council meetings, doing the mayor’s bidding. Reporting on other 
councillors, what they were doing to the different factions within council. 
You make yourself some enemies that way too, but as long as you’ve got the 
majority of councillors onside that’s the controlling clique.’  (Interviewee 5)  
‘I worked in a council where the councillors would say to the general 
manager, “Do what we want or we’ll sack you” … As plain as that. We saw it 
here in January last year; it was in the papers. The council were going to get 
together and sack the GM ’cause he’d made a decision they didn’t like.’  
(Interviewee 4)  
As noted above, the pressure on the GM to conform or comply with the councillors’ 
requests, indicates a cultural negotiation based on ‘pressure power and coercion’ 
(Magnuson, 2005, p. 383).  The inherent tensions associated with this form of 
negotiation are highlighted by the following two comments:  
‘I’ve worked for general managers who staunchly held councillors where 
they needed to be and I’ve worked for a general manager where it was not 
uncommon for me to walk into my office and find a councillor sitting there 
going “So this is what you’re going to do for me today”.’ (Interviewee 4)  
‘I have to give the general manager credit where credit is due. It’s also the 
personal integrity and our general manager’s a man of principles.  That 
relationship between the general manager and the councillors and the 
operational side of the council rises or falls very much on the nature of the 
particular person who is appointed general manager.’ (Interviewee 8)  
The quantum of references to GM appointments indicates a widely held view that their 
role and appointment is pivotal in terms of councils’ approach to corruption control.  
The interpersonal dynamics and relationships between councillors, mayor and GM 
involve formal and informal powers that influence behaviour (Purcell, 2016, p. 111).  
Any tone set from the top then permeates through the organisation and denotes to the 
broader employee base what type of behaviours may or may not be acceptable.  For the 
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council as a whole, these power differentials arguably disperse and diffuse any 
constituents of accountability.   
For the GM, political influence is fundamental in the successful attainment of an 
executive position at this level (Mills, 2000 [1956], p. 136).  As such, there arguably 
needs to be a convergence of interest between the GM and the body of elected officials 
(mayor and councillors).  As noted by Mills (2000 [1956], p. 136) ‘the man who rises to 
the top is the broadened man whose “specialty” coincides with the aims of the 
corporations’.  Of interest for this thesis, however, is the fact that the different and 
diverse structural constraints and power differentials do not feature within the anti-
corruption literature on local government; therefore, this potential ‘enabler’ of 
corruption is either not a matter of consideration or considered to be immaterial.  This 
interviewee elaborates further: 
‘There are far less checks and balances and the one ultimate check and 
balance that they have is beholden to them, so how can there not be 
[corruption]? If you were going to write a recipe for corruption at that level, 
that’s exactly how you’d do it … You’d put a bunch of elected reps in and 
you’d put a person in there whose job it was to keep them on the straight 
and narrow [the GM] and then you’d say by the way, they get to tell you 
whether or not you have a job. How can it not be open for corruption?’ 
(Interviewee 4) 
If, as Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, p. 9) asserts, ‘public corruption exists due to a certain 
power configuration accepted in a society and to practices deriving from it’,  this 
suggests that the structural framework of local government facilitates a power 
differential at the highest level.  From an architectural perspective, this is compounded 
by the fragmented network of 128 councils that exist, each of which is governed by an 
elected body, and run by an appointed GM, being the council’s operational figurehead.  If 
the relationship between the GM and the mayor/councillors breaks down, or the 
interests no longer converge, practices of corruption become a likely outcome, but quite 
possibly in subtle and nuanced ways.  This was recently seen during an ICAC 
investigation involving the City of Ryde Council in 2014, which identified that the mayor 
engaged in corrupt conduct by way of a number of actions that undermined the GM’s 
credibility and reputation (ICAC NSW, 2014d).  At Hurstville Council in 2015, the council 
suspended the GM soon after, but not necessarily in direct relation to, the GM’s release 
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of a report involving a property owned by the mayor.  Soon after standing the GM down, 
the mayor was suspended as a councillor for misconduct by way of his actions (OLG 
NSW, 2016).  These findings support the interviewees’ observations above, regarding 
the inherent tensions that are in place between the organisational lead of any council 
and the head of the governing body: the GM and the mayor.  
If there is a lack of will at the highest levels, combined with a lack of incentive for 
corrupt agents to reject corruption, a culture of corruption may manifest (Rothstein, 
2017a, p. 14).  In this regard, it is notable that many interviewees identified the tenuous 
nature of the GM’s appointment as a contributing factor.  The above-quoted comments 
postulate that GMs may ingratiate themselves with the elected officials or capitulate in 
the interest of self-preservation and survival, facilitating a heteronomous culture.  Over 
time, an ethos of disinterest and apathy evolves, as alluded to by these interviewees: 
‘The council that I worked for that had the most obvious levels of corruption 
and where it was fairly blatant, there was a general manager who didn’t 
have his hands on the wheel, and people knew it.’ (Interviewee 4)  
‘A lack of knowledge even from a lot of the executives who are around that 
so it doesn’t necessarily flow on.’ (Interviewee 7) 
One interviewee identified some of the key reasons that corruption does not come to 
light at this level, including that it is not in the general interest to report suspected 
corruption:  
‘Everybody at Auburn [Council] knew what was going on beforehand. Why 
did it take them until it hit the front page of the papers with that councillor’s 
wedding that they moved on it?25 Any number of other councils are the 
same around the place. [Interviewer: What’s your view on why it took so 
long?] Interviewee: They didn’t know. Why didn’t they know? Because the 
councils were corrupt. That’s why it takes somebody to go, “hey this is not 
right, I’m going to report it.” Well who’s going to do that? General manager? 
GM answers to council. The mayor? The mayor’s relying on that councillor 
to vote for the mayor to put the mayor in place. Who’s going to do it? Unless 
you’ve got a member of the public who says, “look I smell a rat here” and 
makes that report, it just flies under the radar.’ (Interviewee 5)  
 
25 The interviewee is referring to the actions of Salim Mahajer, Deputy Mayor, Auburn City Council (Beasley, 2017, 
p  210). 
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This view underpins the notion of wilful blindness at the highest level, built into the very 
design of local government, and infused within the workplace culture.  A structural 
amorality is deemed to exist, that is feasibly, and easily, entrenched because of the 
power differentials that are created by the architectural framework: a GM who acts as 
the operational head of the council but is appointed by the elected body.  It is not in any 
person’s interest at that level to address suspected corruption, and the potential for 
corruption is easily enhanced by the vested, and converged, interests of individuals at 
this level.  
And so, as the above interviewee argues, corruption ‘just flies under the radar’.  Unless a 
person or a collective speaks up, corrupt practices continue without abatement.  These 
views indicate that the prospect of reporting is unlikely despite the prominence of 
whistleblowing programs and anti-corruption measures.  Attendance to any reported 
matter is not be guaranteed: if reported to ICAC, its investigative remit is restricted, and 
even then, very scarce in resource; if reported internally, it may not be acted upon 
because of vested interests.  
6.5  Summary 
This chapter explored the various structural, cultural and practical constraints that 
contribute to the un/visibility of and in/attendance to corruption within local 
government.  The reactive nature of local government, the absence of a ‘capable’ in-
house local guardian, and the appointment of GMs across the fragmented network of 
councils in NSW, have caused or contributed to different organisational approaches. 
On the occasion that councils are seen to actively address instances of corrupt conduct, 
their approaches are considered tokenistic and focused on examples that portray an 
outward impression of efficacy.  Beyond this, the existence of corruption is deeply 
ingrained, and is not only failing to be problematised for a number of cultural and 
environment reasons, but is unlikely to be effectively managed, especially given the 
many complex – and potentially unyielding – factors that mediate its production.  In-
house cliques, or long-established interpersonal relationships between influential 
personnel, foster avoidance rationalisations, with vested interests that, themselves, 
could be construed as corrupt in nature.      
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The notion of scale and seriousness was attributed to the type of matters pursued by 
ICAC within Chapter 5, whereas in this chapter, impressions of scale and severity were 
factors that affected the reporting of corruption.  Employees have a preference to report 
any concerns to in-house personnel, rather than external bodies such as ICAC.  This 
highlighted the value of an in-house capable guardian, but one with sufficient stature 
and independence, and a scope and expertise that can unrestrictedly respond to 
concerns about suspected corruption.  Such a role is notably absent within the majority 
of councils, with matters receiving various and inconsistent responses and reactions.  
Coupled with other factors, such as a potential lack of evidence available to any potential 
reporter, there is a reality that employees who do suspect corruption will continually fail 
to voice their concerns.  This chapter highlights that this is augmented by councils’ 
general unwillingness to address corruption, or even a wilful ignorance or denial that it 
exists.  Those in charge of councils’ governing (councillors) or administrative mandate 
(GM) have little incentive to explore the risk or manage the reality of corruption, despite 
regulatory obligations imposed upon them.  For this thesis, there are implications for 
how corruption is understood and conceptualised across the diverse base of councils in 
NSW, thus allowing the practice of corruption to metastasise as it is ineffectually 
managed. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of this thesis and will commence with a recap of the 
various issues previously explored and their significance in light of the body of literature 
on corruption.  It then reflects on the implications of this thesis, and presents general 
conclusions and potential ways forward. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Discussion 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon: a practice and a discourse that is prominent in 
everyday life but also highly variable and elusive.  It is clearly a phenomenon that is fluid 
and contested, and subject to multiple levels of interpretation.  This thesis has indicated 
that variances exist with regard to the perception and reality of corruption, by 
explaining and elucidating the complexities of corruption, and how they manifest within 
the administrative domain of local government.  Understanding the nature and influence 
of such variances is important for scholars, policymakers and practitioners, as a means 
of advancing understandings of corruption in its various manifestations.  
The research comprised a mixed methods study, capturing insights using processes of 
triangulation, to enhance the validity of the study through integration of different 
research approaches.  The design of semi-structured interviews held with individuals 
who might be considered as having a ‘guardianship role’, was borne out of insights 
derived from council employees in the attitudinal survey.  These insights explored the 
situated nature and practice of corruption on the ground as part of their working life, 
but also the perceived reality of corruption, as framed by regulators and popular news 
media.  These derived insights should not be generalised across the entire local 
government sector, but seen as a contribution to the body of knowledge within an area 
that seems to be relatively unexplored.  
The literature review was conceptually informed by several inter-related theories:  
first, the normalcy of criminal or deviant acts and behaviours, and how they potentially 
evolve through organisational cultures and workplace practices (Dormaels, 2015, 
p. 596; Sutherland & Cressey, 2004, pp. 67-69); second, the rationalisation of such 
behaviours, by the individual and those around them, to the extent that they appear 
normal, even legitimate (Sykes & Matza, 1957, pp. 667-669; Wells, 2004, pp. 11-12);  
third, the extent to which any council environment creates, facilitates or nurtures a 
wilful ignorance of corrupt practices and behaviours, for complex organisational and 
cultural reasons (Cohen, 2001, p. 5; Heffernan, 2011, p. 104); and finally, the social 
normalcy or conformity of corruption within local government, where visible, low-scale 
222 
 
forms of corruption develop and become naturalised because they are unaddressed 
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982).  
The array of factors which may or may not contribute to the prevalence of corruption 
would be more likely to be present if councils operate in the absence of effective 
guardianship, according to routine activity theory (Clarke & Eck, 2003, p. 27; Felson, 
1995, p. 53; Hollis-Peel et al., 2011, pp. 53-54).  In the absence of formal guardianship at 
the council level, there is a tendency in councils to avoid dealing with the risk or reality 
of corruption.  Those within the council rationalise why it is acceptable to ignore, rather 
than act upon, suspicions of corruption (Shepherd & Button, 2018, p. 18), deferring to 
reasons such as fear of bad publicity, as a popular example (ACFE, 2018, p. 50).  
In consideration of these theories, it was deemed necessary to explore why acts and 
behaviours that might or have been construed as corrupt take place, and also what 
social or organisational factors contribute to tolerance of the corrupt acts and 
behaviours and to their pervasiveness.  This thesis is orientated, to some extent, around 
the social policy of corruption.  Within various stages of this thesis, it is clear that 
corruption has a somewhat convoluted and malleable meaning, that is best understood 
through the adjoining of practice, policy and theory.  That is to say, it is socially situated 
and shaped, and does not have a universal form.  Hence, despite inherent difficulties 
with conducting ethnographic research on corruption, the findings within this thesis 
highlight the significance of such research as a means of advancing the body of 
knowledge on corruption.  Rather than seeking definitional consensus, or focusing solely 
on the environment of regulation and compliance, it seems fruitful to recognise how 
perceptions of corruption are influenced by various factors.  They are interpreted in 
nuanced ways, depending on the perspective and position of the observer, as well as the 
environment and the organisation within which they are seen, or unseen.  
This thesis commenced by quoting Heywood’s (2017, p. 28) insightful, and thought-
provoking, notion that ‘most anti-corruption efforts are bound to fail unless we can find 
more effective ways of unpacking the problem we are seeking to address’.  This 
statement seems quite relevant to this scholar-practitioner.26  The epistemology of 
 
26 This term is discussed further in the Preface, in the context of explaining how the author’s experience and interest 
informed the topic under study. 
223 
 
corruption informs awareness, education and policy, and ultimately, social practices; 
hence, the way in which discourse is mobilised and imparted becomes fundamental for 
the current and next generation of scholars and policymakers.   
In this regard, it is important to reflect on how anti-corruptionism, as a discourse and 
practice, a social movement and legal framework, has evolved during the past three 
decades (Sampson, 2010, p. 262).  This evolution has rapidly influenced citizens’ 
perspectives, considering that corruption is not a new concept but one that has existed 
for a very long time (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p. 3).  For the ageing workforce of local 
government (Hastings et al., 2015, p. 9), the social reality and messiness of corruption is 
not necessarily as straightforward as anti-corruption approaches and efforts might 
suggest (Torsello & Venard, 2016, p. 37).  This thesis has identified that the emergence 
of anti-corruptionism has created impressions of efficacy and success, but within the 
local government sector of NSW, there are implications and contradictions stemming 
from this.  As discussed further below, anti-corruption endeavours have undoubtedly hit 
the target, but they remain short of the mark: the anti-corruption rhetoric remains 
focused on the surface of corruption, not the murky complexities which contribute to its 
entrenched cultural normalcy as an everyday facet of local government administration.  
If a reductionist view of corruption is taken, its incidence and many manifestations 
within local government will likely continue, producing all manner of social effects in 
terms of its impact on the quality of public service and notions of public trust.   
7.1.1 Hitting the target but short of the mark 
When reflecting on the implications of this research, the ability to address the risk and 
reality of corruption within local councils is arguably dependent on how the issue is 
understood.  There is a purported understanding of corruption by those who work 
within local government, constructed largely through the regulatory ambit of ICAC’s 
investigative endeavours and the associated media reporting.  Within the scholarly 
study of the phenomenon itself, corruption is considered differently depending on the 
discipline and scholar, but there is not always an understanding and appreciation of the 
various tensions which exist and their practical implications.  For scholars, regulators, 
and practitioners, it seems pivotal that there should be more harmonisation of these 
different schemas if they wish to advance the body of knowledge on this convoluted 
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subject of study.  This is the baseline through which this thesis is concluded and 
recommendations made.    
The contribution of this thesis is that it reveals some of the complexities associated with 
the exposure of corruption within local government, a sector that affects the day-to-day 
lives of all citizens in NSW (Masters & Graycar, 2016, p. 46), and one that features as the 
most complained about to ICAC (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 17).  These came through in the 
exploratory study that was undertaken, which was deemed necessary as discussed in 
Section 1.1.  Rather than potentially constraining the focus of this thesis to a unifying 
central question or framework, the study explored several factors - grounded in the 
primary research - that contribute to the ingrained nature of much corruption, with 
degrees of crossover between causes, institutional factors and structure.  By examining 
the component parts of corruption, and its mediated social understandings from an 
empirical standpoint, this research indicates that the notion of corruption cannot be 
regarded as a single or universal phenomenon; it cannot, therefore, be addressed or 
‘treated’ with a single response, and this is why one underlying question did not seem 
appropriate or desirable for this thesis.  How scholars, regulators and practitioners find 
common ground in their approach to the management of corruption seems central to 
any future research and policy response.  This is important, and adds value to the body 
of literature, noting that many complexities contribute to its ingrained occupational 
presence, informed by different interpretations, practices and degrees of distinctiveness 
(Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 153; Johnson, 2004, p. 145).  As one informs the other, it seems 
pivotal that these are acknowledged in the consideration of future research and practice.  
Corruption as a concept has existed for as long as humankind, with ancient traditions, 
entrenched cultures and long-established practices each contributing to its situated 
reality, but there are a number of unyielding factors that are hostile to change.  Ensuring 
that the different vectors of academia, regulation and policy are well cognisant of these 
factors will be vital if the study of corruption is to evolve.  
The structure of the thesis is summarised in the next section, with key correlations 
between the research findings and the four sub-questions: 
1. How do local government employees understand the nature and prevalence 
of corruption in local government? 
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2. What perceptions and experiences do employees have of corruption and 
what explanations do they provide for its existence and management within 
local government? 
3. How does the organisational arrangement and culture of councils either 
facilitate or hinder the incidence of corruption?  
4. How do councils recognise and respond to the risk and reality of 
corruption?   
7.1.2 Structure of the thesis: an overview of the main findings 
The first sub-question foregrounds the relevance of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
2007, pp. 68-69) to corruption studies, noting, in particular, that corruption is 
understood differently by different people and social groups.  When any definition is 
extended – in this case, a definition of corruption – the definer is merely inviting others 
to use that same definition (Mills, 2000 [1959], p. 34).  As identified within the review of 
the literature, this is important to acknowledge, as while corruption is subject to a 
variety of definitions and understandings, these definitional and regulatory standpoints 
can be moderated and obfuscated within different organisational and cultural vectors.   
The findings within Chapter 4 identified that respondents’ understandings about 
corruption are largely informed by third-party sources, with the media and ICAC 
featuring as prominent educators.  Also, anti-corruption/governance measures, such as 
‘policies and procedures’, have been construed as adequate remedies for corruption at 
the coalface of local government.  This chapter explored the implications of success of 
these measures, noting a vast divergence between the exceptional forms of corruption, 
which might be investigated by ICAC, and the comparatively everyday, mundane forms 
of corruption, which may not be designated and experienced as corrupt at all.   
The potential corruption which is seemingly unattended to, despite these perceptions, 
was considered by one respondent to be the aspect that is deficient within the current 
anti-corruption focus.  This was framed as: ‘an aggregate of seemingly minor things 
[facilitated by] the nepotism that may result in an informal network of people who 
subtly control the place, the leadership culture that may subtly punish compliance with 
norms/power’.  When unravelling this quote, in the context of the other research 
findings, two aspects are particularly significant: (1) the identification of everyday or 
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mundane infractions which are vastly dissimilar to the notion of newsworthy or high 
threshold corruption, prosecuted by ICAC and reported on by the media; and (2) the 
description of inherent structural practices, cliques, and cultures, which potentially 
foster a normalcy of corruption through reification, and endure in spite of anti-
corruptionism.  
A noteworthy observation of key issues that emerged from this chapter was the 
prevalence of a threshold.  The understanding and interpretation of corruption at the 
frontline is vastly contingent on its perceived degrees of scale and severity.  This 
conditional threshold on the continuum predicates that everyday practices of corruption 
need to become prominent in some way before they attain ‘ICAC-able’ status.  While this 
idea bears similarity to notions which have been explored, or alluded to, by Osrecki 
(2015, p. 343) and Olsen (2014, p. 186), it is not to suggest that those committing the 
infractions have necessarily fallen within the ‘corruption trap’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 
p. 3), as those in or around the corrupt scenario may not be aware that their actions can 
be constituted by outsiders as corrupt.   
This aspect was further elucidated in Chapter 5, which explored the institutionalisation 
of corruption within local government and is pertinent in answering the second sub-
question.  It was shown at the outset of Chapter 5 that practices of corruption have been 
suspected or witnessed by a significant proportion of local government employees.  
However, the designation of some practices as ‘corrupt’ was more likely than others, 
because of their perceived degree of harm and visibility, and the scale and situatedness 
of the act(s) in question.  Notably, the perceived harm of some practices of corrupt 
conduct appears to affect the way that they are treated and then managed.  As a category 
of conduct, particularism featured as one that is most common in local government, but 
that ‘doesn’t get talked about a lot as corruption’, as one interviewee said.  Various 
aspects of the research study highlighted the issues and factors associated with the 
perpetration, tolerance and acceptance of this practice.  Because practices that fall with 
the ambit of particularism do not have an immediate exchange (Heidenheimer, 2009, 
p. 141) or immediate economic benefit (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 53), they can be 
indeterminable.   
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Notwithstanding, practices associated with particularism, including favouritism and 
nepotism (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 2), were familiar to a vast majority of local government 
officials, indicating a degree of institutionalisation, coupled with a perception of 
impunity.  Meanings of corruption are often linked with punishment and not the act in 
question (Kurer, 2015, p. 36), and so the lack of perceived harm (see Figure 5.3) 
suggests that it would not attract any form of punitive action or sanction, and thus it 
persists as a ‘grey’ practice.  The ‘closed recruitment culture’, referred to by one 
interviewee, presents the consideration that many employees within local government 
have professedly attained their status and position through different forms of 
favouritism.  Conceivably, this in-group form of favouritism may be linked to the 
reification of other modes of corruption, as feelings of power, superiority and 
dominance within the social hierarchy contribute to a sense of entitlement and desire to 
maintain and reproduce the existing social order (Rosenblatt, 2012, p. 247).  In relation 
to institutionalisation of corruption, one interpretation of this is the social normalcy of 
particularism, with 2 in 5 respondents claiming to have suspected it (see Figure 5.1).   
This chapter concurrently identified that concerns about some practices remained 
unreported because of organisational barriers and cultural stigmas associated with 
reporting.  On the occasions that concerns about suspected corrupt conduct have been 
made, a number of respondents claimed that there was either no, or unsatisfactory, 
ensuing action taken by their managers.  Ultimately, therefore, while many local 
government employees have either suspected or experienced everyday practices of 
corruption, when concerns were expressed, these have often not resulted in effective or 
decisive management.  
Chapter 6 explored councils’ appetite for corruption, noting that there is a degree of 
antipathy towards corruption within local government.  In this sense, the third and 
fourth sub-questions are addressed jointly below as there is interrelation between the 
two.  
A key theme that emerged from the research was the institutionalisation of much 
corruption.  Chapter 6 highlighted that the organisational architecture and culture are 
key facilitators in this respect, to the extent that one interviewee said, ‘How can it not be 
open for corruption?’  Prominent anti-corruption literature argues that effective anti-
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corruption measures must be driven from the top (ACFE, n.d.; Deloitte, 2015; PwC, 
2010).  This is problematic within local government, with the appointment of the GM 
being one of the most topical and contested aspects identified by many interviewees.  
Interviewees’ accounts highlighted how the existing organisational architecture 
facilitates potential corruption, through various power differentials that exist between 
the elected body and the GM.  As the council’s operational lead, the GM is appointed by a 
body of elected representatives, who invariably have they own agendas and mandates, 
and recognise that the appointment of the GM is pivotal to delivering on their 
aspirations.  As such, the GM’s appointment is not necessarily based on merit, but on 
political relations (Mills, 2000 [1956], p. 136).  
Interviewees’ perspectives enriched this dimension of the study and provided a 
contrasting perspective that differentiated the ‘us’ (employees) and ‘them’ (councillors) 
dualism which came through in some aspects of the attitudinal survey.   At one council in 
particular (Council 8 – see Section 4.1.4), antagonistic prejudices were exhibited by 
many respondents towards the councillors (Bauman, 1990, pp. 46-47), with a 
perception that the out-group (councillors) were subject to a different set of rules to the 
in-group (colleagues and co-workers within the appointed realm).  In contrast to the 
interviewees’ accounts, comments by survey respondents did not generally contemplate 
the appointment of the GM as a particular influencer in the culture of corruption or anti-
corruption.  The lack of reference to the GM’s appointment and their ability to influence 
corruption and its mis/management may be indicative of in-group loyalty.  Thus, 
corruption within the occupational domain may seem rather abstract in comparison 
with that exhibited, or perceived to exist, within the elected domain (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003, p. 21).  Everyday practices within the occupational domain might seem virtuous 
by comparison (Bandura, 1999, p. 206), thus reinforcing a culture of normalcy and 
ambivalence; that is, the ensuing justification of everyday mundane practices (Ashforth 
& Anand, 2003, p. 34).  
Interviewees’ broad observations about the administrative frameworks in place and 
their inherent imperfections enriched the data gleaned from the survey.  Concepts such 
as wilful blindness and denial have aided in the ignoring or justification of certain 
practices over others, creating a situation where the identification, reporting and 
management of corruption is layered within different meanings and ambiguities.  As 
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corruption is understood and appreciated situationally, and thus differently, there is not 
always any cause for concern among those immersed in the everyday lifeworld of local 
government.  This is, to a degree, attributed to the internal culture that is nurtured by 
the GM, as the administrative figurehead within each council.  The GM’s appointment 
and tenure are contingent on their relationship with the elected representatives and the 
research findings highlighted some intricate conflicts of interest around functioning 
expectations.  
As further identified within Chapter 6, on the occasions that corruption is identified and 
attended to, it is weighted towards the visible, lower-level infractions, which often 
materialise if it is within a council’s self-preserving interest to address them.  Power 
differentials at the top tiers of each council ensure that the culture focuses on the ‘low-
hanging fruit’, not personnel in higher positions, supporting contentions made by 
Kurczewski (2004, p. 163) and reported previously.  As asserted by one interviewee, 
‘vested interests’ influence the degree of action, or inaction, and this indicates a milieu 
that incubates and tolerates some forms of corruption over others.  
A tokenistic approach toward corruption governance seems predominantly to be in 
existence, with superficial efforts ‘performing’ an appearance of action (Osrecki, 2015, 
p. 349).  Genuine appetite or desire to address corruption is not apparent, with a 
number of assertions that local government is characteristically ‘reactive’, rather than 
presumably ‘proactive’, in their recognition of, and response to, corruption.  Councils 
that do operate with a formal guardian, such as an internal ombudsman, are rare.  
Moreover, the role of this investigator/regulator is interpreted as being tenuous and 
somewhat tokenistic in itself.  The ability of local government to address corruption was 
described by one interviewee as the ‘Achilles heel’, implying that this is the greatest 
vulnerability, with any symptoms or expressions of corruption being disproportionately 
responded to, if at all.  
7.2 Reflecting on the key implications of this research 
Significant contradictions are highlighted by this thesis.  At one level, corruption is 
evident and observable: made visible by the media and the prominence of ICAC’s 
regulatory endeavours.  At that level, it is very public.  As noted by Rothstein (2017a, 
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p. 4), ‘awareness among the general public about the detrimental effects of corruption 
seems to have increased dramatically’.  However, the more mundane, lower threshold 
practices on the ground might be somewhat disassociated.  These public mechanisms of 
knowledge have ingrained thinking about what corruption means and have ominously 
sedimented a view that it is being adequately pursued and prosecuted.  This further 
signifies that corruption is a responsibility for external regulators, with ICAC being the 
key authority on definitions of, and responses to, corruption in the jurisdiction of NSW 
local government.  However, from a review of the literature, the implications of these 
endeavours over the past three decades of regulation do not appear to be well thought 
through. The implications from a social policy perspective are discussed below.  
ICAC’s classification of some acts and practices as ‘corrupt’ provides the sector of local 
government, and the public sector in general, with a taxonomy or a framework to work 
within.  By virtue of this, it conceptualises what is and is not tantamount to corruption.  
While this regulatory categorisation may be fruitful, it also has the potential to imply 
that there is a cure for the widely termed notion, the cancer of corruption (Bhargava, 
2006; World Bank Group, 2016); moreover, it neglects to unravel, then articulate, the 
underlying causes and symptoms of corruption (Mills, 2000 [1956], p. 344).  This finding 
develops observations in the literature, such as those by Anechiarico (2009b, p. 84), by 
highlighting that reliance on regulation/law enforcement modelling is fraught with risk, 
as it makes corruption reductive.  It feasibly omits to comprehend the inherent social, 
historical, cultural and organisational complexities associated with the current 
discourse on corruption and the situated practices on the ground.   
When the nature of such practices was explored, this thesis revealed that certain 
practices of corruption have been suspected and witnessed in significant quantities.  
Hence, what is important for this thesis, is that it indicates that local government 
employees have had experiences with conduct of a potentially corrupt nature, but that 
these are not captured by any overarching mechanism.  A typology emerged which 
registered the prominence of four key corruption practices, namely (1) conflict of 
interest, (2) particularism, (3) misuse of information or material, and (4) abuse of 
discretion.  However, these practices might be less prone to the label of corruption as 
they are more abstruse in nature than unlawful forms of corruption such as bribery, 
where personal material gain and dereliction of duty through illicit ends is the clear 
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implication (Gorta & Forell, 1995, pp. 316-317; Philp, 1997, p. 441; Zimring & Johnson, 
2005, p. 797).  While more discernible forms of corruption, such as bribery (Zimring & 
Johnson, 2005, p. 802), fall within the purview of ‘lived corruption’ within poor 
countries (Graycar & Monaghan, 2015, p. 592), this research identified that less 
discernible, or greyer, forms of corruption – such as the four within this typology – have 
been practised in ‘full view’, but with little or no intervention.  These practices may be 
diminishingly, and interchangeably, referred to as transgressions, infractions, integrity 
violations, rather than as corrupt conduct.  Despite being experienced and witnessed by 
a vast proportion of the respondent base, the practices remain ‘hidden in plain sight’.  
They appear to be framed more as transactional costs rather than abuses of power or 
harm generators and perpetrators.  For any council as an entity, and for the local 
government sector as a whole, one of the consequent risks is that ongoing decisions and 
policies become set and practised, and therefore embedded within both the structure 
and culture of the organisation.   
7.2.1 Beneath the tip of the iceberg 
The popular metaphor ‘the tip of the iceberg’ refers to only a small part being visible 
when the great bulk is hidden below the surface.  Many publications and studies have 
applied this metaphor to corruption (Huberts et al., 2006; Masters & Graycar, 2016, 
p. 45; Olsen, 2014, p. 180): no one knows how much corruption is occurring beyond 
what is immediately visible, until they delve deeper, especially through empirical and 
observational research.  This suggests that there is a general acknowledgement that any 
measurement of, or perspective on, corruption is limited.  Unlike with an iceberg, 
however, the deeper one starts to look, the more difficult corruption is to see, as 
workplace cultures have obfuscated the nature of corruption or reified corruption 
through verbal or symbolic constructs (Berger & Pullberg, 1965, p. 61).  Visibility of local 
government corruption in NSW is limited to ICAC reports, being one of the few – if only - 
points of reference for the public, practitioners and policymakers, when seeking out real 
life examples.  Within the local government sector there seems to be little recognition of 
these limitations or understanding of the fluid nature and dynamics of this convoluted 
phenomenon.    
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To place these observations into context, out of circa 3,000 complaints made to ICAC 
each year, in the region of 120 reports are made by councils to ICAC each year, with 41 
or less (under 2%) of the total sum resulting in preliminary investigation and 10 
progressing to full investigation (see Figure 2.1).  If the extrapolation referred to within 
Section 5.2.1 is taken a step further – to gauge the extent of potentially witnessed 
practices by the 54,000 employees who worked within the NSW local government at the 
time of the study (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a) – the extrapolation would 
amount to nearly 66,000 witnessed acts of corruption.  ACAs in the Australian states of 
South Australia (ICAC SA, 2018) and Victoria (IBAC VIC, 2017a) have employed similar 
methods of research in recent years and have also derived similar insights in relation to 
the observance of corrupt practices; however, the notion that much corruption exists 
within local government, but is unattended to, seems lacking in any policy response.  As 
discussed below, this thesis highlights that, when one does start to delve deeper, the 
reason that much corruption is hidden from view is because it is constituted within the 
everydayness of public administration.   
7.2.2 Exploring the abyss of corruption 
When seeking to explore the range and types of corruption that may exist within the 
organisational lifeworld of local government, there are practices which seem to be more 
evident than others, as characterised by many employees’ suspicions and observances.  
Many employees remain disinclined to register and report concerns, hence there is a 
risk, and a likelihood, that such practices potentially remain hermetically preserved: that 
is, they endure without visibility, assessment or intervention.  For the researcher, 
understanding the genesis of practices which have become deeply entrenched within the 
workplace cultures of council administration or hard-wired into their organisational 
structures, remains difficult when relying on the perspectives of those who work within 
such areas: a degree of bias, perspective and agenda is likely to moderate any research 
findings.  Such limitations are important to acknowledge in this research study.  Thus its 
findings should not be construed as definitive in nature, but rather as presenting 
insights and issues that have significance for the furthering of knowledge in this area.  
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7.2.3 The corruption disconnect 
Although the approach adopted by this research study is limited in its purview, its 
originality is centred around the broad disconnect between experienced, everyday 
practices and the sensationalistic ‘sexy’ forms of corruption which attain newsworthy, 
or ‘ICAC-able’ status.  When seeking to explain the various influences that contribute to 
the multifarious and complex nature of corruption, the ‘corruption disconnect’ 
presented itself as a significant factor, particularly a divergence between everyday and 
exceptional forms of corruption.  There is limited literature which supports this 
grounded theory; hence, this perspective might be considered interesting and important 
as it contributes to the anti-corruption literature by highlighting divergences between 
corruption perception, reality, reaction and response.  Bridging these disconnects seems 
crucial in the development of conceptual understandings and therefore policy 
interventions.  Each is listed and discussed below with a correlation to the research 
findings that relate.  
a) Perceived level and reality of corruption within local government 
Generally, the broad perception that the level of corruption in local government is low, 
and has reduced in the last 5 years, is in contrast to most other studies of corruption 
which suggest it is on the rise.  A number of indirect or detached factors (media, ICAC, 
controls and training procedures) might have contributed to the formulation of these 
perceptions.  In a similar vein, survey respondents typically believed that any level of 
corruption within their council was moderate, and nearly two-thirds of respondents 
believed that their council handled the risk of corruption well.  If one considers that 
corruption is figuratively aligned with medically-infused terminology (Bhargava, 2006, 
p. 341; Byrne, 2017; Clammer, 2012, p. 124; World Bank Group, 2016), then these 
perceptions indicate that there is a sense of ‘wellness’ with the current anti-corruption 
focus in NSW.   
Similarly, perceived reality naturally followed perceived level.  The perceived reality of 
corruption is slanted towards the nature of corruption that dominates public opinion: 
exceptional, ‘sexy’ and newsworthy corruption.  In this sense, ICAC’s established 
position at the forefront of the anti-corruption agenda dominates understandings and 
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barometers of incidence, with their pursuits sensationalised by the media.  This reveals 
that corruption in NSW is socially constructed as a grand phenomenon that is 
perpetrated by high-profile figureheads, in spectacularly illicit ways.  One of the 
implications of this popular representation is that mundane practices of corruption 
which do not attain such a status are overlooked, allowing them to become interwoven 
within the cultural and organisational fabric.   
b) Reality of corruption within local government 
An argument explored within the literature review was that corruption is infrequently 
observed first-hand by citizens (Van de Walle, 2008, p. 233).  This study has identified 
that this is not necessarily the case in the context of local government employees.  Many 
respondents claim to have suspected or witnessed practices of corruption.  On the basis 
that any claimed suspicion or observation might not be ‘corruption’ per se, the question 
did not explore the indefinable concept of corruption, but invited respondents to 
identify with specific practices which might fall within the broader conception of 
corruption; thereby, its amorphous nature was unpacked and methodically examined.   
Respondents’ experiences of and exposure to certain practices reveal insights into the 
multifaceted dimensions of corruption within local government and how they exist.  
Notwithstanding the moderately small sample of respondents who participated in the 
study, the sum of witnessed practices (n=156) was just over a third higher than the 
number of reports made to ICAC each year (n=120).  This means that witnesses or 
complainants are failing to report corruption suspicions to the council, or if they are, 
they are then not being referred to ICAC.  One sixth of the respondent base (Figure 6.4) 
have reported suspected corruption, mostly to an internal source (Table 6.1), but many 
remain dissatisfied with the outcome (Figure 6.5).  Taken together, these findings 
suggest that council employees are either doing or saying nothing, or that council’s 
management is attending, or not, to their suspicions.  This seems paradoxical in certain 




c) Reaction to corruption within local government 
When distinguishing between injunctive (what people should do or think they should 
do) and descriptive (what people actually do) social norms (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 1015), 
it is notable, from the former perspective, that many respondents (70.9%) stated that 
they would report corruption if they were in possession of ‘actual evidence’ (Figure 6.7).  
As referred to within Section 5.4.1, outside of the four predominating social factors, the 
unavailability of ‘actual evidence’ featured as the fifth main reason why respondents 
would choose not to report corruption. This suggested that, if they were in possession of 
actual evidence, they would report.   
However, when examined from a descriptive perspective, even when respondents have 
witnessed acts which they have simultaneously construed as corrupt, many have chosen 
not to report them.  For local government employees, the rapid evolution of anti-
corruptionism has comprised a suite of products that attempt to create order and ensure 
compliance (Bauman, 1990, p. 182).  Policies and codes that endeavour to condition 
employees’ conduct and behaviour are typical within councils, and are given much 
importance (Brown et al., 2016, p. 1; NSW Audit Office, 2017, p. 6; 2018, p. 14).  They 
have been construed as effective modes of governance and regulation, by many 
employees within local government (Section 4.1.2).  In spite of this, many employees 
remain disinclined to use them, mainly because of social and cultural stigmas (such as 
concerns about being branded a trouble maker or believing they would not be taken 
seriously: Figure 5.6).  The formality of such instruments, which aim to be ‘norm-
enforcing’, would be futile in a situation that has nurtured a normality of fear or 
conformity with practices that many outside the organisation might perceive as 
problematic (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017, p. 10).  
This significance of these insights is that there is a social and cultural barrier to the 
exposure of, and reaction to, corruption which cannot be addressed by the mere 
restatement of formal mechanisms alone.  As an example, a Code of Conduct is deemed 
to be one of the most prominent anti-corruption controls (ACFE, 2018, p. 27), with 
nearly all employees being aware of its existence (Public Service Commission, 2015, 
p. 30).  Nearly all respondents have received Code of Conduct training (Figure 5.12) and 
there was a predominant view that Code of Conduct training sufficiently conveyed the 
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importance of having a workplace culture that rejects the idea of corruption as being 
acceptable (Figure 5.11).  From an injunctive perspective, only 40% of attendees felt 
more inclined to report corruption having attended this training, with more than half 
feeling no extra incentive or motivation (Figure 5.13).  When this is considered from a 
descriptive perspective, however, three out of every four employees who felt the training 
did convey the importance of having a corruption-free workplace have also suspected or 
witnessed corruption yet have declined to report it (Table 5.2).   
These findings shed light on the vast disparity between injunctive and descriptive 
behaviour, which are conceptually, substantively and situationally distinct.   
d) Response to corruption in local government 
Councils were noted as being reactive in general, rather than proactive.  Despite a 
perception that sound anti-corruption controls are in place across local government, 
they have not transitioned into genuine appetite to address corruption.  Efforts are 
focused on the ‘low hanging fruit’, as described by one interviewee, or the ‘binary on 
paper provable things’, as phrased by another interviewee.  As a result, the roots of 
corruption remain firmly embedded in the ground.  
The salience of this for future research and practice is that the current framework of 
regulation and oversight is limited in its reach, both in terms of prosecuting instances of 
corruption that endure in spite of different anti-corruption controls, and also in terms of 
manipulating different modes of understanding within the councils themselves.  The 
existing literature on corruption and anti-corruption is limited in its consideration of 
these issues; hence, this thesis makes an original contribution to the body of literature.  
In particular, mundane or low-threshold corruption, which remains deeply embedded 
within council culture, is unlikely to be addressed unless a framework is implemented 
that addresses the divergences of understanding and how these impact the governance 
and regulation of corruption.  
7.2.4 Intervention: the value of guardianship 
In the occupational realm of local government, there is a limited degree of formal 
guardianship within each of the councils in NSW.  This is problematic by virtue of each 
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council’s geopolitical, cultural and organisational independence and operational or 
legislative autonomy.  A formal guardianship mandate seems beneficial to councils in 
terms of bridging the divide between perception, reality, reaction and response.  The 
modest number of reports made to ICAC indicates that corrupt tendencies remain 
unreported, are attended to in a different way, or are simply diffused within everyday 
operations.  Hence, from an ownership perspective, the point of diagnosis rests with the 
council itself.  This seems counter-intuitive, given each council’s self-governing nature, 
but identification of corruption, and subsequent intervention, by way of a robust 
investigative/governing response, needs to be in real time. 
The notion of guardianship was a theoretical concept underpinning this thesis.  
According to routine activity theory, the absence of effective guardianship contributes to 
the likelihood of crime and deviance, when it converges with the presence of the other 
two components, a motivated offender and a suitable target (Clarke & Eck, 2003, p. 27).  
In particular, there may be features of guardianship within local government but the 
presence of a formal, in-house guardian, is notably lacking from the majority of councils 
in NSW.  Many respondents to the survey had different ideas about what this guardian 
role is and what it looks like, as many believed that they did have a comparative role in-
house.  One explanation for this anomaly could be correlated with respondents’ views 
about the compliance-based efforts, which place statutory responsibilities on councils to 
report on complaints, public interest disclosures (whistleblowing instances) and corrupt 
conduct.27  
A consequence of the absent guardian figure is that the characteristics of corruption 
have no clear, and constant or reaffirming, point of identification.  They are, therefore, 
more prone to ambiguity and ambivalence, but also comparative disorganisation from 
an educative and regulatory perspective.  The impression of a formal guardian is 
currently restricted to one who might observe and deter corruption because of their 
physical or symbolic presence (Felson, 1995, p. 53; Felson & Eckert, 2018, p. 28; Hollis-
Peel et al., 2011, p. 54).  However, this concept could viably be extended to one that not 
only observes and deters, but has a tutelage component that educates and prevents.  
Providing education on corruption, but beyond that, sound and sincere workplace 
 
27 As required, respectively, by the OLG, NSW Ombudsman and ICAC. 
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practice, appears to be the cornerstone of any future research and action projects in this 
space.  This would benefit the sector if it is configured and implemented as a formal 
program that unpacks the complexities of corruption and its relationship within the 
administration and mechanics of local government.  Similar to the three-pronged 
approached advocated by ICAC (Gorta, 2006, p. 206) and ICAC Hong Kong (Law, 2008, 
p. 82), any reaction to corruption – by way of investigation, sanctions and redress – 
needs to be supported by effective education and prevention strategies.  A local 
guardianship mandate, that is holistically standardised and streamlined across the 
existing 128 councils in NSW, might viably focus on localised, and thus contextually-
sensitive, education and prevention.  A focus on education and prevention would 
feasibly influence the existing discourse on corruption; moving it away from the notion 
that corruption is an economic and instrumental problem that can be constrained by 
policy and system (Krastev, 1998, p. 56), to instead frame it more as a social and cultural 
relation, that can be progressively redesigned and reprogrammed via multiple 
disruptive strategies.  The research findings with this thesis serve as a basis for 
advancing this proposition.  
7.2.5 Limitations to this study and avenues for future research 
There would undoubtedly be a multitude of competing views and opinions on the 
matters explored within this thesis, given their socially situated and mediated character.  
Although this presents as a major limitation of doing such research, this exploratory 
study represents not a broader viewpoint, but an insight into the cultural and social 
tensions that influence the incidence and tolerance of, and responses to, corruption 
within local government in the state of NSW, Australia.  These perspectives highlight 
why certain forms of corruption may remain hidden from view, and indicates that there 
are avenues of research to build on which are beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 Chapter 5 in particular demonstrated that within the broad realm of corruption, 
practices of corruption are imbued with a system of scalability, which is neither tangible 
nor identifiable.  For straightforwardness, if Heidenheimer’s (2009, p. 152) colour-coded 
classification is utilised, there are various shades of grey, which highlight the mundane 
and situated messiness of the problem, between the white corruption (tolerant and 
unexceptional) and the black corruption (grand, exceptional).  It is, therefore, important 
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to acknowledge the salience of individuals’ perspectives on the threshold of corruption; 
to appreciate how mundane or unexceptional corruption can be when it manifests, and 
that it can work up from there to become exceptional unless intervention is forthcoming.  
There is significance, for the scholar and the practitioner, in better understanding how, 
and in what form, much corruption sits within the grey space of practice and how 
particular frameworks may or may not address this broad spectrum.  Within Chapter 6, 
degrees of scalability were further contextualised within the discussion on impediments 
to reporting corruption.  Further empirical examination of this scalability could 
contribute to the anti-corruption literature, assist further understanding of the reality of 
corruption, and thus offer further opportunities to tackle some of the key risk factors.  
Similarly, further research would be beneficial around issues associated with 
favouritism in the appointment of personnel.  As identified within Chapter 5, 
particularism is considered to be one of the least harmful forms of corruption, but is 
feasibly enshrined within the ‘closed recruitment culture’ that is deemed to exist.  As 
particularism is a concept that is theoretically underdeveloped (Rotondi & Stanca, 2015, 
p. 220), the causality between particularism and corruption is one that has been 
studiously neglected, most likely because of a lack of conceptual clarity.  This suggestion 
supports observations by Rothstein and Torsello (2014, p. 264), who contend that 
‘ethnographic knowledge has an intrinsic, strong, and often hidden potential to 
disentangle the social and cultural complexity of corruption, in particular concerning the 
universalism–particularism puzzle’.  Further exploration would tease out the informal 
and social complexities which make corruption’s everyday situatedness more resistant 
to the label of corruption.  
7.3 Conclusions and potential ways forward 
The outward view tends to support a number of positives about the current anti-
corruption agenda in the local government sector of NSW: ICAC’s investigative pursuits 
are thought to serve as a deterrent, as publicised by the media; compliance-based 
initiatives are deemed to viably reduce corruption; the risk of corruption is thought to 
be handled well; and reporting of corruption is encouraged.  Consequently, there is a 
perceived aura of incorruptness within local government as a result of these factors.  
Beyond this impression, however, a methodical unpacking of corruption has highlighted 
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a profusion of everyday corruption that functions quite normally within the 
administration.  
One key theme that manifests in the thesis is the appreciation of corruption as a socially 
situated and constructed phenomenon; or as similarly described, something that is in 
the ‘eye of the beholder’ (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 3; Holmes, 2015, p. 2; Olsen, 
2014, p. 187).  As developed by this exploratory study, the notion of corruption is 
beholden to any number of moral, legal, cultural, and situational ambivalences.  It is far 
from being clear what corruption means and thus how to define it.  Instead of revisiting 
the debate on definition, it would be prudent to focus efforts on disentangling its richly 
opaque composition.  This can be done by empirically examining its potential for 
permeation within the broader operational and administrative domain, as well as the 
ways it is described and expressed in the languages of those working within its midst.  
Moving beyond this thesis, research and policy efforts need to explore the grey 
dimensions of corruption: its degree of indistinctness and malleability; and the extent to 
which confusions around in/appropriate workplace conduct – as well as bureaucratic 
formalities, hierarchies and the organisational self-governance and isolation of councils 
– contribute to its embeddedness.  The current understanding of corruption on the 
ground stems from the anti-corruption discourse.  Indirect information has informed 
perception, and perception has informed its situated realism, or lack thereof.  It follows 
that, if corruption is in the ‘eye of the beholder’, any tutelage on corruption needs to 
ensure that those who might observe and react are guided to appreciate and understand 
a broader ‘view’.  
For the scholar-practitioner, it would be useful to see this focus built into a number of 
trajectories.  The notion of corruption in local government is of interest from a 
regulatory and academic perspective as well as a policy-orientated/practitioner 
perspective.  As such, an examination of the complexities of corruption and everyday life 
should be considered and harmonised across several vectors: the regulatory vector; the 
policy vector; and the academic research and education vectors.  These silos need to be 
better interconnected and interwoven, so that emerging knowledge, ideas and practices 
can be considered in conjunction, with each one intrinsically informing the others.  
These vectors should be interdependent, as corruption should not be segregated as a 
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theoretical exploration or a practitioner or policy-based endeavour.  If any vector 
operates in isolation, then the body of knowledge on this intangible and convoluted 
phenomenon is limited in its advancement.  These are discussed further below.  
7.3.1 Regulation vector – ICAC 
As a sovereign authority on corruption in NSW, ICAC’s presence serves as an established 
platform on the topic of corruption and anti-corruption.  Building on the implications of 
this research, one option might be to examine which councils in NSW have or have not 
submitted statutory reports to ICAC.  The results would inform a typology that would 
highlight risk areas, identify councils that may not have reported any suspected 
corruption during this time, and detect particular patterns of corruption, especially any 
cultural practices that are greyer in character and constitution.  Subsequently, this 
typology would establish a baseline for thematic analysis.   
7.3.2 Policy vectors 
A policy which supports the supplementation of the NSW oversight platform with a local 
integrity model would arguably benefit the local government sector in its pursuit and 
understanding of corruption.  This could feasibly incorporate the notion of a formal 
guardian, such as an internal ombudsman, but at a minimum, it seems timely that each 
council attests to its degree of effort to manage the risk and reality of corruption so that 
the sector is more transparent and accountable.  This will also provide the opportunity 
to identify, and compare and contrast, the nuanced and experimental ways councils are 
preventing, detecting and responding to corruption in their organisation.  
7.3.3 Academic vectors – research and education 
Within the academic vector, it seems apposite that research and education should be 
centred on understanding more about the ancient tradition known as corruption and 
how it transcends from a theoretical concept to an occupational and social construct.  
This research has explored this process to a limited degree, within one state and one tier 
of Australian government.  It has highlighted that a reductionist view of corruption 
should not be maintained in any occupational setting, and that conceptually, it is much 
more complicated than its popular framing.  Currently, much research on corruption is 
confined to a particular discipline, and thus a disciplinary mode of thought and 
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problematisation.  By way of example, the anthropological literature on corruption is 
exceptionally limited (Rothstein & Torsello, 2014, p. 264).  Through a more enriched 
understanding of how everyday practices and social interactions converge, its 
contribution to other disciplines that have an interest in corruption and its various 
components – such as sociology, criminology and organisational psychology – would 
seem complementary and better inform social policy responses.   
7.4 Final words 
At the time of concluding this thesis, proposed reform within Australia is focused on 
developing an Integrity Commission for the Commonwealth (Attorney General’s Office, 
2018).  When this is ratified, Australia will have a federal commission, as well as a form 
of ACA, within each of its six states and two mainland territories.  This is proportionally 
greater than any other country in the world.   
Before another regulatory agency is established, it needs to be recognised, as this 
research highlights, that addressing corruption is not solely an aspect of regulation.  
Approaching it as such will feasibly generate further unintended consequences, as well 
as a confinement of knowledge on this subject.  Without wishing to detract from the 
value of this endeavour, the creation of another commission might seem apposite for the 
jurisdictional coverage that it will have, but this should not be at the expense of 
understanding – primarily through engaged and applied research – more about the 
complexities of corruption.  Corruption, as has been shown, is an intangible, 
unquantifiable and complex phenomenon.  It is well discussed, but vastly subject to 
interpretation, context and understanding.  This thesis has contributed to the body of 
knowledge on these areas, and offers a basis for change in the way that corruption is 
imagined, and hence addressed, organisationally, but also socially and culturally more 
broadly.  The potential to expand the scope of understanding about corruption is 
extensive and intriguing.  The implications of this study might well serve as a 
contribution to the body of knowledge that is drawn upon when seeking to devise 
frameworks and solutions, such as the proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission.  
Before continuing on the same anti-corruption journey,  
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Appendix 1 – Summary of publicly reported ICAC investigations involving 
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Sydney 
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Bathurst & Yass 
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Danby 12/05/2011 No Yes 
6   Burwood Council 
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Magnus 20/04/2011 No Yes 
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Challenger 15/12/2010 No Yes 
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Appendix 2 – Classification factors in choice of sampled councils 
• Number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff. (Councils with very low numbers of staff 
were chosen as well as councils with very high numbers of staff.  As a means of 
comparison only, at the time of assessment, Urana Shire Council had just 31 FTE 
staff, while City of Sydney Council had 1,741 FTE staff.) 
• Infrastructure management which may range from ‘weak’ to ‘very strong’. 
• Council type classification (Metropolitan; Metropolitan Fringe; Regional Town/City; 
Rural; Large Rural).1  
• Geographical coverage. (As a means of comparison only, at the time of assessment, 
Hunters Hill Council had the smallest council area in NSW, measuring 5.7 square 
kilometres, while Central Darling Council had the largest, covering 53,494 square 
kilometres). 
• Population served by each council. (As a means of comparison only, at the time of 
assessment, Urana Shire Council had the smallest population with 1,269 residents 
and Blacktown City Council had the largest at 299,700 residents, 236 times as many). 
• Standing on the Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage, 
‘which compares the relative social and economic conditions of cities, towns and 
suburbs across Australia’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008), and in particular, 
on the SEIFA (Socio Economic Indexes for Areas), with the aim of including councils 
at contrasting ends of the spectrum. 
• Representation that included a range of councils that differed based on their 
Financial Sustainability Rating (FSR) and Outlook2.  As stated within TCorp’s (2013) 
publication, Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local Government Sector:  
‘The FSR provides TCorp’s assessment of each Council’s current long-term rating.  
The FSR methodology is used to individually assess Councils and categorise them 
into seven rating bands ranging from Very Strong to Distressed.  TCorp considers 
that a Council needs to be assessed at a Moderate or higher level to be acceptable 
 
1 As set out by the OLG, listed under Appendix 3 of Comparative Information on NSW Local Government (DLG NSW, 
2013, pp. 350–351). 
2A list of ratings and definitions can be found in TCorp’s publication, Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales 
Local Government Sector (TCorp, 2013, pp. 69–70). 
276 
 
in terms of their sustainability.  A Moderate level FSR is on average equivalent to 
marginally exceeding the benchmarks utilised in TCorp’s assessment process.  
TCorp’s assessment of the likely movement in a Council’s FSR over the short term, 
being the next three years, is the Outlook. Councils were assigned an Outlook 
rating of Positive, Neutral or Negative.  A Positive Outlook indicates that a Council’s 
FSR is likely to improve in the short term, whilst a Neutral Outlook indicates that 
the FSR is likely to remain unchanged.  A Negative Outlook indicates that a 
Council’s FSR is more likely to deteriorate, and is a sign of a general weakening in 
performance and sustainability.  A Council with an FSR of Moderate and an Outlook 
of Negative, is assessed as being in a deteriorating position or at risk of being 
downgraded from Moderate to Weak.’ (TCorp, 2013, p. 6) 
• Councils with a known internal ombudsman or former internal ombudsman.3 
• Some councils that have been the subject of a recent ICAC investigation.4  
  
 
3 The source was the researcher’s personal knowledge of councils that have a current or former internal ombudsman, 
each of whom was a member of the Local Government Internal Ombudsman Network (LGION) at this time. 
4 Data taken from ICAC’s website page, ‘Past investigations’ (ICAC NSW, 2014e).  
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Appendix 3 – Letter sent to general managers at 35 councils in NSW 
Allan Yates, PhD Candidate, 
Research School of Sociology, 
College of Arts and Social Sciences, 
C/- Australian National University 
Tel: [redacted] 
Email: u5444260@anu.edu.au 
Mr / Ms (surname)  
General Manager 
(name of) Council 
(PO Box number) 
(City/town)  
NSW (postcode) 
Friday, 16 January 2015 
Request for participation in PhD study exploring how corruption is perceived and 
addressed in local government 
Dear (name of General Manager), 
I am a PhD candidate in Sociology, affiliated with the College of Arts and Social Sciences 
at the Australian National University (ANU).  I am writing to you to seek your consent 
and support to facilitate the dissemination of an online survey to all appointed officials 
within your council as part of my doctoral research project.  The survey is seeking to 
explore the perceptions of council employees on how corruption is being addressed in 
local government. 
I am proposing to issue an online questionnaire to all appointed officials in a sample of 
up to 30 councils in the state of New South Wales.  As such, I respectfully request your 
278 
 
participation and endorsement of this initiative, by being the main recipient for the 
online survey link and by distributing it to all employees at your council.   
The survey is entirely voluntary, and will not identify any participant, but will elicit a 
great deal of information about perceptions of corruption in local government at 
different levels of service and what is currently being done to address corruption in 
terms of training programs and regulatory frameworks. 
Your support, in terms of encouraging your council employees to participate in this 
research, would be greatly appreciated in what will be an entirely independent social 
study of perceptions of corruption in local government and strategies of redress.  This 
survey is an integral part of my doctoral thesis which, when completed, will assist in 
providing all councils with complimentary information and knowledge on best practice 
in creating a corruption resistant local government. 
This is my preliminary request, and at this stage, I ask you to kindly let me know 
whether you would be willing or unwilling to participate in this research.  As such, I 
would be grateful if you could complete the attached remittance slip and return a 
scanned, electronic copy to me at my ANU email address, which is listed at the top of this 
letter, by COB Friday, 6 February 2015. 
On agreeing to participate in this research, you will subsequently receive an email that 
contains a hyperlink to the online questionnaire, which I ask that you then forward to all 
employees by way of your preferred choice of internal electronic communication (e.g., 
email, intercom, or intranet message).  If you would be willing to include a foreword, or 
covering message of your own, to endorse my request and to recommend participation, 
this would be greatly appreciated.  The covering message in my email will introduce the 
survey and direct the participant to the online questionnaire.  It will include my contact 
details, as well as those of my doctoral supervisor’s and the Human Ethics Manager at 
the ANU, should any participant have any queries or concerns.  The survey will be open 
for six weeks to suit staff schedules and availability.   
If you are agreeable to this request, I will send a copy of your completed remittance slip 
to the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at the ANU, along with my ethics 
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approval request.  I anticipate that approval may take 4–6 weeks, so I hope to be able to 
email you the link to my online survey by the end of March 2015 at the latest. 
I have attached a Participant Information Sheet for your information.  Although fairly 
formal and verbose, it does nevertheless ensure that this research adheres to the very 
rigorous ethical standards set by the ANU, Australia’s leading research university.  The 
Participant Information Sheet and the Ethics Approval will be attached to my email 
introducing participants to the survey, and will be available to them should they wish to 
know more about how data will be held, for what purpose the data is being sought and 
processes of ensuring confidentiality. 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of my research proposal, or if you would simply 
like further information before deciding whether or not to participate, I would be more 
than happy to discuss this further over the telephone, or to attend your office at a time 
and date that is convenient to you.  Otherwise, thank you very much for taking the time 






Encs. 1) Participant Information Sheet (3 pages) 




Appendix 4 – Council participant information sheet (sent to councils when 
inviting them to participate) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
PhD research project: How corruption is perceived and addressed in local 
government 
Researcher: 
My name is Allan Yates and I am a PhD candidate in the Research School of Sociology at 
the Australian National University (ANU).  
For the purposes of integrity, I wish to disclose that I am also a full-time employee of a 
council in New South Wales, where am I employed in the capacity of Acting Internal 
Ombudsman.  The council in which I currently work is purposefully excluded from the 
sample of councils chosen for this research to avoid any potential bias blighting the 
study.  I further emphasise that my research is being conducted solely for the purpose of 
my studies as a PhD candidate, and as such, it is an independent, analytical exploration 
of how corruption is perceived and addressed in local government in the state of New 
South Wales. 
Project Title: How corruption is perceived and addressed in local government 
General Outline of the Project: 
Description and Methodology 
This thesis will seek to explore how corruption is perceived and addressed within local 
government in the state of New South Wales (NSW).  In a state comprising 152 general 
purpose councils, this thesis will seek to ascertain the degree to which local government 
is susceptible to corruption, why this may be so, and whether there are appropriate 
mechanisms in place to address corruption.  It aims to provide a deeper understanding 
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of the social issues that help or hinder the effective establishment of anti-corruption 
initiatives in local government. 
Using a multi-method approach to data collection, the first stage of the research design 
involves issuing questionnaires to all appointed officials within and across a diverse 
array of councils in NSW.  Subsequent stages of research include an analysis of all 
publically reported investigations carried out by the NSW Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC), and semi-structured interviews with a range of key 
stakeholders who have been involved in, or who have a vested interest in, addressing 
corruption within local government. 
It is envisaged that the first stage of research, for which I am seeking your input, is a 
crucial element of this study.  The perceptions and experiences of local government 
officials will provide first hand, but confidential, empirical data on whether there are 
risks and opportunities for corruption to occur within local government and whether 
there is a genuine willingness on the part of the council, and appropriate mechanisms in 
place, to address it effectively. 
Participants 
A sample of councils have been chosen in NSW, based on a number of factors, including, 
but not limited to, their size, population demography, geographical location and 
financial sustainability.  At each of these sampled councils, the General Manager is being 
asked to send, on my behalf, an online, self-complete survey, to all appointed officials 
within her or his respective council.  The survey itself is entirely voluntary and it will not 
identify any respondent.  Moreover, those partaking in the study are free to disregard 
any question they feel is inappropriate or irrelevant.  There is no bias in the distribution 
of the questionnaire: it will capture the perceptions and experiences of appointed 
officials, regardless of their contractual role, their length of service or level of seniority. 
Use of Data and Feedback 
No specific feedback will be provided to participants in the on-line survey.  Aggregated 
results will be in the public domain in the form of the final manuscript, and possibly also 
in any resulting academic publications, conference papers or presentations.  Any 
publication or presentation of the results will not identify any individual who has 




Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal 
The online survey will inform all participants that the questionnaire is entirely 
voluntary.  Participants may, without any sanction, decline to take part or withdraw 
from the research at any time without providing an explanation, and/or refuse to 
answer a question.  If they do withdraw, the data completed up until that point will be 
captured by the questionnaire but there will be no indication that a particular 
participant has withdrawn.  As previously stated, the questionnaire is completely 
confidential and no participant will be identifiable to the researcher or to the employer.  
What will participants have to do? 
The participants will be asked to complete an online self-complete questionnaire. 
Location and Duration 
Participants are given six weeks to complete the survey, in their own time and at their 
own pace.  There will be an option provided to ‘save’ responses and to finalise the 
survey at a convenient time.  In its entirety, the survey should take between 10 and 15 
minutes to complete. 
Incentives 
There will be no incentives, financial or otherwise, offered to participants undertaking 
the questionnaire. Participants will only be provided with details outlining the benefits 
of their involvement in this survey prior to taking part, and how their contribution will 
inform the broader research thesis, which will improve the effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures across local government in the state of NSW. 
Risks 
There is no risk attendant on this research.  Participants are not obliged to inform their 
line manager or any other person that they have taken part in the survey and all 
employees are encouraged to complete the questionnaire.  As only aggregated data will 
be used in the final manuscript, no identifying features will be present that would pose a 
risk to any person completing the questionnaire.   
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Implications of Participation 
Every care has been taken to ensure that participants will not be identifiable and 
prospective participants will be informed that if they decline participation there will be 
no personal effects.  Participants will be invited to give honest, accurate responses and 
will be reassured that there will be no adverse or legal effects in so doing. 
The lead researcher’s contact details, and the contact details of his doctoral supervisor 
and ANU’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), will be on the questionnaire 
should any participant wish to voice their concerns about a perceived risk in 
participation or anything else to do with the survey. 
Confidentiality 
As the chief investigator of this research study, only I will have direct access to the 
material provided by the participants.  As only aggregated data will be presented when 
the responses are received, there will be no way of identifying any of the participants.  
Participating councils and their staff will not be identifiable in the final thesis or in any 
associated reports, conference papers, presentations or academic publications. 
Data Storage 
The data will be held by me, as the lead researcher, on a password protected data 
storage unit in accordance with ANU’s ‘Responsible Practice of Research Policy’ for a 
minimum of five years from publication of the final thesis. 
Queries or concerns: 
Contact Details for More Information:  
Participants will be given the lead researcher’s contact telephone number and ANU 
email address should they wish to raise any concerns or queries about the study. This 
contact will be available at the time the survey is launched and for the full six weeks that 
the survey is live.  Participants will also be supplied with the contact details of the lead 
researcher’s supervisor and the HREC if they have any ethical concerns. 
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Ethics Committee Clearance:  
If you agree to engage the employees of your Council in this research, an Ethics Research 
form will be submitted to the HREC, prior to the commencement of the survey.  Subject 
to approval by the HREC, their details will be included on the survey, along with the 
corresponding Protocol number. 
The following statement will appear on the Participant Information Sheet issued to 
participants: 
If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, 
please contact:  
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 





Appendix 5 – Council remittance slip 
 
Remittance Slip 
PhD research project: How corruption is perceived and addressed in local government 
Please send the completed remittance slip to Allan Yates at u5444260@anu.edu.au by 
Friday 6 February 2015. 
I confirm that I have received a formal written request from Mr Allan Yates, PhD 
candidate at the Australian National University (ANU), requesting my participation in 
circulating to all staff within my Council an online, self-complete questionnaire, in 
relation to his PhD research project.  
Please see below and complete as appropriate. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I DO agree to participate in this research, by being the point of contact for  
Mr Yates’s request for his survey and forwarding it to all employees within my Council 
with a covering message and a link to the online survey. 
Signed:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 





If you would prefer the covering email message and link to be sent to another person or 
delegate with Council for action, please nominate their details below, otherwise leave 
blank. 
Name:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Role: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Their contact details: Tel: …………………………… / Email:  …………….…………………………… 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I DO NOT agree to participate in this research. 
Signed:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Name:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Role:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Council:  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 








Appendix 6 – Survey participant information sheet (sent to participating 
councils with survey hyperlink) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher:  
My name is Allan Yates and I am a PhD candidate in the Research School of Sociology at 
the Australian National University (ANU).  
For the purposes of integrity, I wish to disclose that I am also a full-time employee of a 
council in New South Wales, where am I employed in the capacity of Acting Internal 
Ombudsman.  The council in which I currently work is purposefully excluded from the 
sample of councils chosen for this research to avoid any potential bias blighting the 
study.  I further emphasise that my research is being conducted solely for the purpose of 
my studies as a PhD candidate, and as such, it is an independent, analytical exploration 
of how corruption is perceived and addressed in local government in the state of New 
South Wales. 
Project Title:  
How corruption is perceived and addressed in local government  
General Outline of the Project:  
• Description and Methodology:  
This thesis will seek to explore how corruption is perceived and addressed within local 
government in the state of New South Wales (NSW).  In a state comprising 152 general 
purpose councils, this thesis will seek to ascertain the degree to which local government 
is susceptible to corruption, why this may be so, and whether there are appropriate 
mechanisms in place to address corruption.  It aims to provide a deeper understanding 
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of the social issues that help or hinder the effective establishment of anti-corruption 
initiatives in local government. 
Using a multi-method approach to data collection, the first stage of the research design 
involves issuing questionnaires to all appointed officials within and across a diverse 
array of councils in NSW.  Subsequent stages of research include an analysis of all 
publicly reported investigations carried out by the NSW Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC), and semi-structured interviews with a range of key 
stakeholders who have been involved in, or who have a vested interest in, addressing 
corruption within local government. 
It is envisaged that the first stage of research, for which I am seeking your participation, 
is a crucial element of this study.  The perceptions and experiences of local government 
officials will provide first hand, but confidential, empirical data on whether there are 
risks and opportunities for corruption to occur within local government and whether 
there are appropriate mechanisms in place to address it effectively. 
• Participants:  
A sample of councils have been chosen in NSW, based on a number of factors, including, 
but not limited to, size, population demography, geographical location and financial 
sustainability.  Your General Manager has been informed of the purpose of this study 
and has agreed to engage Council in this research project by sending or publishing, on 
my behalf, an online, self-complete survey, to appointed officials within Council.   
The survey itself is entirely voluntary and will not identify any respondent.  Moreover, 
you, as a participant, are free to disregard any question that you feel is inappropriate or 
irrelevant.  There is no bias in the distribution of the questionnaire: it will capture the 
perceptions and experiences of appointed officials, regardless of their contractual role, 
their length of service or level of seniority. 
• Use of Data and Feedback:  
No specific feedback will be provided to participants in the on-line survey.  Aggregated 
results will be in the public domain in the form of the final manuscript, and possibly also 
in any resulting academic publications, conference papers or presentations.  Any 
publication or presentation of the results will not identify any individual who has 
participated in this research.  
289 
 
Participant Involvement:  
• Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal:  
The online survey informs you that the questionnaire is entirely voluntary.  You may, 
without any sanction, decline to take part or withdraw from the research at any time 
without providing an explanation, and/or refuse to answer a question.  If you do 
withdraw, the data completed up until that point will be captured by the questionnaire 
but there will be no indication that you have withdrawn.  As previously stated, the 
questionnaire will not identify you to the researcher or your employer.  
• What does participation in the research request of you?  
You will be invited to complete an online self-complete questionnaire. 
• Location and Duration:  
The survey will be open for six weeks for you to complete in your own time and at your 
own pace.  In its entirety, the survey should take between 10 and 15 minutes to 
complete. 
• Implications of Participation:  
Every care has been taken to ensure that you will not be identifiable and all participants 
are equally informed that if they decline participation there will be no personal effects.  
You are invited to give honest, accurate responses and please be reassured that there 
will be no adverse or legal effects in so doing. 
As the lead researcher, my contact details, and those of my doctoral supervisor and the 
ANU’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), are on the questionnaire should you 
wish to voice your concerns about a perceived risk in participation, any psychological 
harm that may have been experienced, or anything else to do with the survey. 
Confidentiality:  
As the chief investigator of this research study, only I, as the lead researcher will have 
direct access to the material provided by you and other participants.  As only aggregated 
data will be presented when responses are received, there will be no way of identifying 
you or any other participants.  Participating councils and their staff will not be 
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identifiable in the final thesis or in any associated reports, conference papers, 
presentations or academic publications. 
Data Storage:  
The data will be held by me, as the lead researcher, on a password protected data 
storage unit in accordance with the ANU Code of Research Conduct, for a minimum of 
five years following any publications arising from the research. 
Queries and Concerns:  
• Contact Details for More Information:  
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the questionnaire, or if you have any concerns 
or queries about the study, please contact the lead researcher, Mr Allan Yates: 
u5444260@anu.edu.au (0406 322866), or the research coordinator, Dr Gavin Smith: 
gavin.smith@anu.edu.au (02 6125 0323). 
Ethics Committee Clearance:  
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Protocol number: 2014/641).  If you have any concerns or 
complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact:  
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 





Appendix 7 – Questionnaire categories 
Section ONE: Questions 1 to 13 
• Corruption in local government: the types of corruption that may be prevalent 
within local government and whether there are opportunities and risks for such 
conduct to occur in the respondent’s line/place of work. 
Section TWO: Questions 14 to 29 
• Reporting corruption: the effectiveness of reporting arrangements, how corruption 
may be identified and to where such reports may be directed.  
Section THREE: Questions 25 to 30 
• Awareness of corruption and mechanisms to manage: awareness of corruption 
through Code of Conduct training, other ethics-related training and the 
effectiveness of alternative initiatives.  
Section FOUR: Questions 31 to 38 
• Demographic composition of participants: this included the participant’s gender, 
age, salary range, and years of employment in local government.  
Section FIVE: Questions 39 to 41 
• Organisational characteristics: the nature of the business each participant works 
in, the type of activities they may execute in their role, and the workplace or 















































































































































Appendix 9 – Composition of participating councils  
a FSR and Outlook groupings assigned by Treasury Corporation (TCorp) (2013, pp. 17-18). 
b Council type classification (DLG NSW, 2013, pp. 350-351). 
c Number of FTE staff, Size of population serviced by Council and Geographical size of LGA ascertained from Comparative Information on NSW Local Government (DLG NSW, 2014). 
d Low = 1–30; Below average = 31–60; Average = 61–90; Above average = 91–120; High = 121–152. SEIFA ‘uses a broad definition of relative socio‐economic disadvantage in terms 
people’s access to material and social resources, and their ability to participate in society’ (DLG NSW, 2013, p. 344). 





















Involved in an 
ICAC 
investigation 




Council 2 Weak Positive Metropolitan Moderate Under 200 Under 50k Under 50 High Yes Yes 
Council 3 Moderate Neutral 
Metropolitan 
Fringe 
Strong 200 to 500 50k to 100k 51 to 500 High   
Council 4 Moderate Neutral Metropolitan Weak Under 200 Under 50k Under 50 High   




Council 6 Moderate Neutral 
Regional 
Town/City 
Moderate 200 to 500 50k to 100k 501 to 2000 Average   




Council 8 Sound Negative Metropolitan Moderate 500 to 1000 100k to 200k Under 50 High  Yes 




Council 10 Moderate Neutral 
Regional 
Town/City 






Appendix 10 – Demographic composition of questionnaire respondents 
Gender representation 
Gender representation was quite evenly matched, with half of all respondents being 
male (50%) and just under half (44%) being female; 6% of respondents preferred not to 
say (Figure A10.1).  The gender representation was closely aligned with the gender 
balance in the local government workforce as a whole, of which 46% are women and 
54% are men (DLG NSW, 2011, p. 7; Hastings et al., 2015, p. v).  
 
Figure A10.1. Gender representation of respondents (n=197) 
Age representation 
Nearly half (46%) of all respondents were aged between 40 and 54 years (Figure A10.2). 
Of those respondents who stated which age category they fell into, a quarter (25%) were 
under 40 years of age and just under a quarter (22%) over 55 years of age.  While this 
split is not directly comparable with the categorisation tables published by the OLG, this 
is a good representation across the age range, considering that half of the government 
workforce in NSW is aged between 35 and 54 years (DLG NSW, 2011, p. 13).  The 
representation of respondents who are aged over 55 years is reflective of local 
government in general, which tends to have a workforce that is ageing and older in 









Figure A10.2. Age range of respondents (n=197) 
Income representation 
Almost half (49%) of the respondent base earned less than $90,000 per annum (Figure 
A10.3). 
 
Figure A10.3. Salary range of respondents (n=197) 
Core business of departments in which respondents worked 
There was a balanced representation of respondents from various business 
departments, with Community featuring as the core service that the majority of 







55 years and over













Figure A10.4. Core business of respondent’s’ departments (n=195) 
A typology devised by the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government 
(ACELG), within the University of Technology, Sydney, consigns local government 
occupations to four streams similar to the ones that respondents have identified in 
Figure A10.4, with the exception of Executive (Hastings et al., 2015, p. 8).1  While caution 
should be exercised against making any direct comparison, the ACELG classification 
recognises that there is an extensively diverse gender differentiation between 
occupation streams which is worthy of acknowledgement as a demographic trait within 
local government; by way of example, females account for less than 10% of employees 
within Engineering2 but are more likely to work within Corporate Services (65%) or 
within Community (78%)3 (Hastings et al., 2015, pp. 8-9).  Jobs within Corporate 
Services might be closely aligned with governance/administration functions, hence 
would arguably have a degree of broader understanding about the frameworks that 
apply within local government.  Within Community, these may include community 
centre coordinators or managers, community development or engagement 
coordinators/managers/officers; that is, frontline council officials who have an 
inherently public interaction and integration role.  Notwithstanding the nature of this 
 
1 The ACELG has divided local government occupations into the following four streams: (1) Planning and 
environment; (2) Engineering/infrastructure; (3) Human/community services; and (4) Corporate 
services/governance. 
2 Referred to as Engineering/infrastructure in the ACELG Report. 

















gender difference, Figure A10.1 indicates that the gender pool is analogous with the 
local government workforce as a whole generally. 
As shown in Figure A10.5, the vast majority of respondents have worked for local 
government for more than 2 years, with nearly half (a total of 89) working in local 
government for more than 15 years.  More than a third of respondents (a total of 82) 
claimed to have worked at one council while half (a total of 97) claimed to have worked 
at more than one council.  The remainder of respondents preferred not to say how many 
councils they had worked for or for how long.   
 
Figure A10.5. Cross-tabulation between respondents’ length of service and number of 


































Number of years employed in local government
(including current employment within your Council)
1
More than 1
Prefer not to say
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Appendix 11 – Covering letter sent to potential interviewees 
Allan Yates, PhD Candidate, 
Research School of Sociology, 
College of Arts and Social Sciences, 
C/- Australian National University 
Tel: [redacted]  
Email: allan.yates@anu.edu.au 
Mr/Ms (Name)  
(Address) 
(PO Box number) 
(Town / City)  
(State / postcode) 
22 December 2015 
Request to be interviewed in relation to a PhD study exploring how corruption is 
perceived and addressed in local government 
Dear [recipient], 
I am a PhD candidate in Sociology, affiliated with the College of Arts and Social Sciences 
at the Australian National University (ANU).  I am writing to you to request your 
participation in a semi-structured interview as part of my doctoral research project.   
This is the second stage of this research project, which is seeking to explore how 
corruption is perceived and addressed in local government.  Participants that have been 
involved in, or who have a vested interest in, addressing the prospect of corruption 
within local government have been selected for participation in this aspect of my study.  
This aspect of the study will provide thick, rich descriptive insights to complement 
quantitative data acquired so far. 
The interview is entirely voluntary, and will elicit a deeper understanding about social 




Your participation would be greatly appreciated in what will be an entirely independent 
social study of perceptions of corruption in local government and strategies of redress.  
This survey is an integral part of my doctoral thesis which, when completed, will assist 
in providing all councils with complimentary information and knowledge on best 
practice in creating a corruption resistant local government. 
At this stage, I ask you to kindly let me know whether you would be willing or unwilling 
to participate in this research.  As such, I would be grateful if you could complete the 
attached consent form and return a scanned, electronic copy to me at my ANU email 
address, which is listed at the top of this letter, by COB Friday, xxx 2015. 
On agreeing to participate in this research, please be advised that you will be given 
opportunities to ask questions about the project before, during and after the interview.  
You are also welcome to decline or withdraw from the interview at any time, without 
providing an explanation, and/or choose not to answer a question.   
If you are agreeable to this request, I will contact you by telephone to arrange an 
interview at a mutually convenient time and place.  The interview itself will take up to 
one hour and the total time requested of you will not exceed two hours. 
I have attached a Participant Information Sheet for your information.  Although fairly 
formal and verbose, it does nevertheless ensure that this research adheres to the very 
rigorous ethical standards set by the ANU, Australia’s leading research university.  The 
Participant Information Sheet is available to you should you wish to know more about 
how data will be held, for what purpose the data is being sought and processes of 
ensuring confidentiality.  This further includes my contact details, as well as those of my 
doctoral supervisor’s and the Human Research Ethics Manager at the ANU, should you 
have any queries or concerns.   
If you would like to discuss any aspect of my research proposal, or if you would simply 
like further information before deciding whether or not to participate, please do not 
hesitate to let me know.  Otherwise, thank you very much for taking the time to read my 
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Appendix 12 – Interview participant information sheet (sent to potential 
interviews) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher:  
My name is Allan Yates and I am a PhD candidate in the Research School of Sociology at 
the Australian National University (ANU).  
For the purposes of integrity, I wish to disclose that I am also a full-time employee of a 
council in New South Wales, where am I employed in the capacity of Acting Internal 
Ombudsman.  This research is being conducted solely for the purpose of my studies as a 
PhD candidate, and as such, it is an independent, analytical exploration of how 
corruption is perceived and addressed in local government in the state of New South 
Wales. 
Project Title: How corruption is perceived and addressed in local government  
General Outline of the Project:  
• Description and Methodology:  
This thesis will seek to explore how corruption is perceived and addressed within local 
government in the state of New South Wales (NSW).  In a state comprising 152 general 
purpose councils, this thesis will seek to ascertain the degree to which local government 
is susceptible to corruption, why this may be so, and whether there are appropriate 
mechanisms in place to address corruption.  It aims to provide a deeper understanding 
of the social issues that help or hinder the effective establishment of anti-corruption 
initiatives in local government. 
Using a multi-method approach to data collection, this stage of the research project is 
qualitative and comprises semi-structured interviews with a range of key stakeholders 
who have been involved in, or who have a vested interest in, addressing corruption 
within local government. 
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It is envisaged that this stage of research, for which I am seeking your input, is a crucial 
element of this study and will add a richer, thicker description to data acquired so far. 
• Participants:  
The participant pool comprises a range of individuals who have been involved in, or 
have a vested interest in, addressing the prospect of corruption in local government.  
These participants will have different associations and views of the subject matter, 
based on their respective vocations, standpoints and level of exposure, so it is 
anticipated that a broad spectrum of opinions will be acquired.  Through snowball 
sampling, participants may be identified throughout the initial stages of this aspect of 
research and invited to participate.   
Use of Data and Feedback 
A summary of the results will be made available to each participant.  Results will be 
available in the public domain in the form of the final manuscript, and possibly also in 
any resulting academic publications.  In any academic publications or in the final 
manuscript, individuals will not be identified. 
Participant Involvement:  
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You may, without any sanction, 
decline to take part or withdraw from the research at any time without providing an 
explanation, and/or refuse to answer a question.  If you withdraw during the interview 
process, you further have the option of withdrawing your account if you wish. 
What does participation in the research request of you? 
You will be invited to participate in an electronically recorded semi-structured 
interview.  The recorded interview will subsequently be transcribed and you will be 
provided with a full verbatim transcript of your interview.  Both the transcript and the 
audio recording will only be used for the purpose of this research and will be held on a 
password protected data storage facility by the lead researcher. 
Location and Duration 
The interview will be conducted with you at a time and place that is mutually agreeable.  
The interview itself will take no more than one hour and the total time requested of you 




This research will improve understanding of social factors that help or hinder the 
effective establishment of anti-corruption initiatives, and as such, will have the potential 
to inform and enhance policy development in this area. 
Implications of participation 
If you decline participation, there will be no adverse personal effects.  Your perspective 
is greatly valued, and as such, you are invited to give honest, accurate responses in your 
interview and you are reassured that there will be no adverse or legal effects in so doing. 
As the lead researcher, my contact details, and those of my doctoral supervisor and the 
ANU’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), are at the bottom of this Participant 
Information Sheet, should you wish to voice your concerns about a perceived risk in 
participation, any psychological harm that may have been experienced, or anything else 
to do with the interview. 
Confidentiality: 
As the chief investigator of this research study, only I, as the lead researcher, will have 
direct access to the material provided by you and other participants.  You will not be 
personally identifiable in the final manuscript or any resulting publications.  Responses 
given will be coded and categorised and referred to under a pseudonym in the 
publication of results. 
Data Storage:  
The data will be held by me, as the lead researcher, on a password protected data 
storage unit in accordance with the ANU Code of Research Conduct, for a minimum of 
five years following any publications arising from the research. 
Queries and Concerns: 
Contact Details for More Information 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the interview, or if you have any concerns or 
queries about the study, please contact: 
Lead researcher, Mr Allan Yates: allan.yates@anu.edu.au  
Research coordinator, Dr Gavin Smith: gavin.smith@anu.edu.au 
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Ethics Committee Clearance: 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Protocol number: 2015/654).  If you have any concerns or 
complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 





Appendix 13 – Interview consent form 
 
Consent form 
PhD research project: How corruption is perceived and addressed in local government 
I consent to participate in an electronically recorded interview by Mr Allan Yates, PhD 
candidate at the Australian National University (ANU), in relation to his PhD research 
project. 
I have been provided with a Participant Information Sheet and understand that I may 
decline to participate without adverse personal effect.  I further understand, that I may 
choose not to answer any question during the interview process, should I wish, or 
terminate the interview. 
I understand that I will be provided with a transcript of the interview.  I understand that 
I will not be personally identifiable in the any results emerging from this interview 
process, but may be referred to under a pseudonym in any publication that may arise 
from this research.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I DO / DO NOT* agree to participate in an electronically recorded interview for the 
purpose of this PhD research project (*Please circle as appropriate) 
Signed: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Name:  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Role:  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Contact details:  
Tel: ……………………………………………… / Email:  …………………………………….…………………… 
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Appendix 14 – Elaboration of reasons for using mixed methods 
In coding the justifications for combining quantitative and qualitative research, two 
different schemes were employed. First, the influential scheme devised in the context of 
evaluation research by Greene and colleagues (1989) was used. 
This scheme isolates five justifications for combining quantitative and qualitative 
research: 
1. Triangulation seeks convergence, corroboration, correspondence or results from 
different methods. In coding triangulation, the emphasis was placed on seeking 
corroboration between quantitative and qualitative data (Greene et al., 1989, 
p. 259). 
2. Complementarity ‘seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of 
the results from one method with the results from another’ (Greene et al., 1989, 
p. 259). 
3. Development ‘seeks to use the results from one method to help develop or inform 
the other method, where development is broadly construed to include sampling 
and implementation, as well as measurement decisions’ (Greene et al., 1989, 
p. 259). 
4. Initiation ‘seeks the discovery of paradox and contradiction, new perspectives of 
frameworks, the recasting of questions or results from one method with questions 
or results from the other method’ (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). 
5. Expansion ‘seeks to extend the breadth and range of enquiry by using different 
methods for different inquiry components’ (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). 
This scheme has been quite influential and was employed by Niglas (2010) in her 
examination of education research articles.  In their analysis of evaluation research 
articles, Greene and colleagues (1989) coded each article in terms of a primary and a 
secondary rationale.  An advantage of the Greene et al. scheme is its parsimony, in that it 
boils down the possible reasons for conducting multi-strategy research to just five 
reasons, although the authors’ analysis revealed that initiation was uncommon. A 
disadvantage is that it allows only two rationales to be coded (primary and secondary).   
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Accordingly, a more detailed but considerably less parsimonious scheme was devised.  It 
was based on an extensive review of the kinds of reasons that are frequently given in 
both methodological writings and research articles for combining quantitative and 
qualitative research.  The scheme provided for the following rationales: 
a. Triangulation or greater validity – refers to the traditional view that quantitative 
and qualitative research might be combined to triangulate findings in order that 
they may be mutually corroborated.  If the term was used as a synonym for 
integrating quantitative and qualitative research, it was not coded as 
triangulation (Bryman, 2006, p. 105). 
b. Offset – refers to the suggestion that the research methods associated with both 
quantitative and qualitative research have their own strengths and weaknesses 
so that combining them allows the researcher to offset their weaknesses to draw 
on the strengths of all. 
c. Completeness – refers to the notion that the researcher can bring together a more 
comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in which they are interested if both 
quantitative and qualitative research are employed. 
d. Process – quantitative research provides an account of structures in social life but 
qualitative research provides sense of process. 
e. Different research questions – this is the argument that quantitative and 
qualitative research can each answer different research questions but this item 
was coded only if authors explicitly stated that they were doing this. 
f. Explanation – one is used to help explain findings generated by the other. 
g. Unexpected results – refers to the suggestion that quantitative and qualitative 
research can be fruitfully combined when one generates surprising results that 
can be understood by employing the other. 
h. Instrument development – refers to contexts in which qualitative research is 
employed to develop questionnaire and scale items – for example, so that better 
wording or more comprehensive closed answers can be generated. 
341 
 
i. Sampling – refers to situations in which one approach is used to facilitate the 
sampling of respondents or cases. 
j. Credibility – refers to suggestions that employing both approaches enhances the 
integrity of findings. 
k. Context – refers to cases in which the combination is rationalised in terms of 
qualitative research providing contextual understanding coupled with either 
generalisable, externally valid findings or broad relationships among variables 
uncovered through a survey. 
l. Illustration – refers to the use of qualitative data to illustrate quantitative 
findings, often referred to as putting ‘meat on the bones’ of ‘dry’ quantitative 
findings. 
m. Utility or improving the usefulness of findings – refers to a suggestion, which is 
more likely to be prominent among articles with an applied focus, that combining 
the two approaches will be more useful to practitioners and others. 
n. Confirm and discover – this entails using qualitative data to generate hypotheses 
and using quantitative research to test them within a single project. 
o. Diversity of views – this includes two slightly different rationales – namely, 
combining researchers’ and participants’ perspectives through quantitative and 
qualitative research respectively, and uncovering relationships between 
variables through quantitative research while also revealing meanings among 
research participants through qualitative research. 
p. Enhancement or building upon quantitative/qualitative findings – this entails a 
reference to making more of or augmenting either quantitative or qualitative 
findings by gathering data using a qualitative or quantitative research approach. 
q. Other/unclear. 




Appendix 15 – Interviewees’ occupational roles and biographies 
1. A former senior police officer, former ICAC Chief Investigator and former internal 
ombudsman of a metropolitan council. 
2. A former internal ombudsman of a regional city council, employed as a consultant 
with experience in investigations across a number of private sector and public sector 
organisations. 
3. A current internal ombudsman within a metropolitan council with experience in 
local government. 
4. A former ICAC officer based within the Corruption Prevention Division, currently 
employed in a metropolitan council. 
5. A manager within Governance Services of a metropolitan fringe council, with 
extensive experience in local government and formerly impacted by a major ICAC 
investigation at another council. 
6. A Group Manager of Community Services in a metropolitan council. 
7. A manager within Compliance and Enforcement at a metropolitan council. 
8. A former human resources manager of a metropolitan council, with previous 
experience in human resources departments within local and state government. 
9. A former senior police officer, currently employed as a manager of Regulatory 
Services in a regional town council. 
10. A councillor of a metropolitan council. 
11. A senior staff member with a NSW oversight body, not ICAC. 
343 
 
Appendix 16 – Comparison of councils in NSW (2014/2015)4 






































                         
306  
              
51,082  
                         
49  51 40.4 37.5 22.1 5.3 87 46,736 
Health 
care/social 






                     
4,231  
              
25,327  
                         





                               
8  
            
44,498  
                         
49  51 37.8 43.4 18.8 44.4 122 55,015 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Auburn City 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
33  
              
85,446  
                         





                         
485  
              
41,644  
                         
48  52 31.4 38.5 30.1 3.3 99 40,734 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Balranald 
Shire Council Rural 
                  
21,693  
                 
2,400  
                         





City Council Metropolitan 
                            
77  
           
200,357  
                         






                     
3,816  
              
41,682  
                         




4 Data sourced from a comparative report produced by the OLG (2020)  
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6,279  
              
33,468  
                         
49  51 29.8 37.7 32.4 2.9 71 38,010 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Bellingen 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
1,600  
              
13,032  
                         
49  51 33.0 38.3 28.7 3.1 55 34,585 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Berrigan 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
2,066  
                 
8,413  
                         





City Council Metropolitan 
                         
240  
           
332,424  
                         
50  50 44.8 40.9 14.3 36.9 93 47,498 Manufacturing  
Bland Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
8,558  
                 
5,994  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
1,525  
                 
7,409  
                         









                     
1,431  
              
79,688  
                         





                  
14,601  
                 
3,076  
                         






                     
3,947  
                 
2,422  
                         






                     
2,578  
                 
2,602  
                         









































of the City of 
Botany Bay Metropolitan 
                            
22  
              
44,742  
                         
50  50 39.2 42.0 18.8 44.1 105 53,177 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Bourke Shire 
Council Rural 
                  
41,605  
                 
2,973  
                         





Shire Council Rural 
                  
19,165  
                 
1,931  
                         








                         
170  
              
19,048  
                         
49  51 35.6 36.8 27.5 2.3 8 45,843 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Burwood 
Council Metropolitan 
                               
7  
            
36,053  
                         
49  51 43.0 38.3 18.7 59.2 121 49,606 
Health 
care/social 





                         
566  
              
32,119  
                         
50  50 33.0 44.6 22.5 6.3 98 37,689 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Cabonne 
Council Large Rural 
                     
6,024  
              
13,776  
                         








                         
201  
              
67,084  
                         
50  50 44.4 40.5 15.1 10.2 133 53,729 Manufacturing  
Campbelltow
n City Council 
Metropolitan 
Fringe 
                         
312  
           
156,572  
                         




                            
20  
              
87,480  
                         
49  51 37.5 43.4 19.2 35.8 138 67,877 Professional  
Canterbury 
City Council Metropolitan 
                            
34  
           
150,626  
                         
50  50 40.2 41.1 18.7 63.9 51 43,407 Retail Trade 
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Shire Council Rural 
                  
18,933  
                 
2,795  
                         







                  
53,494  
                 
2,065  
                         








                     
1,965  
              
54,979  
                         






                  
10,429  
              
51,003  
                         
50  50 32.6 36.6 30.8 1.9 13 34,988 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Cobar Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                  
45,571  
                 
5,111  
                         






                     
1,174  
              
72,382  
                         
49  51 36.0 38.0 26.0 5.7 70 39,207 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Conargo 
Shire Council Rural 
                     
8,738  
                 
1,535  
                         





Shire Council Rural 
                     
2,431  
                 
4,308  
                         






Council Large Rural 
                     
5,185  
              
10,216  
                         
51  49 33.9 40.1 26.0 6.2 95 44,975 Retail Trade 
Coonamble 
Shire Council Rural 
                     
9,916  
                 
4,292  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
1,524  
                 
7,749  
                         
48  
51.
7 32.7 33.9 33.4 1.4 32 43,405 Retail Trade 
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Council Large Rural 
                     
2,329  
              
11,455  
                         
50  50 32.6 34.0 33.3 1.7 57 41,558 Manufacturing  
Cowra Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
2,809  
              
12,574  
                         








                         
143  
                 
7,437  
                         
49  51 35.0 35.9 29.1 2.4 31 39,332 
Health 
care/social 





                     
3,426  
              
41,573  
                         
49  51 42.6 37.4 20.0 3.0 83 46,001 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Dungog Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
2,250  
                 
9,108  
                         








                     
3,428  
              
37,643  
                         
49  51 28.2 34.5 37.3 3.7 53 36,934 Retail Trade 
Fairfield City 
Council Metropolitan 
                         
102  
           
203,109  
                         
49  51 41.9 39.8 18.3 69.9 5 41,691 Manufacturing  
Forbes Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
4,718  
                 
9,759  
                         





Shire Council Rural 
                     
4,832  
                 
4,440  
                         






Council Large Rural 
                     
5,480  
                 
8,966  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
2,950  
                 
5,064  
                         












































                         
941  
           
171,992  
                         
49  51 35.7 38.2 26.2 5.3 115 47,580 
Health 
care/social 






                     
3,220  
              
29,376  
                         
51  49 36.3 38.8 25.0 3.3 61 44,817 
Health 
care/social 





                     
3,373  
              
36,499  
                         
50  50 26.2 32.4 41.3 2.4 26 37,398 Retail Trade 
Greater 
Hume Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
5,749  
              
10,258  
                         








                     
3,729  
              
48,941  
                         
49  51 32.4 35.5 32.1 2.2 12 37,105 
Health 
care/social 





                     
1,640  
              
25,811  
                         
51  49 42.6 37.8 19.7 20.6 73 42,375 Manufacturing  
Gundagai 
Shire Council Rural 
                     
2,457  
                 
3,755  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
4,987  
              
12,826  
                         






                     
4,390  
                 
4,619  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
9,262  
                 
5,080  
                         










































                     
1,868  
                 
3,751  
                         








                     
2,775  
              
65,527  
                         
50  50 41.9 39.9 18.2 5.3 118 48,482 Construction  
Hay Shire 
Council Rural 
                  
11,326  
                 
2,989  
                         








                         
401  
           
187,703  
                         
50  50 39.7 41.2 19.1 28.5 149 60,635 Retail Trade 
Holroyd City 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
40  
           
111,100  
                         
50  50 42.0 41.1 16.9 51.0 91 45,740 Manufacturing  
The Council 
of the Shire of 
Hornsby Metropolitan 
                         
462  
           
168,614  
                         
49  51 38.2 41.4 20.5 28.4 143 61,702 
Health 
care/social 






                               
6  
            
14,689  
                         
51  49 39.1 37.2 23.7 18.2 146 120,789 Professional  
Hurstville 
City Council Metropolitan 
                            
23  
              
85,886  
                         
49  51 39.0 40.2 20.8 48.9 119 49,446 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Inverell Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
8,595  
              
16,846  
                         
49  51 38.6 35.5 25.9 2.2 18 35,598 Retail Trade 
Jerilderie 
Shire Council Rural 
                     
3,373  
                 
1,519  
                         









































Council Large Rural 
                     
2,030  
                 
6,297  
                         








                     
3,376  
              
29,643  
                         
50  50 34.4 36.6 29.0 1.9 4 35,177 
Health 
care/social 







                         
258  
              
21,314  
                         





                            
16  
              
61,030  
                         
49  51 38.7 41.4 19.9 49.8 131 53,519 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Ku-ring-gai 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
85  
           
120,978  
                         
48  52 38.4 38.6 23.0 21.0 153 92,079 Professional  
Kyogle 
Council Large Rural 
                     
3,584  
                 
9,531  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                  
14,965  
                 
6,775  
                         









                         
648  
           
202,676  
                         
49  51 36.4 38.1 25.5 3.8 106 49,139 
Health 
care/social 




                            
11  
              
34,807  
                         
49  51 38.1 42.7 19.2 21.7 151 89,174 Professional  
Leeton Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
1,167  
              
11,595  
                         
50  50 44.3 35.0 20.6 5.9 50 39,796 Manufacturing  
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11  
              
58,136  
                         





                     
1,288  
              
44,629  
                         
50  50 37.3 40.1 22.6 4.3 66 38,784 
Health 
care/social 






                     
4,512  
              
21,249  
                         





                         
305  
           
199,928  
                         
50  50 44.8 40.9 14.3 49.8 88 46,948 Manufacturing  
Liverpool 
Plains Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
5,082  
                 
7,819  
                         





Shire Council Rural 
                     
2,896  
                 
3,080  
                         








                         
392  
              
75,170  
                         
50  50 41.8 39.7 18.4 3.1 107 52,413 Manufacturing  
Manly 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
14  
              
44,786  
                         
49  51 36.4 45.2 18.3 12.3 147 87,682 Professional  
Marrickville 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
17  
              
83,356  
                         






                     
8,753  
              
24,017  
                         
51  49 37.1 38.2 24.7 2.7 72 45,261 Mining 
Moree Plains 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                  
17,906  
              
14,092  
                         











































                               
9  
            
30,276  
                         
47  53 35.0 42.1 22.9 12.7 152 142,773 Professional  
Murray Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                     
4,345  
                 
7,466  
                         







                     
3,507  
                 
2,528  
                         






Council Large Rural 
                     
3,405  
              
17,045  
                         
53  47 44.1 40.1 15.8 2.8 78 57,889 Mining 
Nambucca 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
1,491  
              
19,655  
                         
49  51 30.6 34.8 34.7 2.3 9 34,014 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Narrabri 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                  
13,014  
              
13,764  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
4,116  
                 
5,961  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
5,260  
                 
6,854  
                         








                         
187  
           
160,021  
                         
50  50 40.1 39.0 20.9 8.3 110 52,957 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
North Sydney 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
11  
              
71,025  
                         
48  52 32.6 49.0 18.4 19.6 148 95,653 Professional  
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Council Large Rural 
                     
3,627  
                 
5,327  
                         





                         
284  
              
41,431  
                         
49  51 42.6 37.5 19.9 4.9 90 50,126 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Palerang 
Council Large Rural 
                     
5,147  
              
15,510  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
5,955  
              
15,217  
                         
50  50 39.1 36.7 24.2 2.2 36 44,797 Retail Trade 
Parramatta 
City Council Metropolitan 
                            
61  
           
189,932  
                         
51  49 42.5 41.5 16.1 50.2 112 47,905 
Health 
care/social 





                         
405  
           
194,134  
                         
50  50 43.4 40.4 16.2 14.6 109 49,046 Manufacturing  
Pittwater 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
90  
              
63,338  
                         







                     
3,683  
              
77,481  
                         
48  52 31.3 35.8 33.0 2.3 75 39,480 
Health 
care/social 






                         
859  
              
69,728  
                         





                         
172  
              
40,858  
                         





City Council Metropolitan 
                            
36  
           
143,776  
                         
50  50 41.2 41.3 17.5 30.1 134 65,968 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
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3,047  
              
22,983  
                         
49  51 36.6 35.7 27.7 1.8 7 35,020 Manufacturing  
Rockdale City 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
28  
           
108,072  
                         
50  50 37.9 42.1 20.0 54.4 114 48,486 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Ryde City 
Council Metropolitan 
                            
41  
           
114,598  
                         





                         
147  
              
68,762  
                         
49  51 40.3 39.0 20.8 10.8 81 47,559 
Health 
care/social 





                     
4,567  
              
99,016  
                         
50  50 32.6 35.7 31.7 3.4 63 40,194 
Health 
care/social 





                     
4,893  
              
23,884  
                         
52  48 42.6 41.6 15.8 2.7 116 63,310 Mining 
Snowy River 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
6,030  
                 
8,069  
                         






                            
14  
              
39,481  
                         
51  49 43.7 40.3 16.0 60.8 128 51,424 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Sutherland 
Shire Council Metropolitan 
                         
334  
           
225,070  
                         
49  51 37.9 40.6 21.5 11.6 137 59,412 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Council of the 
City of 
Sydney Metropolitan 
                            
27  
           
198,331  
                         






                     
9,884  
              
60,495  
                         
50  50 39.3 37.2 23.5 
2.0 69 42,628 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
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Council Large Rural 
                     
2,802  
                 
6,050  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
7,322  
                 
6,980  
                         





Shire Council Rural 
                     
4,393  
                 
3,578  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
4,567  
              
11,375  
                         





                     
1,307  
              
91,210  
                         
48  52 32.7 37.1 30.2 3.7 68 39,594 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
Upper Hunter 
Shire Council Large Rural 
                     
8,096  
              
14,658  
                         






Council Large Rural 
                     
7,128  
                 
7,761  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
3,227  
                 
6,408  
                         






                     
3,356  
                 
1,147  
                         









                     
4,826  
              
62,799  
                         
49  51 44.2 36.8 18.9 4.6 108 47,678 
Health 
care/social 
assistance   
356 
 



































of the Shire of 
Wakool Rural 
                     
7,521  
                 
3,990  
                         






                     
6,261  
                 
3,098  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                  
22,309  
                 
6,840  
                         






                  
10,754  
                 
2,921  
                         






                         
149  
           
155,289  
                         
49  51 37.0 42.6 20.3 16.1 140 65,007 Professional  
Warrumbung
le Shire 
Council Large Rural 
                  
12,371  
                 
9,786  
                         






                               
9  
            
71,769  
                         
50  50 37.0 47.1 15.8 18.9 141 87,101 Professional  
Weddin Shire 
Council Rural 
                     
3,409  
                 
3,709  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
4,110  
                 
9,054  
                         





Shire Council Large Rural 
                  
26,257  
                 
6,884  
                         





City Council Metropolitan 
                            
22  
              
74,166  
                         
48  52 38.3 43.4 18.3 35.1 144 85,860 Professional  
357 
 







































                     
2,688  
              
47,584  
                         
48  52 33.6 35.3 31.1 4.5 120 49,475 
Health 
care/social 





                     
2,556  
              
47,084  
                         





                         
684  
           
206,794  
                         
50  50 39.2 38.4 22.4 16.7 100 50,450 
Health 
care/social 




                            
12  
              
58,619  
                         





                         
740  
           
159,015  
                         
49  51 37.8 36.8 25.4 4.0 56 43,047 Retail Trade 
Yass Valley 
Council Large Rural 
                     
3,998  
              
16,433  
                         





Council Large Rural 
                     
2,693  
              
12,641  
                         







Appendix 17 – List of categories and sub-categories from NVivo analysis of 
interviews (Phase 2) 
Below is a list of categories and sub-categories that emerged in NVivo as interview 
transcripts were thematically analysed.  The list is presented in alphabetical order. 
 




Accountability 2 2 
Code of Conduct / Ethics, Training 6 11 
Community implications and impact on employees 





Corruption Trap (corruption breeds more corruption) 2 3 
Discretion in Regulatory Functions 3 3 
Ethics 2 4 
Opportunity and motivations (concepts within Fraud 
Triangle) 
1 1 
Proposals for way forward 4 6 
Links to sub-question 1: -  
• How do employees understand corruption and how 
is this understanding mediated by social and 
demographic factors 
2 2 
Definition of corruption 





Reputational impact 6 9 
Time impacts – now with local government years ago 4 4 
Variations in understanding 
• Community, social or cultural views 
• Connotations of corruption 
• Interpretation of corruption based on ethnicity and 
culture 













Links to sub-question 2: -  
• What perceptions and experiences do employees 
have of corruption and what explanations do they 
provide for its existence and its management 
5 8 
Corruption an everyday working practice / blurred lines 6 13 
Corruption by managers 1 1 
Factors that allow corruption to take place or manifest 
• No punishment or deterrence 
• Power and authority 
• What curbs corruption 


















Increased awareness 5 8 
Measurement 1 1 
Media 





Nepotism 3 4 
Oversight and law enforcement bodies 7 31 
Scale, severity and type 





Tick box factor 5 9 
Links to sub-question 3: - 
• How does the organisational architecture and 
arrangement of councils either facilitate or hinder 
the incidence of corruption 
6 15 
CEO / General Manager 9 28 






The extent to which corrupt practices are a common 
features of local government work 
• Awarding of contracts 
• Closed recruitment / internal nepotism 
• Comparisons with State Government 
• Developments in recent years 
• Low pay 
• Number of councils 
• Risk – live and work in the community 
• Risk – long-time employees in local government 























Unions 1 1 
Links to sub-question 4: - 
•  How do councils recognise and respond to the risk 
and reality of corruption 
3 6 
Audit – limitations 4 4 
Biggest impediments to managing the risk or prevalence 
of corruption 
5 10 
Champion / Internal Ombudsman / In-house point-of-
contact 
7 30 
Corruption as a risk 4 11 
Corruption control / Systems / Control environment 9 28 
Corruption is not a priority or focus 1 3 
Cultural 
• Behaviour, as opposed to rules 
• Conflict of interest with a failure to recognise 
• Ignorance of high level more subtle corruption 
• Managers supervisors condoning or failing to act 






















• Tone at the top / Executive management 8 28 
Deterring corrupt actors / publicising outcomes 6 7 
Recognition of and response to corruption 3 19 
Innovation 5 23 
Principal officers’ recognition and response to corruption 1 2 
Tolerance, willingness and appetite to address corruption 











• Acts not brought to attention of ICAC 
• ‘Dobbing in’ and closed ranks 
o Within sub-cultures and groups 











Key factors that deter reporting 3 3 
Whistleblowing Protections / PID Act / Reprisal action 1 1 
Whether council employees are willing to report corrupt 
behaviour 
• Turning a blind eye 
4 
 
4 
10 
 
8 
 
 
